=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-3289/paper2
|storemode=property
|title=Countering Russian Misinformation, Disinformation, Malinformation and Influence Campaigns in Italy Surrounding the Russian Invasion of Ukraine
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3289/paper2.pdf
|volume=Vol-3289
|authors=Max Lesser,Hallie J. Stern,Sara-Jayne Terp
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/ifdad/LesserST22
}}
==Countering Russian Misinformation, Disinformation, Malinformation and Influence Campaigns in Italy Surrounding the Russian Invasion of Ukraine==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3289/paper2.pdf
Countering Russian Misinformation, Disinformation,
Malinformation and Influence Campaigns in Italy
Surrounding the Russian Invasion of Ukraine
Max Lesser 1, Hallie J. Stern 1 and Sara J. Terp 1
1
DISARM Foundation
Abstract
Countering Russian misinformation, disinformation, malinformation (MDM) and influence
involves more than content moderation, censoring, and the deplatforming of key individuals
on digital platforms. This is especially true in Italy, given the large role that traditional media
such as television plays in the Italian media landscape. This paper examines two specific
Russian campaigns in Italy surrounding the war in Ukraine to demonstrate how responders
can employ the techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) outlined in the DISARM
framework to effectively counter Russian MDM and influence with a cross-platform, whole
of society approach.
Keywords 1
Disinformation, Counter-Disinformation, DISARM, Russia, Italy, Ukraine
1. Misinformation, Disinformation, and Malinformation Extend Beyond
Social Media Platforms
Much of the discourse surrounding misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation (MDM)
focuses on social media, but MDM extends far beyond online platforms. MDM campaigns use every
propagation tool necessary to fabricate events through the lens of the storyteller (often a nation state),
who uses political leaders, news pundits, or any other aligned, influential entities to push out their
agenda to influence a demographic for strategic gain.
Influential MDM campaigns combine a number of techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPS) that
vary in scope and style. A series of combined cyber, social, political, and economic schemes can lead
to larger military schemes that serve a larger aim, such as undermining democracy. MDM can be
amplified with traditional forms of media—such as television, radio, and print—or any platform that
has a large audience, reach, or following within specified cohorts or niches across civil society.
Considering the range of cross-platform TTPs used in campaigns, effective approaches to
countering MDM should move beyond a sole focus on censoring foreign news outlets and
deplatforming individuals on social media. Instead, counter-MDM responders should consider taking
a “whole of society” approach to security operations in the MDM space in order to shift narratives in
public dialogue, both online and offline. To achieve this, there are many tools and strategies that
responders can consider, a selection of which will be detailed in this paper.
1
IFDaD 2022 INTERNATIONAL FORUM on DIGITAL and DEMOCRACY, November 17-18, 2022, live and digital event in Rome, Italy
EMAIL: max.lesser@disarm.foundation (A. 1)
disarm.foundation
©️ 2022 Copyright for this paper by its authors.
Use permitted under Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
CEUR Workshop Proceedings (CEUR-WS.org)
2. MDM and the Italian Media Environment
The Global Disinformation Index (GDI) reports that more than a third of recently evaluated Italian
online news sites fall into the high- or maximum-risk category of presenting disinformation to the
Italian public [1]. GDI states that many of Italy’s media platforms publish sensational or otherwise
biased content in order to generate views and clicks, rather than inform, while negatively targeting
individuals, and groups, as well as various organizations and nation state leaders [2].
The GDI also suggests that many Italian publishers lack transparency in sources, financial
disclosures, and ownership. They report that “even the best-performing sites often fail to publish an
adequate code of ethics, disclose the author of an article, or clearly detail the ownership and financial
structure of the media outlet” [3]. This lack of transparency and non-adherence to editorial principles
and practices creates a media environment in which disinformation can thrive.
In a 2020 Global Advisory Survey, Ipsos also found that “in the past five years, the overall trust
placed in online news websites and platforms by Italians has decreased by 19 percent, with 69 percent
of respondents claiming that ‘fake news’ is prevalent in the news and information provided by online
news websites and platforms” [4]. These factors suggest that Italian citizens are aware of the
prevalence of MDM in their information ecosystem.
