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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Identifying Noise Variables in Singular Decisions using Counterfactual Reasoning</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Meghna Bhadra</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Stefen Hölldobler</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>. Noise in Singular Decisions</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>North Caucasus Federal University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Stavropol, Russian Federation</addr-line>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Computer Science</institution>
          ,
          <country country="DE">Germany</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>In their book, Noise: A Flaw in Human Judgment, the authors Daniel Kanheman, Olivier Sibony and Cass R. Sunstein highlight the importance of minimizing bias, i.e. systematic deviation, and noise, i.e. variability, in judgments in order to reduce error. Bias has long been the subject of many discussions but noise is yet to gain the attention it deserves. In this paper, we discuss noise variables in decision-making, particularly in unique, non-recurrent or singular decisions. For this purpose we introduce and utilize the framework of the Weak Completion Semantics to discuss how noise variables may be identified using counterfactual reasoning.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;Weak Completion Semantics</kwd>
        <kwd>Noise</kwd>
        <kwd>Singular Decisions</kwd>
        <kwd>Counterfactual Reasoning</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>
        same person being interviewed by diferent interviewers may be rated and assessed diferently.
This indicates variability and noise. People seeking asylum in the United States are admitted
on a system resembling a lottery [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ]. This indicates variability and noise. Decisions to grant
patents are again variable and thus noisy [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        When speaking of noise in decision-making, one needs to recognize two kinds of decisions:
recurrent and singular. Recurrent decisions are those which we take on a repetitive basis. For
example, deciding on the grades or performance of students appearing for an examination.
Singular decisions are on the other hand unique and not repeated. For example, deciding on
marriage with a particular person, or deciding whether to design a certain kind of mobile
application can be considered as singular decisions. Obama’s decision to send three thousand
healthcare workers and soldiers to West Africa when the Ebola epidemic broke out in 2014 is yet
another example of a historically prominent singular decision [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. Obama had never encountered
such a situation before and never had to take such a decision prior to that experience. Thus,
he did not have a previously formulated and pre-packaged template of actions or choices he
could draw from. Moreover, he did not have the scope to repeat this decision; it was a unique
situation which was not recurrent.
      </p>
      <p>
        Recurrent and singular decisions both sufer from noise and variability. It is however not very
easy to identify noise in singular decisions, given their nature. While identifying the presence of
noise in the exemplary situation above, one may imagine the following, in lines with [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]: would
Obama have taken the same decision had he been surrounded by a diferent set of advisors? Or
if his advisors had a diferent mindset? What if the situation and its gravity had been presented
diferently to the president? If we can imagine diferent alternative outcomes on tweaking these
diferent parameters, we can sense the noise in the system. These parameters are therefore the
noise variables. The authors of [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] suggest that noise in singular decisions could be identified
using counterfactual reasoning. However, this point was not very elaborated upon. Thus, it is
the goal of this paper to discuss an example of a singular decision, and using it as a prototypical
model illustrate how counterfactual reasoning may be employed to recognize noise variables in
the system. We use the Weak Completion Semantics (WCS) framework for our purposes.
      </p>
      <p>
        The WCS is a formal three-valued, computational, non-monotonic cognitive theory. Till date
it has been used to adequately model the suppression task by [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ] as shown by [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ], disjunctive
reasoning as shown by [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ], human syllogistic reasoning as shown by [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ], and its belief bias
as discussed in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]. It has also been used to model the four inference tasks associated with
reasoning about a conditional sentence, namely afirmation of the antecedent, afirmation of
the consequent in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ], denial of the antecedent in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ] and denial of the consequent in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Counterfactual reasoning, as the name suggest, is reasoning with imagined alternatives
which are contrary to facts. That is, how people reflect on past events which have occurred,
and imagine possibilities like, ”What if . . . had happened? Would the outcome have been any
diferent? What if . . . had not happened?”. People can imagine alternatives to something that
has happened, by either deleting or undoing some aspect of it which had happened in the past
reality, or by adding some new aspects to their simulation of reality [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]. To use an example
from the field of explainable AI, discussed in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ], suppose a human tries to understand why
an autonomous vehicle swerved into a wall to avoid hitting a pedestrian (thus injuring its
passenger) and not hit the brakes instead. One might wonder, ”if the car detected the pedestrian
earlier and braked, the passenger would not have been injured” or ”if the car had not swerved
towards the wall then the passenger would not have been injured”. The former is called an additive
counterfactual as it adds or considers new information for the reasoning process, and the latter
is called subtractive because it deletes facts for the reasoning process.
