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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Real-Time Cybersecurity Risk Assessment</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Oleksandr Korchenko</string-name>
          <email>oleksandr.korchenko@npp.nau.edu.ua</email>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Svitlana Kazmirchuk</string-name>
          <email>sv.kazmirchuk@nau.edu.ua</email>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Tetiana Panivko-Babenko</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Stanislav Milevskyi</string-name>
          <email>Stanislav.Milevskiy@hneu.net</email>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Volodymyr Aleksiyev</string-name>
          <email>aleksiyev@gmail.com</email>
        </contrib>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>The structural solution of the real-time information security risks assessment system is developed, which, due to the structural components of the subsystems of primary and secondary data generation, as well as their components of input data initialization modules, formation and conversion of reference values, weighing evaluation parameters and their adjustment, evaluation of risk degree and report generation, in which the proposed method is implemented, allows to provide certain properties of adaptability and efficiency in risks assessment in real time.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>1 Information security</kwd>
        <kwd>risks assessment</kwd>
        <kwd>risk degree</kwd>
        <kwd>software</kwd>
        <kwd>report</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>Often in the risks analysis and assessment
(RAA) it is not always possible to involve relevant
specialists, and there are situations in which the
expert can not always unambiguously assess a
particular vulnerability of information systems
resources (ISR). It is proposed to use appropriate
databases (DB) of vulnerabilities (in which their
quantitative estimates are presented), such as the
National Vulnerability Database (NVD), Open
Sourced Vulnerability Database (OSVDB), IBM
X-Force, US-CERT VND, SecurityFocus and etc.</p>
      <p>The basic component of such databases is CVSS
- indicators that can be used as an alternative to
expert estimates.</p>
      <p>In practice, for example, there may be
situations where it is necessary to carry out
operational assessment and monitoring
(realtime) of risks without the involvement of these
experts, and the available methods and tools of
RA do not provide such an opportunity.</p>
      <p>Let’s consider in details its work, which is
based on 11 steps.</p>
      <p>Step 1 (Determining the complete set of RIS
identifiers and vulnerabilities)</p>
      <p>The first step determines the complete set of
identifiers of all RIS, ie</p>
      <p>r
RIS = {</p>
      <p>RISrs} (rs = 1, r) ,
rs=1
where r – the number of all resources (and,
accordingly, their identifiers), as well as the full
set of vulnerabilities</p>
      <p>n
V = {</p>
      <p>Vuz} (uz = 1, n) ,
uz=1
where n – the number of all vulnerabilities
(and, accordingly, their identifiers). Based on and
experts can identify sets of RIS and vulnerabilities
by object of assessment. To create appropriate sets
(as a basis), for example, a known database of
NVD vulnerabilities can be used.</p>
      <p>Step 2 (Determining the set of RIS
identifiers and vulnerabilities for the object of
evaluation)</p>
      <p>Here, based on the set RIS for a specific
object of evaluation, experts determine the
required set of RIS (and, accordingly, their
identifiers) RISO (RISO  RIS) , that is</p>
      <p>ro</p>
      <p>RISOrs} (rs = 1, ro),
rs=1
where ro – the number of assessed RIS at the
facility. Next for every RISOrs the sets of their
vulnerabilities are determined Vrs  V
accordingly, their identifiers), ie
ro ro nrs</p>
      <p>(and,</p>
      <p>Vrs,uz}} (rs = 1, ro,
{
rs=1</p>
      <p>Vrs} = {
rs =1, ro and uz = 1, nrs , ie</p>
      <p>ro ro nrs
{ LRVrs} = { { LRVrs,uz}} ,</p>
      <p>rs=1 rs=1 uz=1
where LRVrs,uz – quantitative risk assessment
for each uz-th vulnerability of rs-th РІС on yhe