The DISARM foundation believes that the prevalence and influence of MDM in Italy can be
mitigated through appropriate intervention and application of recommended TTPs. Understanding
offensive strategies and employing defensive strategies mapped in the DISARM framework can help
counter the spread of MDM in Italy. We use two case studies to illustrate the use of this framework for
analysis and to wargame potential responses to targeted MDM campaigns; specifically, the denial of
Russian involvement in the Bucha massacre and allegations of US biological laboratories beneath the
Azovstal steel mill in Mariupol.
3. Russian Influence in the Italian Information Ecosystem
Winston Churchill famously referred to Italy as the “soft underbelly” of Europe while communicating
his strategic vision during WWII [5]. Today, this term has been appropriated to convey Italy’s
susceptibility to Russian influence [6].
Indeed, the prevalence of Russian influence in the Italian information ecosystem has been well
documented. COPASIR (the Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic), the Italian
parliamentary committee that oversees Italian intelligence, opened a probe in May 2022 to investigate
the use of Italian media outlets to propagate Russian MDM [7]. Adolfo Urso, COPASIR’s President,
confirmed that 13,831 documented instances of MDM have entered Italy’s information ecosystem
since 2014 [8]. More instances are likely undocumented.
The alarming degree of Russian influence in Italy’s information ecosystem is exemplified by the
appearance of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, on the Italian television show
Zona Bianca [9]. Here, Lavrov advanced claims that elicited widespread controversy.
First, he dismissed the notion that Ukrainian President Vlodomyr Zelensky’s Jewish heritage
undermines the Russian claim that Ukraine is run by Nazis. Stating that Zelensky’s Jewish heritage
“amounts to nothing,” Lavrov asserted that “Hitler, too was of Jewish origin” and that “all the worst
antisemites are Jewish” [10]. Lavrov also denied Russian responsibility for the Bucha massacre in this
interview, claiming that the Ukranians staged the massacre [11]. Lavrov appeared to be received
warmly by the presenter of the program, who refrained from pushing back on Lavrov’s assertions,
closing the interview by wishing Lavrov “good luck with your work” [12].
Another event that highlights the severity of Russian influence in Italian media occurred during a
prime time television show that was aired from Moscow’s Red Square on La7, an Italian television
channel [13]. This event featured Maria Zakharova, Director of the Information and Press Department
of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Vladimir Solovyov, a popular Russian radio and
television presenter [14]. Both have been known to make false claims that appear to advance the
Kremlin’s interest, such that Russia did not start the war in Ukraine and that the Pentagon is
developing biological weapons [15-16].
As the above incidents demonstrate, Russian MDM and influence in Italy extend far beyond online
platforms and social media; these are also spread through traditional media, and, significantly,
national television. Foregrounding the extent of Russian presence in Italian television, Decode39, an
Italian geopolitical and analytic news outlet, has listed Russian state officials and influencers who
have appeared on Italian television, drawing on research from Matteo Pugliese, an Italian Institute for
International Political Studies Fellow [17-18]. This research documents 12 Russians advancing
Kremlin talking points—including government officials, idealogues, and media personalities—who
were hosted on Rete4 and 8 who were hosted on La7, both of which are private networks, and 1 who
was hosted on state broadcaster RAI [19].
4. The Effects of Russian Influence on Italian Public Opinion
It appears that Russian influence has had a measurable effect on Italian public opinion. The full extent
is unknown, but a study by the European Council of Foreign Relations found that only 56% of Italians
blame Russia for war in Ukraine, the lowest in the European Union [20]. This same study found that
Italy is nearly evenly split over “which country constitutes the biggest obstacle to peace between
Russia and Ukraine,” with 39% saying that Russia is the biggest obstacle and 35% saying Ukraine
[21]. Similarly, a “Flash Eurobarometer Survey” performed by the European Commission found that
only 39% of Italians think Russian authorities are responsible for invasion of Ukraine [22].
5. Countering Russian MDM and Influence in Italian Information
Ecosystem: Moving Beyond Deplatforming, Content Moderation, and
Censorship
Considering that Russian MDM and influence in the Italian information ecosystem involve traditional
media such as television in addition to online platforms and social media, an effective response should
take a cross-platform approach to MDM in Italy’s media landscape. A sole focus deplatforming social
media users will likely fail to address the issue with traditional media such as television and radio.
