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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>Workshop on Formal and Cognitive Reasoning, September</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>On Contextual Programs Under Three-Valued Łukasiewicz Logic</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Islam Hamada</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Technische Universität Dresden</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>01062 Dresden</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="DE">Germany</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2022</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>19</volume>
      <issue>2022</issue>
      <fpage>0000</fpage>
      <lpage>0002</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>Weak completion semantics is based on a cognitive theory that managed to model human reasoning in a variety of scenarios. It is based on a non-monotonic theory that uses normal logic programs under three-valued Łukasiewicz logic. We discuss contextual programs in this paper, in that it will be shown that the monotonicity of their semantic operators is generally undecidable. It will also be shown that the 椀昀xed point of the semantic operator of acyclic contextual programs is not only a model but a minimal model.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;human reasoning</kwd>
        <kwd>weak completion semantics</kwd>
        <kwd>Łukasiewicz logic</kwd>
        <kwd>contextual programs</kwd>
        <kwd>monotonicity</kwd>
        <kwd>minimal model</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        The weak completion semantics (WCS) is a cognitive theory that models human reasoning using
normal logic programs [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. It is a non-monotonic theory that uses three-valued Łukasiewicz
logic. It was 昀椀rst used to model the suppression task [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ], then it has been further developed to
model human choices in the selection task [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ], syllogistic reasoning [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ], and ethical decision
problems [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]. The semantics can model di昀erent types of conditionals [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5 ref6 ref7">5, 6, 7</xref>
        ], as well as
disjunctions [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]. It has an operational semantics given by the implementations in Prolog,
Python and ASP. Finally the (least) model one reasons with respect to can be computed by a
connectionist network [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ]. Consider the following example
      </p>
      <p>
        If today is Sunday, Jack will rest the whole day. Today is Sunday. What do we conclude?
The example will be modeled as a program following Stenning and van Lambalgen in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]. The
椀昀rst statement is represented by { ← ∧ ¬ , ← ⊥}, where and denote that Jack will rest
the whole day and Today is Sunday, respectively, and is an abnormality predicate which is
assumed to be false represented by ← ⊥. The second statement is represented by ← ⊤,
which means should be mapped to true in the model. Consequently, ∧ ¬ is mapped to
true, therefore is also mapped to true. So one reasons w.r.t. the model ⟨{ , }, { }⟩. The model
speci昀椀es that and are mapped to true, whereas is mapped to false, and there are no atoms
mapped to unknown because there are no other atoms le昀琀. Consequently one concludes that
Jack will rest the whole day.
      </p>
      <p>
        Sometime ago an operator known as the context operator (ctxt) was added to WCS in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ].
Programs that use the context operator are called contextual programs. Contextual programs
are useful in cases, where default reasoning is involved [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ]. The context operator ctxt assumes
an atom to be false when it is neither assigned true or false, which mimics negation as failure.
For example we will extend the previous example into the following:
      </p>
      <p>If today is Sunday, Jack will rest the whole day, unless he knows an exam is coming. If the
semester is ending soon, and exam is coming soon. Today is Sunday. What do we conclude?
The 昀椀rst sentence is represented by { ← ∧ ¬ , ← }, where atom denotes that
an exam is coming, and the other atoms denote the same as before. The second sentence is
represented by { ← ∧ ¬ , ← ⊥}, where denotes the semester is ending. The last sentence
is represented by ← ⊤. Note that is mapped to false, while is unknown, so ∧ ¬ is
unknown, hence is unknown too. This means that is mapped to false, consequently
is mapped to false. This means that ∧ ¬ is mapped to true, hence is also mapped to false.
The model we just built is ⟨{ , }, { , }, from which we conclude that Jack will rest the whole
day. Note that if we remove the context operator from the previous program, we will get the
model ⟨{ }, { }⟩ instead, from which we conclude that it is unknown whether Jack will rest
the whole day. This means that the operator ctxt preceding the atom enables us to assume
that There is no coming exam by default, since Jack lacks knowledge about whether an exam is
coming, hence the utility of the context operator.</p>
      <p>
        Despite their utility, contextual programs gave rise to some questions because they do not
share the same properties that non-contextual programs have. For example the models we
computed in the two previous examples can be computed using a semantic operator in WCS. This
semantic operator is always monotonic for non-contextual programs [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref12">12, 10</xref>
        ]. Consequently, the
semantic operator of a non-contextual program always has a (unique) least 昀椀xed point [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]. This
椀昀xed point was shown to be the least model of the weak completion of the program. Furthermore,
reasoning in WCS is done w.r.t. this 昀椀xed point, i.e., w.r.t. the least model of the weak completion
of programs. On the other hand, contextual programs o昀琀en do not have monotonic semantic
operators, hence they sometimes do not have any 昀椀xed points. This explains our interest in
deciding whether a given (contextual) program has a monotonic semantic operator because if a
(contextual) program has a monotonic semantic operator, then its semantic operator indeed has
a unique 昀椀xed by the Knaster-Tarski Fixed Point Theorem [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]. This will be later shown to be an
undecidable problem. Finally, we consider a certain subclass of contextual programs, the class
of acyclic contextual programs. This is because the semantic operator of an acyclic contextual
program always has a unique 昀椀xed point [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11 ref13">11, 13</xref>
        ], this 昀椀xed point was shown to be a model
of the weak completion of the program, and was conjectured to be a minimal model. In the
weak completion semantics minimal models are preferred because a minimal model does not
assign true or false to any atoms unnecessarily, i.e., a minimal model is minimal in information
(knowledge) ordering. For example in the reasoning scenario above there is nothing about the
premises that suggests whether an exam is coming, so one should expect the model that we
reason with respect to to map to U, which was the case. It will be shown that the 昀椀xed point
of the semantic operator of an acyclic contextual contextual is indeed a minimal model.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. The Weak Completion Semantics</title>
      <p>
        We assume the reader to be familiar with classical logic [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ]. Let ⊤, ⊥ and U be truth constants
denoting true, false, unknown, respectively. A non-contextual literal is an atom or its negation.