      </p>
      <p>Summing up, during decision-making or judgment it is advisable that both noise and bias
within a system be addressed and minimized as much as possible. In order to reduce noise, one
needs to identify it first. Our aim is to propose one such modelling method using the WCS
to identify noise variables within a given system. The paper is thus organized as follows: In
Section 2 we formally introduce the WCS. A classification of conditional sentences relevant to the
goal of this paper is given in Section 3. An example of a singular decision is presented in Section 4.
Identification of noise variables in this particular system using the WCS is demonstrated in
Section 5. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude and outline further possible research.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. The Weak Completion Semantics</title>
      <p>
        We assume the reader to be familiar with logic and logic programming as presented in e.g. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ]
and [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ]. Let ⊤, ⊥, and U be truth constants denoting true, false, and unknown, respectively. A
(logic) program is a finite set of clauses of the form  ← body , where  is an atom (also called
a head ) and body is ⊤, or ⊥, or a finite, non-empty conjunction of literals. Clauses of the form
 ← ⊤ ,  ← ⊥ , and  ← 1, . . . ,  are called facts, assumptions, and rules, respectively,
where , 1 ≤  ≤ , are literals. We restrict our attention to propositional programs although
the WCS extends to first-order programs as well [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Throughout this paper,  will denote a program. An atom  is defined in  if and only if 
contains a clause of the form  ← body . As an example consider the program
 = { ←  ∧ ¬ab, ab ← ⊥} ,
where , , and ab are atoms.  and ab are defined, whereas  is undefined. ab is an
abnormality predicate which is assumed to be false. In the WCS, this program represents the
conditional sentence if  then . In their everyday lives humans are often required to reason
in situations where the information of all factors afecting the situation might not be complete.
They still reason, unless new information which needs consideration comes to light. The
abnormality predicate in the program serves the purpose of this (default) assumption, as was
suggested in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ]. Let  be a consistent subset of literals occurring in P, i.e.  does not contain
both an atom and its negation. Then, defs(, ) = { ← body ∈  |  ∈   ¬ ∈ }. E.g.
let 0 = { ← ⊤ ,  ← ,  ← ⊥} and  = {, ¬}. Then, defs(0, ) = { ← ⊤ ,  ← }.
      </p>
      <p>
        Let us now consider the following transformation: (1) For all defined atoms  occurring
in a program , replace all clauses of the form  ← body 1,  ← body 2, . . . by  ←
body 1 ∨ body 2 ∨ . . . . (2) Replace all occurrences of ← by ↔. The resulting set of equivalences
is called the weak completion of , denoted by wc(). It difers from the program completion
defined in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ] in that undefined atoms in the weakly completed program are not mapped to
false, but to unknown instead. Reconsidering the previous program 0, the reader may note
that while the undefined atom  is mapped to false under the completion of 0, it is mapped to
unknown under its weak completion. Weak completion is necessary for the WCS framework to
adequately model the suppression task (and other reasoning tasks) as demonstrated in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        As shown in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
        ], each weakly completed program admits a least model under the
threevalued Łukasiewicz logic [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">19</xref>
        ] (see Table 1). This model will be denoted by ℳ(). It can be
computed as the least fixed point of a semantic operator introduced in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">20</xref>
        ]. Let  be a program
and  be a three-valued interpretation represented by the pair ⟨⊤, ⊥⟩, where ⊤ and ⊥ are
the sets of atoms mapped to true and false by , respectively, and atoms which are not listed are
mapped to unknown. We define Φ  = ⟨ ⊤,  ⊥⟩,1 where
 ⊤ = { | there exists  ← body ∈  and  body = ⊤},
 ⊥ = { | there exists  ← body ∈  and for all  ← body ∈  one finds  body = ⊥}.