Further, censorship of media outlets that have operations across online and traditional media will
likely fail to significantly stem the tide of Russian MDM and influence: indeed, the EU banned
Sputnik and Russia Today (RT) in March 2022, yet Russian MDM and influence continue to spread
throughout the Italian information ecosystem [23].
To demonstrate the techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) that responders can use to
counter Russian MDM and influence, we have analyzed two incidents (below), one surrounding the
Bucha massacre and the other surrounding the alleged US biological laboratories underneath the
Azovstal steel mill in Mariupol, Ukraine. For both incidents, we used the DISARM framework to map
out a selection of the TTPs used by the incident creators in their MDM and influence campaigns, and
the tools that can be used by responders to counter these incidents. These responder TTPs provide a
broader spectrum of possible response than deplatforming, content moderation, and censorship, which
can enable responders to respond more fully and effectively to Russian MDM and influence that spans
multiple forms of media.
6. Incident 1: Disinformation Denying the Bucha Massacre
A major talking point of Lavrov on Zona Bianca was the accusation that the Ukranians staged the
Bucha Massacre. These claims have been advanced by the official channels of the Russian Ministry of
Defense and the Twitter page of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [24].
The Institute of Strategic Dialogue conducted a study that identified the top 10 Facebook posts
concerning Bucha in 20 countries [25]. The study found that “8 of the 10 most shared posts” that
mentioned Bucha in the Italian information ecosystem were pro-Kremlin, the highest out of all the 20
countries it surveyed [26]. The study also found that these 8 posts “had either originated from the
official Facebook page of Italian war reporter Toni Capuozzo or mentioned a controversial
interpretation of the events by Capuozzo”: Capuzzo claimed that the fact that photos of the massacre
appeared in the media after the Russian troops withdrew suggests that the Ukranians rather than
Russians might be responsible for certain deaths [27]. Capuozzo also alleged inconsistencies between
photographs and people’s account of the massacre, noting that blood was not in the streets and that the
mayor of Bucha did not mention the bodies in a video that was released after the Russian troops
withdrew [28].
Below, we provide an overview of the TTPs displayed by the incident creators in this campaign, as
well as TTPs that can be used by responders to counter this campaign. These “red” and “blue” TTPs
are drawn from the open source DISARM framework [29].
The DISARM incident creator TTPs outlined below align with aspects of this specific incident. A
claim was made by Lavrov on Italian television (T0002, T0111, T0111.001) and the Russian Ministry
of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (T0110), one which dismissed the credibility of the Bucha
massacre (T0075, T0075.001, T0004, T0068, T0023). This claim was then picked up by an influential
Italian war reporter (T0039, T0100, T0100.001, T0100.003) and echoed across social media platforms
(T0104).
DISARM also outlines a wide range of TTPs that responders can use to counter this MDM and
influence. These TTPs that extend far beyond censoring and deplatforming individuals. Several of
these TTPs seek to strengthen the media environment more broadly, such as coalition building with
stakeholders and third party inducements (C00161). Others target the narrative directly, such as
developing a compelling counter narrative, one that is truth based (C00030). Others target specific
individuals, such as training newsrooms and journalists to counter influence moves (C00188) and
naming and shaming influencers who spread disinformation (C00048).
A robust response to the Bucha massacre would ideally employ a variety of these methods. The
following provide examples of responder TTPs in the context of this specific incident: forming an
Italian MDM-focused Information Sharing and Analysis Center (C00161); advancing the narrative
that the Bucha massacre plays into a long history of Russian atrocities by using hard evidence
(C00030); creating incentives (financial, social) for broadcasters on national television to undergo
courses that train them to identify and counter instances of MDM (C00188); and creating a campaign
that publically identifies Capuozzo as the culprit of disinformation and strongly denounces his actions
(C00048) .