A contextual literal has the form ctxt or ¬ctxt where is a non-contextual literal. A (logic)
program is a 昀椀nite set of clauses of the form ← Body, where is an atom and Body is either
⊤, ⊥, or a 昀椀nite non-empty conjunction of literals. Clauses of the form ← ⊤ , ← ⊥ and
← 1 ∧ … ∧ are called facts, assumptions and rules, respectively, where , 1 ≤ ≤ , are
literals. In this paper, denotes a program. Program is contextual if it has at least one
occurrence of a contextual literal, otherwise it is a non-contextual program. An atom is
de昀椀ned if and only if contains a clause of the form ← Body. The truth tables needed
throughout the paper are shown in Table 1.
      </p>
      <p>
        Consider the following transformation: (1) For all de昀椀ned atoms occurring in , replace all
clauses of the form ← 1, ← Body1 ∨ Body2 ∨ … (2) Replace all occurrences of ← by ↔.
The resulting set of equivalences is called the weak completion of : for short, . It di昀ers
from the completion de昀椀ned by [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ] in that unde昀椀ned atoms are not mapped to false, but to
unknown instead. As shown by Hölldobler and Kencana Ramli [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ], each weakly completed
noncontextual program admits a least model under three-valued Łukasiewicz [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]. This model is
denoted by ℳ . It can be computed as the least 昀椀xed point of a semantic operator introduced
by Stenning and van Lambalgen [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]. Let be a program and a three-valued interpretation
represented by the pair ⟨ ⊤, ⊥⟩, where ⊤ and ⊥ are the sets of atoms mapped to true and false
by , respectively, and atoms which are not listed are mapped to unknown by . An interpretation
= ⟨ ⊤, ⊥⟩ is subsumed by interpretation ′ = ⟨ ′⊤, ′⊥⟩, i.e., ⊆ ′, i昀 ⊤ ⊆ ′⊤ and ⊥ ⊆ ′⊥.
De昀椀nition 1. For a program
and an interpretation , Φ
      </p>
      <p>= ⟨ ⊤, ⊥⟩1, where
⊤ = { | there exists ←
⊥ = { | there exists ←
and for all ←
∈ ( )
∈ ( )
∈ ( ),
(</p>
      <p>) = ⊤},
we 昀椀nd
(
) = ⊥}.
where ( ) denote the grounding of program</p>
      <p>.</p>
      <p>Note that ( ) was used in the above de昀椀nition instead of , in case is 昀椀rst-order. Note
also that ( ) denotes the set of ground instances of formula , and that for a program
1Whenever we apply a unary operator like Φ to an argument like , we omit parenthesis and write Φ instead.
( ) denotes the program containing all the ground instances of each clause occurring in
. the semantic operator of non-contextual programs was shown to be monotonic, i.e., let
and ′ be two interpretations, if ⊆ ′, then Φ ⊆ Φ ′, hence the existence of a least
椀昀xed point of the semantic operator for non-contextual programs. However, the semantic
operator is o昀琀en not monotonic for contextual programs, and sometimes does not have any
椀昀xed points. Nevertheless, we are still interested in the unique 昀椀xed points of their semantic
operators, if they exist. The class of acyclic contextual programs is a subclass of programs
where a unique 昀椀xed point of the semantic operator always exists. A program is acyclic i昀
is acyclic w.r.t. some level mapping. A level mapping is a mapping from the set of ground
atoms to the set ℕ of natural numbers. For our purpose we extend the level mapping by
¬ = = = ¬ = ¬ = ¬ ¬ . is acyclic w.r.t. lvl if and
only if for every rule ← 1 ∧ … ∧ occurring in ( ) , we 昀椀nd ≥ for all 1 ≤ ≤ .