object. To display the result of the RA, we will use
the LV "RISK DEGREE" (RD), presented in the
form of a tuple.</p>
      <p>
        Further, to ensure the evaluation process,
indicators are taken as a basis CVSS [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] with
NVD. To do this, define the required sets of
parameters EPi , (i = 1, g) , used for evaluation, ie
      </p>
      <p>g
EP = {</p>
      <p>EPi} = {EP1, EP2 ,..., EPg } , where g –
i=1
the number of sets of such parameters.</p>
      <p>
        Note that for version 3 estimations of CVSS
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ], in which, unlike version 2.0, the metrics of
operation (АС, AV, PR, UI) calculated for the
vulnerable component, and impact metrics (С, І,
А) for the attacker. This makes it possible to
distinguish between vulnerable and attacking
components, for example, when g = 3 can be
determined by the following sets of values –
3
      </p>
      <p>EPi} = EP1, EP2 , EP3 ={ B, T , E }</p>
      <p>(i = 1,3 ) ,
{</p>
      <p>i=1
where:</p>
      <p>nrs</p>
      <p>B – basic (Base) estimations, which are
presented as a set</p>
      <p>B = {</p>
      <p>Buz} (uz = 1, nrs ) ,
AVuz = {
av=1</p>
      <p>uz=1
whose members are formed on the basis of a
group of sets of parameters AVuz , ACuz , PRuz ,
Suz , UIuz , Cuz , Iuz , Auz (uz = 1, nrs ), where:</p>
      <p>AVuz – cyber-attack vector, which is
represented as a set
4</p>
      <p>AVuz,av} = AVuz,1, ..., AVuz,4 =
N , A, L, P
(uz = 1, nrs , av = 1, 4) , where: N – «Network» =
0,85; A – «Connected network» = 0,62; L – «Local
access» = 0,55; P – «Physical access» = 0,2,</p>
      <p>ACuz – the complexity of the cyber-attack,
represented by the set</p>
      <p>2
ACuz = {</p>
      <p>ACuz,ac} = ACuz,1, ACuz,2
ac=1</p>
      <p>= L, H
(uz = 1, nrs , ac = 1, 2) , where: L – «Low» =
0,77; H – «High» = 0,44,</p>
      <p>PRuz – compliance with the authority
represented by the plural
PRuz = {</p>
      <p>PRuz, pr } = {PRuz,1, PRuz,2 ,</p>
      <p>PRuz,3} = N , L, H
(uz = 1, nrs , pr = 1,3) , where: N – «Absent» =
0,85;</p>
      <p> 0,62 at Suz,1 = U ,
L – «Low» = 0,68 at Suz,2 = C, with
2
s=1
ui=1</p>
      <p>c=1</p>
      <p>Suz – action scope, which can be represented
as a set</p>
      <p>Suz = {</p>
      <p>Suz,s} = Suz,1, Suz,2 = U , C
(uz = 1, nrs , s = 1, 2) , where: U – «No changes»;
С – «Changing»);</p>
      <p> 0, 27 at Suz,1 = U ,
H – «High» = 0,50 at Suz,2 = C,
UIuz = {
UIuz – user interaction, represented by the set
2</p>
      <p>UIuz,ui} = UIuz,1, UIuz,2 = N , R
(uz = 1, nrs , ui = 1, 2) , where: N – «No need» =
0,85; R – «Is required» = 0,62,</p>
      <p>Cuz – impact on privacy, defined as a set</p>
      <p>3
Cuz = {</p>
      <p>Cuz,c} = {Cuz,1, Cuz,2 , Cuz,3} =</p>
      <p>N , L, H
(uz = 1, nrs , c = 1,3) , where: N – «Absent» = 0;
L – «Low» = 0,22; H – «High» = 0,56,</p>
      <p>Iuz – influence on integrity, which is
represented by the set</p>
      <p>3
Iuz = {</p>
      <p>Iuz,in} = {Iuz,1, Iuz,2 , Iuz,3}
in=1</p>
      <p>= N , L, H
(uz = 1, nrs , in = 1,3) , where: N – «Absent» =
0; L – «Low» = 0,22; H – «High» = 0,56,</p>
      <p>Auz – the impact on availability, which can be
represented by the plural</p>
      <p>3
Auz = {</p>
      <p>Auz,ai} = {Auz,1, Auz,2 , Auz,3} =
ai=1</p>
      <p>N , L, H,
(uz = 1, nrs , ai = 1,3) , where: N – «Absent» =
0; L – «Low» = 0,22; H – «High» = 0,56;</p>
      <p>Т – temporal estimates, which in accordance
with paragraph 4.6 are presented as a set
nrs
sets
set</p>
      <p>T = {</p>
      <p>Tuz} (uz = 1, nrs ) ,
uz=1
whose members are determined by a group of</p>
      <p>of parameters: EXuz , RLuz , RCuz
(uz = 1, nrs ), where:</p>
      <p>EXuz – usability, which can be displayed as a</p>
      <p>5
ex=1
EXuz = {</p>
      <p>EXuz,ex} = EX uz,1, ..., EX uz,5 =
X , U , POC, F, H
(uz = 1, nrs , ex = 1,5) , where: Х – «No data» =
1; U – «Theoretical (no evidence)» = 0,91; POС
– «Experimental» = 0,94; F – «Functional» =
0,97; H – «High» = 1,</p>
      <p>RLuz – the level of correction (indicator of the
degree of readiness of the decision), which is
determined as a set</p>
      <p>5
RLuz = {</p>