Table 1
Disinformation Denying the Bucha Massacre Through the Lense of the DISARM Framework
Incident Creator TTPs Responder TTPs
TAO2: Plan Objectives TA01: Plan Strategy
T0002: Facilitate C00190: Open Engagement with Civil Society
State Propaganda C00174: Create a Healthier News Environment
T0075: Dismiss C00161: Coalition Building with Stakeholders
T0075.001: Discredit and third-party inducements
Credible Sources TA02: Plan Objectives
TA14: Develop Narratives C00030: Develop a compelling counter narrative
T0068: Respond to (truth based)
Breaking News Event C00031: Dilute the core narrative - create
or Active Crisis multiple permutations, target/amplify
T0004: Develop TA05: Micro Target
Competing Narratives C00065: Reduce political targeting
TA06: Develop Content C00178: Fill information voids with
T0023: Distort facts non-disinformation content
TA08: Conduct Pump Priming C00130: Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn
T0039: Bait legitimate vicariously.
influencers TA06: Develop Content
TA16: Establish Legitimacy C00014: Real-time updates to fact-checking
T0100: Co-opt trusted database
sources C00094: Force full disclosure on corporate
T0100.001: Co-Opt sponsor of research
Trusted Individuals TA07: Select Channels and Affordances
T0100.003 Co-opt C00099: Strengthen verification methods
Influencers TA08: Conduct Pump Priming
TA07: Select Channels and C00154: Ask media not to report false
Affordances information
T0104: Social C00188: Newsroom/Journalist training to
Networks counter influence moves
T0110: Formal C00113: Debunk and defuse a fake expert /
Diplomatic Channels credentials
T0111: Traditional TA09: Deliver Content
Media C00200: Respected figure (influencer) disavows
T0111.001: TV misinfo
C00125: Prebunking
TA11: Persist in the Information Environment
C00138: Spam domestic actors with lawsuits (ie.
defamation)
TA15: Establish Social Assets
C00062: Free open library sources worldwide
C00203: Stop offering press credentials to
propaganda outlets"
C00036: Infiltrate the in-group to discredit
leaders (divide)
C00048: Name and Shame Influencers
7. Incident 2: Disinformation Alleging US Biological Laboratories
Underneath Azovstal Steelworks
A graphic depicting alleged US biological laboratories beneath Azovstal steelworks, which served as
Ukraine’s last stand in Mariupol, was distributed by multiple Italian national television programmes,
including “Porta a Porta,” RAI 1’s flagship programme, as well as Rete4 and La7 [30]. This photo
appears to have been originally disseminated by Serhei Markov, political scientist and advisor to
Vladimir Putin [31].
This photo is not a real depiction of the Mariupol steel mill, but a rendering of a bunker from
“GURPS” (Generic Universal Roleplaying System), a role playing game developed in the 1970s and
80s [32]. This particular reference is related to a zombie fan fiction called the “Morrow Project,”
which takes place after a “devastating nuclear war” set in 1989 [33]. The latest edition of this game
was released in December of 2013 [34].
Figure 1: Image of alleged US Biolab beneath Mariupol Steel Mill, which is actually a graphic from
an apocalyptic board game. Source: “Kremlin on Air. Putin’s propaganda soars in Italy,” Source:
Decode39.
The allegation of US biological laboratories draws upon a recurring conspiracy theory that goes
back at least as far as the 1980s, namely, that the US created AIDs in a laboratory [35]. The AIDs
conspiracy is part of a Russian operation known as “Operation Infektion,” which appears to have
aimed to sow distrust among citizens of the US and its allies by discrediting the intentions of the US
government [36-37].
Here, the methods used by the incident creators span a range of TTPs that are outlined in the
DISARM framework. The fact that the image was originally circulated by a Putin aide demonstrates
that the incident creators originally facilitated state propaganda (T002); in particular, propaganda that
distorts the true nature of the event (T0076) in a capacity that can distract from the perception that the
last stand at the Mariupol steel plant is a heroic occurrence (T0077).
This campaign leverages existing conspiracy narratives and suspicions surrounding the US using
biological laboratories to create bioweapons (T0081.004, T0003). In doing so, Russian actors
amplified an existing conspiracy theory narrative (T0022.002) while simultaneously developing an
original iteration of this narrative (T0022.002) that responded specifically to a breaking news event
and active crisis at the time (T0068), which is the Ukrainians last stand in Mariupol.
The incident creators also reused existing content (T0084), that is, the image from the GURPS
game, and deceptively labeled it (T0084.003) in order to appropriate it as evidence for their narrative
(T0084.04). This artifact, which was originally circulated by a Putin aide, eventually found its way
onto Italian national television, which is a form of traditional media (T0114.002, T0117).