Note that lfp(Φ ) denotes the least 昀椀xed point of the semantic operator Φ , and it is usually
used in the context of acyclic contextual programs.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Fixed Points Are Minimal Models</title>
      <p>
        The semantic operator of acyclic programs (contextual or non-contextual) is a contraction by
the Banach Contraction Mapping Theorem [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ]. Consequently, it has a unique 昀椀xed point that
can be reached by iterating the semantic operator starting with any interpretation. This 昀椀xed
point has been shown to be a model of the weak completion of contextual programs [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ]. We
will also show that it is a minimal model in this section.
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>3.1. Alternative Definition of The Semantic Operator</title>
        <sec id="sec-3-1-1">
          <title>De昀椀nition 1 happens to be equivalent to the following:</title>
          <p>De昀椀nition 2. For any program</p>
          <p>, an interpretation , and a ground atom
Φ
Which means that a昀琀er an iteration of the semantic operator the mapping of a de昀椀ned atom
is the same as the mapping of the right-hand side of the equivalence in ( ( )) , which
happens to be its le昀琀-hand side. If is unde昀椀ned, then it is mapped to U. The equivalence of
De昀椀nition 1 and De昀椀nition 2 can be veri昀椀ed by a direct comparison of both de昀椀nitions.
3.2. The Least Fixed Point lfp(Φ ) Is a Minimal Model
The least 昀椀xed point lfp(Φ ) of an acyclic contextual program can be reached by iterating
the semantic operator starting with any interpretation. Consider the following program =
{ ← ∧ , ← ⊤, ← ⊥, ← }. Iterating the semantic operator starting with the empty
interpretation = ⟨∅, ∅⟩ leads to the 昀椀xed point through the following sequence: = ⟨∅, ∅⟩ →
Φ = ⟨{ }, { }⟩ → Φ2 = ⟨{ }, { , }⟩ → Φ3 = Φ2 . Note that Φ maps to ⊤ by the second
clause and maps to ⊥ by the third clause. Consequently in the next iteration Φ2 maps to
⊥ by the 昀椀rst clause because ∧ is mapped to ⊥. Note that Φ maps to U by the 昀椀rst and
due to the fact that ∧ was still mapped to U by . Another observation is that through the
sequence of interpretations once an atom got mapped to ⊤ or ⊥, this mapping does not change
in the following iteration. This happens because when an atom gets mapped to ⊤ or ⊥, this is
a necessary consequence of the program itself. To elaborate is mapped to ⊥ because of the
second clause, is mapped to ⊤ because of the third clause, 昀椀nally is mapped to ⊥ by the 昀椀rst
clause and due to the propagation of the necessary mappings of and through the iteration
process. All the mappings to ⊥ or ⊤ were necessary due to the program itself. This (least) 昀椀xed
point is minimal w.r.t. the mappings of atoms to ⊥ or ⊤, i.e., the 昀椀xed point has to be a minimal
model of the weak completion of the program as we will see later.</p>
          <p>Proposition 1. Let be a contextual program such that Φ has a unique 昀椀xed point . If ′ is
a model for and ′ ≠ , then ′ must map an unde昀椀ned atom to true or false.
Proof. Let be a contextual program, the unique 昀椀xed point of Φ , and ′ be a model for
such that ′ ≠ . Because ′ is a model for , it must map each equivalence ↔
occurring in to true. The latter holds if and only if ′( ) = ′( ) for each equivalence
↔ occurring in . Because ′ ≠ and is the unique 昀椀xed point of Φ , we 昀椀nd a
gr↔ound∈ atom . Bseuccahustehat ′ is′(a m)≠odΦel for ′( ) ., wAes s昀椀nudme th′(at) =is d′e(昀椀ne) d..BIunt th′is( c)a=seΦwe 昀椀nd′( )
by De昀椀nition 2 and, thus, ′( ) = Φ ′( ) . Consequently, our assumption is wrong and we
conclude that must be unde昀椀ned. In this case, by de昀椀nition, Φ ′( ) = U. Consequently,
′( ) must be either true or false.</p>
          <p>Consider the following contextual program: = { ← ¬ ∧ , ← ⊥, ← ⊥} . Program
is acyclic because it acyclic w.r.t. the following level mapping ∶ = 1, = 0,
Therefore Φ has a unique 昀椀xed point, namely lfp(Φ ) = ⟨∅, { , }⟩, which is a model of the weak
completion . There are two other models, namely 1 = ⟨∅, { , , }⟩ and 2 = ⟨{ , }, { }⟩.
Model 1 maps the unde昀椀ned atom to ⊥, and model 2 maps the unde昀椀ned atom to ⊤. Now
we can proceed to prove the main theorem.</p>
          <p>is acyclic, then the unique 昀椀xed point of Φ
is
Proof. Let be an acyclic contextual program. The semantic operator Φ has a unique 昀椀xed
point. Let be this 昀椀xed point. Assume that is not a minimal model for . Then, we
椀昀nd a model ′ for such that ′ ⊆ . By Proposition 1, we 昀椀nd an atom such that is
unde昀椀ned in and ′ maps to either true or false. Because ′ ⊆ , must map to either
true or false, too. However, because is unde昀椀ned in , Φ will map to U, in which case
Φ ≠ . In other words, is not a 昀椀xed point anymore and, thus, our assumption is false.