      <p>RLuz,rl } = RLuz,1, ..., RLuz,5 =
rl=1
{X ,OF, TF, W , U}
RCuz = {</p>
      <p>rc=1
(uz = 1, nrs , rl = 1,5), where: Х – «No data» =
1; OF – «Official patch» = 0,95; TF – «Interim
solution» = 0,96; W – «Solutions based on tips and
tricks» = 0,97; U – «Absent» = 1,</p>
      <p>RCuz – the reliability of the report (an
indicator of the degree of reliability of
information), which is represented by the set
4</p>
      <p>RCuz,rc} = RCuz,1, ..., RCuz,4 =
{X , U , R, C}
(uz = 1, nrs , rc = 1, 4), where: Х – «No data» =
1; U – «Undefined» = 0,92; R – «Justified» = 0,96;
C – «Confirmed» = 1;</p>
      <p>Е – environmental metrics
(Environmental), presented as a set</p>
      <p>nrs
E = {</p>
      <p>Euz} (uz = 1, nrs ),
uz=1
whose members are determined by a group of
sets of parameters: CRuz , IRuz , ARuz , MSuz ,
MAVuz , MACuz , MPRuz , MUIuz , MCuz , MIuz ,
MAuz (uz = 1, nrs ), where:</p>
      <p>CRuz – confidentiality requirements defined as
a set</p>
      <p>CRuz = {</p>
      <p>CRuz,cr } = CRuz,1, ..., CRuz,4 =
4
cr=1
X , L, M , H
(uz = 1, nrs , cr = 1, 4), where: Х – «Undefined»
= 1; L – «Low» = 0,5; M – «Medium» = 1; H –
«High» = 1,5,</p>
      <p>IRuz – integrity requirements represented by
the set</p>
      <p>IRuz = {</p>
      <p>IRuz,ir } = {IRuz,1, ..., IRuz,4} =
4
ir=1</p>
      <p>X , L, M , H
(uz = 1, nrs , ir = 1, 4), where: Х – «Undefined»
= 1; L – «Low» = 0,5; M – «Medium»= 1; H –
«High» = 1,5,</p>
      <p>ARuz – accessibility requirements, presented
in the form of a set</p>
      <p>4
ARuz = {
ar=1</p>
      <p>ARuz,ar } =  ARuz,1, ..., ARuz,4 =
X , L, M , H
(uz = 1, nrs ,
ar = 1, 4),
where:
Х</p>
      <p>–
«Undefined» = 1; L – «Low» = 0,5; M –
«Medium» = 1; H – «High» = 1,5,</p>
      <p>MSuz – modified action scope, which can be
represented as a set</p>
      <p>MSuz = {</p>
      <p>MSuz,ms}
3
ms=1
= MSuz,1, MSuz,2 , MSuz,3 =  X , U , C
(uz = 1, nrs , ms = 1,3),</p>
      <p>Medium = MAVuz,1, ..., MAVuz,5 =</p>
      <p> X , N , A, L, P
(uz = 1, nrs , mav = 1,5) , where: Х –
«Undefined» = 1; N – «Network» = 0,85; A –
«Connected network» = 0,62; L – «Local access»
= 0,55; P – «Physical access» = 0,2,</p>
      <p>MACuz
–
modified
complexity</p>
      <p>of a
cyberattack determined by the set</p>
      <p>3
MACuz = {</p>
      <p>MACuz,mac}=
mac=1
MACuz,1, MACuz,2 , MACuz,3
=  X , L, H </p>
      <p>(uz = 1, nrs , mac = 1,3) , where: Х –
«Undefined» = 1; L – «Low» = 0,77; H – «High»
= 0,44,</p>
      <p>MPRuz – modified compliance with the
authority represented by the set</p>
      <p>4
MPRuz = {</p>
      <p>MPRuz,mpr } =
mpr=1
{MPRuz,1, MPRuz,2 ,
MPRuz,3, MPRuz,4
(uz = 1, nrs , mpr = 1, 4) ,
} =  X , N , L, H 
where:
Х</p>
      <p>–
«Undefined» = 1; N – «Absent» = 0,85;</p>
      <p> 0, 62 at MSuz,1 = U ,
L – «Low» = 
0, 68 at MSuz,2 = C;
 0, 27 at MSuz,1 = U ,
H – «High» = </p>
      <p>0, 50 at MSuz,2 = C,</p>
      <p>MUIuz – modified interaction with the user,
represented by the set</p>
      <p>3
mui=1
MUIuz = {</p>
      <p>MUIuz,mui}
= MUIuz,1, MUIuz,2 , MUIuz,3
=  X , N , R
5
mav=1</p>
      <p>4
mc=1
(uz = 1, nrs , mui = 1, 2) ,
where:
Х</p>
      <p>–
«Undefined» = 1; N – «No need» = 0,85; R –
«There is a need» = 0,62,</p>
      <p>MCuz – modified impact on privacy determ
MAVuz = {</p>
      <p>MAVuz,mav} ined by the set
MCuz = {</p>
      <p>MCuz,mc} = {MCuz,1, MCuz,2 ,</p>
      <p>MCuz,3 , MCuz,4} = X , N , L, H </p>
      <p>MIuz
determined by the set</p>
      <p>
        4
(uz = 1, nrs , mc = 1, 4) ,
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref3">2, 3</xref>
        ] &lt; K EPi , T~KEPi , X EPi &gt;, where the base term
      </p>
      <p>m
sets are initialized by m-terms T T
~ KEPi = j=1~KEPi j</p>
      <p>, for
which, respectively, determine their intervals of
values for each EPi , (i = 1, g) – [kEPi1 ; kEPi 2 [, [ kEPi 2
; kEPi 3 [, …, [ kEPi j−1 ; kEPi j [, [kEPi j ; kEPi j+1[, …, [ kEPim ;
kEPi m+1 ].</p>
      <p>
        Next, using the appropriate method [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ], which
is implemented using four stages, the conversion
of intervals into fuzzy numbers (FN) – T~KEPi j =
(аij; bi1j; bi2j; сij).
