<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Archiving and Interchange DTD v1.0 20120330//EN" "JATS-archivearticle1.dtd">
<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Use of the Normalized Gap of Maximum Singular Value of the Image Block to Evaluate the Capacity of the Steganographic Channel</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Ivan Bobok</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Alla Kobozieva</string-name>
          <email>alla_kobozeva@ukr.net</email>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Nataliya Kushnirenko</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Odessа Polytechnic State University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Shevchenko av., 1, Odesa, 65044</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>The Least Significant Bit (LSB) method is one of the most widespread and demanded steganographic methods nowadays. Detection and decoding the hidden information, embedded in a container using the LSB, is a challenging task, in particular, in conditions of low capacity of the hidden communication channel. The existing steganalysis algorithms developed to detect the LSB, as a rule, solve the main problem of steganalysis - the detection of a hidden communication channel. However, the problem of the additional information recovery remains unfulfilled. The important step in solving this problem is the evaluation of the hidden (steganographic) channel capacity. In the current work, a digital image is used as container. All the results obtained can also be applied to digital video, which is considered as a sequence of frames. The aim of the work is to get estimates for the value of the capacity of the hidden communication channel, formed by the LSB method. To achieve the aim of the work the following studies carried out: performed additional in-depth investigation of properties of the normalized gap of the maximum singular value of non-intersecting image blocks, obtained by standard splitting; studied properties of a discrete function y(QF), that determines the number of image blocks in which the normalized gap of maximum singular value increases when the image is re-saved to lossy format with quality factor QF. As a result of the research, the estimates of the value of the capacity of the hidden communication channel, created using the LSB method and based on a container in a lossy format, were obtained.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;Steganalysis method</kwd>
        <kwd>digital image</kwd>
        <kwd>the capacity of the hidden communication channel</kwd>
        <kwd>the LSB method</kwd>
        <kwd>the normalized gap of singular value</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        Steganography today is one of the most
powerful and widely used areas of information
security. One of the main questions here is who
holds such a powerful means of protection, since
the use of steganography, unfortunately, can lead
to the setting up of hidden communication with
anti-state, illegal, inhuman goals [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref2">1,2</xref>
        ]. In such
cases, early detection of hidden communication is
critical. The main "weapon" for here is
steganalysis [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]. Powerful efforts of scientists
around the world today are aimed at solving the
main task of steganalysis - to identify the presence
of hidden (additional) information in information
content [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]. However, in the condition of the
information confrontation, that takes place in the
modern world [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ], these actions are not sufficient.
Only the decoding of hidden information, its
recovery will allow achieving the goal of
steganalysis to the fullest. The extracting of
hidden information and its decoding are the most
complicated tasks. It can be facilitated by
determining/evaluating the capacity of the
organized steganographic channel [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3 ref5">3,5</xref>
        ], which is
what this work is aimed at.
      </p>
      <p>
        Today, one of the most widespread and
demanded steganographic methods is the least
significant bit modification method - LSB [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ].
However, modern steganalysis methods, as a rule,
do not evaluate the capacity of the hidden
communication channel [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6 ref7 ref8">6,7,8</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        In [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ], a steganalysis method was proposed,
which aimed at detecting a hidden communication
channel with low capacity. The method was
based on properties of the normalized gap of the
maximum singular value of image matrix block.
In particular, it took into account the number of
image blocks, obtained by standard matrix
splitting, in which the normalized gap of the
maximum singular value increased due to
resaving of image to a lossy format with different
quality factors QF. This number was reflected by
the discrete function y(QF ) that was built for the
image under examination. Let us introduce the
appropriate notation.
