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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Model for the Construction and Maintenance of Institutional Reality</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Paul Johannesson</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Maria Bergholtz</string-name>
          <email>maria@dsv.su.se</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Department of Computer and Systems Sciences, Stockholm University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Borgarfjordsgatan 12, Kista</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="SE">Sweden</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2022</year>
      </pub-date>
      <abstract>
        <p>The practice of conceptual modelling is to a large extent concerned with the representation of the social and institutional reality. Much research has been devoted to the study of the processes through which institutional reality is created by means of communicative acts. Other research has investigated the structure of the institutional reality in terms of rights, obligations, roles, positions and related notions. One topic, however, in need of further work concerns the informational and physical underpinnings of the institutional reality, which are needed not only for constructing but also for maintaining it. This paper presents a conceptual model that shows how institutional phenomena depend and build on informational and physical structures. In particular, the paper highlights the role of information registries for maintaining and upholding institutional reality over time.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>institution</kwd>
        <kwd>ontology</kwd>
        <kwd>institutional ontology</kwd>
        <kwd>conceptual modelling</kwd>
        <kwd>SBVR</kwd>
        <kwd>IAO</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        Conceptual modeling addresses physical reality, but it is to an even larger extent concerned
with the social and institutional reality, as suggested by [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ], and [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]. Institutional reality is
created and maintained by social interaction governed by rules and norms; it is about human
activities and the entities and relationships that they create. Physical things, on the other hand,
exist independently of rules, social interaction, language, and humans — they are
observerindependent. And people use language only for communicating about them, not for creating
them. In contrast, institutional phenomena are observer-relative and require people, rules and
language to exist, such as marriages, clients, companies, money, and insurances, [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        There exists much work on processes for creating institutional reality, [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]. Many
studies on this topic have been based on speech act theory. They have investigated how
institutional relationships, in particular commitments, are constituted by multiple agents that
interactively perform speech acts according to well-defined institutional processes. There also
exist studies on the kinds of entities and relationships that are created by these processes,
how they are related to each other, and what kind of deontic consequences they have in
terms of obligations, privileges and powers that are established, [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]. What still seems
nEvelop-O
LGOBE
under-researched, however, is the informational and physical underpinnings of the institutional
reality, which are needed not only for creating but also for maintaining institutional phenomena
over time. The goal of this paper is to introduce a conceptual model that shows in what
ways institutional phenomena are dependent on and grounded in informational and physical
structures. In particular, we highlight the role of information registries for maintaining and
upholding institutional phenomena over time.
      </p>
      <p>The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a background to institutional
theory and institutional ontology. Section 3 discusses standards and ontologies on information,
focusing on SBVR and the Information Artefact Ontology, that are used as a basis for the
proposed conceptual model. Section 4 presents the proposed model, while Section 5 outlines
our plans for validating it. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the paper and discusses a number of
open issues.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Institutional Ontology</title>
      <p>
        Institutional theory, particularly neo-institutionalism, is one of the most important theoretical
perspectives in management and organizational research, [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ]. According to [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ], an institution
is a social structure that ofers organizations or individuals lines of action, while, at the same
time, controlling and constraining them. In doing this, institutions not only regulate actions but
also enable new kinds of actions and relationships, [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ]. From a rule perspective, institutions
have been defined as “systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social
interactions”, [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]. Institutional theory extends this definition by viewing institutions as a
combination of regulative, normative, and cultural–cognitive structures, also called institutional
pillars, that, together with human activities, provide stability and meaning to social life, [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ].
Institutions exist on a continuum from the informal to the formal. For example, the institutions
of Christmas or dinner manners are highly informal and fluid, while tax law or banking standards
are examples of formal institutions with well-defined rules. In the remainder of this paper, we
focus on formal institutions for which there exists some authority that is responsible for laying
down and enforcing its rules.
