=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-3241/paper1
|storemode=property
|title=Automated Organizational Management Systems of Critical Infrastructure: Security and Functional Stability
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3241/paper1.pdf
|volume=Vol-3241
|authors=Oleksandr Dodonov,Olena Gorbachyk,Maryna Kuznietsova
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/its2/DodonovGK21
}}
==Automated Organizational Management Systems of Critical Infrastructure: Security and Functional Stability==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3241/paper1.pdf
Automated Organizational Management Systems of Critical
Infrastructure: Security and Functional Stability
Oleksandr Dodonov1, Olena Gorbachyk1, Maryna Kuznietsova1
1
Institute for Information Recording of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv,03113, Ukraine
Abstract
An approach to improving the security of critical infrastructure based on the theory of
survivability of systems is proposed. Taking into account the peculiarities of the functioning
of automated organizational management systems (OMS), in the event of the emergence and
implementation of emergencies, the possibility of ensuring the functional stability of these
systems through the use of mechanisms of increasing survivability is justified. The concept of
functional stability of OMS and methods of its estimation are defined. A formalized
description and a qualitative resource model for assessing the limits of functional stability of
automated OMS are proposed. The main tasks of the OMS in the process of developing
management decisions in emergency situations are formulated. The creation and
implementation of the analytical component of the automated OMS in order to improve the
quality of management in the face of adverse effects and emergencies is proposed. It has been
shown that special attention needs to be paid to the analysis and modeling of chains of
influence that cross several sectors of critical infrastructure and can cause potentially
unpredictable effects. The main problematic issues for modeling are formulated, the types of
scenarios for emergency analysis are proposed, the tasks of creating and using resources of
the analytical component of OMS for modeling situations, development of management
decisions and analysis of their effectiveness are formulated. Typical approaches to ensuring
the functional stability of automated OMS are analyzed: use of resource redundancy, special
means of protection, organization of planned recovery procedures, application of sustainable
structural solutions, construction of alternatives for communication networks and information
exchange based on self-organizing systems. It is determined that the main modern
requirements for automated OMS are the construction of a flexible structure of management
of facilities and processes with the possibility of reorganization according to the requirements
of external and internal environments, with the use of adaptation mechanisms that allow
automated OMS to evolve along with the evolution of the operating environment,
management facilities and in the case of a smooth emergency scenario. It is shown that in the
conditions of rapid development of emergencies the functional stability of OMS can be
supported by such mechanisms of increasing survivability as dynamic reconfiguration,
recovery, compensation, counteraction to adverse effects.
Keywords 1
Organizational management systems, critical infrastructure objects, emergencies,
functional stability, survivability, safety and security
1. Introduction
Automated Organizational Management Systems (OMS) of Critical Infrastructure Objects (CIO)
are complex socio-technical systems that operate in a changing environment. Disorders in the
XXI International Scientific and Practical Conference "Information Technologies and Security" (ITS-2021), December 9, 2021, Kyiv,
Ukraine
EMAIL: ipri2020@ukr.net (O. Dodonov); bges@ukr.net (O. Gorbachyk); marglekuz@gmail.com (M. Kuznietsova)
ORCID: 0000-0001-7569-9360 (O. Dodonov); 0000-0001-8492-4478 (O. Gorbachyk); 0000-0001-6054-418X (M. Kuznietsova)
© 2021 Copyright for this paper by its authors.
Use permitted under Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
CEUR Workshop Proceedings (CEUR-WS.org)
1
functioning of the CIO (nuclear energy, chemical industry, military and aviation industries, transport,
etc.) pose a potential threat to human life and the environment. Probability of emergencies at
facilities, objects and critical processes infrastructures forces us to consider existence of such
situations, to estimate risks of their realization. It is necessary to correctly determine the goals and
required level of security of critical systems and infrastructures, to be able to predict possible losses in
case of emergencies, to be able to prevent the development of dangerous conditions at infrastructure,
to plan and implement restoration or "safe shutdown". Automated OMS should not only guarantee the
proper functioning of the CIO in the specified operating conditions, but also to ensure an adequate
response to a potential emergency, to initiate the implementation of appropriate measures to overcome
it. There are problems that are not inherent in the normal mode of operation of the OMS and its
components, the burden on managers is growing, the managers must make decisions in the face of
adverse effects and limited time. To ensure the manageability of the CIO and critical infrastructure in
general, the functional stability of the OMS is required to perform those functions which will allow to
achieve the desired goal of functioning and to resist the destructive influences. Protecting critical
infrastructure and increasing its resilience is one of the highest security priorities. In our research we
will extend the application of this approach on new obtained data for the next years and will study in
time the efficiency of SMART-characteristics time series analysis and how we can use their change
for prediction the disk failure.