      </p>
      <p>
        Let F be the matrix of the digital image,
which is split in a standard way into
nonintersecting l×l-blocks with singular values [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]
1  2  ...  l  0 , which form vector of
singular values  = (1,2 ,...,l )T ; the normalized
vector of singular values  = (1,2 ,...,l )
T
is
determined by
      </p>
      <p> =   ,
where </p>
      <p>
        is a norm of vector  . Then the
normalized gap of the singular value i , i = 1,l is
determined as follows [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ]:
svdgapn (i) = min  j − i ,
i j
whence it follows that the normalized gap of the
maximum singular value is
and
svdgapn (1) = 1 − 2
      </p>
      <p>0  svdgapn (1)  1</p>
      <p>
        The efficiency of algorithmic implementation
of the method proposed in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ] exceeds the modern
analogues in terms of the detection of the hidden
communication channel in conditions of a low
capacity. It means, that the mathematical basis of
the method provides sensitivity to small
disturbances of the container in the process of
steganographic transformation, and therefore can
be considered promising for evaluating the
steganographic channel capacity. To ensure the
possibility of determining/evaluating the capacity
of the hidden channel, additional studies of the
properties of the function y(QF ) are required.
      </p>
      <p>The aim of the work is to obtain estimates for
the value of the capacity of the hidden
communication channel, formed using the LSB
method, by identifying the corresponding
additional properties of y(QF ).</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Main Body</title>
      <p>
        Let the image were initially saved in a lossy
format; F1 is the matrix of the image, which is
subject to examination. Formally, it is saved in a
lossless format. If F1 is a steganographic
message, then we will assume that it is obtained
on the basis of a Jpeg container with a matrix F
. Let us apply to F1 the steganographic
transformation with the low capacity of the
hidden communication channel (for example,
1%), which formally represented as [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ]:
      </p>
      <p>F1,1 = F1 + F ,</p>
      <p>(1)
where F is the matrix representation of the
additional information, F1,1 is the matrix of the
image-steganographic message. Let us define
functions y (QF ) for F1 and F1,1 re-saving them
with losses with all possible values of the quality
factor QF. For a particular QF, as a rule, the value
y (QF ) for F1,1 will be greater than that for F .</p>
      <p>1
Geometrically it means that the y (QF ) graph for
F1,1 will be higher along the ordinate than the
y (QF ) graph for F1 whether the message or the
container matches the matrix F . However, the</p>
      <p>1
difference between the values of the function
y (QF ) (between the corresponding graphs) will
be different depending on whether the matrix F1</p>
      <p>original image or
corresponds to the
steganographic message.</p>
      <p>Let F1 be the matrix of the container, then
the steganographic message (1) for it will be the
first and only one. If F1 corresponds to the
steganographic message, then for it (1) is a
repeated steganographic transformation. Let us
show that the primary transformation (1) with the
help of the matrix F will "lift" the y (QF )
graph higher along the ordinate compared to the
graph constructed for F1 , than repeated
transformation using the same matrix F .</p>
      <p>The steganographic transformation of the
Jpeg container almost always leads to an increase
in the smallest singular values and decrease in the
normalized gap of the maximum singular value in
the blocks involved in the steganographic
transformation, thereby increasing the likelihood
of the growth of the normalized gap of the
maximum singular value when the image is
resaved into a lossy format. If the additional
information is embedded in the
imagesteganographic message, then the normalized gap
of the maximum singular value in blocks,
involved in the primary steganographic
transformation, is less than in the corresponding
blocks of the original container. After the
additional information is embedded in the
steganographic message, the smallest singular
values of the corresponding blocks involved in
repeated steganographic transformation, which
are no longer comparable to zero in those blocks
that were involved in the primary transformation,
can both decrease and increase. This fact can lead
to both an increase and decrease in the normalized
gap of the maximum singular value.