      </p>
      <p>
        One of the pioneers in the area of institutional ontology is John Searle who has investigated
how institutional reality is constructed by means of speech acts. Searle acknowledges that there
is a material world that exists independently of human beings and their beliefs, and asks “how
can we account for social facts within that ontology?”, [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ]. This question can be answered
partially by the fact that humans have a capacity for collective intentionality, which enables
them to share intentions, [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]. Through collective intentionality, they are able to assign functions
to things. Some functions of things depend solely on their physical properties; for example, the
ability of a screwdriver to turn screws depends on its physical structure and nothing else. Other
functions, however, have little to do with the physical properties of the tool or medium that
mediates the functions. Searle refers to such functions as status functions. For example, people
can assign the function of being money to a digital object, which counts as a bank account
within an institutional bank context. Through that bank account, a bank and a customer are
interrelated and thereby possess diferent claims on and duties toward each other. For example,
the bank is obliged to pay a certain interest rate and the customer can make deposits and claim
revenue, based on the account balance. The bank account has the status function of being money
not by virtue of its physical structure, but by virtue of its collective acceptance. According to
Searle, [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ], status functions mark a key diference between material and institutional reality.
Furthermore, as institutional entities cannot exist without the use of language, communication
is constitutive for institutional reality.
      </p>
      <p>
        Key notions of an ontology of institutions are institutional entities, institutional relationships
and institutional agents. These are shown in Fig. 1, which is a small and simplified fragment of
the ontology presented in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]. An institutional entity is an object that can possess or be the object
of rights, e.g. a citizen, a student, or a bank note. An institutional relationship is a relationship
among two or more institutional entities, which establishes a number of rights between the
participating institutional entities. For example, a marriage establishes certain duties between
the spouses, and an employment relationship establishes duties between an employer and an
employee. We introduce institutional phenomenon as a generalization of institutional entity and
institutional relationship. An institutional agent is an institutional entity that is able to create
and modify institutional phenomena.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Information Ontology</title>
      <p>Our conceptualization of information relies primarily on two sources: The Semantics of Business
Vocabulary and Business Rules (SBVR) and the Information Artifact Ontology (IAO).</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>3.1. Semantics of Business Vocabulary and Business Rules</title>
        <p>
          SBVR is a standards specification that is to be used for documenting the semantics of business
vocabularies and business rules in order to enable and facilitate the exchange of such vocabularies
and rules among organizations and between software tools. SBVR provides “an unambiguous,
meaning-centric, multilingual, and semantically rich capability for defining meanings of the
language used by people in an industry, profession, discipline, field of study, or organization”,
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>
          The theoretical basis for the linguistics-based architecture of SBVR is the semiotic/semantic
triangle, also known as Ogden’s triangle, [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
          ], which aims to explain the relationships between
thoughts, things and words. The three corners of the semiotic/semantic triangle are meaning,
thing and expression, see Fig. 2. In SBVR, meaning is defined as “what is meant by a word, sign,
statement . . . or description; what someone intends to express or what someone understands”,
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
          ]; the thought, concept or idea a person associates with an expression. A thing is defined as
“anything perceivable or conceivable”, [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
          ]; something in a universe of discourse to which an
expression refers. An expression is defined as “something that expresses or communicates, but
considered independently of its interpretation” [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
          ], e.g. a word, a sentence or a speech sound.
        </p>
        <p>
          The sides of the semiotic/semantic triangle describe the relationships between meanings,
things and expressions. A meaning corresponds to a thing, i.e “the thing is conceptualized by and
is consistent with the meaning”, [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
          ]. An expression represents a meaning, i.e. “the expression
portrays or signifies the meaning”, [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
          ]. The relationship denotes relates an expression to a
thing and is shown as a dotted line in Fig. 2, highlighting that this relationship is indirect; for an
act of denoting to succeed, it must pass through an intermediate step of representing a meaning.
