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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Recommendation Privacy Protection in Trust-based Knowledge Sharing Network</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Weisen Guo</string-name>
          <email>guows@dlut.edu.cn</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Steven Kraines</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Division of Project Coordination of the University of Tokyo</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Tokyo 277-8568</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="JP">Japan</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Inst. of Systems Eng. of Dalian University of Technology</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Dalian 116024</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="CN">China</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>Trust can be applied to knowledge sharing on a distributed network of knowledge source agents. Each agent represents a person who trusts some other agents. Based on these trust-relationships, an agent can infer the trustworthiness of an unknown agent by asking trusted agents for recommendations. However, the person represented by an agent may not be willing to share his or her individual opinion about the trustworthiness of a particular agent to agents that do not protect information privacy. A solution for this issue is proposed using three kinds of privacy policies: generosity, caution, and non-cooperation. An agent that adopts the caution policy towards another agent will hide the details of the trust recommendation path. An analysis shows the effect of the privacy policies on the calculated reliabilities of the recommended trust values3.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>or some combination of the two. In particular, if AgentA knows that AgentB is
the final link of a trust chain to AgentC, then AgentA knows that the
recommendation is the opinion of the person represented by AgentB because AgentB
is not using any other information to infer the recommended trust value.
However, the person represented by AgentB may not want his or her opinions to be
public.</p>
      <p>
        In our previous work [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ], in order to calculate inferred trust values of unknown
agents with a high degree of accuracy, all of the trust information along each
trust path is returned to the source agent. However, in this case, the source agent
will be able to determine how much the target agent is actually trusted by the
person represented by the agent giving the trust value of the final link of a trust
chain as explained above. This paper introduces a set of privacy policies into the
trust model and evaluates the effectiveness of those policies to enable the agents
to protect the privacy of the persons that they represent on the trust-based
knowledge network.
      </p>
      <p>The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses a number of
trust models in the literature that are related to our study. The privacy policy
used by our approach is described in Section 3. In Section 4, several scenarios
demonstrating the performance of the trust-recommendation network generated
by the system are analyzed. The analysis shows how the effectiveness of the
privacy protecting trust inferring algorithm depends on the situation of the trust
network. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude the paper with a description of future
work.
2</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Related Work</title>
      <p>
        Privacy has been a hot topic since as early as the 19th century, when an
influential paper “The Right to Privacy” was published. Recently, the primary focus
of privacy has shifted from media privacy, territorial privacy, communication
privacy, bodily privacy, to information privacy as technologies for information
sharing have progressed. The first four aspects of privacy have been well
established in most legal frameworks around the world; however, information privacy
continues to create many problems today [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Goecks and Mynatt [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ] noted that privacy is a critical social issue confronting
Ubiquitous Computing that requires urgent attention. They proposed that the
concepts of trust and reputation are critical to understanding privacy and
building systems that enable users to effectively manage privacy. They created a trust
network that calculated the reputations of entities in the network. Based on these
reputations, users can manage how, when, and where they share their personal
information. Their approach offered a new way to protect the privacy of user’s
personal information and thereby addressed the problem of privacy protection
in Ubiquitous Computing environments. We consider that a user’s trust
information for another user is his or her personal information. So, the privacy of
user’s trust information for others should be protected as well.
      </p>
      <p>
        Our previous work introduced trust and recommendation concepts in a
webbased knowledge sharing system. We presented the RTI algorithm to infer the
trust value for the target agent from the recommendations of other intermediary
agents in the trust chain to the target agent. The RTI algorithm uses negative as
well as positive recommendations to accurately infer trust values of intermediary
agents [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ]. Most trust models do not try to evaluate the inferred trust value for
the intermediary nodes in the trust chains [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]. However, if an agent, AgentA, is
encountered in more than one chain from the source agent to the target agent,
then ideally the source agent should give it the same trust value in each chain.
The RTI algorithm infers the trust value for each intermediary agent in the trust
chains to increase the accuracy of the inferred trust value for the target agent
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ]. However, the RTI algorithm assumes that each agent will give all of the
trust information that it has to a requesting agent. In this paper, we study the
methods for protecting the privacy of trust information of individual agents.