      </p>
      <p>
        To do this, we modify the expression of the
method using the following redefinitions [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]:
a j = b2 j , c j = b1 j , where j = 1, m , (m – number of
term sets) a1 = b11 =0 і cm = b2m = km+1 .
      </p>
      <p>Significance assessment of EPi is performed
using parameters from the set
LS {LSi} (i = 1, g) , and estimation of the
current value of the estimation parameter – by
means of set ep {epuz,i} (uz = 1, nrs , i = 1, g) .</p>
      <p>Step 4 (Determining the number of term
sets)</p>
      <p>
        The number of term sets that will be used in
the RA process is determined. If necessary, the
initial number of term sets can be changed. For
this purpose, for the equivalent transformation of
m-dimensional terms of FN LV DR(m) in DR(m-n)
or DR(m+n) and K E(mPi) in K E(mPi−n) or K E(mPi+n) it is
proposed to use methods of realization of function
of transformation of LV standards [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Step 5 (Assessment of the evaluation
parameters significance level). This step is
interrelated with a similar step of the method
described in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Step 6 (Determination of reference values of
the risk degree).</p>
      <p>In this step, the reference values for LV DR are
determined, that is, the number of terms in the
base term set is specified T~ DR , where they
correspond to a given range of values in the range
from drmin to drmax.</p>
      <p>Step 7 (Determination of evaluation
parameters reference values).</p>
      <p>Experts determine the standards of parameters
for LV KEPi , that is, the number of terms in the
term set T~ KEPi is specified.</p>
      <p>
        To convert intervals into FN, we use the
method proposed in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ], which is implemented
using four stages. For convenience of estimation
parameters display through FN tab. 1 was used.
uz = 1, nrs ), that is {epuz,i} = { epuz,B , epuz,T ,
while values MSuz,ms , MAVuz,mav , MACuz,mac ,
MPRuz,mpr , MUIuz,mui , MCuz,mc , CRuz,cr , MIuz,min ,
epuz,E }.
      </p>
      <p>
        The value of each of the parameters can be this method. Here Euz is a corrective evaluation
taken from known databases or determined by parameter that determines Buz and Tuz .