Following [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21">21</xref>
        ] we consider an abductive framework ⟨,  , ℐ, |=⟩, where  is a program,
 = { ← ⊤ |  is undefined in } ∪ { ← ⊥ |  is undefined in } is the set of
abducibles, ℐ is a finite set of integrity constraints of the form ⊥ ← body or U ← body ,2 and
ℳ() |=  if ℳ() maps the formula  to true. Let  be an observation, i.e., a finite
set of literals each of which does not follow from ℳ(). We apply abduction to explain ,
where  is called explainable in the abductive framework ⟨,  , ℐ, |=⟩ if and only if there
exists a non-empty  ⊆   called an explanation such that ℳ(∪ ) |=  for all  ∈ 
and ℳ(∪ ) satisfies ℐ. We have assumed that the set of explanations is non-empty as
otherwise the observation already follows from the weak completion of the program. Formula 
follows credulously from  and  if and only if there exists an explanation  for  such that
ℳ(∪ ) |=  .  follows skeptically from  and  if and only if  can be explained and
for all explanations  for  we find ℳ(∪ ) |=  . The latter is an application of the
so-called Gricean implicature [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">22</xref>
        ]: humans normally do not quantify over things which do not
exist. Meaning, (unlike classical logic) all explanations for an observation  may only be taken
into account to skeptically decide on a formula  , when  is explainable and these so-called
explanations exist in the first place. If a formula  does not follow skeptically from  and ,
we conclude that nothing follows. Furthermore, one should also observe that if an observation 
cannot be explained, then nothing follows credulously as well as skeptically. In all examples
discussed in this paper the set of integrity constraints is empty; they are not relevant to the goal
of this paper. However they are needed in other applications of the WCS like human disjunctive
reasoning [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]. For the purposes of our current goal we utilize a so-called revision operator rev ,
defined in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref23">23</xref>
        ]. Let us consider a consistent set of literals , whose elements in the general case
may be mapped to false under the least model of wc(). We then define the revision of  with
respect to  as, (, ) = ( ∖ defs(, )) ∪ { ← ⊤ |  ∈ } ∪ { ← ⊥ | ¬  ∈ }.
1Whenever we apply a unary operator like Φ to an argument like , we omit the parenthesis and write Φ 
instead. Likewise, we write  body instead of (body).
2Please note that assumptions like  ← ⊥ are weakly completed. Their truth value is propagated via Φ. Moreover,
they can be overridden by another clause of the form  ← body. On the other hand, the constraint ⊥ ←  cannot
be part of the program. It’s only purpose is to eliminate models, where  is true.
      </p>
      <p>
        Overall, given premises, general knowledge, and observations, reasoning in the WCS is
modelled in six steps:
1. Reasoning towards a logic program  following [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">20</xref>
        ].
2. Weakly completing the program, leading to ().
3. Computing the least model ℳ() of () under the three-valued Łukasiewicz logic.
4. Reasoning with respect to ℳ().
5. If observations cannot be explained, then applying skeptical abduction.
      </p>
      <p>
        6. Searching for counterexamples [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ].
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. A Classification of Conditional Sentences</title>
      <p>
        In this section we introduce a classification of conditionals and their antecedents which we
consider relevant for the identification of noise variables in a system. Pragmatics, life experiences
and cultural diferences play a deciding role in how diferent individuals comprehend or classify
both. Following [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref24">24</xref>
        ] we identify two types of conditional sentences: obligational and factual. We
call a conditional sentence obligational if the truth of the consequent appears to be obligatory
when given that the antecedent is true. For each obligational conditional there are two initial
possibilities humans comprehending the conditional think about. The first possibility is the
conjunction of the antecedent and the consequent, which is permitted in the viewpoint of the
individual. The second possibility is the conjunction of the antecedent and the negation of
the consequent, which is forbidden. Exceptions are possible but unlikely. Let us consider for
example, if Maria drinks alcoholic beverages in pubs then she must be over 19 years of age. In
many countries the law demands that a person may only drink alcohol publicly when they
are above a certain age group (e.g. 19 years). This implies that for an individual from such a
background, Maria is drinking alcoholic beverages in a pub and she is older than 19 years is a
permitted possibility, whereas Maria is drinking alcoholic beverages in a pub and she is not older
than 19 years is a forbidden one. Hence, this particular conditional is an obligational one. As
another example consider, if plants get water then they grow. Here, plants getting water and
plants growing is a permitted possibility. But as many plant enthusiasts would know, plants
getting water and plants not growing is also possible. There are many factors, such as lack of
light, overwatering, pest infestation, etc. which may hinder a plant’s growth. Conditionals
such as these, where the (truth of the) consequent is not obligatory given the antecedent, we
call factual conditionals. In particular, in such a case the truth of the antecedent is deemed
inconsequential to that of the consequent by the individual in question.