3
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Privacy Policy</title>
      <p>In order to handle the issues that we presented in Section 1, we introduce a set
of privacy policies in the RTI algorithm.</p>
      <p>Like humans, when an agent receives a request for information on the
trustworthiness of a target agent from a requesting agent, it should have the ability
to decide what information it will return to the requesting agent. If the agent
does not know or trust the requesting agent well, then it may not give any
information to it. Even if the agent does know the requesting agent, if it cannot
confirm that the requesting agent will protect its privacy, it may just return the
information that it does not mind becoming public, such as an inferred trust
recommendation for the target agent, and hide the detailed information of the
recommendation chain. Only if the agent can confirm that the requesting agent
will protect its privacy, will it return the trust recommendation together with
all of the detailed information of the trust chain.</p>
      <p>We provide three kinds of privacy policies to handle these three kinds of
situations: generosity policy, caution policy, and non-cooperation policy.</p>
      <p>When an agent AgentA receives a request for information on the
trustworthiness of AgentB from AgentC and AgentA trusts that AgentC will protect its
privacy by not giving the information to any unreliable agents, then AgentA will
adopt the generosity policy and send to AgentC all of the trust recommendation
information that it has that might be related to the trust chains to AgentB. If
AgentA cannot confirm that AgentC will protect its privacy, but AgentA still
wants to give some information to AgentC, then AgentA will adopt the caution
policy and send only inferred trust values for AgentB, hiding the detailed
information on the trust chain that led to the inference. If AgentA does not know or
trust AgentC at all, then AgentA can adopt the “non-cooperation policy” and
not give any recommendation information to AgentC.</p>
      <p>
        Using the privacy policy, a person’s privacy can be protected in the following
way. As in our previous trust model, when the source agent wants to know the
trustworthiness of an unknown target agent, it sends out a request for trust
information to the agents that it trusts, specifying a maximum chain length n
(step 6 in our previous trust model [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ]). If the receiving agent does not have a
direct trust value for the unknown agent, it will send out another request for
trust information to the agents that it trusts with a maximum chain length n-1.
When an agent receives a request for trust information with a chain length of
1, it means that the requesting agent is asking only for direct trust values for
the unknown agent, so any value that the receiving agent sends back will be
understood to be the actual opinion of the person represented by the receiving
agent. As we noted earlier, a person’s actual opinions about the trustworthiness
of other people is a form of private information. Therefore, an agent asked for
trust information for an unknown agent with maximum chain length 1 will only
return a trust value if it adopts the generosity policy towards the requesting
agent (unless the agent being asked for information is a dishonest agent that is
trying to trick the requesting agent with false information).
      </p>
      <p>An agent that is requested for trust recommendations with a maximum length
greater than 1 can return a trust value it has for the unknown agent even if
it does not adopt the generosity policy. This is because the requesting agent
cannot determine whether the recommendation is from the person represented
by the agent or an inferred trust value calculated from recommendations of other
agents, and so the actual opinions of the person represented by the agent are
protected. Furthermore, in order to make full use of the RTI algorithm, an agent
A can return the information that it has about an agent B between it and the
target agent. However, if agent B is just on link away from the target agent,
then the agent receiving the information about agent B from agent A will know
the opinions of person represented by agent B. Therefore, agent A should only
give this additional information to agents that it trusts highly, i.e. that it can
guarantee to agent B to be trustworthy.</p>
      <p>In the implementation that we are constructing, each person represented by
an agent on the trust network has an interface to set the privacy policy adopted
by her agent towards each agent that is known. The agent would initially adopt
a default privacy policy, such as the caution policy. Later, the person represented
by the agent could change the policy based on her assessment of the
trustworthiness of the person represented by the target agent. Because each agent uses
different privacy policies for engaging with both known and unknown agents,
our modified trust system implements a form of basic privacy protection similar
to real human interactions that should provide significantly more accurate trust
inference than conventional systems based on statistical analysis of
recommendations irrespective of source.
4</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>The Analysis of RTI algorithm with Privacy Protection</title>
      <p>
        First, we revisit the scenario that we described in the previous paper,
reproduced in Fig. 1 [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ]. The scenario has a social network composed of ten users
each characterized as having high reliability (H), moderate reliability (M), low
reliability (L), or as being dishonest (D). Sam is a dishonest service provider.