Reembedding the additional information in the
steganographic message will generally increase
the resulting capacity of the hidden
communication channel, additionally disturbing
the singular values, but the relative change in the
smallest singular values of the container blocks be
greater than in the smallest singular values of
steganographic message with the same
disturbance. Thus, the number of blocks in which
the normalized gap of the maximum singular
value will increase at re-saving with losses of the
steganographic message, obtained as a result of
consecutive double steganographic
transformation will be greater, than when
resaving the primary steganographic message.</p>
      <p>However, the degree of this increase will be less
than the degree of increase using the same (which
is characterized by matrix F ), but the primary
steganographic message on an empty container.</p>
      <p>Moreover, the degree of increase will be smaller
the more the capacity of the hidden
communication channel of the primary
steganographic transformation. Indeed, the more
the capacity of the hidden communication channel
of the primary steganographic message, the more
the number of container blocks, in which the
normalized gap of the maximum singular value
will decrease as a result of the steganographic
transformation, the less the normalized gap of the
maximum singular value in the blocks F1
involved in the steganographic transformation,
the “higher” will be the graph of the function
y (QF ) , obtained when re-saving F1 with losses.</p>
      <p>When re-embedding additional information into a
steganographic message formed with a relatively
significant primary capacity of the hidden
channel, there will be a significant number of
blocks, where, after repeated steganographic
transformation, the normalized gap of the
maximum singular value will increase, rather than
decrease, in comparison with the normalized gap
of the maximum singular value in the block of the
input steganographic message. This will lead to
the fact that when re-saving a steganographic
message obtained as a result of a double
steganographic transformation, although the
graph of the function y (QF ) will be higher than
the graph of a similar function for the input
steganographic message (obtained as a result of a
single steganographic transformation), this
difference will be the smaller, the larger was the
capacity of the hidden channel of primary
steganographic transformation. It was confirmed
in practice by the results of a computational
experiment, in which the following sets of digital
images were involved:
•
•</p>
      <p>
        M Tif – 500 images in lossless format (Tiff)
(150 images from 4cam_auth base [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ], 275
images from img_Nikon_D70s base [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ], 75
images taken by non-professional camera);
M Jpeg ,70 , M Jpeg ,75 , M Jpeg ,80 – each contained
500 images, obtained by re-saving of images
from the set
      </p>
      <p>M Tif to the Jpeg format with
QF=70, 75, 80 respectively (the most
frequently used quality factors in practice).</p>
      <p>At the first stage, additional information was
embedded into the original image (with or without
loss) with the capacity of the hidden
communication channel of 1, 5, 10%. The original
image-container and the obtained steganographic
messages were re-saved into lossy format (Jpeg)
with all quality factors QF 1,2,...100. As a
result, discrete functions
container),
y1(QF ) ,
y0 (QF ) (for the
y5 (QF ) ,</p>
      <p>y10 (QF ),
QF 1,2,...100 for the steganographic message
were determined,
characterizing the</p>
      <p>respectively. A value
change in the function
y0 (QF ) was considered as a quantitative
characteristic of the image change as a result of
the primary steganographic transformation:
1</p>
      <p>(2)
 100
T0,i =   y0 (QF ) − yi (QF )2  2 ,</p>
      <p> 1 
i  1,5,10.</p>
      <p>At the second stage, additional information
was re-embedded with the channel capacity of 1%
into the steganographic messages generated at the
first stage (the matrix of additional information
F was randomly generated, the same matrix
was used for steganographic messages with the
channel capacity of 1, 5, 10%, formed on the basis
of one container ). Steganographic messages
obtained after the repeated steganographic
transformation were re-saved with losses (Jpeg
format) with QF 1,2,...100. As a result, discrete
functions</p>
      <p>y10,1(QF ) ,
y1,1(QF ) ,</p>
      <p>y5,1(QF ) ,
QF 1,2,...100 were obtained for
steganographic messages with the channel
capacity of the primary steganographic
transformation of 1, 5, 10%, respectively. By
analogy with (2), the following value was
considered as a quantitative characteristic of the
change in the image-steganographic message after
repeated transformation:</p>
      <p>1
 100
Ti,1 =   yi (QF ) − yi,1(QF )2  2 ,</p>
      <p> 1 
i  1,5,10.</p>
      <p>(3)</p>
      <p>The experimental results for the original
images in the lossy format for the case of the Jpeg
format with the quality factor QF=75 are shown