2. Automated Organizational Management System of Critical Infrastructure
Critical objects, or critical infrastructure objects, are identified in the [1] as the object’s disruption (or
cessation) of operation which may lead to loss of control, destruction of infrastructure, irreversible
negative change (or destruction) of the economy of the country, entity or administrative-territorial
unit, significant deterioration of the safety of the people, living in these areas. In fact, CIO are
complex multi-level hierarchical systems, control of their state condition and functioning is performed
by appropriate multilevel control systems using the means of automatic control and management
according to certain technical regulations [2].
Automated organizational management systems are complex socio-technical systems where the
collecting, analyzing and processing information about the object of management, its internal
environment and interaction with the external environment is done [2]. There is always a risk of
destructive effects on real systems from the environment, due to personnel actions or structural
defects in hardware or software, failures of technical means, due to inaccuracy or insufficiency of data
in the information resources of the system, which may lead to the inability to perform the required
functions with a given level of characteristics [3]. Preservation (automatic recovery) of the ability to
perform a complete or acceptable set of system functions in conditions of destructive (undesirable)
effects is ensured by the functional stability of the system, which allows the user to trust the services
of the system [3].
2.1. Functional Stability of Automated Organizational Management System
and its Importance for Safety
The functional stability of the automated OMS means the property of the system to maintain the
management structure and perform basic management functions within the limits set by regulatory
requirements, in the presence of destructive (undesirable) effects. Due to the functional stability of the
OMS is within the allowable space of states, that is, in addition to the fact that the system performs
the main functions of its intended purpose, it does not have a negative impact on the environment and
does not pose a threat to its existence [4].
Changes in the operating environment and in the critical infrastructure, the action of destructive
factors of different nature can cause structural and functional disorders in the OMS, which can cause
disruptions in its operation, the emergence of uncontrolled processes that can lead to the emergence
and development of emergencies on the CIO, and even lead to disasters [5,6].
2
The range of threats to critical infrastructure in Ukraine is determined by the peculiarities of the
security situation in the country. Fighting on the territory of Ukraine, high depreciation of fixed
assets, serious problems with environmental and man-made safety dramatically increase the risk of
accidents at high risk: power facilities, chemical and metallurgical enterprises and life support
networks, both as a result of their intentional or accidental damage or loss of control over
technological processes, and as a result of terrorist acts and sabotage [1].
Such a property as functional stability allows the system to ensure the performance of a certain
critical range of functions in case of failure, failures or disturbances in the functioning of certain
elements of the system due to destructive influences, both external and internal, to choose the
appropriate mode of operation, using their own internal resources or obtained from outside, changing
the structure, set of functions and operation of separate subsystems. The critical scope of management
functions, as well as the allowable space of the OMS states, are determined based on the requirements
to prevent unacceptable negative changes in the critical infrastructure [5]. Due to large-scale
automation and informatization of management and technological processes, modern automated OMS
are focused on working with information and intensive data exchange in the actual merger of
automated production, production technologies with minimal human intervention in technological and
management processes performed under normal operating conditions. Automated OMS usually
implement certain standardized tools for assessing the situation on the CIO, tools for forecasting the
development of events to prepare management decisions during the emergence and development of
situations that disrupt the normal functioning of the CIO and OMS. Depending on the field of
implementation, different indicators are used in scientific publications [4-9] to assess the functional
stability of automated OMS, in particular, the amount of managerial functions performed, functions’
performance indicators, the total weight of management functions performed, degree of controllability
of technological processes, coherence of the management structure, parameters of analytical models
for assessing functional stability, etc. The choice of indicators of functional stability should be made
at the stage of design or automation of the OMS, taking into account the characteristics of critical
infrastructure and its individual facilities, existing management structure, rules of subordination and
information exchange in the social component of the OMS, set of critical management functions and
time constraints on the safe termination of the CIO.