Consequently, is a minimal model for .</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Undecidability of The Monotonicity Problem</title>
      <p>
        The monotonicity problem refers to the question whether a given contextual program has a
monotonic semantic operator. It is an important property because whenever the semantic
operator is monotonic, the Knaster-Tarski Fixed Point Theorem guarantees the existence of a
least 昀椀xed point of the semantic operator [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]. This problem will be shown to be undecidable
by a reduction from the Post correspondence problem.
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>4.1. The Monotonicity Problem</title>
        <p>The monotonicity problem is to decide for a given contextual program whether it has a monotonic
semantic operator. Some contextual programs have monotonic semantic operators, while
some others have non-monotonic semantic operators. Consider the following contextual
program 1 = { ← , ← }. Program 1 has a non-monotonic semantic operator
because we can 昀椀nd the two interpretations = ⟨∅, { }⟩ and ′ = ⟨{ }, { }⟩ such that ⊆ ′
and Φ 1 = ⟨∅, { }⟩ ⊈ Φ 1 ′ = ⟨{ }, ∅⟩. On the other hand the following contextual program
2 = { ← ⊤, ← } has a monotonic semantic operator because we cannot 昀椀nd any
two interpretations and ′ where ⊆ ′ and Φ 2 ⊈ Φ 2 ′. Similarly the following program
3 = { ← ¬ , ← , ← } has a monotonic semantic operator too. Is the monotonicity
problem decidable? The monotonicity problem is easily decidable for any propositional program
because we can verify for a given program whether all pairs of interpretations and ′ satisfy
the following statement: if ⊆ ′, then Φ ⊆ Φ ′. This constitutes a sound, complete
and terminating procedure for the monotonicity problem because there is a 昀椀nite number of
interpretations that can be de昀椀ned over the alphabet of a propositional program. However,
this is not the case for 昀椀rst-order programs with in昀椀nite Herbrand Base because the previous
procedure is not terminating due to the possibly in昀椀nite number of interpretations. It will
shown that the monotonicity problem is undecidable by showing that it is undecidable for a
subclass of contextual programs, named class .
4.2. Class</p>
        <p>of Programs
A program belonging to class</p>
        <p>has the following form
{ ←
1, ←
2, … ,
←
, ←
},
where and are nullary predicate symbols and is a non-contextual conjunction of literals
such that and do not occur in for all 1 ≤ ≤ , and ∈ ℤ +. Note the three contextual
program 1, 2 and 3 that we used in the previous subsection belong to class . Note
also that every program of class has clauses that share the same head. We are interested
winhcelraess bbeelcoanugssetoa cplraossgram,and of′cslhasasres nisondoen昀椀n-emdoatnoomtosnwicitih昀 is,ienqcuaisvealen′ tistonot ′em∪pty,,
and most importantly has a non-monotonic semantic operator too. For example program
= { ← , ← , ← ¬ ∧ , ← ⊤} has a non-monotonic semantic operator Φ
abnecdausebel=ongs t′o∪clas,sw h,esrheares′ n=o {de昀椀n←ed¬ato∧ms wit,h ← ′⊤,}aannddprogr=am{ ← ca, n b←e shown},
to have a non-monotonic semantic operator using the pair of interpretations = ⟨∅, { }⟩and
′ = ⟨{ }, { }⟩, because ⊆ ′ but Φ ⊈ Φ ′. Note that this same pair of interpretations can
be used to show that Φ is non-monotonic.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>4.3. The Post Correspondence Problem (PCP)</title>
        <p>
          The Post correspondence problem is a well-known undecidable problem. The PCP problem well
be introduced next using the notation in [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
          ]. An instance of the PCP can be de昀椀ned as a 昀椀nite
sequence = ( 1, 1), … , ( , ) of pairs ( , ) were ′ and ′ are nonempty 昀椀nite words
over {0, 1}. The question is whether where exists a nonempty sequence 1, 2, … , of indices
1, … , ∈ {1, … , } such that 1 ⋅ 2 ⋅ … ⋅ = 1 ⋅ 2 ⋅ … ⋅ , where ⋅ is a binary concatenation
operator. It has been established that a PCP instance K has a solution i昀 the formula is valid
in classical two-valued logic as shown in [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
          ]. The formula = ( 1 ∧ 2 ) → , such that
( ), ( )), 2 = (∀ , )( ( , ) →
( ),
( ))),
= (∃ ) ( , ).