        </p>
        <p>
          There exist several specializations of things as well as expressions and meanings. Two kinds
of meanings are concepts and propositions, where a concept is a “unit of knowledge created
by a unique combination of characteristics”, [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
          ], while a proposition is the “meaning of a
declarative sentence that is not a paradox and that is invariant through all the paraphrases
and translations of the sentence including synonymous closed logical formulations”, [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
          ]. An
important kind of thing is a state of afairs, i.e. an “event, activity, situation, or circumstance”,
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
          ]. Propositions correspond to states of afairs — if a state of afairs holds, the corresponding
proposition is true, and it is called a fact. Concepts are related to things through the instance
relationship, i.e., a thing is an instance of a concept if it is included in the set of things to which
the concept corresponds. A statement is an expression that represents a proposition.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>3.2. The Information Artifact Ontology</title>
        <p>
          The Information Artifact Ontology (IAO), [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
          ], is intended to serve as a domain‐neutral resource
for representing various types of information content entities, including documents, databases,
and digital images. It is based on a theory of document acts describing what people can do with
documents, [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>A key notion in the IAO is the Information Content Entity (ICE), which is defined as “an
entity which is (1) generically dependent on (2) some material entity and which (3) stands in a
relation of aboutness to some entity”. Some examples of ICEs are natural language statements,
DNA sequences and pdf files. An ICE is generically dependent on some material entity, meaning
that an ICE can exist only if there is another material entity that carries it, but it is not required
that this entity stays the same over time. In other words, the ICE can migrate over diferent
material entities. For example, a pdf file is dependent on some but not any specific memory
store — it can migrate from one memory store to another while continuing to exist. However,
whenever an ICE appears in a particular spatio-temporal location, it is dependent on a specific
material entity, e.g., when an SMS is read it is dependent on a specific mobile phone. In other
words, the SMS is concretized in the mobile phone. Another example would be a statement that
is concretized in a pattern of ink marks on a specific piece of paper.</p>
        <p>
          In order to capture the notion of concretized ICEs, the IAO introduces the notion of an
Information Quality Entity (IQE), which is defined as “a quality that is the concretization of
some Information Content Entity”, [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
          ]. An ICE corresponds to an expression in SBVR, while
an IQE is a concrete token, located in space and time, of such an expression; IQEs do not have a
counterpart in SBVR. For example, some ink dots on a piece paper is an IQE that concretizes
an ICE. The IAO also introduces the notion of an information artifact, which is defined as “an
artifact whose function is to bear an Information Quality Entity”, [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
          ]. In other words, IQEs are
inscribed on information artifacts. Examples of information artifacts are black boards, sheets of
paper, hard drives and flash memories. Thus, information artifacts are material entities as well
as the IQEs they carry, while the ICEs concretized by IQEs are abstract entities.
        </p>
        <p>As stated above, an ICE is about some entity, for example, a certain car, a person or a state of
afairs. Thus, the aboutness relationship in the IAO corresponds to the denotes relationship in
SBVR.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. A Model of Institutional Construction and Maintenance</title>
      <p>
        This section introduces a model that shows how institutional phenomena are created through
language acts and maintained over time through information registries, see Fig. 3. (The model
will be referred to as the CMIR model, Construction and Maintenance of Institutional Reality.)
The starting point is that people create institutional phenomena by enacting institutional
processes consisting of institutional acts. These processes and acts can be described and
understood in terms of their efects on the institutional reality, indicated in Fig. 3 by them being
placed on an institutional layer. However, in order to realize these processes and acts, people
need to perform information acts, similar to speech acts, [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ], and document acts, [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ]. In other
words, people are required to manipulate information in such ways that these manipulations
are recognized to have institutional efects, e.g. by retrieving, transferring and registering
statements; these acts are taking place on an informational layer. Finally, the information acts
are realized through physical acts, such as making certain sounds, writing with ink on paper, or
pressing keys on a keyboard; these are acts on a physical layer.
      </p>
      <p>When institutional phenomena have been created, they will continue to exist only if there
are memory traces of them. Such traces could sometimes reside in the brains of people. Still, in
most institutional contexts, it is required that they are externalized so that they can be easily
retrieved and objectively inspected. Therefore, there is a need for information registries that
can store information that provides evidence for institutional phenomena. And this information
has to be physically represented on some storage medium, such as paper or flash memories.