      </p>
      <p>After the above discussion a question that may naturally arise is, what happens when the
antecedent of a conditional sentence is not satisfied? To that end, the antecedent  of a
conditional sentence if  then  can be classified as necessary with respect to the consequent ,
if and only if  cannot be true unless  is true. This implies that if  does not hold,  cannot
either. For example, in case of the conditional if plants get water then they grow, the antecedent
plants get water is a necessary one for the consequent plants will grow. If a plant is not watered
at all, it will very likely die. This does not imply however, that the antecedent need always be a
precondition for the consequent, per se. On the other hand, the antecedent  of a conditional
sentence if  then  is said to be non-necessary with respect to the consequent , if  can be
true despite the falsity of . This implies, if  does not hold,  may or may not hold. In the
conditional, if Maria drinks alcoholic beverages in pubs then she must be over 19 years of age, the
falsity of drinking alcoholic beverages in a pub is inconsequential to the truth of the consequent
older than 19 years. There are plenty of adults (over 19 years) who do not drink alcohol. The
antecedent of the conditional sentence is therefore called non-necessary.</p>
      <p>
        In order to account for the aforementioned classifications in the WCS, given a clause
{ ←  ∧ ¬ab} in a program , the previous definition of the set of abducibles  (see
Section 2) can be extended to include  = { ← ⊤} when the antecedent is deemed
non-necessary, and to include  = {ab ← ⊤} when the conditional is deemed factual. An
interested reader may find this discussed in a lot more detail in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ].
4. A Singular Decision: Dr. Snow and the Broad Street Pump
As an example of a singular decision let us consider the following excerpt from the life of the
father of epidemiology, Dr. John Snow, synthesized from [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref25 ref26">25, 26</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>The human race has been threatened by a multitude of diseases, among which Cholera alone
has claimed the lives of many over the years. Its patients sufer from mild to severe symptoms,
the latter including intense diarrhoea and dehydration which may cause the person’s skin to turn
bluish-grey and even be life-threatening. This symptom gives Cholera its colloquial nickname,
"the blue death". Although Cholera still poses a problem in certain parts of the world, sewage and
water treatment systems have helped curb it in many parts of the globe. This was not however
always the case. England for example sufered high Cholera outbreaks in 1831, 1848 and 1854. No
efective treatment had yet been in sight, and people did not yet have the knowledge that bacteria
transmitted the disease. It was a common (mis)conception that Cholera spread through "miasmas"
or toxic gases from open graves, garbage dumps, sewers etc.</p>
      <p>During the Cholera outbreak in 1848, Dr. John Snow, who had received his medical degree in
London was a practising physician there. The outbreak led Snow to examine many Cholera patients
and become heavily involved in the study of the disease. It is also noteworthy that during the
1831 outbreak, young Snow who aimed to be a physician had been working as an apprentice to a
physician who treated Cholera patients. These experiences ultimately led Snow to publish a book on
specific conclusions he had reached about the nature of the disease which was unfortunately rejected
by most of his colleagues in the medical community. This did not discourage Snow however, and in
1854 when Cholera broke out once again Snow conducted his own investigation. His investigations
showed that most death cases were approximately concentrated around a hand pump in Broad
Street. Furthermore, numerous (fruitful) interviews with the families of the deceased indicated
that the victims had consumed water from the aforementioned hand pump. Convinced that the
hand pump’s contaminated water played an important role in the epidemic, Snow appeared for
an interview with the Board of Guardians of the St. James parish. The board paid heed to Snow’s
advice and had the hand pump removed the following day. This helped control the epidemic to a
large extent, the repercussions of which echoed through time.</p>
      <p>The decision taken by the Board of Guardians to remove the Broad Street pump was a singular
one because it was a unique decision with unique circumstances that was never repeated. This
singular decision, however, was not entirely free from noise. In other words, had certain
parameters in the background story been changed, the singular decision might have had a
diferent outcome. Identification of the noise, or more specifically the noise variables can be
brought about by reasoning counterfactually about the singular decision. How this can be
modelled using the WCS framework will be discussed in the next section.
5. Identifying Noise Variables using Counterfactual Reasoning</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>5.1. Representing Background Knowledge using Causal Conditionals</title>
        <p>Table 2 lists the various conditional statements which may be used to comprehensively
summarize the background knowledge presented in Section 4. For the convenience of the reader it
also includes the corresponding clauses in a logic program representing the said conditionals,
which shall be further used during the modelling of noise variables in the next sub-section. The
reader may observe that the abnormality predicate in each clause has been assumed to be false.