1 = ⋀ (
        </p>
        <p>=1
¬ 1 ≡2 ⋁ ¬ ( ( ), ( ))</p>
        <p>=1
¬ 2 ≡2 ¬(∀ , )(¬ ( , ) ∨
≡2 (∃ , )( ( , ) ∧ ( ⋁ ¬ ( ( ),</p>
        <p>=1
≡2 ⋁(∃ , )( ( , ) ∧ ¬ (
( ),</p>
        <p>( )))
⋀ ( ( ),
=1
( )))
( ))))
⋀ (
=1</p>
        <p>We use ≡2=1to denote equivalence in classical two-valued logic. Note that uses a constant
symbol , two unary function symbols 0 and 1, a binary predicate symbol . For simplicity
we use the following abbreviation: 1… ( ) ∶= (… ( 1( )) …) , where ∈ {0, 1} for all
1 ≤ ≤ . Note denotes , the empty word, 0 denotes the function ”concatenate 0 to the
right”, and 1 denotes the function ”concatenate 1 to the right”. Thereby ( ) concatenates
to the right of word . For example 01(00) = 0( 1(00)) = 0(001) = 0010. We will show that
a PCP instance K has a solution i昀 is valid in classical two-valued logic i昀 a program
has a monotonic semantic operator. How does the monotonicity of the semantic operator have
anything to do with validity in classical two-valued logic?</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-3">
        <title>4.4. Monotonicity and Validity in Classical Two-valued Logic</title>
        <p>To see the connection between the monotonicity problem and validity in classical two-valued
logic, let us have another look at the examples we discussed in this section: 1 = { ← , ←
}, 2 = { ← ⊤, ← }, and 3 = { ← ¬ , ← , ← }. Program 1 was
shown to have a non-monotonic semantic operator, while program 2 and 3 were shown
to have monotonic semantic operators. All of those programs share common features such as
belonging to class and containing the clause ← . So the di昀erence has to arise from the
bodies of the rest of the clauses. Note that the disjunction of the bodies of the rest of the clauses
are the following: (1) , (2) ⊤, and (3) ¬ ∨ . (1) is not valid in classical two-valued logic, whereas
(2), (3) are valid in classical two-valued logic. This is not a coincidence, and it will be formally
proved to be the reason why Φ 1 is non-monotonic, whereas Φ 2 and Φ 3 are monotonic.
To that end, one needs to show the link between validity in three-valued Łukasiewicz logic
and classical two-valued logic. Before we proceed to do so, a few propositions on the relation
between interpretations that are subsumed by each other will be presented next.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-4">
        <title>4.5. Subsumed Interpretations</title>
        <p>The relations between subsumed interpretations will be shown in this section in four statements,
each consisting of two parts. In these statements we assume that 1 and 2 are interpretations
and 1 ⊆ 2. Note that a formula is non-contextual, when no contextual literal occurs in it. Now
we proceed to prove the four statements.</p>
        <p>Observation 1. For a ground atom
2( ) = ⊥ .</p>
        <p>(1) If 1( ) = ⊤ , then 2( ) = ⊤ , (2) If 1( ) = ⊥ , then
Proof. Let 1 = ⟨ 1⊤, 1⊥⟩ and 2 = ⟨ 2⊤, 2⊥⟩. Because 1 ⊆ 2, 1⊤ ⊆ 2⊤ and 1⊥ ⊆ 2⊥. If ( ) = ⊤ ,
then ∈ 1⊤, consequently ∈ 2⊤. So 2( ) = ⊤ . The second part can be proved similarly.
Proposition 2. For a non-contextual literal (1) If 1( ) = ⊤ , then 2( ) = ⊤ , (2) If 1( ) = ⊥ ,
then 2( ) = ⊥ .</p>
        <p>Proof. If = , where is an atom, then the proposition follows by Observation 1. If = ¬ ,
where is an atom, then 1( ) = 1(¬ ) . If 1(¬ ) = ⊤ , then 1( ) = ⊥ . By Observation 1,
2( ) = ⊥ . Consequently 2(¬ ) = ⊤ . The second part can be proved in a similar fashion.
Proposition 3. For a non-contextual conjunction of literals (1) If 1( ) = ⊤ , then 2( ) = ⊤ , (2)
If 1( ) = ⊥ , then 2( ) = ⊥ .</p>
        <p>Proof. If is the empty conjunction, denotes ⊤. Consequently 1( ) = 2( ) = ⊤ , which
satis昀椀es the proposition trivially. Otherwise is a non-empty conjunction of literals, =
1 ∧ … ∧ , where is a non-contextual literal for all where 1 ≤ ≤ . Then we will prove each
claim separately. (1) Assume 1( ) = ⊤ . Then 1( 1 ∧ … ∧ ) = ⊤. So for all where 1 ≤ ≤ ,
1( ) = ⊤. By Proposition 2, 2( ) = ⊤ for all where 1 ≤ ≤ . So 2( 1 ∧ … ∧ ) = ⊤, and
2( ) = ⊤ . (2) Assume 1( ) = ⊥ . Then 2( 1 ∧ … ∧ ) = ⊥. So for some where 1 ≤ ≤ ,
2( ) = ⊥. By Proposition 2, 2( ) = ⊥. Consequently 2( 1 ∧ … ∧ ) = ⊥, and 2( ) = ⊥ .