For purposes of simulation, we assume without loss of generality that agents of
users with high, moderate, and low reliabilities will give correct
recommendations 90%, 80%, and 70% of the time, respectively, and the agent of a dishonest
user will give opposite recommendations 90% of the time.
      </p>
      <p>The reliability of the service or recommendation trust value of an unknown
agent can be calculated based on the recommendation trust values of the agents
giving recommendations for the trust value of the unknown agent. We do this
by giving each recommendation trust relationship a value between 0 and 1.
Specifically, we give a low recommendation trust relationship a value of 0.7, a
moderate trust relationship a value of 0.8, and a high trust relationship a value
of 0.9. By quantifying the recommendation trust relationships in this way, we
can combine recommendation trust values both in series (from the chain rule
for Bayesian Networks) and in parallel (from the noisy-OR model for Bayesian
Networks).</p>
      <p>In this paper we add the privacy policies described in section 3 to the RTI
algorithm, and we discuss the effect on the accuracy of the inferred trust
values. If everyone adopts the generosity policy, Ann will receive all of the trust
relationship information, including the identities and trust values of the target
agents of each relationship. Therefore, Ann can calculate the inferred trust value
of each inner agent in all trust chains and then use the RTI algorithm to obtain
the most accurate inferred trust value for Sam.</p>
      <p>If Brad and Chad both adopt the generosity policy towards Ann, then we have
seen that the result will be the same as for the RTI algorithm with no privacy
policy. If Brad adopts the caution policy towards Ann, and only Chad adopts the
generosity policy, Ann will receive the information that Eve is dishonest from
Chad and the recommendation that Sam is trustworthy from Brad. However,
because Brad does not tell Ann that his recommendation came from Eve, Ann
will use his recommendation, which she calculates as being more reliable than
Diana’s, and she will believe that Sam is highly trustworthy, which is incorrect.
If Brad adopts the generosity policy and Chad adopts the caution policy, then
Ann will receive all of the recommendation information from Brad. However,
because Chad does not have a recommendation for Sam’s trustworthiness since
he believes that his only source, Eve, is dishonest, Ann will not receive any
information from Chad. Because Ann does not have any information leading
her not to trust Eve, she will believe the information from Brad, leading again
to the incorrect result. If both Chad and Brad adopt the caution policy, then
Ann will receive a recommendation that Sam is trustworthy from Brad and no
information from Chad, so Ann will accept Brad’s recommendation and again
incorrectly believe that Sam is highly trustworthy. Therefore, only if both Brad
and Chad adopt the generosity policy towards Ann will Ann be able to avoid
being tricked by Eve through the application of the RTI algorithm.</p>
      <p>
        In general, the addition of privacy policies to the trust model enables each
agent to adopt a different kind of behavior towards each other agent based on
the level of trust it has for the other agent. For example, if one agent has reason
to believe that another agent asking for information is dishonest, it can choose
to adopt the “non-cooperation policy” which in the RTI algorithm means that
no recommendation is returned to the requesting agent. If the agent does not
know anything about the requesting agent, it might adopt the “caution policy”
as a default, giving the requesting agent only the minimum information needed
to make the trust network work and hiding the path information of the other
agents between it and the target agent. If the agent believes that the requesting
agent is trustworthy, perhaps because another trustworthy agent has vouched
for it, the agent can adopt the “generosity policy”, in which case it returns the
recommendation and the path information that it receives from all of the agents
between it and the target agent. Then, the requesting agent can interpret all
of the information that it receives in terms of the original RTI algorithm and
calculate the inferred trust value for the target agent as described in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Now, we consider a slightly more complicated situation where Eve knows
more than two agents and where two of the agents she knows give the same
trust recommendation for the target agent. The social network shown in Fig. 2
is composed of seven agents representing the Web users Ann, Brad, Chad, Diana,
Eve, Kay, and Mary. Mary is a highly trustworthy service provider. There are
eight relationships between the seven agents, forming three chains of trust links
that connect Ann to Mary.</p>
      <p>In this example, because Kay is the final user in all of the trust chains, Kay
