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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Improving the Stability of Cryptographic Algorithms on Algebraic Lattices</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Olha Petrenko</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Oleksii Petrenko</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Ivan Kozhedub Kharkiv National Air Force University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Sumska Str. 77/79, Kharkiv, 61023</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Kharkiv National University of Radio Electronics</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Nauky Ave. 14, Kharkiv, 61166</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>The paper considers a way to increase the stability of the NTRU Encrypt algorithm by replacing the uniform distribution with a normal one when generating encryption keys to increase the stability of transformations. The use of fast Fourier sampling to reduce the number of operations when performing encryption is justified.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>1 Algebraic lattices</kwd>
        <kwd>NTRU Encrypt algorithm</kwd>
        <kwd>fast Fourier transform</kwd>
        <kwd>normal distribution</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        With the constant process of improving
quantum computers, which leads to increase in the
number of qubits, the classic encryption
algorithms can be rapidly hacked. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] Given this,
there is a necessity of developing and further
improving of the algorithms, which are able to
counteract cryptanalysis in the post-quantum
period. The question of defining and
substantiating the size of their parameters and
conditions of application for solving various
applied problems remains relevant. With the
practical application of the algorithms, there are
problems associated with end-to-end encryption,
such as encrypting messages between the UAV
and the ground workstation. In solving the tasks,
it is necessary to use fast algorithms that can work
effectively in the post-quantum period. Finding
new solutions to protect information in the
postquantum period and improving existing
algorithms by increasing their cryptographic
stability is a task that is relevant today.
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-1-1">
        <title>Algorithms that use transformations on algebraic lattices, the stability of which is based</title>
        <p>on solving NP-complexity problems, have
become an alternative to classical algorithms in
fields and rings.</p>
        <p>
          NP-complexity problems include the
following tasks: finding the shortest lattice vector
(SVP - Shortest Vector Problem) or finding the
(approximately) shortest independent vectors
(SIVP – Shortest Independent Vectors Problem)
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
          ]. The essence of these problems is to find in a
given basis of the algebraic lattice of a nonzero
vector that close to a certain normal.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-1-2">
        <title>The aim of this article is developing tools of increasing the stability of the algorithm on algebraic lattices, the NTRU algorithm exactly, without effect on its performance</title>
        <p>2. Algebraic lattices and fast Fourier
transform.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-1-3">
        <title>Algebraic lattices have become a convenient</title>
        <p>
          tool for cryptographic transformations in modern
conditions. An algebraic lattice of dimension m
means a set of all possible combinations of
linearly independent vectors from a space of
dimension n with integer coefficients. [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>The basis of a lattice  1,  2 ,… ,  is a set of
linearly independent vectors that generates the
specified lattice. Coordinates of basis vectors are
  = { 11,  12, . . .  1 }  = ̅1̅̅,̅̅.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-1-4">
        <title>The lattice can be associated with a matrix</title>
        <p>which rows are the coordinates of the basis
vectors that form it. It is well known that any
lattice can be defined by several bases and build a
matrix of transition from one basis to another.
basic vector of dimension n, the coordinates of
which
are equal to the coefficients
coordinates of the basis vectors with the formula:
where  is the number of basis vectors,  is the
degree of the original element,  is the value of
the original root of unity,   is the value of the
polynomial from the degrees of the original root
of unity.</p>
        <p>This
mathematical apparatus allows
with
performing transformations on algebraic lattices
to reduce the number of operations due to the
properties
such as   0 =    = 1. In addition,    ∙    =
element then.