This may be overridden in the subsequent discussion when we take the classification of the
conditionals and their antecedents into account while searching for noise variables.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>5.2. Modelling Noise Variables using the Weak Completion Semantics</title>
        <p>The idea behind the approach that we demonstrate in this paper is to pick up the thread of
the singular decision or the first statement, counterfactually gauge which antecedent could
have altered the consequent, which in turn hints at the former being a noise variable. Then,
go further back in the chain of events to explore the rules of inference which led to the
aforementioned antecedent, thus repeating the exercise.</p>
        <p>Beginning with statement (1) in Table 2, upon considering the nature of the antecedent as
discussed in Section 3, one may deem the antecedent to have been necessary for the consequent.
In other words, one may not easily imagine a possibility where Snow had no interview with the
board yet the board decided to remove the hand pump. Had Snow not approached the board for
an interview, the very idea of removing the hand pump may have slipped their attention. The
logic program 1 which may be constructed from statement (1) consists of the following:
{ ←  ∧ ¬ab, ab ← ⊥ ,  ← ⊤} ,
where rem denotes the board removed the hand pump and int denotes Snow had an interview
with the board. abint is an abnormality predicate denoting anything that went wrong with
regard to the interview, e.g. one of the board members fell sick on the spot and the meeting was
adjourned. As there was no such case it is assumed to be false. The last clause represents a fact.
The weak completion of 1, (1), is</p>
        <p>
          { ↔  ∧ ¬ab, ab ↔ ⊥,  ↔ ⊤},
which has the least model ℳ(1) = ⟨{, }, {ab}⟩.3 This signifies  and 
are true, while ab is false. When reasoning with the situation counterfactually, one may
use the conditional if Dr. Snow did not have an interview with the board, then the board would
not have removed the hand pump or, if ¬ then ¬. Upon evaluating ¬ under the
aforementioned least model, the reader may find that it is false. Hence we call the
conditional a subtractive counterfactual conditional, in lines with [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
          ]. Revising 1 with respect
to {¬} using the revision operator rev (see Section 2) leads us to the revised program
rev (1 , {¬int }) = (1 ∖ { ← ⊤} ) ∪ { ← ⊥} . Its weak completion,
        </p>
        <p>{ ↔  ∧ ¬ab, ab ↔ ⊥,  ↔ ⊥}
admits the least model ⟨∅, {, , ab}⟩. In particular,  which was true is now false.
Thus, the variability in the truth of the consequent leads to variability in the outcome, which
indicates noise. Consequently, int is a noise variable.</p>
        <p>Now we further explore the atom int and hence statement (2). Considering that the antecedent
may be deemed necessary for the consequent, any possibility that Snow himself was not convinced
that the hand pump should be removed yet had an interview with the board about the same may
be discounted. The logic program 2 constructed from the statements (1) and (2) is:
{ ←  ∧ ¬ab, ab ← ⊥ ,  ←  ∧ ¬ab, ab ← ⊥ ,  ← ⊤} ,
where conv denotes Snow was convinced about the hand pump, and abconv is an abnormality
predicate assumed to be false. The last clause represents a fact. (2) admits the least
model ℳ(2) = ⟨{, , }, {ab, ab}⟩. Reasoning counterfactually, one may
imagine the conditional if John had not been convinced then he would not have asked for an
interview viz. if ¬ then ¬. As ¬ evaluates to false under the aforementioned
least model, this is a subtractive counterfactual conditional. Then, rev (2 , {¬conv })
leads to (2 ∖ { ← ⊤} ) ∪ { ← ⊥} . Its weak completion admits the least model
⟨∅, {, , , ab, ab}⟩. This indicates that  is a noise variable.</p>
        <p>
          Going further back on the chain of events, we now consider the statements (1) to (4). In case
of statements (3) and (4), both antecedents of the conditionals may be considered necessary for
the consequent. Hence, in such a case the logic program 3 is:
3This model can be computed as follows. Starting with the interpretation ⟨∅, ∅⟩, we obtain Φ1 ⟨∅, ∅⟩ =
⟨{}, {ab}⟩ and Φ1 ⟨{}, {ab}⟩ = ⟨{, }, {ab}⟩ = Φ1 ⟨{, }, {ab}⟩.