2.2. Definition and Formalization of the Concept of Functional Stability of
Automated Organizational Management System
The operation of the automated OMS is aimed at resolving specific situations by implementing the
overall process of the control system and the actions of the control object. If the situations that require
management decisions are repeated and routine, then the automated OMS for their processing provide
appropriate procedures and solutions that are typical and programmed. If there is a situation for which
there are no proven programmed management decisions, than o make a really effective (purposeful,
timely, comprehensive, etc.) decision it is necessary to form a sufficiently complete set of its possible
alternatives and to choose from them the one that can be implemented with available resources (funds,
stocks, opportunities).
Аn automated OMS (АOMS), as a socio-technical system, has the following resources at its
disposal:
- hardware and technical - technical means that are part of the АOMS;
- software - software components of АOMS;
- information - information created and/or discovered, registered, evaluated with certain
(specified) laws of degradation and renewal;
- social - officials and staff who implement information technology to perform the functions
assigned to the АOMS.
If at a time interval t with any set of destructive influences R t there is at least one efficient
distribution of АOMS resources, which will ensure the implementation of functions set in the current
state of communication F {f n } with a quality level not lower а lim , then АOMS is functionally
stable over time interval t , that is
3
( Rt R , mN Μ Nt , mG M Gt ), k * ( Z t ) K, k * , mN , mG > а k* а lim ,
where Rt – a subset of destructive influences that affect the system over time interval t from a set
R of all destructive influences which can operate on АOMS;
M Nt = { mN } – subset of quality indicators of spatial-temporal identification of CIO in АOMS on the
basis of CIO monitoring data on time interval t , which is formed from an ordered set M N
indicators of the quality of spatial and temporal identification of COI in the AOMS, taking into
account the data of current monitoring, computer models of CIO and the current destructive effects
Rt ;
M Gt = { mG } – a subset of indicators of the quality of information exchange in the АOMS in the time
interval t , which is formed from an ordered finite set M G of indicators of the quality of
information exchange in the АOMS, taking into account the current destructive effects Rt , available
lines of communication over time interval t ;
Z t – a subset of resources (hardware, software, information, human) that are available for use in
АOMS under destructive influences Rt over time interval t from the set Z = { z i } of resources of
АOMS, operating in normal conditions;
K ={ kl }, k l =< Z l1 , Z l2 ,..., Z lN >, Z li Z – set of resource allocations АOMS by N functions of
the set of functions F {f n } , which implement the requirements for functionality;
а k* – vector of indicators of quality of realization of a set of functions F {f n } of АOMS when
allocating resources in it and current indicators of the quality of spatial and temporal identification of
CIO in АOMS mN and information exchange mG in АOMS, based on its spatio-temporal
configuration over time interval t ;
а lim – the limit indicator of the quality of implementation of a set of functions F {f n } АOMS,
below which the functioning of the АOMS does not meet the requirements of the appointment.
Each vector а i is a set qi11 , qi22 ,..., qiNN of length N (where N – the number of management
functions implemented in accordance with the purpose of the АOMS), and each element qi j reflects a
certain level of quality of implementation of the j -function and belongs to the set Q j , which, n turn,
reflects a partially ordered finite set of possible levels of implementation quality of the j -function
Q j = { q1j , q2j ,..., q Lj j }.
For a set of functions F {f n } , which are implemented by АOMS, there is a set Q levels of
quality of functioning of АOMS, which consists of subsets that do not intersect, { Q1 , Q 2 ,..., Q N },
with elements qij Q j , j = 1, N , arranged according to the condition
q1j q 2j ... q Lj j , j = 1, N ,
where qij – the minimum level of implementation quality of j -function, corresponding to non-
performance of the function, q Lj j – the maximum level of quality with which АOMS can theoretically
implement j -function, L j – the number of gradations of the level of performance quality of the j -
function.