   +</p>
        <p>=   ( + )
condition    −1 =   −1
. So, it is enough to use the
to
find the inverse</p>
        <p>With the help of fast Fourier transform it is
possible to solve a problem
which consists in
search from a numerical matrix of the big size of
extraction of the small size block
with the
specified properties.</p>
        <p>Under the block means the submatrix of the
initial matrix. The idea of this algorithm, based on
the fast Fourier transform, is to find some pattern
 0,  1, … …   −1 in a range  0,  1, … ,   −1, where
  ,   are some numbers. It is well known that the
subrange enters from the i-th position, if   =
  + ,  = 0,1,2, … ,</p>
        <p>− 1. Entry of the subrange
of the i-th position is equivalent to the fulfillment
of the condition:
 −1
 =0
  =
∑ (  −   + ) = 0.</p>
        <p>(4)
2</p>
        <p>
          Calculating the array Ві allows to determine all
entries of subranges into the range. This property
is used to construct one-sided functions with a
trapdoors,
which
are
used in
cryptographic
transformations on algebraic lattices [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <sec id="sec-1-4-1">
          <title>The algorithm for calculating Ві according to</title>
          <p>
            [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
            ] is to perform the following steps:
1.
          </p>
          <p>Polynomial calculations are performed
 ( )=  ( ) ( ), where  ( )=   −1   −1 +
⋯ +  1 +  0,  ( )= 0  −1 + ⋯ +   −1
the
coefficient of the specified polynomial at   −1+

 −1+ =  0  +  1  +1 + ⋯ +
is
equal
to</p>
          <p>−1
  −1  −1 = ∑ =0    + .</p>
          <p>2. Calculations
 = ∑ =−01  2


performed and this addend is present in every Ві;
3. Calculations
= ∑ =−01  2


performed;
are
are
of

(</p>
          <p>) =
 0
 1
⋮
  −1
1
⋮
   −1
( −1)( −1)
) (  1 ),
 0</p>
          <p>⋮
  −1
(1)
= (
1
⋮
1  
1
⋮
1    −1… 
…
…
⋮
where   is the value of the polynomial from the
degrees of the original root of unity,    is the
value of the original root of unity degree і,   are
polynomial
coefficients
that
determine
the
coordinates of the basis vectors.</p>
          <p>For any prime number  in the field of surpluses
modulo  there is a root 
of degree ( − 1)of
unity, which satisfies the following formula:
 − 1 =  2 ,
(2)
where   is the root of degree of unity. Formula
2 allows the application of fast Fourier transform
algorithms for polynomials of degree . It can be
shown that for any natural number k such a prime
number q exists. This follows from</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-1-5">
        <title>Dirichlet's</title>
        <p>
          theorem
Dirichlet's
on prime
numbers
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
          ]. To
apply
theorem
for
cryptographic
transformations on lattices, the number  and the
degree
of
the
polynomial
on
which
the
transformations are performed must correspond to
        </p>
        <p>
          NTRU Encrypt algorithm [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ] today is one
during decryption, it is necessary to include
control bits in each message block.
        </p>
        <sec id="sec-1-5-1">
          <title>The following parameters are used to</title>
          <p>build a mathematical model of the algorithm:
N – the dimension of the ring
of
polynomials which used in encrypting messages;
p</p>
          <p>– a natural number involved in
encrypting and decrypting of the message;
q – a natural number that participates in
encrypting, decrypting
to attacks depends;</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-1-6">
        <title>4. Calculations of the recurrent formula:</title>
        <p>with certain properties, such as to find the shortest
lattice vector.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>3. NTRU algorithm</title>
      <p>• dі (і=1,2) – distributions of polynomial
coefficients used in the formation of the public
and secret keys.</p>
      <p>When generating keys, consider a ring of
truncated polynomials 
element of the ring
polynomial form  =
=  [ ]/(  − 1). Each
can
 −1
∑ =0 

be represented in
  or in vector form
( 1,  2, … ,   −1). All coefficients of a polynomial
are integers. To reduce the
complexity
calculating the operation of multiplication of
polynomials in a ring of truncated polynomials is
possible
by
applying
the
operation
of
of
"convolution" according to the following rule: let
it be necessary to multiply 2 polynomials  =
 −1
∑ =0 

 
and  =</p>
      <p>−1
∑ =0  
truncated polynomials 
  in a ring of
=  [ ]/(  − 1). The
result of multiplication ℎ =  ⨂ is a polynomial
of the form: ℎ =
are calculated by the formula:
∑ =0
 −1 ℎ   , which coefficients</p>
      <p>ℎ</p>
      <p>= ∑
 =0 
   − + ∑
 −1
 = +1     + − .</p>
      <p>This
formula
=  [ ]/(  − 1) due to the
numbers, but they must satisfy the conditions:
НСД (p, q) = 1 and parameter p should be much
smaller than q. Using the values of the parameters
p and q, two polynomials  and  are randomly
selected. A polynomial 
truncated polynomials 
belongs to a ring of
=  [ ]/(  − 1) with
the distribution of coefficients with the parameter
d1. This means that the polynomial  contains d1
coefficients equal to 1, d1 -1 coefficients equal to
-1 and all other coefficients equal to 0. This
distribution of coefficients is due to the presence
of an inverse polynomial to the polynomial  . A
polynomial 
polynomials
belongs to a ring of truncated
 =  [ ]/(  − 1)
with
the
distribution of coefficients with the parameter d2.