 ←  ∧ ¬ab,  ←  ∧ ¬ab,
ab ← ⊥ , ab ← ¬ , ab ← ⊥ , ab ← ¬ ,  ← ⊤ ,  ← ⊤} ,
where exp denotes Snow had a lot of experience with Cholera patients and inv denotes Snow’s
investigations proved fruitful. abexp and abinv are abnormality predicates. The last two clauses
represent facts. One may observe that we have now added the clauses ab ← ¬  and
ab ← ¬  and we attempt to clarify this in what follows. As the antecedents of both
the conditionals if  then  and if  then  have been deemed necessary for the
consequent, the possibility that one of the antecedents is false but the consequent is true is
discounted. Not having enough experience with Cholera patients could have prevented Snow from
being convinced about the removal of the hand pump even if his investigations had proved fruitful.
Likewise, an unproductive investigation could have prevented Snow from being convinced about the
pump, despite him having enough experience. Thus given the two conditionals if  then 
and if  then , where both the antecedents are deemed to be necessary, we characterize
¬ as an abnormality with respect to the former conditional and ¬ as an abnormality
with respect to the latter. Hence the additional clauses ab ← ¬  and ab ← ¬ . Such
a characterization is along the lines of so-called enabling relations as discussed in [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref27">27</xref>
          ]. Using
this we have also modelled experiments involving additional arguments in the suppression task
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4 ref5">4, 5</xref>
          ]. The reader may note that in (3), the assumptions ab ← ⊥ and ab ← ⊥ are
overridden by ab ← ¬  and ab ← ¬ , respectively. (3) has the least model
ℳ(3) = ⟨{, , , , }, {ab, ab, ab, ab}⟩ where inv and
exp are true, and so is rem. In particular no least models of (3) where inv , exp or both
are false but conv is true are constructed. Reasoning with the situation counterfactually now
gives rise to the conditionals, if Snow had no experience with Cholera patients then he would
not have been convinced, viz. if ¬ then ¬, and if his investigations were unsuccessful
then he would not have been convinced viz. if ¬ then ¬. Upon evaluation of ¬ and
¬ with respect to ℳ(3) the reader may find that they are both false. Hence these are
subtractive counterfactual conditionals. So, rev (3 , {¬exp, ¬inv }) results in the program
(3 ∖ { ← ⊤ ,  ← ⊤} ) ∪ { ← ⊥ ,  ← ⊥} . Its weak completion now admits a
least model where inv and exp are false, and (now) so is rem. Thus the variability in the truth
of rem indicates that inv and exp are noise variables.
        </p>
        <p>Let us now consider statements (1) to (6), and in particular statements (5) and (6). While
practising in London during 1848 may be deemed necessary for the level of experience Snow
had with Cholera patients, his apprenticeship during 1831 may be deemed non-necessary by
some individuals. That is while one may not readily imagine a possibility where Snow did not
practise in London, but had experience with Cholera patients, one may imagine Snow not doing the
apprenticeship yet having experience. The reader is pointed out that the opposite may also hold
for some individuals where they may consider apprenticeship to be necessary but the London
practice to be non-necessary. Or some individuals may even consider both antecedents to be
non-necessary for the consequent. For the sake of modelling and demonstration purposes, we
assume the first case. So, we consider the conditional if  then , where  is deemed
non-necessary for . And consider if  then , where  is deemed necessary for
, owing to which we characterize ¬ as an abnormality with respect to the former
conditional.4 Thus, the program 4 has the clauses:</p>
        <p>∧ ¬ab, ab ← ⊥ ,
, ab ← ¬</p>
        <p>,
 ← ⊤ ,  ← ⊤ ,  ← ⊤} ,
where prac denotes Snow was practising in London during the 1848 outbreak and app denotes
Snow was an apprentice for a physician during the 1831 outbreak. abprac and abapp are abnormality
predicates. The last three clauses represent facts. The reader may note that we now have
the additional clause ab ← ¬ , and that the assumption ab ← ⊥ is overridden by
 in (4). The least model of (4) is:
ab ← ¬
ℳ(4) = ⟨{, , , , , , }, {ab, ab, ab, ab, ab, ab}⟩.