4
The set Q is partially ordered, it is convenient to present in the form of a quasi-matrix of N -
order with terms that are ordered sets Q j [3]
q11 ... q1Li
Q = = q ij , i = 1, N , j = 1, Li
q1N q LNN
A set of vectors of quality levels A ={а i } of implementation of a set of functions F {f n }
АOMS also is partially ordered, moreover for any two vectors а i and а j , the vector а i is better
than а j , if for each task f m from a set of functions F the level of quality of its implementation qim
, belonging to the vector а i , not worse than the level of quality of implementation of this function q mj
, belonging to the vector а j :
а i а j : ( qkl а i , qml а j , l = 1, N ) ( kl ml ).
l l
On the set A we introduce a metric: the distance between two vectors from this set is equal to the
minimum difference between the indices of the quality levels of the implementation of each function
of the set F , which are elements of these vectors
( а i , а j A , а i а j ) s ( а i , а j ) = min ( kl - ml ), qkl l а i , qml l а j , l = 1, N .
l
а lim determines the limit of АOMS’ functional stability to destructive influences from the set R ,
and the distance s ( а lim , а ( k * )) can be interpreted as a margin of functional stability АOMS in the
allocation of resources k * . Changing requirements to the limit of functional stability а lim , you can
solve problems to build reliable, survivable and safe (secure) systems.
For reliable systems а lim = а relay lim and accordingly:
( Rt R , mN M Nt , mG M Gt ), k * ( Z t ) K, k * , mN , mG > а k* а relay lim ,
where а relay lim is the minimum level of quality of implementation of functions F , in which the
АOMS retains in time within the established limits the values of all parameters that determine its
ability to perform functions F under certain modes and operating conditions.
For survivable systems а lim = а surv lim ,
( Rt R , mN M Nt , mG M Gt ), k * ( Z t ) K, k * , mN , mG > а k* а surv lim ,
where а surv lim is the minimum level of quality of implementation of functions F , in which the
АOMS retains the ability to perform critical functions F кр F under conditions of destructive
influences.
For safe (secure) systems а lim = а safe lim ,
( Rt R , mN M Nt , mG M Gt ), k * ( Z t ) K, k * , mN , mG > а k* а safe lim .
5
where а safe lim is the minimum level of quality of implementation of functions F , in which the
functioning of the АOMS does not pose a threat to human life and the environment.
If you can determine the level а of the quality of AOMS functions from the set F at the current
time and the maximum possible level а max of quality of performing functions АOMS is known,
than distance between vectors а and а max will determine the margins of stability in terms of
reliability, survivability and safety.
The flow of destructive influences of different nature can cause failures in AOMS, and this will
lead to changes in the vector, which will mean a decrease in reserves of stability or complete loss of
diversion property of AOMS. In the case of recovery procedures based on the mechanisms of
reconfiguration and / or reorganization of resources, or by introducing additional resources from the
outside, you can restore the lost property. If the use of mechanisms of reconfiguration, reorganization
in the AOMS allows to achieve compliance: а relay lim а а max , then restored such a property as
reliability; if а surv lim а а max , then the system has survivability; provided а relay lim а
а max , the system becomes secure. The process of ensuring the functional stability of AOMS can be
considered as a process of maintaining the current quality vector of AOMS functions at certain
intervals in a given period of time by activating special tools and mechanisms for reconfiguration and
reorganization of system resources.
3. Safety of Critical Infrastructure Objects in the Conditions of Destructive
Factors and Development of an Emergency Situation
Security and protection of critical infrastructure involves, above all, ensuring the smooth and
sustainable operation of critical infrastructure in certain modes, and the ability to prevent the
destruction or irreparable damage, the cessation or loss of control of critical infrastructure objects due
to all factors, and to ensure the rapid restoration of their operation if it is interrupted. The main task of
protecting critical infrastructure is to prevent crises related to the functioning of critical infrastructure.