Thus, similarly to acts, registries can also be identified on the three layers of institutional,
informational and physical. In the rest of this section, we fill in the details of the above outline
by describing the CMIR model shown in Fig. 3.</p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>4.1. The Basis of Institutional Phenomena</title>
        <p>Institutional phenomena exist if and only if they are created and maintained by institutional
agents. In particular, an institutional phenomenon exists only as long as some institutional agent
certifies that this is the case. For example, a Swedish citizen exists only as long as the Swedish
Tax Agency so certifies. The CMIR model shown in Fig. 3 allows for institutional agents to
certify institutional facts, which are facts (true propositions) about institutional phenomena.
And these institutional facts are represented by institutional statements that are contained in
information registries, as described below.</p>
        <p>Recall that a statement is an expression that represents a proposition. For example, the
statements “John is married to Mary” and “Mary is married to John” both represent the same
proposition, which is true if and only if it holds that there is a marriage between John and Mary.
A statement, like any other expression, is an abstract object, meaning that it has no extension in
time and space. However, there can exist persistent, physical patterns that constitute physical
tokens of statements, called inscriptions. An inscription can be an electric field of a flash memory,
a pattern of ink dots on a piece of paper, or a pattern of paint marks on the surface of a trafic sign.
The CMIR model distinguishes between the inscription, i.e., the pattern of physical qualities,
and the physical substrate, i.e., the physical object carrying the inscription. In the examples
above, the flash memory, the piece of paper and the trafic sign are all physical substrates. Thus,
inscriptions correspond to IQEs in the IAO, and physical substrates to information artifacts.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>4.2. The Structure and Role of Registries</title>
        <p>A collection of inscriptions can be kept in a physical registry, which is a physical object that is
able to store and retrieve inscriptions. It consists of physical substrates that carry inscriptions
as well as components that enable storage and retrieval actions. For example, a physical registry
could include hard disks and other forms of media storage as well as processors and presentation
devices.</p>
        <p>By abstracting from the specific physical properties of a physical registry, it is possible to
introduce a notion of a registry that focuses on its functional capabilities, in particular, what
statements it contains: an information registry is a system that can store, retrieve and present
information in the form of statements. The relationship between information registries and
physical registries is analogous to the one between ICEs and IQEs in the IAO. In other words, an
information registry contains statements and is generically dependent on some physical registry
that contains inscriptions that are tokens of these statements. But it is not necessary that the
physical registry stays the same over time; it is only required that at each point in time, there
exists some physical registry containing the needed inscriptions. For example, an information
registry can at one point in time be based on a particular configuration of hardware and at
another point in time on another configuration of diferent hardware, while still maintaining its
identity — what matters is not its underlying physical structure but the functional capabilities
of the information registry.</p>
        <p>An information registry can be used for diferent purposes, including entertainment, personal
bookkeeping and systems development. However, information registries are often used for
institutional purposes, meaning that they contain institutional statements, i.e. statements that
represent institutional facts that are about institutional phenomena. For example, an information
system of a bank would typically include statements that are about bank customers, accounts,
balances and transactions, which are all institutional phenomena.</p>
        <p>As will be seen below, institutional phenomena come into existence through institutional
processes. But in order for an institutional phenomenon to continue to exist, there needs to be
an institutional statement that represents its existence, thereby providing evidence for it. For
example, an account in a bank continues to exist only if there is a statement that represents this
fact. Furthermore, it is also required that the statement be contained in an oficial information
registry that is authorized by some trusted institution, e.g. the bank that provided the account.