Proposition 4. For a non-contextual disjunction of conjunctions of literals
then 2( ) = ⊤ , (2) If 1( ) = ⊥ , then 2( ) = ⊥ .</p>
        <p>Proof. If is the empty disjunction, then denotes ⊥. Consequently, 1( ) = 2( ) = ⊥ , which
satis昀椀es the proposition trivially. Since is a non-contextual disjunction of conjunctions of
literals, = 1 ∨ … ∨ , where is a non-contextual conjunction of literals. Then we will
prove each claim separately. (1) Assume 1( ) = ⊤ . Then 1( 1 ∨ … ∨ ) = ⊤. So for some
where 1 ≤ ≤ , 1( ) = ⊤. By Proposition 3, 2( ) = ⊤. Consequently 2( ) = ⊤ . (2) Assume
2( ) = ⊥ . Then 1( 1 ∨ … ∨ ) = ⊥. So for all where 1 ≤ ≤ , 1( ) = ⊥. By Proposition 3,
2( ) = ⊥ for all where 1 ≤ ≤ . Consequently 2( 1 ∨ … ∨ ) = ⊥ and ( ) = ⊥ .
(1) If 1( ) = ⊤ ,
For example assume we have a disjunction of conjunctions of literals = (¬ ∧ ) ∨ . Assume we
have two interpretations 1 = ⟨{ }, { }⟩and 2 = ⟨{ }, { , }⟩. 1 maps to 1( ) = (¬ U∧⊥)∨⊤ = ⊤.
Because 1 ⊆ 2, 2 must map to ⊤ too, 2( ) = (¬⊥ ∧ ⊥) ∨ ⊤ = ⊤ . Note that Proposition 2 does
not hold for a contextual literal . Consider the two interpretations 1 = ⟨∅, ∅⟩, 2 = ⟨{ }, ∅⟩.
Although 1 ⊆ 2, interpretation 1 maps the contextual literal to 1( ) = ⊥, and
interpretation 2 maps the same contextual literal to 2( ) = ⊤. The same example can be
used to show why Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 do not hold for contextual conjunctions of
literals and contextual disjunctions of conjunctions of literals.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-5">
        <title>4.6. Validity in Classical Two-valued Logic and Three-Valued Łukasiewicz</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-6">
        <title>Logic</title>
        <p>Here we establish the link between validity in classical two-valued logic and three-valued
Łuasiewicz Logic.</p>
        <p>Proposition 5. If there are two interpretations and , where is two-valued and is three-valued,
and that for each ground atom occurring in a formula we 昀椀nd ( ) = ( ) , then ( ) = ( ) .
Proof. The truth tables of the operators of classical logic and three-valued Łukasiewicz logic
are identical when none of the operands are mapped to U, and maps no atom to U and
cannot map to U, hence ( ) = ( ) . See Table 1.</p>
        <p>Proposition 6. If is a non-contextual disjunction of conjunctions of literals, then there is a
two-valued interpretation where ( ) = ⊥ i昀 there is a three-valued interpretation where
( ) = ⊥
Proof. To prove the if-half, assume there is a three-valued interpretation where ( ) = ⊥ .
Construct another three-valued interpretation ′ where for each ground : If ( ) ≠ U, then
′( ) = ( ) , and If ( ) = U, then ′( ) = ⊥ . By the de昀椀nition of ′, ⊆ ′. So ′( ) = ⊥
by Proposition 4. Construct a two-valued Herbrand interpretation such that for each ground
atom , ( ) = ( ) . is a two-valued interpretation because does not map any atom to U by
the de昀椀nition of ′. By Proposition 5, ( ) = ( ) = ⊥ . To prove the only-if-half, assume
there is a two-valued interpretation where ( ) = ⊥ . Construct a three-valued interpretation
where for each ground atom , ( ) = ( ) . By Proposition 5, ( ) = ( ) = ⊥ .
For example assume we have a disjunction of conjunctions of literals 1 = ∨ ( ∧ ¬ ), and a
two-valued interpretation = { }, i.e., the interpretation maps the atom to ⊤ and the rest of
the atoms, and , to ⊥. The interpretation maps the disjunction 1 to ( 1) = ⊤ ∨ (⊥ ∧ ⊤) = ⊤.
By Proposition 6 this entails the existence of a three-valued interpretation such that ( 1) = ⊤.
For instance the three-valued interpretation = ⟨{ }, ∅⟩ maps the disjunction 1 to ( 1) =
⊤∨(U∧U) = ⊤. On the other hand for a disjunction of conjunctions of literals such as 3 = ∨¬ ,
3 is clearly valid in classical two-valued logic, so by the previous proposition we should be
able to 昀椀nd a three-valued interpretation such that ( 3) = ⊥, which is the case because for
all three-valued interpretations, 3 can either be mapped to ⊤ or U.</p>
        <p>Corollary 1. A non-contextual disjunction of conjunctions of literals is valid in classical
twovalued logic i昀 cannot be falsi昀椀ed in three-valued Łukasiewicz logic.
Proof. This can be shown by negating both sides of the equivalence of Proposition 6.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-7">
        <title>4.7. Herbrand’s Theorem</title>
        <p>
          Here the weak version of Herbrand’s theorem is introduced as it is needed for the undecidability
proof. In this subsection we only speak about validity in classical two-valued logic.