In [1] the following categories of threats are proposed, for which the protection of critical
infrastructure should be configured:
1) accidents and technical failures, in particular, aviation accidents, nuclear accidents, fires,
accidents in energy supply systems, emissions of hazardous substances, system failures, accidents and
emergencies due to negligence, organizational errors, etc.;
2) dangerous natural phenomena, in particular, extreme weather conditions, forest, steppe and peat
fires, seismic phenomena, epidemics and pandemics, space phenomena, hurricanes, tornadoes,
earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, etc.;
3) malicious actions, in particular, the malicious actions of groups or individuals, such as terrorists,
criminals and saboteurs, as well as hostilities in wartime.
Combined threats and threats are particularly dangerous, the implementation of which can lead to
catastrophic and diverse cascading effects due to the interdependence of critical infrastructure
elements.
Measures to counter threats to critical infrastructure are determined by the following
guidelines [1]:
physical protection – aimed at ensuring the protection of objects from unauthorized access,
prevention and cessation of sabotage, theft or any other illegal seizure of equipment, devices and
materials;
technical protection – increasing fault tolerance and survivability of systems, functional
redundancy;
staff – training and testing of personnel, control of their ability to perform certain functions,
security of personnel;
6
Information Technology – protection of information, communication systems and management;
legal – settlement of issues of personnel response and functioning of infrastructure in crisis
situations, consolidation of division of responsibilities in normative and legal documents,
development of manuals and instructions for personnel, including on interaction in crisis situations;
recovery plans – creation of plans, reserves and services for quick recovery of lost functions.
The following modes of operation are defined for the system of protection of critical infrastructure,
which is a part of the automated OMS CIO:
crisis prevention;
crisis management;
operation in a state of emergency;
functioning in martial law.
The normal mode of operation of critical infrastructure for the protection system is a regime of
monitoring and risk assessment of crisis situations, in which continuous crisis prevention should be
provided.
In the event of a crisis, the critical infrastructure protection system should switch to crisis
management. If a crisis situation occurs in a particular sector of critical infrastructure, then due to the
interconnectedness of sectors (interconnections / impacts of facilities from different sectors), it can
spread to all critical infrastructure and lead to the most serious consequences for the country.
Crisis management regime provides for the involvement of emergency measures to contain factors,
improve the conditions and characteristics of the security environment, or improve the functioning of
certain objects of critical infrastructure, etc. The same regime is used in the restoration of critical
infrastructure after malicious actions, accidents and failures, significant impact of dangerous natural
phenomena. The transition to the operation of the OMS in states of emergency and martial law should
take place in the event of the proclamation of appropriate legal regimes in the event of an emergency,
terrorist threat or armed invasion.
3.1. The Functions and Tasks of Automated Organizational Management
System in case of Threat or Emergency
An emergency (crisis) situation is a violation of normal living conditions and activities of people
on the site or territory, caused by an accident, catastrophe, natural disaster, epidemic, fire, use of
means of destruction [1]. There are 5 typical stages (phases) of emergency development (emergency):
the accumulation of deviations - the initiation of an emergency - the manifestation of the main impact
factors - the action of secondary impact factors - the action of residual impact factors. It is necessary
to prevent the emergence of critical infrastructure by all possible means, to adequately respond to
emergencies and to have the means to eliminate the consequences of emergencies.
Occurrence and development of emergencies occurs in real time, so the solution of problems of
monitoring and analysis of stages of emergencies must also take place in real time, which requires
spatial and temporal identification of CIO and infrastructure as a whole. Emergency management
systems must take into account the nature and speed of emergency development, control not only the
parameters of the CIO, but also the characteristics of the environment. The following functions must
be performed in the automated OMS:
monitoring, the main task of which is the continuous processing of data from the CIO in real
time and signaling the departure of certain parameters beyond acceptable limits;
diagnostics of the place of occurrence of the emergency to localize the area of malfunctions or
errors;
forecasting the consequences of certain events or phenomena based on the analysis of
monitoring data from various sources;
planning actions to prevent the development and spread of emergencies;
correction of management decisions in case of diagnosing errors and failures;
ensuring the management of the CIO and the relevant mode of operation of the OMS itself;
providing the necessary information and recommendations to all levels of government.