In other words, the account will exist if and only if there is an information registry authorized
by the bank that states that the account does exist. Generalizing, an information registry
that is authorized by some institution is needed for upholding the existence of institutional
phenomena. Such an information registry will be called an institutional registry. And the
institutional statements in it will be said to record institutional phenomena, i.e. provide evidence
for them, thereby maintaining their existence.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-3">
        <title>4.3. Acts for Creating Institutional Phenomena</title>
        <p>In order to create or modify institutional phenomena, institutional agents enact institutional
processes. An institutional process consists of a sequence of institutional acts, where an
institutional act is an act performed by a single institutional agent with the intent to contribute to
some institutional efect, i.e. to create, delete or modify some institutional phenomenon. An
example of an institutional process is a wedding ceremony, in which two persons to be married
and a wedding oficiant participate, and together they carry out a number of institutional acts,
which result in the creation of an institutional relationship, a marriage.</p>
        <p>Institutional acts are realized through information acts, where an information act is an act
that collects, transfers, processes or registers information. For example, during a wedding
ceremony, a participant can perform the information act of transferring information by saying
“I do” through which the agent also performs an institutional act. It can be helpful to distinguish
between four kinds of information acts. An information collection act is an information act
in which an informational agent makes some information available to itself in the form of an
expression. The agent can do this by reading the expression as it has been documented or by
directly perceiving its environment. An information transfer act is an information act in which
one informational agent makes some information available to another informational agent.
An information processing act is an information act in which an informational agent processes
information, e.g. by performing some computation on a number of expressions. An information
registration act is an act in which an informational agent stores a statement in an information
registry. Agents that have the capability to perform information acts are called informational
agents.</p>
        <p>Information acts are realized through physical acts, where a physical act is an act that
influences physical objects by changing their structure, mass, energy or position in space. And
an informational agent is grounded in a physical agent, which is a physical object that has the
capability to perceive its environment through sensors and act upon it through efectors. At
each point in time, an informational agent is related to exactly one physical agent but over time
the physical agent can vary.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Plans for Validation</title>
      <p>The CMIR model aims to show in what ways institutional phenomena are dependent on and
grounded in informational and physical structures. The model highlights the role of
information registries for maintaining and upholding institutional phenomena over time and over
organizational, national and institutional borders. The latter presupposes that
communication and interaction between institutional actors take place according to well understood and
standardized patterns. To ensure that the CMIR model supports these goals, we plan to carry
out an analysis based on a case from the domain of open banking, which is a practice of high
complexity regarding institutional as well as informational aspects. Below, we outline how we
intend to perform this analysis and also indicate some preliminary observations from such an
analysis; more work is needed for a complete validation of the CMIR model.</p>
      <p>
        Open banking is a banking practice that gives third-party financial service providers access to
the transactions and accounts of bank customers. These institutional entities have their origin
in the digital infrastructure controlled by financial organizations, and they are accessed through
the use of APIs. Open banking allows the networking of accounts across organizations for
use by consumers, banks, and third-party service providers. To support Open banking, the EU
published a directive, [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
        ], on payment services in the internal market. The PSD2 also assumes
that the exchange of information through Request and Response-pairs is carried out according
to another standard, the REST API protocol.
      </p>
      <p>
        When designing new institutional entities, software and digital agents of the Open banking
digital infrastructure, a designer needs to analyze what is meant by the institutional concepts
used in the PSD2 directive (EU 2015/2366), as well as the accompanying Berlin group standard
(Berlin Group 2018), [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
        ] and their functions in Open banking.