appropriate formulas [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref2">1,2</xref>
        ]: For clarity, the results of the calculations are
0 at IMuz  0, entered in table. 2, where λuz,ij – the level of
Buz = roundUp1(min[(IMuz + EXbuz ), 10]) at Suz,1 = U ,
roundUp1(min[1,08  (IMuz + EXbuz ), 10]) aatfSfuizl,i2at=ioCn,of the carrier epuz,i to the fuzzy subset
      </p>
      <p>IRuz,ir , MAuz,mai , ARuz,ar pre-defined in step 3 of
where roundUp1 ( ) – function for rounding to
the first decimal place (for example, 3,822 will be
rounded to 3.8);
6, 42ISCuz at Suz,1 = U ,
7,52(ISCuz − 0, 029) −
IMuz = −3, 25(ISCuz − 0, 02)15</p>
      <p> at Suz,2 = C,
where
ISCuz = 1 − ((1 − Cuz,c )(1 − Iuz,in )(1 − Auz,ai )) ,
values Suz,s , Cuz,c , Iuz,in , Auz,ai we obtain on
the basis of step 3 of this method, and</p>
      <p>EXbuz = 8, 22AVuz,av ACuz,ac PRuz, prUIuz,ui ,</p>
      <p>Tuz = roundUp1(Buz EXuz,ex RLuz,rl RCuz,rc ) ,
where the values EXuz,ex , RLuz,rl і RCuz,rc also
obtained on the basis of step 3 of the method;


0 at MIMuz  0,

roundUp1(min[(MIMuz + MEXbuz )
EX uz,ex RLuz,rl RCuz,rc , 10])
Euz =  at MSuz,1 = U ,
roundUp1(min[1, 08(MIMuz + MEXbuz )
EX uz RLuz,rl RCuz,rc , 10])

 at MSuz,1 = C,

where:
6, 42(MISCuz ) at MSuz,1 = U ,
7,52(MISCuz − 0, 029) −
MIMuz = −3, 25(MISCuz − 0, 02)15</p>
      <p>а
at MSuz,2 = C,
MEXbuz = 8, 22MAVuz,mav MACuz,mac</p>
      <sec id="sec-1-1">
        <title>MPRuz,mpr MUIuz,mui і</title>
        <p>MISCuz = min[(1− (1− MCuz,mcCRuz,cr )
(1− MIuz,minIRuz,ir ) (1− MAuz,mai ARuz,ar )), 0,915] ,
T~KEPi j .</p>
        <p>Vrs,uz .</p>
        <p>EPi
EP1
…
EPi
…
EPg</p>
        <p>Similar transformations are carried out for all</p>
        <p>λuz,ij for T~KEPi j ( uz = 1, nrs , i = 1, g ,
Step 10 (Risk degree assessment)</p>
        <p>This step calculates the risk indicators for each
vulnerability reflected by the identifier Vrs,uz</p>
        <p>Klrj =
according to the formula</p>
        <p>m  g 
LRVrs,uz =  Klrj i=1 (ks  LSi )λuz,ij  ,</p>
        <p>j=1  
where 90 – 20(m –
j),
ks =</p>
        <p>1
(LS1 + ... + LSi )</p>
        <p>– rationing factor, λuz,ij
(uz = 1, nrs , i = 1, g , j = 1, m, ) determined for
each</p>
        <p>Vrs,uz
(rs = 1, ro, uz = 1, nrs ) , and
LSi,
(i = 1, g) depending on the significance of the
parameter.</p>
        <p>Step 11 (Formation of a structured risk
parameter)</p>
        <p>Based on the calculated value of LRVrs,uz and
constructed standards form a structured parameter
of the risk degree RD by expression:

(LRVrs,uz ; T~ DRj )

at  j (LRVrs,uz ) = 1;

SPuz = (LRVrs,uz ; T~ DRj ( j (LRVrs,uz ));

 T~ DRj+1 ( j+1(LRVrs,uz )))
 at  j (LRVrs,uz )  1   j+1(LRVrs,uz )  1,
where (LRVrs,uz ; T~ DRj ) verbally interpreted as
– «The risk degree T~ DRj
with a numerical
equivalent</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-1-2">
        <title>LRVrs,uz »,</title>
        <p>and
(LRVrs,uz ;
T~ DRj ( j (LRVrs,uz )); T~ DRj+1 ( j+1(LRVrs,uz ))) , as –
«The risk degree with a numerical equivalent
LRVrs,uz , which borders T~ DRj and T~ DRj+1 along the
border</p>
        <p>T~ DRj –
 j+1(LRVrs,uz ) ».</p>
        <p> j (LRVrs,uz )
and</p>
        <p>T~ DRj+1 –</p>
        <p>With the help of RD both the numerical value
of the degree of risk and its linguistic
interpretation can be obtained.</p>
        <p>Also, can be calculated the average value LRrs
by estimation resource:</p>
        <p>nrs
LRrs = ( LRVrs,uz ) / nrs .</p>
        <p>uz=1</p>
        <p>Thus, the presented method of assessing the
risks of IS based on open database vulnerabilities
by modifying the procedures for determining the
set of RA parameters and estimating the current
values of parameters with the possibility of
integration (as an alternative to expert estimates)
of CVSS values (version 3.0) presented in NVD
distinguish between vulnerable and offensive
components, and also allows for the
implementation of operational assessment and
monitoring (real-time) of risks without the
involvement of experts in the relevant subject
area.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>3. Information security assessment system risks</title>
      <p>
        On the basis of the developed method the
corresponding system of IS RA which due to use
of structural components of subsystems of
formation of primary and secondary data, and also
components of their modules of initialization of
input data, formation and transformation of
reference values, weighing of estimation
parameters and their adjustment, estimation of RD
and generation of report, which implemented the
proposed method, allows to provide certain
properties of adaptability and efficiency in RA of
RIS security in real time. Such a system, using
CVSS metrics, allows to perform RA in real time,
as well as at the request of the user to transform
the reference LV without the involvement of
specialists in the relevant field. In addition, the
system provides the function of editing these
metrics, using the built-in CVSS-calculator
version 3.0 [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3 ref4">3,4</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>The structural solution of the proposed system