7
In the conditions of emergency situations in the functioning of the AOMS there are problems
associated with the high rate of changes in the parameters and state of CIO, unpredictability of events,
dependence of information flows on the situation and communication system, changing the
distribution of functions, expanding or narrowing the scope, etc. [4]. In such conditions, it is desirable
to have the means to support the development of management decisions, in particular, to have pre-
established schemes of action in the development of emergencies, to have a base of precedents,
systematized and accumulated experience in overcoming previous emergencies.
Given the interpenetration and, inter alia, the interdependence of critical infrastructures, it is
necessary to ensure that the AOMS performs the function of identifying, analyzing and modelling
chains of influence that cross several sectors of critical infrastructure and lead to potentially
unpredictable effects. For chains of influence, there are several types of interdependencies that make
up the paths between infrastructure components (nodes) of the type: a b c d ... y z.
This path reflects (models) the cascading consequences of the event or the derived dependence of
the node-object z on the node-object a, which is denoted (a z). A chain constructed in this way may
not be the only one, and if the end effect is the effect on z of several object nodes, it is affected (abc
z). Pathways are not unique in terms of effect, they may change over time, and their behavior may be
cumulative in nature, that is, the end effect may be the culmination of several possible events. To
analyze infrastructure interdependencies and forecast changes in infrastructure, it is necessary to
determine:
1. What will be the cascading effect on the subset of object nodes {x, y, z, ...}, given the set of
initiating events { (a), (b), ...}?
2. What will be the set of events { (a), (b), ...}, what can cause a cascading effect given
the set of object nodes {x, y, z, ...} and the desired end state?
3. What will be the derivative of interdependence (ab xyz ), based on the set of events {
(a), (b), ...} and the set of observed results on the nodes-objects {x, y, z, ...}?
4. What is the subset of critical nodes {x, y, z, ...} of all networks that will negatively affect a
particular function through a direct or derivative relationship, given the set of infrastructure networks
and the critical function?
Management decisions to ensure the security and protection of critical infrastructures depend on
the answers to these questions. Some of the impacts and their consequences that can be predicted, it is
advisable to analyze and prepare appropriate effective management decisions.
The AOMS should have the means to act in the "slow" and "fast" scenarios of emergency
development. In a "slow" scenario, there is time to apply certain means of protection and perform
certain protective actions to localize the emergency and prevent its further spread by the
infrastructure. In the case of a "fast" scenario of development of the emergency, events in the
infrastructure unfold rapidly. It is desirable to apply such measures and means that would allow to
react before the destruction of the CIO and infrastructure.
The functional stability of the AOMS in the conditions of the "fast" scenario of emergency
development becomes extremely important, because the strict time constraints require:
1) assess the parameters of the operating environment, taking into account safety risks and possible
consequences of emergencies;
2) identify places in critical infrastructure that have the highest risks, and assess their impact on the
structure and functioning of individual CIOs, predict potential losses;
3) to carry out spatio-temporal identification of CIOor to use available dynamic models for
forecasting of a probable condition of infrastructure and CIO and to choose from possible variants of
administrative decisions more rationally for reaction to current events;
4) determine and permanently monitor the parameters of the CIO, assess and forecast the state of the
CIO, if possible, to build scenarios of events taking into account the current external and internal
influences on the CIO and AOMS;
5) determine the list of necessary resources for counteracting emergencies, develop scenarios for
localization and elimination of the consequences of emergencies.
After the elimination of emergencies, it is advisable to analyze the adopted and implemented
management decisions, evaluate their effectiveness, although with the evolution and increasing
complexity of CIO, its parameters and components change, which leads to an increase in the number
8
and variety of kinds and types of risks and the entire infrastructure [2,8,9 ], so the analysis of the
range of possible risks should be constantly monitored, the state of the selected parameters and the
environment should be monitored, and new risk situations should be modelled [6,10-12].