Here, app and prac are both true and so is rem. Because prac has been deemed necessary
for exp, irrespective of whether he worked as an apprentice or not, as long as Snow did
not practice in London in 1848 he would not have the level of experience. Reasoning
counterfactually about the situation we may thus imagine, if Snow would not have been
practising in London then he would not have the experience viz. if ¬ then ¬. Upon
evaluating ¬ with respect to ℳ(4), we find that it is false. Hence, this is a subtractive
counterfactual conditional. Therefore revision using rev (4 , {¬prac}) leads us to the program
(4 ∖ { ← ⊤} ) ∪ { ← ⊥} . Its weak completion admits a least model where prac is
false, and so is rem. The variability in the truth of rem indicates that prac is a noise variable.</p>
        <p>Now, reconsidering statements (5) and (6) from a diferent angle, we might ask ourselves the
following - ”if Snow was a physician’s apprentice in 1831 does it necessarily mean that he would
have a high level of experience with Cholera patients?” or that ”if Snow practised in London in 1848,
does it necessarily that he would have a high level of experience with Cholera patients?”. In other
words, we may imagine a possibility where Snow did practise in London in 1848 but due to some
(additional) reasons he could not have a high level of experience with Cholera patients. Or that, he
was an apprentice but certain reasons hindered his opportunity to have the needed experience. As
discussed in Section 3, imagining such (alternative) possibilities count for statements (5) and (6)
being comprehended as factual. Meaning in such a case, given if  then  and afirming ,
both  and ¬ are deemed possible. For the current moment, we are particularly interested in
this latter possibility. Within the WCS it can be modelled by considering  as an observation
and applying abduction in order to explain it using the set of abducibles for factual conditionals,
 , mentioned in Section 3. We attempt to clarify the process in the current context in what

follows. We consider the program 5 = 4 ∖ { ← ⊤ ,  ← ⊤} , and consider  and
 to be observations instead, meaning  = {, }. Now we apply abduction in order to
explain . Following the definition of abducibles as described in Section 2, since both  and
4This is in lines with the prior discussion regarding statement (3) and (4).
 are undefined in 5, 5 = { ← ⊤ ,  ← ⊥ ,  ← ⊤ ,  ← ⊥} . Moreover,
comprehending statements (5) and (6) as factual entails extending the set of abducibles that can be
derived from 5 to 5 = 5 ∪ 5 , where 5 includes {ab ← ⊤ , ab ← ⊤} . While
there is a minimal explanation for , viz. { ← ⊤ ,  ← ⊤} , there is also a non-minimal
explanation viz. { ← ⊤ , ab ← ⊤ ,  ← ⊤ , ab ← ⊤} . Adding the former to 5
would again result in the program 4. However, the latter results in a program 5′:
 ←  ∧ ¬ab, ab ← ⊥ , ab ← ¬ ,</p>
        <p>∧ ¬ab, ab ← ⊥ , ab ← ⊤ ,</p>
        <p>, ab ← ¬ , ab ← ⊤ ,
 ← ⊤ ,  ← ⊤ ,  ← ⊤} .</p>
        <p>
          Its weak completion, (5′), admits the least model:
ℳ(5′) = ⟨{, , , ab, ab, ab}, {, ab, , ab, , ab, }⟩,
where , , ab and ab are true, but exp is false. The reader is pointed out that
the additional clauses {ab ← ⊤} and {ab ← ⊤} signify that there could be (other
additional) reasons which could have hindered Snow’s experience with Cholera patients.
This is in line with additive counterfactuals as discussed in [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
          ]. In other words, reasoning
counterfactually one may thus use statements such as if something abnormal had happened with
respect to his apprenticeship, then John would not have the experience, i.e. if ab then ¬ or,
if something abnormal had happened with respect to his practice, then John would not have the
experience, i.e. if ab then ¬. Information here is not taken away like in case of (the
previous) subtractive counterfactual statements, but rather added to the simulation of reality.
As rem is false in ℳ(5′), it signifies variability in the outcome. Thus ab and ab are
noise variables which could be explored further.