Theorem 2. [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">19</xref>
          ] Let be a 昀椀nitely axiomatized by universal formulas. Let
(∃ 1, … , ) ( 1, … , ) be a purely existential formula. Then ⊧ i昀 there are gound terms
( ,)1≤ ≤ , 1≤ ≤ such that ⊧ ⋁=1 ( ,1, … , , ).
        </p>
        <p>Corollary 2. Let = (∃ 1, … , ) ( 1, … , ) be a purely existential sentence and is a
quanti昀椀er-free formula. Then is valid i昀 there are ground terms ( ,)1≤ ≤ , 1≤ ≤ such that
⋁=1 ( ,1, … , , ) is valid.
=</p>
        <sec id="sec-4-7-1">
          <title>Proof. A special case of Theorem 2 where</title>
          <p>= ∅ and is a sentence.</p>
          <p>Remember that ( ) denote the set of all ground instances of a formula .</p>
          <p>Corollary 3. Let = (∃ 1, … , ) ( 1, … , ) be a purely existential sentence and a
quanti昀椀erfree formula. Then is valid i昀 ⋁ ∈ ( ) is valid.</p>
          <p>Proof. To prove the if-half, assume is valid, then there are ground terms ( ,)1≤ ≤ ,1≤ ≤ such
that ⋁=1 ( ,1, … , , ) is valid by Corollary 2. For each ≤ , ( ,1, … , , ) is a ground instance
of , i.e., ( ,1, … , , ) ∈ ( ) . Hence ⋁ ∈ ( ) ≡ 2 ′ ∨ ⋁=1 ( ,1, … , , ), where ′ is a
disjunction of all the ground instances of that do not occur in the disjunction ⋁=1 ( ,1, … , , ).
Consequently, ⋁ ∈ ( ) is valid too. To prove the only-if-half, assume ⋁ ∈ ( ) is valid.
For each ∈ ( ) , = ( 1, … , ) for some sequence of ground terms 1, … , . We can give
each ∈ ( ) a unique natural number say such that = ( ,1, … , , ). Consequently, there
are ground terms ( ,)1≤ ≤ ,1≤ ≤ , where is the number of ground instances of such that
⋁=1 ( ,1, … , , ) is valid. By Corollary 2, is valid.</p>
          <p>For example the following formula (∃ , ) ( , ) is valid i昀 ⋁ ∈ ( ( , )) is valid by the
corollary above. Later we will deal with a formula that is a disjunction of purely existential
sentences, hence we need the following proposition.</p>
          <p>Proposition 7. Let = (∃ ,1, … , , ) ( ,1, … , , ) be a purely existential sentence and
quanti昀椀er-free formula for any ∈ ℕ. Then 1 ∨…∨ is valid i昀 (⋁ 1∈ ( 1) 1)∨…∨(⋁ ∈ ( )
is valid.
a
)
Proof. Note that
1 ∨ … ∨
= ((∃ 1,1, … , 1, 1) 1 ∨ … ∨ (∃ ,1, … , , ) )
≡2 (∃ 1,1, … 1, 1, … , ,1, … , , )( 1 ∨ … ∨
)
⋁ ∈ ( 1∨…∨ )
pairwise.</p>
          <p>By Corollary 3, 1 ∨ … ∨ is valid i昀 ⋁ ∈ ( 1∨…∨ ) is valid. It is not hard to see that
≡ 2 (⋁ 1∈ ( 1) 1)∨…∨(⋁ ∈ ( ) ) because 1, …, and share no variables
For example the following formula (∃ , )( ( , ))) ∨ (∃ )( ( ))
⋁ 1∈ ( ( , )) 1 ∨ ⋁ 2∈ ( ( )) 2, by Proposition 7.
is valid i昀</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-8">
        <title>4.8. Validity And The Monotonicity in Class</title>
        <p>Here the connection between the previous validity results and the monotonicity of programs in
class will be shown.</p>
        <p>Proposition 8. For a program</p>
        <p>of class , an interpretation , a ground atom
Φ
Proof. Φ ( ) = ( ), for a disjunction of conjunctions of literals
Note that ( ) = { ← } ∪ ⋃1≤ ≤ { ← | ∈ (
(⋃1≤ ≤ ⋃ ∈ ( ) ) . Consequently Φ ( ) = (
where ↔ ∈
)}. Hence =
∨ ⋁(1≤ ≤ ⋁ ∈ ( ) )) .</p>
        <p>( ( )) .</p>
        <p>∨
Proposition 9. For any program of class , the semantic operator Φ
⋁1≤ ≤ (∃ ) is not valid in classical two-valued logic.
is non-monotonic i昀
Proof. To prove the if-half, assume the sentence ⋁1≤ ≤ (∃ ) is not valid in classical
twovalued logic. By Proposition 7, the formula = ⋁1≤ ≤ ⋁ ∈ ( ) is not valid in classical
two-valued logic either. Hence, we can 昀椀nd a two-valued interpretation such that ( ) = ⊥ .