must adopt the generosity policy to Eve. Furthermore, if Eve adopts either the
caution policy or the generosity policy to Diana, Chad and Brad, the final result
will be the same. Therefore, we only need to consider the privacy policies adopted
by Diana, Chad, and Brad to Ann. In here, we just consider the following two
situations to illustrate the impact of the privacy policies to RTI algorithm.</p>
      <p>If Brad and Chad adopt the generosity policy and Diana adopts the
caution policy, then Ann will receive the single recommendation of “low trust”
for Eve from Chad, and the single recommendation of “high trust” for Eve
from Brad, but the recommendation from Diana for Mary will have the
aggregated reliability value of 0.7 × 0.9 = 0.63 with no information about who gave
the recommendation. Therefore, Ann will calculate the trust value for Eve to
be “high trust” because Ann trusts Brad more than Chad for a single
recommendation, i.e. Ann calculates the reliability of the second trust chain using
H (0.9) replacing L (0.7) for the trust value of Chad to Eve. The final result
for the reliability of the recommendation that Mary is highly trustworthy is
1 − (1 − 0.7 × 0.63) × (1 − 0.7 × 0.9 × 0.9) × (1 − 0.8 × 0.9 × 0.9) = 0.91.</p>
      <p>If Brad adopts the generosity policy, and Chad and Diana both adopt the
caution policy, then Ann will receive the single recommendation of “high trust”
for Eve from Brad. The recommendations for Mary from Chad and Diana will
not have any information about who gave the recommendations. Therefore, Ann
will assign the trust value for Eve to be “high trust”, but she will use the
aggregate reliabilities for the recommendations of Mary’s trustworthiness from Chad
and Diana of 0.7 × 0.9 = 0.63. The final result for the reliability of the
recommendation that Mary is highly trustworthy is 1 − (1 − 0.7 × 0.63) × (1 − 0.7 ×
0.63) × (1 − 0.8 × 0.9 × 0.9) = 0.89.</p>
      <p>The analyses above show the effect of protecting privacy in the trust
network. If the agents adopt the caution policy, information from some trust chains
will be lost, and the accuracy of the inferred trust value will decrease. On the
other hand, if an agent adopts the generosity policy, then it risks having its
privacy information exposed. Our implementation of the RTI algorithm with
privacy protection supports dynamic propagation of trust and privacy
information in two ways. Whenever an agent receives trust recommendations from
highly trusted agents for agents that it knows but does not trust, our
implementation allows the agent to update the privacy policies accordingly. Alternatively,
any time a person represented by an agent confirms that another agent is
either trustworthy or dishonest, that person can manually assign an appropriate
privacy policy. Furthermore, when an agent changes its trust level for another
agent in either of these ways, it will send the new trust information to all of the
agents to which it has adopted the generosity policy, resulting in a push style
of trust information transfer. This push style information transfer will only
occur between highly trusted agents adopting the generosity policy to each other.
Each community of agents will adopt its own guidelines for balancing the risks
of trusting a particular agent against the benefits of getting useful information
from that agent using all of the trustworthy information that is available to it,
much the same way that humans interact in society. Our hope is that this will
result in the establishment of reliable recommendation networks where a
recommendation for a particular agent will be updated quickly among the highly
trusted peers of the recommending agent. Because each agent knows that if it is
dishonest, its malicious reputation will be rapidly spread through the peer-based
connections of the network, we hypothesize that most agents will be motivated
to stay honest and friendly. In this way, we propose that the privacy policies in
the trust network will result in a dynamic equilibrium where most agents are
honest and adopt generosity policy between each other, which forms a robust
network of trust recommendation that rapidly exposes dishonest agents, keeping
their numbers down. Then, a high accuracy of inferred trust can be maintained
while simultaneously protecting privacy.
5</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Future Work</title>
      <p>We plan to continue our research along several directions. First, we will create
a trust network that closely simulates real social networks by exhibiting
characteristics such as small world behavior. Based on that, we will conduct simulation
studies to analyze how the different trust metrics work. Second, we are
investigating methods for integrating the trust-recommendation network with the EKOSS
knowledge searching and matching system in order to share different quantities
and qualities of knowledge with agents that have different trust values.</p>
    </sec>
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