        </p>
        <p>
          The case of non-necessary antecedents begs a lengthier discussion than the current spatial
constraints of the paper would allow. Given if  then , comprehending  to be non-necessary
for  signifies that in case of ¬, both ¬ and particularly  are deemed possible. This
implies two least models, one in which  is false, and the other where  is true. Both can be

computed by employing the abductive framework using the extended set of abducibles 
mentioned in Section 3, as discussed in detail in [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
          ]. However, the implications of dealing with
these multiple least models when identifying noise variables need further analysis. For now, as
a small example let us consider statement (6) and explore the atom . Thus, we consider the
program 6 = (4 ∖ { ← ⊤} ) ∪ { ←  ∧ ¬ab, ab ← ⊥} . In statement (6),
the antecedent may be deemed non-necessary for the consequent. Meaning, considering the
question, ”if John had not received his medical degree in London, could he (yet) be practising there
during the 1848 outbreak?”, one may deem it possible for John to not have received his medical
degree in London but to have been practising there. This can be modelled within the WCS using the
aforementioned abductive framework as follows. Supposing  = {¬} to be an observation
for which we look for an explanation, leads us to apply abduction. Since  is undefined in 6,
6 includes { ← ⊤ ,  ← ⊥} . Furthermore as  here is a non-necessary antecedent,
  where 6 includes {  ← ⊤} . While there is a minimal explanation
6 = 6 ∪ 6
to  viz. { ← ⊥} , there is also a non-minimal explanation, viz. { ← ⊥ ,  ← ⊤} .
The latter results in the revised program 6 ∪ { ← ⊥ ,  ← ⊤} . Its weak completion
admits a least model where we find that  is true, although  is false. Summing up in
simpler words, there could be some reason due to which John practised in London (i.e. 
could be true) even if he had not received his medical degree there (i.e.  was false). Such an
exercise in turn motivates further questions along the lines - ”what if this particular reason had
not occurred?”. This so-called reason hints at being a noise variable and could be explored further.
        </p>
        <p>
          In all that has been demonstrated so far, we have attempted to illustrate the identification
of some of the noise variables in our system such as, , , , , , ab, ab
etc. Thus we have identified the system noise. At this point it must also be acknowledged that
while there are variables which may contribute to noise, there may also be those which do
not. One possible means to identify the latter could be to guage the relevance of the antecedent
of a conditional with respect to the consequent, in line with [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref28">28</xref>
          ]. For example, consider
7 = 6 ∪ { ← ⊤ ,  ← ⊤} , where  ← ⊤ represents the fact that the winter of
1848 was particularly harsh, and a conditional, if Snow received his medical degree from London
then the winter of 1848 was particularly harsh viz. if  then . In the common knowledge
of an individual,  is very likely not relevant to . This may be modelled following [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref29">29</xref>
          ],
using the notion of the so-called strong relevance, the core idea of which is to check whether
 loses support as soon as the support of  is withdrawn.5 The reader may observe that
both  and  are true in ℳ7 . Now, removing the support of  from 7 which leads
to 7′ =  ∖ { ← ⊤} , we still find that  is true in ℳ7′ . Hence, in this case we may
conclude that  is not strongly relevant to . The said individual may thus ask - ”if Snow
had not received his medical degree from London, would the winter of 1848 still be harsh?”. And
the answer may well be yes. With this remark we cease the discussion about variables that do
not add to noise, as it requires further research and is best reserved for another occasion.
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>6. Conclusion</title>
      <p>
        Noise just like bias, may be undesirable in much of our decision-making and judgment. As the
human race journeys further into the age of digitalization and artificial intelligence becomes
more and more involved in our daily lives, creating systems which minimize bias and noise, both
of which contribute to errors in judgement seems important. In order to create any kind of AI
system with decision-making capabilities with minimal noise and bias, it is essential to discuss
how they can be identified in our own, humane judgments, whether it be in economy, judiciary,
education, healthcare, or even personal. Regardless of whether the decisions are recurrent or
singular the aim is to identify and minimize the noise in both. In this paper, we have particularly
looked into singular decisions because in comparison with recurrent decisions the noise in these
systems may be less apparent. Considering the singular decision to remove the hand pump in
Broad Street which not only helped save the lives of many during the 1854 Cholera outbreak
5Unfortunately the current spatial constraints of the paper disallows us from being more detailed about strong
relevance, but an interested reader is encouraged to read [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref29">29</xref>
        ].
in London, but also influenced healthcare for the better around the world, we have attempted
to demonstrate how the historical outcome was not entirely free from noise. Had some of the
influencing causal factors been tweaked, the outcome may have been diferent. The outcome’s
variability thus becomes apparent. To that end, we have used the WCS framework to model
the identification of some of these so-called noise variables using counterfactual reasoning.
The protoypical modelling is not limited to the discussion in this paper however and there is
scope for future development and general formalization. Some avenues that present themselves
for furture exploration through the current exercise are modelling non-necessary antecedents
as noise variables, handling obligational conditionals when reasoning counterfactually and
eventually minimizing noise in a system.
      </p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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