      </p>
      <p>In the following we will map the classes in the CMIR model into key PSD2 concepts in order
to gain knowledge of what the PSD2 concepts mean in terms of institutional and informational
notions.</p>
      <p>
        The small case study aims to evaluate the suggested model with respect to its ability to
represent and explain key PSD2 concepts, more precisely to identify what possible representational
deficiencies, [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">19</xref>
        ], that may occur. There can be four types of representational deficiencies
between two models:
• Construct overload, which occurs when one construct in one model corresponds to several
constructs in the other model;
• Construct redundancy, which occurs when several constructs in one model correspond to
the same construct in the other model;
• Construct excess, which occurs when there is a construct in one model that does not
correspond to any construct in the other model; and
• Construct deficit , which occurs when the other model contains constructs that do not
correspond to any construct in the first model
      </p>
      <p>The central theme of PSD2 is to provide regulations of new services to be operated by
ThirdParty Payment Service Providers (TPP) on behalf of a Payment Service User (PSU ). For example,
PayPal (a TPP ) can ofer payment services through which an individual or an organization (a
PSU ) can transfer money held in accounts in a bank.</p>
      <p>To provide the new services, a TPP needs to access the account of the PSU, which is maintained
by an Account Servicing Payment Service Provider (ASPSP ), usually a bank. An ASPSP must
provide an interface (called a “PSD2 compliant Access to Account Interface” a.k.a. an “XS2A
Interface”) to its accounts to be used by a TPP for accesses, which are compliant to and regulated
by the PSD2 directive.</p>
      <p>Realizing the payments services requires software, called Applications, that shall be provided
by both the TPP s (versus the PSU s) and APSPSs (versus the TPP s) — the latter is referred to as
ASPSP Applications.</p>
      <p>(ASPSP) Applications with related functionality are grouped together into an XS2A Interface,
which facilitates the management, publication, and discovery of the ASPSP Applications. When
implementing and publishing its ASPSP Applications, an ASPSP must adhere to several rules
defined in the PSD2. Doing so ensures that diferent ASPSP s will provide uniform naming
and access, as well as consistent semantics to their ASPSP Applications, thereby facilitating
communication within a digital infrastructure. To express and organize these rules, the Berlin
standard introduces the notion of an API Access Method, which works as a template for ASPSP
Applications. An API Access Method specifies a name and a description of its semantics.</p>
      <p>An API Access Method partially specifies how an ASPSP API conforming to it can be located.
Technically, this is done by specifying an Endpoint that is to be part of the URL at which the
ASPSP API can be accessed. Finally, an API Access Method specifies the HTTP method to be
used, which tells whether a corresponding API is about creating, reading, updating, or deleting
information. Some API Access Methods are mandatory, meaning that an ASPSP must support
them according to the Berlin standard. Formally, HTTP method and Endpoint (URL) are not part
of the PSD2 standard per se but instead of another standard, namely the REST protocol, which
is used by PSD2.</p>
      <p>Table 1 shows a mapping of PSD2 concepts into CMIR concepts1— this mapping is still work
in progress and needs to be both consolidated and extended.</p>
      <p>The definitions of the concepts of the CMIR model can be used to analyze the meaning of
the concepts of the PSD2 standard. However, as can be seen above, several representational
deficiencies with respect to the suggested model and the concepts in the PSD2 standard do
occur, some of which will be briefly discussed below.</p>
      <p>Some concepts of the CMIR model are too general to map into any concept in the PSD2
standard or the REST protocol (construct deficit) or maps into too many concepts in PSD2
(construct overload). An example of the former is the class ‘Institution’ that may be too broad
to be of practical use to explain anything in PSD2 – ‘Institution’ may in fact map onto the
1The subclasses of Agent in the Informational Layer are omitted for reasons of space.
entire PSD2 as a rule framework within the institution of the European Union. ‘Institutional
Phenomena’ maps onto several Institutional Entities in PSD2 such as TPP, ASPSP, PSU, Account
etc. This may indicate that this class should be specialized into several subclasses in the CMIR
model.</p>
      <p>The ‘Agent’ class on various levels in the suggested model, i.e. Agent-classes on both the
institutional and informational level, maps onto the same Agent concept in PSD2, indicating a
form of representational redundancy. However, the layered approach here, institutional agents
versus informational agents, may help highlight and clarify when exactly the actions of an
agent gain legal force with respect to an institution. As an example consider running the PSD2
agents in a sand-box (test-environment) — the payment transactions carried out in the sandbox
will change the sums of the accounts involved in the transactions but this is only done on the
informational level — nothing is changed on the institutional level. In order for the latter to
occur the transactions must occur in an environment maintained, regulated and recognized by
an institution.</p>
      <p>Several concepts in the CMIR model have no correspondence in PSD2. This particularly
applies to the classes in the physical layer indicating heavy construct excess, i.e. that the
CMIR model contains concepts/classes that is not meaningful (to explain PSD2 in this case).