This means that the polynomial 
contains d2
coefficients equal to 1, d2 -1 coefficients equal to
-1 and all other coefficients equal to 0. Using
polynomial 
coefficients, polynomials 
 ≡
 (
 )and   ≡  (</p>
      <p>)are constructed.</p>
      <p>The
obtained</p>
      <p>polynomials have inverse
polynomials in the ring of truncated polynomials
  =   [ ]/(  − 1) and   =   [ ]/(  −
1). As for polynomials obtained by reducing a
polynomial modulo p and q, they do not have
inverse polynomials in the ring of truncated
polynomials   =   [ ]/(  − 1) and   =
  [ ]/(  − 1).</p>
      <p>The public key is calculated according to the
rule: ℎ ≡    −1 ⊗  (
 ). It should be noted
that the polynomial ℎ and the numbers p and q are
open parameters, and the polynomial  and   −1
are secret. To encrypt messages a polynomial r ,
that has a distribution of coefficients d3 in the ring
of
truncated
polynomials 
=  [ ]/(  − 1),
and a public key ℎ are randomly selected. This
means
that the
polynomial
ℎ
contains
d3
coefficients equal to 1, d3 -1 coefficients equal to
-1 and all other coefficients equal to 0.</p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>The message m is encrypted as follows: с ≡</title>
        <p>).</p>
        <sec id="sec-2-1-1">
          <title>The message is decrypted in two stages.</title>
          <p>First, calculate the polynomial p with integer
coefficients from the interval (
formula:  ≡  ⊗  (
 ). Then calculate
2</p>
          <p>2
− ,  ) by the
 −1 ⊗  .</p>
          <p>The specified encryption algorithm has a
disadvantage,
which
is
associated
with
the
appearance of parameters that contribute to errors.
Therefore, it is necessary to include control bits
for each message block. The cause of such errors
is incorrect message centering. It is possible to get
rid of it by calculating a polynomial 
≡ 
⊗
 )with integer coefficients in the interval
+  ) for a small value of negative or
positive x. If this algorithm does not work, then
the encryption procedure is repeatable.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-1-2">
          <title>From the decryption procedure, it can be</title>
          <p>concluded
that the</p>
          <p>NTRU
cryptosystem
is
probabilistic, so the plaintext is not always
restored correctly from the encrypted text. The
correct choice of polynomials f, g, r allows to
reduce the probability of such an error to .
 (</p>
          <p>−
(
2
+  ,</p>
          <p>2
4. Means to increase the stability of
the NTRU algorithm and its speed</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-1-3">
          <title>Given the advantages and disadvantages of the</title>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-1-4">
          <title>NTRU</title>
          <p>
            Encrypt algorithm
and
the
existing
specific attacks [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref8 ref9">8-10</xref>
            ],]it is possible to increase
the stability of the algorithm by applying not
uniform
but normal
distribution
law
when
encrypting a message, namely when choosing
polynomial r coefficients.