(Fig. 1) consists of two basic components that
reflect the subsystems of primary (SPDP) and
secondary data (SSDP) processing. We describe
the composition of each of the subsystems.</p>
      <p>The SPDP subsystem is intended for primary
processing of initial values and includes the
module of input data initialization (MDI), and also
modules of formation (MFR) and conversion
(MCR) of reference values.</p>
      <p>The SSDP subsystem, using CVSS metrics,
performs the transformation of the primary
parameters coming from the SPDP in order to
form the final estimates of the RD. It consists of a
module for weighing evaluation parameters
(MWP) and their adjustment (MAP), as well as
modules for estimating RD (MRD) and
generating a report (MGR).</p>
      <p>
        Let’s consider the functional purpose of each
of the modules of the subsystems. Thus, MDI is
designed to form and identify many RIS and
vulnerabilities of the evaluation object [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Here based on the set RIS for the specified
object experts determine the required set of RIS
(and, accordingly, their identifiers)
ro</p>
      <p>RISOrs} (rs = 1, ro), where ro – the</p>
      <p>Vrs,uz}} (rs = 1, ro, uz = 1, nrs ), where
{
ro nrs</p>
      <p>{
rs=1 uz=1
nrs – the possible number of identified
vulnerabilities of rs -th estimated RIS ( RISOrs )
.</p>
      <p>As input for the MDI can be used, for example,
the results of the program to check the system for
penetration (Penetration test).</p>
      <p>Such software, as a rule, analyzes the specified
object, searching for vulnerabilities of its RIS in
cyberspace (according to ISO / IEC 27032: 2012,
cyberspace can be understood as a complex entity
that actually exists as a global set of processes of
interaction of people, software and Internet
services in networks (including technological
equipment connected to them), but which does not
manifest itself in any known, material form).</p>
      <p>Thus, a list is formed in the form of a set of
RIS vulnerabilities of the studied object. To
obtain a set of RIS and a set of relevant
vulnerabilities in MDI, performed the processing
of the corresponding report obtained from
specialized software (level - Penetration test),
which contains information about RIS and
vulnerabilities with the specified CVSS metrics.</p>
      <p>Next, the list of vulnerabilities and RIS is
initialized for further transmission to the MFR. As
a result of the work of the MDI, all identified
MFRs arrive at the entrance RISOrs , Vrs and
their CVSS metrics.
Next, the MFR performs the formation of a set
of parameters:
ro
−</p>
      <p>LR = {</p>
      <p>LRrs } (rs = 1, ro) , where
rs=1
LRrs – quantitative risk assessment of rs − th RIS
on object (used for RISOrs );
where LRVrs,uz – quantitative risk assessment for
each uz − th vulnerability of rs − th RIS on the
object (used for the RA for each vulnerability
reflected by the identifier Vrs,uz );</p>
      <p>DR, where LV «RISK DEGREE» is
represented as a corresponding tuple &lt;DR, T~ DR ,
XDR&gt; (is used to display the RA result);</p>
      <p>g
EP = {</p>
      <p>EPi } (i = 1, g ) , where g –
K EPi ,</p>
      <p>i=1
number of sets of evaluation parameters (used to
ensure the evaluation process, based on CVSS
indicators);</p>
      <p>− where LV «LEVEL OF
EVALUATION</p>
      <p>PARAMETER</p>
      <p>EPi »
determined by the tuple &lt; K EPi , T~KEPi , X EPi &gt;
(used to display evaluation results using CVSS
metrics).</p>
      <p>Formed LVs DR and K EPi are transmitted to
the input of the MCR, where for each of the terms
T
~ DR1
,…, T
~ DRj
,…, T~ DRm
і T~KEPi1
, T~KEPi 2
,…, T~KEPi j−1
,
implemented according to the specified range of
values [dr1; dr2[, …, [drj; drj+1[,…, [drm; drm+1] і
[kEPi1 ; kEPi 2 [, [ kEPi 2 ; kEPi 3 [, …, [ kEPi j−1 ; kEPi j [, [kEPi j ;
LRV =
{
rs=1</p>
      <p>LRVrs } =
LRVrs,uz }}
(rs = 1, ro,
kEPi j+1[, …, [ kEPim ; kEPi m+1 ] to FN. Also in MCR the
procedure of variation by the order of LV is
implemented. Thus, for the equivalent
transformation of m-dimensional terms of FN LV
DR(m) to DR(m–n) or DR(m+n) and K E(mPi) to K E(mPi−n) or
K E(mPi+n) in MCR methods of transformation of LV
standards are used. As a result of transformations
on output of SPDP arrive RISOrs , Vrs and their
CVSS metrics, EРi, LV DR and K EPi , as well as
formed sets LR і LRVrs for RA.</p>
      <p>Significance levels of estimation parameters
are defined in MWP SSDP LSi (i = 1, g ) and
their current values
epuz,i to a given FN, after which values λuz,ij are
formed. Also in MWP the graphic interpretation
of estimation parameters is carried out B, T and E.</p>
      <p>If necessary, it is possible to adjust the CVSS
metrics using the MAP, which implements their
redefinition due to the built-in CVSS-calculator
(see Fig. 2). Adjusted parameters B’, T’ and E’
are transferred back to the MWP.</p>
      <p>Data from MWP LSi , epuz,i and λuz,ij enter the
MSP, where for each vulnerability reflected by the
identifier Vrs,uz , SR evaluation is implemented
LRVrs,uz , and the average value is calculated LRrs
for RIS.