4. The Survivability of the Automated Organizational Management System as
a Factor in maintaining its Functional Stability
The development of information technology, automation of a number of management functions
have led to a change in perceptions of the ideal OMS as a stable and fully manageable system with a
rigid hierarchical structure. Requirements for modern OMS include the construction of a flexible
structure of management of facilities and processes with the possibility of reorganization according to
the requirements of external and internal environments, with effective mechanisms of adaptation,
allowing OMS to evolve along with the evolution of the operating environment and management
objects.
The complexity of the CIO, both technological and operational in nature, leads to an increase in
the number of elements involved in the monitoring and management processes, diversification of
interaction structures in OMS, which leads to an increase in the number and variety of kinds and
types of risks, which can cause disruptions in the functioning of the CIO and in the infrastructure as a
whole. It is impossible to predict and protect critical infrastructure from all risks, therefore, the safety
of its operation should be ensured based on the conditions of "if, then". Such conditions require
adequate quality management and functional stability of AOMS of the critical infrastructure .
To ensure the functional stability of AOMS in the design of its technical component, a certain
redundancy is traditionally introduced (structural, software, time, resource); built-in control systems
are being implemented; contours of protection of AOMS against destructive influences of external
environment are formed; components with the increased level of protection and reliability are chosen.
These traditional solutions have certain limitations. Additional redundancy, unfortunately, leads to a
deterioration of the technical and economic characteristics of the systems. Monitoring systems
observe a number of parameters, but may not always or not at all provide an adequate response to an
abnormal situation and may not reduce the likelihood of such situations. The protection circuit can
minimize the influence of external factors, but does not completely eliminate it. The choice of element
base with the increased level of protection and reliability does not provide functional stability of
system when failure has already occurred [4, 6-9].
Ensuring the functionality and security of computer systems, as part of AOMS, involves the
implementation of a comprehensive security system using firewalls, anti-virus software, in-depth
application traffic analysis procedures, identification and authentication of users, security incident
management systems with the ability to track and manage incidents, etc. The use of information
technology in AOMS to ensure effective management of the CIO in the emergence and development
of emergencies, and today, in particular, in areas of hostilities, has led to new security requirements:
formation and maintenance of a zone of continuous information coverage of a large plane;
ensuring the scalability of the communication network in order to increase the coverage area
and the density of information support;
creation of wireless transport channels for communication of access points in the "one-to-one"
mode;
ensuring noise immunity, protection from imitation interference, increasing resistance to loss
of individual network elements;
guaranteeing the smooth operation and adaptability of the communication network.
Communication requirements are partially met by technology Mesh – construction of networks, a
distinctive feature of which is self-organized architecture (Wireless Mesh Network (WMN), which are
also called cellular networks [13]. Mesh networks are built as a set of clusters. The coverage area is
divided into cluster zones, the number of which is theoretically unlimited. Mesh networks use special
protocols that allow each access point to create network subscriber tables with traffic channel status
monitoring and support for dynamic traffic routing along the optimal route between neighbouring
points. If any of them fails, the traffic is automatically redirected to another route, which guarantees
not just the delivery of traffic, but its delivery in the shortest time. Mesh technology is based on a
9
decentralized network design scheme, and access points that operate on Mesh networks provide
subscriber access services and act as routers / repeaters for other access points on the same network.
This makes it possible to create a self-installing and self-healing segment of a broadband network.
Using such a network allows you to quickly recover traffic in the event of failures or intentional
damage to individual network nodes. The disadvantage of Mesh networks is the use of intermediate
points for data transmission, which can cause delays in the transmission of information, and,
consequently, reduce the quality of real-time traffic.
AOMS in the conditions of origin and development of the emergency system operates under
constant variability of the external environment, uncertainty of external and internal destructive
influences, the impossibility of clearly taking into account the reaction of the environment to the
actions of the system and the response of the system to external influences, that is, in terms of the
manifestation of such a fundamental systemic property as survivability. Due to this property, any
system can be stored as a whole in the unpredictable, sometimes extreme, conditions, adapt to them,
changing the behavior, structure or system-wide purpose of the operation. High survivability systems
are characterized by flexibility in management, variability of operation algorithms, transitions from a
hierarchical management model to linear, network, network-centric, and vice versa, which ensures the
safe operation of the system itself and its achievement of the system-wide purpose of operation.