in Fig. 1 and in Table 1, where can be observed
the general tendency of qualitative changes in the
values of estimates (2), (3) with increasing the
capacity of the hidden channel of the primary
steganographic transformation: decreasing the
mode of the histogram of values Ti,1 with a
simultaneous increase in the value in the mode;
decreasing the length of the interval of possible
values Ti,1 by decreasing the maximum value. Ti,1
. The quality results obtained are typical for lossy
images, regardless of the specifics of the
format (Jpeg) and the quality factor used
(QF=75). Using a different lossy format (for
example, Jpeg2000) or a different quality factor
will only change the quantitative indicators of the
histograms.</p>
      <p>Analysis of the numerical values of (2), (3)
using the obtained histograms (Fig. 1) allows us
to make conclusions, that the following points are
important for evaluation the value of the capacity
of the hidden channel:
• If for image, which is under examination
the value then the</p>
      <p>Ti,1  125,
•
•
steganographic transformation were not
applied to it;
If 61  Ti,1 , then for analyzed image the
capacity of the hidden channel is &lt;5%,
here the image can be a "clean" container;
If 26  Ti,1 , then for analyzed image the
capacity of the hidden channel is &lt;10%.</p>
      <p>
        The results obtained at this stage of the
research are not final, the quantitative estimates
obtained for the capacity of the hidden channel
are one-sided (upper estimates), such that they
depend on the value of the capacity of the hidden
channel of the primary stegano-transformation
of the image in the Jpeg format (QF=75). By
expanding the computational experiment, by
increasing the variety of values of the capacity
of the hidden channel for the primary
steganotransformation (for example, from 1 to К% with a
step h%), the results obtained can be made more
precise, what will be done in the development of
the direct method for evaluating the capacity of
the hidden communication channel. Using a
different lossy format (for example, Jpeg2000) or
a different quality factor QF will change the
quantitative indicators of histograms, therefore,
the development of a method requires quantitative
characteristics for all possible (most used) values
of the quality factor. Taking into account their
possible variety, the preliminary step of
determining QF for a container in a lossy format
is required before using the method for estimating
the capacity of the hidden communication
channel. It can be done using, for example, the
method proposed in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14,15</xref>
        ].
c d
Figure 1: Histograms of values Ti,1 , i 0,1,5,10 , for the original image-container, saved in Jpeg with
QF=75: а – T0,1 (the mode equals 13, the value in mode is 19); b – T1,1 (the mode is 10, the value in
mode is 24); c – T5,1 (the mode is 6, the value in mode is 30); d – T10,1 (the mode is 5, the value in
mode is 41)
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Conclusions</title>
      <p>The paper studied the properties of the
normalized gap of the maximum singular value of
the image matrix blocks, a discrete function
y(QF ), that corresponds to the image in the
conditions of its re-saving with losses with
different quality factors and represents the
number of blocks in which the normalized gap of
the maximum singular value increases as a result
of re-saving.</p>
      <p>It is found that:
1. The number of image-steganographic
message blocks, for which normalized gap of
T1,1
Max
124</p>
      <p>Min
2.4</p>
      <p>T5,1
Max
61</p>
      <p>Min
1.7</p>
      <p>T10,1
Max
26</p>
      <p>Min
2
the maximum singular value increases when
re-saving with losses, is greater, than in
magecontainer regardless of the container format
(with/without losses);
2. The primary steganographic transformation
of a digital image using a matrix F changes
(«lifts» along the ordinate) the graph of the
function y (QF ) higher, than a repeated
steganographic transformation using the same
matrix F ;
3. The higher the capacity of the hidden
communication channel of the primary
steganographic transformation, the smaller
the difference between corresponding
functions y(QF ) for steganographic
messages, obtained by single and double
steganographic transformations, while the
same matrix F is used to re-embed
additional information regardless of the
capacity of the hidden communication
channel of the primary steganographic
message.</p>
      <p>As a result of the studies, one-sided
estimates (from above) of the capacity of the
hidden communication channel were obtained
in the conditions of the image-container in the
Jpeg format (QF=75). The conducted studies and
the obtained results indicate that the chosen
direction is promising for evaluating the capacity
of the hidden communication channel of the
primary steganographic transformation of a
digital image and is currently being continued by
the authors.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. References</title>
    </sec>
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