          </p>
          <p>
            To
determine
the
coefficients
of
the
polynomial r , it is proposed to use a random
number generator and the density of the normal
distribution
with predetermined
mathematical
expectations and standard deviation. The standard
deviation in this algorithm is the value of safety
level control and is a decisive factor. This is due
to the fact that the stability of algorithms on
algebraic lattices is based on the solution of the
SPV problem (the problem of finding a short
lattice vector) [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
            ]. The specified value of the
parameter
should
be
chosen
under
the
requirements of the stability of transformations,
namely the standard deviation should be equal to
the shortest vector of the algebraic lattice. As for
the mathematical expectation, it can be zero. This
point is due to the fact that for successful
cryptanalysis it is necessary to find the lattice
points within the probable radius  √ , where N is
the degree of the polynomial, the modulus of
which is transformed, s is the Euclidean norm of
the shortest lattice vector. The higher the rate of
the vector, the greater the freedom of action of the
cryptanalyst to carry out attacks. In view of this,
it is proposed to choose the standard deviation
equal to the Euclidean norm of the shortest lattice
vector. It is possible to obtain the shortest lattice
vector among the basis vectors with using the
algorithm
proposed in the
paper [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
            ].
          </p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-1-5">
          <title>This</title>
          <p>algorithm allows to obtain a basis using the
Gram</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-1-6">
          <title>Schmidt orthogonalization</title>
          <p>
            process [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
            ]
with
predetermined restrictions on the lengths of
vectors.
          </p>
          <p>Next, using the obtained value of the standard
deviation and a mathematical expectation equal to
zero a random sequence is formed according to
the following algorithm:</p>
          <p>a sequence (сn) of random numbers is
generated;</p>
          <p>divide the field of real numbers into
intervals according to the following condition:
І1 = (−∞, −3 ),   І2 = (−3 , 0) І3 = (0,3 ) 
І4 = (3 , +∞);</p>
          <p>check in what interval the generated
number got сі. If сі ∈ І1, сі ∈ І4, then і - member
of the sequence is equal to 0. If сі ∈ І2 , Then і
member of the sequence is equal to -1. If сі ∈ І3 ,
then і - member of the sequence is equal to 1. This
sequence is the coefficient of the polynomial r,
which is used for encryption.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-1-7">
          <title>The sequence proposed by this rule allows to increase the resistance of the algorithm on the algebraic lattices of NTRU Encrypt to the attack described in [12,13].</title>
          <p>To find the shortest lattice vector, we use a
one-way function with a trapdoor, which allows
us to find the shortest lattice vector from an array
based on the fast Fourier transform. Next, the
1.
2.
3.</p>
          <p>Euclidean norm of this vector is calculated, which
allows to set the density function of the normal
distribution and on the basis of the calculations to
obtain a polynomial r .</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-1-8">
          <title>It is possible to increase the speed of</title>
          <p>algorithms, as mentioned above, by applying a
fast Fourier transform.  =  [ ]/(  − 1).</p>
          <p>According to formula 2 to determine the
modulus q it is necessary to find such a simple
value of q that corresponds to the condition  −
1 =  ∙ 27. It is proposed to apply to
cryptographic transformations that provide a high
level of stability the value of  = 3 ∙ 27 + 1 =
769. This parameter gives possibility to apply the
fast Fourier transform algorithm for polynomials
of degree N. In a accordance with Dirichlet’s
theorem on a prime number for a prime number
769 in the field of the class of surpluses there is a
root g of degree 768 of unity. Then  =  3 is a
root g of degree of unity. This fact gives
possibility to apply formula 3 and reduce the
complexity of the calculation.</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>5. Conclusion</title>
      <p>Based on the analysis of the NTRU Encrypt
algorithm, the paper proposes the application of
the normal distribution law to determine the
coefficients of the polynomial by which
encryption is performed. The application of its
parameters, namely mathematical expectation and
heart-square deviation, is determined and
substantiated. The choice of the original root for
the representation of the base vectors of the
algebraic lattice using fast Fourier transform is
substantiated. It allows to reduce the encryption
complexity for a high level of stability of
transformations based on the NTRU Encrypt
algorithm.
6.References</p>
    </sec>
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