Low survivability systems break down quickly, and if there is a low survivability of AOMS critical
infrastructures, it can lead to the development of cascading accidents with significant material losses
[7], while AOMS, characterized by increased survivability, are destroyed gradually, retaining partial
functionality, limited performance [6]. There is time to make decisions regarding the transition to a
safe mode of operation, emergency stop, isolation of damage, preventing their spread, and so on.
Survivability is a fundamental intrinsic property of complex systems, regardless of the conditions
of their operation, and it is manifested only in the presence of destructive effects, damage or even loss
of system components and component failures [2,6].
In the event of an emergency, the functional stability of AOMS CIO can be supported (increased)
by mechanisms to ensure survivability, after all, survivability is the property that allows the system to
adapt to new operating conditions in the presence of destructive influences, maintain or promptly
restore the functions of the system with minimal loss of efficiency in case of degradation or failure of
individual components of the system through the use of available operational resources.
To maintain the functional stability of the AOMS, it is advisable to use the following mechanisms
of survivability ensuring [6,14]:
recognition and localization – to detect attacks on AOMS information components, successful
intrusions into the system and its information resources, the occurrence of risks of loss or distortion of
information, increased risk and failure of vital (critical) components of AOMS, identification of the
failed element or component, fixing the output of certain parameters of AOMS, CIO and environment
beyond the established limits;
counteraction – creation and application of a set of predetermined means and measures to
maintain the specified operating conditions and minimize losses associated with the transition to a
non-standard mode of operation;
recovery and restoration – development and use of a set of methods and software and hardware to
restore the functionality and performance of components and the system as a whole, its information
resources and information and communication tools under adverse effects;
adaptation – development of a set of procedures for targeted changes in the parameters and
structure of AOMS based on information about changes in operating conditions, the emergence of
unforeseen situations, the consequences of violating the security of information resources;
reorganization – development of algorithms and procedures for redistribution of failed
component functions between operational components or, in case of impossibility of redistribution, -
organization of system transition to a new purpose of operation;
reconfiguration – performing automatic (automated) restructuring of the structure of the
information exchange network or changing the algorithm of operation to achieve the greatest
efficiency of the purpose of operation on the available operational resources of the system;
reconstruction – application of reduction of the purpose of operation (list of AOMS functions
performed) and system resources to certain base levels, when the system can perform only a clearly
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defined set of functions, save a certain amount of information, ensure smooth degradation of certain
parameters.
These mechanisms integrate the tools and design solutions implemented in the system to increase
reliability and fault tolerance, monitoring, automatic control and compensation, built-in algorithms
and means of protection of components and components of AOMS, etc.
5. Conclusions
In the context of hostilities in Ukraine, which lead to a significant large number of emergencies,
effective management of critical infrastructure has become an extremely important task. The
functioning of the automated organizational management system is aimed at resolving specific
situations by implementing the overall process of the control system and the actions of the control
object. Rapid response to emergencies at the objects of the critical infrastructure and in the
infrastructure as a whole, localization of the emergency zone, preventing the development of
cascading accidents, improving the level of protection and safety of critical infrastructure – here are
the tasks that AOMS provides. The functional stability of automated organizational management
system, as a property of the system to maintain the management structure and perform management
functions within the limits set by regulatory requirements, in the presence of destructive influences –
is an affecting on the safety of critical infrastructures factor. Improving the survivability of automated
organizational management system of the objects of the critical infrastructure allows even in the "fast
scenarios" of emergency development to reduce the negative consequences of emergencies, due to the
validity and timeliness of management decisions, preventing the complete loss of of the critical
infrastructure objects management.
The expediency and effectiveness of the proposed approach to ensuring the safety of the objects of
the critical infrastructure and critical infrastructure in general in the presence of destructive influences
by increasing the functional stability of automated organizational management systems were tested
and demonstrated when creating the automated OMS of special purpose.
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