Next, based on the calculated value LRVrs,uz ,
LRrs and constructed standards in the SPDP, the
process of defasification, which is associated with
the formation of a structured parameter of the RD
SPuz , which allows to obtain numerical values of
RD and its linguistic interpretation.</p>
      <p>On the basis of MGR, taking into account the
results of SPDP and SSDP, a report is generated
on the estimates of the RD (see Fig. 3), which
contains RISOrs , Vrs , LRVrs,uz , LRrs , their
linguistic equivalents and graphical interpretation
of the results.
The proposed real-time IS RA system, for
example, can be implemented programmatically
and work on the basis of the proposed basic
algorithm (Fig. 4).</p>
      <p>According to this algorithm, the operation of
the system begins with the initialization of the list
of vulnerabilities and CVSS ratings (top 1) using
a specialized program to check the system for
penetration (Penetration test).</p>
      <p>This procedure in the software implementation
can, for example, be performed by the function
OpenXMLFile (), which opens the file in XML
format and implements its parsing. XML file
parsing is used to initialize (fill in) fields in the
Vulnerability class with the following structure:
}}.</p>
      <p>After identifying the next vulnerability
(Vulnerability class), its characteristics are
entered into the List container, resulting in the
formation of a structure – List &lt;Vulnerability&gt;.
Next, after generating a list of vulnerabilities
(vertex 2), its contents are written to the ListBox
component with RISOrs , Vrs and their CVSS
estimates.</p>
      <p>Next, in the loop (vertex 3) performs a
selection of vulnerabilities (vertex 4) from the
ListBox (Select Vul) and their graphical
interpretation (vertex 5) CVSS metrics (Fig. 2).
This process provides the appropriate event
handler - the lbVul CVSS_
SelectedIndexChanged function. The moment the
SelectedIndexChanged event occurs when the
index of the selected ListBox component changes.
The lbVulCVSS_SelectedIndexChanged function
graphically displays CVSS metrics based on the
LiveChart library. CVSS metrics are displayed in
the form of a bar chart (see Fig. 2), which is
achieved using the following block of program
listing:
сhartCVSS.Series.Add(new ColumnSeries()
{</p>
      <p>Title =
vulList[lb.SelectedIndex].Description,</p>
      <p>Values = new
ChartValues&lt;ObservableValue&gt;()
{</p>
      <p>new
ObservableValue(vulList[lb.SelectedIndex].metri
cs.baseVector.CommonScore),</p>
      <p>new
ObservableValue(vulList[lb.SelectedIndex].metri
cs.tempVector.CommonScore),</p>
      <p>new
ObservableValue(vulList[lb.SelectedIndex].metri
cs.envirVector.CommonScore)
},</p>
      <p>DataLabels = true});</p>
      <p>Next, with the help of a predetermined process
(vertex 6) is the formation of LV K EPi and DR,
and sets are initialized for subsequent estimates
LR and LRVrs .</p>
      <p>After the formation of the necessary linguistic
terms, the conversion of the given intervals into
FN is performed, linguistic standards are formed
and their graphical interpretation is realized
(vertex 7). For clarity, the obtained CVSS metrics
for each vulnerability are displayed on a graph
with reference values EРi (see Fig. 5).</p>
      <p>Representation of terms of LV in
K EPi
graphical form (in accordance with the software
implementation of the system) is provided by the
structure of TrapezeCreator, which may have, for
example, such fields:
struct Trapeze
{
public string degreeRisk;
public double a { get; set; }
public double b11 { get; set; }
public double b21 { get; set; }
public double c { get; set; }
}.</p>
      <p>The intervals that will be used to convert to FN
are described by the Interval structure, which
consists of the following fields:
struct Interval
{
}.</p>
      <p>public double a { get; set; }
public double b { get; set; }</p>
      <p>
        Graphical interpretation of the obtained results
(according to the proposed software
implementation) is carried out using the function
List &lt;Trapeze&gt; CreateTrapezeList (double
lengthAsixX, int countTrap, params double
intervalArr) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]. Next, with the help of
subroutines Interval, IncrementTerm,
DecrementTerm and conditional vertices (vertices
8-13), which are used to control the need for
additional data processing, ie converting the
specified intervals into FN, the process of
decrementing and incrementing the order of LV.