Responders can employ a range of methods to counter this campaign. For example, they can engage
the payload directly and debunk it, propagating evidence that the image originates in a fantastical
game (C00119). They can also repurpose the image with new text (C00118), for example, creating a
meme that labels it with its original source. Responders can also engage a respected influencer to
disavow this campaign (C00200), an individual who has broad influence in Italian society. See Table 2
on the following page for an overview of incident creator TTPs observed in this campaign and a range
of recommended responder TTPs.
8. A Cross-Platform, Whole of Society Approach to Countering Russian
MDM and Influence in Italy
This paper demonstrates a) how cross-platform vectors of attack can be used by incident creators in
MDM campaigns and b) how the DISARM framework can serve as a bridge between analysis and
response by mapping connections between incident creator and responder TTPs. Future research can
document and measure the effectiveness of the response measures detailed above against various
campaigns.
In both incidents, content quickly moves across platforms, with false claims advanced by Russian
state officials spreading throughout both social media and traditional media. An effective response
should accordingly move beyond platforms, focusing on a range of both long-term and short-term
initiatives targeting individual people, individual communities, individual campaigns, as well as the
broader media environment.
Despite the scope and severity of Russian MDM and influence, the techniques outlined in the
DISARM framework can empower incident responders to take concrete steps toward countering
Russian MDM and influence. Amid the largest armed conflict in Europe since WWII, Italy can build
resilience to Russian MDM and influence by methodically mapping incident creator TTPs and
undertaking TTPs in response across a range of platforms.
Table 2
Disinformation Alleging US Biological Laboratories Underneath Azovstal Steelworks Through the
Lense of the DISARM Framework
Incident Creator TTPs Responder TTPs
TAO2: Plan Objectives TA01: Plan Strategy
T0002: Facilitate State C00190: Open Engagement with Civil Society
Propaganda C00174: Create a Healthier News Environment
T0076: Distort
C00161: Coalition Building with Stakeholders and third-party
T0077: Distract
inducements
TA13: Target Audience Analysis
T0081.004: Identify Existing TA02: Plan Objectives
Conspiracy C00030: Develop a compelling counter narrative (truth based)
Narratives/Suspicions C00031: Dilute the core narrative - create multiple
TA14: Develop Narratives permutations, target/amplify
T0003: Leverage Existing TA05: Micro Target
Narratives C00065: Reduce political targeting
T0022.001: Amplify Existing C00178: Fill information voids with non-disinformation
Conspiracy Theory Narratives
content
T0022.002: Develop Original
C00130: Mentorship: elders, youth, credit. Learn vicariously.
Conspiracy Theory Narratives
T0068: Respond to Breaking TA06: Develop Content
News Event or Active Crisis C00014: Real-time updates to fact-checking database
TAO6: Develop Content C00094: Force full disclosure on corporate sponsor of
T0084: Reuse Existing Content research
T0084.003: Deceptively Labeled TA07: Select Channels and Affordances
or Translated C00099: Strengthen verification methods
T0084.004: Appropriate Content TA08: Conduct Pump Priming
TA07: Select Channels and Affordances
C00154: Ask media not to report false information
T0111: Traditional Media
C00188: Newsroom/Journalist training to counter influence
T0111.001: TV
TA09: Deliver Content moves
T0114.002: Traditional Media C00113: Debunk and defuse a fake expert / credentials
T0117: Attract Traditional Media TA09: Deliver Content
C00200: Respected figure (influencer) disavows misinfo
C00125: Prebunking
TA11: Persist in the Information Environment
C00138: Spam domestic actors with lawsuits (ie. defamation)
TA15: Establish Social Assets
C00062: Free open library sources worldwide
C00203: Stop offering press credentials to propaganda outlets"
C00036: Infiltrate the in-group to discredit leaders (divide)
C00048: Name and Shame Influencers
9. Acknowledgements
A special thanks to Decode39 for exposing the MDM campaigns that serve as a basis for our
analysis.
10. References
[1] M. Petrocchi, A. Spognardi., Disinformation Risk Assessment: The Online News Market in
Italy, 2022. URL: www.disinformationindex.org.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ipsos & the Trust Project, The Future of Trust in Media: Graphic Reference Report, 2020.
URL:
https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/publication/documents/2020-10/the-future-of-trust
-in-media-graphic-reference-report.pdf..
[5] The Churchill Project 2016, Were “Soft Underbelly” and “Fortress Europe” Churchill
Phrases? URL: https://winstonchurchill.hillsdale.edu/soft-underbelly-fortress-europe/.