By Corollary 1, we can 昀椀nd a three-valued Łukasiewicz interpretation ′ where ′( ) = ⊥ .
So one can construct an interpretation 1 where: (1) For any ground atom , if ≠ , then
1( ) = ′( ) ; (2) 1( ) = U. Note that 1( ) = ⊥ , since ( ) = ⊥ and does not occur in
. Also 1( ) = ⊥ by de昀椀nition of 1. Therefore 1( ∨ ) = ⊥ . Construct another
interpretation 2 where: (1) For any ground atom , if ≠ , then 2( ) = ′( ) ; (2) 2( ) = ⊤.
Note that 2( ) = ⊥ , since ′( ) = ⊥ and does not occur in . Also 2( ) = ⊤by de昀椀nition
of 2. Therefore 2( ∨ ) = ⊤ . Note also that 1 ⊆ 2 because they only di昀er on the
mapping of where 1( ) = U and 2( ) = ⊤. By Proposition 7 Φ 1( ) = 1( ∨ ) = ⊥
and Φ 2( ) = 2( ∨ ) = ⊤ . Hence Φ 1 ⊈ Φ 2, while 1 ⊆ 2. So Φ is non-monotonic.
To prove the only-if-half, assume Φ is non-monotonic. Then There are two interpretations
1 and 2 where 1 ⊆ 2 and Φ 1 ⊈ Φ 2. Due to Φ 1 ⊈ Φ 2, for some ground atom ,
Φ 1( ) ≠ Φ 2( ) and Φ 1( ) ≠ U. Φ 1( ) ≠ U implies that is a de昀椀ned atom otherwise
Φ 1( ) = Φ 2( ) = U by De昀椀nition 2. Since is the only de昀椀ned atom, Φ 1( ) ≠ Φ 2( )
and Φ 1( ) ≠ U. By Proposition 3, 1( ∨ ) ≠ 2( ∨ ) and 1( ∨ ) ≠ U where
= ⋁1≤ ≤ ⋁ ∈ ( ) . Since 1( ∨ ) ≠ U, 1( ∨ ) is either ⊤ or ⊥. Assume
1( ∨ ) = ⊤ . Assume 1( ) = ⊤. Then 1( ) = ⊤. Since 1 ⊆ 2, 2( ) = ⊤ and
2( ) = ⊤ so 2( ∨ ) = ⊤ but 1( ∨ ) ≠ 2( ∨ ) . A contradiction. So
1( ) ≠ ⊤. Consequently 1( ) = ⊤ , which implies 2( ) = ⊤ , by Proposition 4. So
2( ∨ ) = ⊤ but 1( ∨ ) ≠ 2( ∨ ) . A contradiction. 1( ) ≠ ⊤ either. Hence
1( ∨ ) ≠ ⊤ , subsequently 1( ∨ ) = ⊥ . Since 1( ∨ ) = ⊥ , 1( ) = ⊥ . There is
a three-valued Łukasiewicz interpretation 1 where 1( ) = ⊥ . By Corollary 1, is not valid in
classical two-valued logic. By Proposition 7, the sentence ⋁1≤ ≤ (∃ ) is not valid in classical
two-valued logic either.
4.9. Reduction
,
,
,
1 ),
),</p>
        <p>}.
is shown on the le昀琀, and program
is shown on the
As mentioned before a PCP instance has solution i昀 is valid, see Section 4.3. Note that
program shown on the right has a non-monotonic semantic operator i昀 is not valid by
Proposition 9. So program has a monotonic semantic operator i昀 is valid. Consequently,
program has a monotonic semantic operator i昀 PCP instance has a solution.
Theorem 3. The monotonicity of the semantic operator of a given contextual program
undecidable
is
Proof. If the monotonicity of Φ is decidable, then the PCP problem is decidable by the previous
reduction. Hence, the monotonicity of Φ is undecidable.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Conclusion</title>
      <p>
        Contextual programs use the context operator (ctxt) to model cases where default reasoning
is preferred. There is always a least 昀椀xed point of the semantic operator of non-contextual
programs. This is possible because the semantic operator of non-contextual programs is
monotonic [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref12">12, 10</xref>
        ]. On the other hand the semantic operator of contextual programs is o昀琀en
non-monotonic and their semantic operators o昀琀en do not have any 昀椀xed points. Nonetheless,
for the class of acyclic contextual programs, there is always a least 昀椀xed point of the semantic
operator by the Banach Contraction Mapping Theorem [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11 ref13">11, 13</xref>
        ]. This 昀椀xed point was shown
to be a model in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ], and has been shown to be a minimal model by Theorem 1. Contextual
programs o昀琀en do not have monotonic semantic operators, that is why there is no guarantee a
椀昀xed point exists. The monotonicity of the semantic operator of a contextual given program has
been shown to be generally undecidable in Theorem 3 using a reduction from PCP. However, it
is decidable for programs with 昀椀nite Herbrand base because the number of interpretations is
椀昀nite in this case.
      </p>
    </sec>
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