      </p>
      <p>Initialization of a new interval in the program
is realized by means of the following block of
program listing (verses 8-9):</p>
      <p>
        Double interval = new
double[intervalList.Count * 2] [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ];
      </p>
      <p>for (int i = 0, k = 0; i &lt; interval.Length; i++,
k++)
{
interval[i] = intervalList[k].a;
interval[++i] = intervalList[k].b;}.</p>
      <p>Intervals are formed from a pre-formed list of
intervalList, having the type List &lt;Interval&gt;, and
are filled using the following block of program
listing:</p>
      <p>private void bSetInterval_Click(object sender,
EventArgs e)
{
string[] arrInterval = interval.Split(':');
double a =
Convert.ToDouble(arrInterval[0]);</p>
      <p>
        double b =
Convert.ToDouble(arrInterval[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]);
      </p>
      <p>intervalList.Add(new Interval() { a = a,
b = b });}.</p>
      <p>The procedure of incrementing (vertices
1011) or decrementing (vertices 12-13) can be
carried out, for example, using the developed
functions List &lt;Trapeze&gt; IncrementTrapezeList
(List &lt;Trapeze&gt; trapList, double lengthAsixX) or
List &lt;Trapeze&gt; DecrementTrapezeList (List
&lt;Trapeze &gt; trapList, double lengthAsixX).</p>
      <p>On the basis of the received CVSS metrics the
estimation (top 14) is realized LSi and
classification of λuz,ij obtained epuz,i (fasification).</p>
      <p>If necessary (vertex 15) CVSS metrics are
adjusted B, T and E (vertex 16). Next, using the
data obtained LSi and λuz,ij , estimated RD</p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>LRVrs,uz</title>
        <p>(vertex 17) for each vulnerability
reflected by the identifier Vrs,uz , and the average
value is calculated LRrs . Here, based on the
received</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>LRVrs,uz ,</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-3">
        <title>LRrs</title>
        <p>and
constructed
standards in the PDP, the structured parameter RD
is formed SPuz (dephasification).</p>
        <p>As a result of the calculations performed by the
method of IS RA (vertex 18) a report is formed on
the estimates of the RD (Fig. 6), which contains
RISOrs , Vrs , LRVrs,uz , LRrs , their linguistic
equivalents, as well as a graphical interpretation
(vertex 19) of the results (Fig. 3). To verify the
work of the developed software (see Fig. 6), a
corresponding experimental study was conducted.</p>
        <p>To test the object of assessment for penetration
used software to test the system for vulnerabilities
- "Netsparker" (Fig. 7).
As a result of scanning the XML file with the
list of RIS and their vulnerabilities (fig. 8) was
formed for the further use as input data of the
developed system of IS RA.</p>
        <p>Based on the obtained information about the
assessment components and vulnerabilities, the
system implements the calculation (vertex 17) of
the RD for each vulnerability and with the help of
a subprogram (vertex 18) that implements the
functions of the MGR, performs a graphical
interpretation of the vulnerability of the LV DR at
m=4 (see Fig. 11). All the obtained results are
recorded in the report generated by MGR.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>4. Conclusions</title>
      <p>Thus, the structural solution of the real-time IS
RA system is developed, which, due to the
structural components of the subsystems of
primary and secondary data generation, as well as
their components of input data initialization
modules, formation and conversion of reference
values, weighing evaluation parameters and their
adjustment, evaluation of RD and report
generation, in which the proposed method is
implemented, allows to provide certain properties
of adaptability and efficiency in RA security of
RIS in real time.</p>
      <p>Also on the basis of the offered structural
decision the basic algorithm and the
corresponding software for estimation in the form
of application software system of RA which
unlike known uses values of CVSS (versions 2.0
and 3.0) of the indicators presented in the
corresponding databases and allows real-time risk
assessment of RIS security.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>5. References</title>
    </sec>
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