However, even if the PSD2 standard does not aim to regulate the physical layer, e.g. computers,
IP-addresses, physical human beings etc., all PSD2 concepts do relate to classes in the physical
layer, e.g. a PSD2 Host is physically grounded in a computational hardware, which has been
granted access to the Internet and identified with an IP address. Furthermore, even if the PSD2
currently does not aim to regulate the concepts at the physical layer, this may be wanted in
the future for reasons such as (standardization of) reliability, environmental friendliness, and
performance. In this respect, the layered approach (institutional, informational, physical) of the
CMIR model may be used to find missing, but needed, concepts in a standard such as PSD2.</p>
      <p>In other cases, the absence of a relationship between a CMIR concept and a PSD2 concept may
occur from level of granularity diferences, i.e. some CMIR model concepts such as statement
or fact do not map onto a PSD2 concept per se but sometimes to attributes of PSD2 concepts.
In the table above, we have coded this as a ‘p’ (for partial correspondence). For instance, a
statement or a fact regarding the balance of an account may be modelled as attributes of PSD2
Request/Response pairs. In the CMIR model, this is instead treated as a concept of its own.
Doing so may be an advantage, since we are able to model attributes of the fact or statement,
since this is being modelled as a class, but could also be overkill if this level of granularity is not
needed.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>6. Discussion and Conclusions</title>
      <p>Based on information ontologies, we have proposed a conceptual model that shows in what
ways institutional phenomena are dependent on and grounded in informational and physical
structures. The model shows how institutional phenomena are created through institutional
processes, which are performed through information acts, which in their turn are performed
through physical acts. To capture these dependencies, the model has been structured into three
layers: institutional, informational and physical. While these acts are required for creating
institutional phenomena, they do not sufice for maintaining them. In order to cater for their
maintenance, there is a need for institutional registries that can store and retrieve information
that provide evidence for the phenomena. And these registries are dependent on informational
and physical registries, meaning that the three layers reoccur also for the registries.</p>
      <p>
        Institutional and informational agents can be grounded in both human beings and digital
artefacts. When it comes to the ability of efecting institutional phenomena, they both have
that ability if they are properly authorized within an institution. However, it seems that digital
artefacts cannot be responsible for their acts, which distinguishes them from human beings,
which is a distinction that cannot yet be captured by the CMIR model. Furthermore, it has been
argued that it could be fruitful to ascribe responsibility also to digital artifacts, [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">20</xref>
        ]; a move
that would mirror the one of ascribing responsibility to legal persons.
      </p>
      <p>Another issue concerns the institutional character of information and registries. Clearly,
both physical registries and information registries are institutional entities, as they can be the
objects of rights. And the same holds for statements and facts, for example, consent can be
given to sharing facts. Thus, there seems to be a layered structure, where one institution is the
basic one, addressing some domain, e.g. vehicles. And then there are statements and registries
needed to uphold the institutional phenomena in that institution. In order to manage that
information, there is a separate institution, on top of the first institution, in which the statements
and registries are institutional entities of their own, which are regulated in accordance with
that second institution.</p>
      <p>The relationship between informational agents and information registries need to be
investigated. They share several similarities, as they both can process information in the form
of statements and both need access to some physical substrates to store inscription of the
statements. One possibility is to view information registries as specializations of informational
agents.</p>
      <p>Another issue relates to the contents and formulation of rules that govern institutional
processes. Such rules can address one or several of the three layers, i.e., some rules solely
describe institutional efects, while others also describe the information to be created, and yet
others even the physical acts to be taken. This layering allows for a separation of concerns
when formulating institutional rules.</p>
    </sec>
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