[6] R. Sanderson, Draghi Toughens Italy’s ‘Soft Underbelly’ Reputation, Washington Post,
2022.URL:https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/draghi-toughens-italys-soft-underbelly-
reputation/2022/03/07/5aa4fe1e-9de4-11ec-9438-255709b6cddc_story.html.
[7] The Local It, Italy launches investigation into Russian disinformation claims, 2022. URL:
https://www.thelocal.it/20220513/italy-launches-investigation-into-russian-disinformation-cla
ims/.
[8] Decode39, Watch out, NATO: Russia is winning the disinfo war in Italy, 2022. URL:
https://decode39.com/3318/russia-disinfo-italy/.
[9] O. Lanzavecchia, Kremlin on air, part II: Lavrov’s freewheeling propaganda on Italian TV,
2022. URL: https://decode39.com/3272/lavrov-italian-tv/.
[10] Ibid.
[11]Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Decode39, Live from Moscow: Italian TV’s Lowest point (yet), 2022. URL:
https://decode39.com/3545/live-moscow-italian-tv/.
[14] Ibid.
[15] DW Fact Check, Fact check: Russia falsely blames Ukraine for starting war, 2022. URL:
https://learngerman.dw.com/en/fact-check-russia-falsely-blames-ukraine-for-starting-war/a-60
999948.
[16] US Department of State, Faces of Kremlin Propaganda: Vladimir Solovyov, 2022. URL:
https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/faces-of-kremlin-propaganda/vladimir-solov
yov/.
[17] Decode39, Mapping the Kremlin’s propagandists on Italian TV, 2022. URL:
https://decode39.com/3603/kremlin-propagandists-italian-tv/.
[18] M. Pugliese. URL: https://twitter.com/MatteoPugliese/status/1536392735338397703.
[19] Decode39. Mapping the Kremlin’s propagandists on Italian TV, 2022. URL:
https://decode39.com/3603/kremlin-propagandists-italian-tv/.
[20] I. Krastev, M. Leonard, Peace versus Justice: The coming European split over the war in
Ukraine, 2022. URL:
https://ecfr.eu/publication/peace-versus-justice-the-coming-european-split-over-the-war-in-uk
raine/.
[21] Ibid.
[22] European Commission, Eurobarometer: Europeans approve EU’s response to the war in
Ukraine, 2022. URL:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/ip_22_2784/IP_22_2
784_EN.pdf. .
[23] Council of the EU, EUimposes sanctions on state-owned outlets RT/Russia Today and
Sputnnik’s broadcasting in the EU, 2022. URL:
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/02/eu-imposes-sanctions-on
-state-owned-outlets-rt-russia-today-and-sputnik-s-broadcasting-in-the-eu/.
[24] New Atlanticist, Atlantic Council. Russian War Report: Kremlin claims Bucha massacre
was staged by Ukraine, 2022. URL:
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-war-report-kremlin-claims-buch
a-massacre-was-staged-by-ukraine/.
[25] Digital Dispatches, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, On Facebook, Content Denying
Russian Atrocities in Bucha is More Popular than the Truth, 2022. URL:
https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/on-facebook-content-denying-russian-atrocities-i
n-bucha-is-more-popular-than-the-truth/.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] DISARM Framework. URL: https://disarmframework.herokuapp.com/.
[30] Decode39, Kremlin on air. Putin’s propaganda soars in Italy, 2022. URL:
https://decode39.com/3246/kremlin-on-air-putins-propaganda-soars-in-italy/.
[31] Ibid.
[32] GURPS Bunker. URL: https://www.pinterest.com/pin/715227984550823989/.
[33] More about GURPS. URL: https://www.sjgames.com/gurps/details.html.
[34] GURPS Morrow Project. URL: https://arrgh.weebly.com/gurps-morrow-project.html.
[35] A. Ellick, and A. Westbrook, Disinformation Operation Infektion, 2018. URL:
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/12/opinion/russia-meddling-disinformation-fake-news-elec
tions.html.
[36] A. Jeppsson, How East Germany Fabricated the Myth of HIV Being Man-Made, 2017.
URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2325957417724203.
[37] P. Ratner, 38 years ago, a KGB defector chillingly predicted modern America, 2018.
URL: https://bigthink.com/the-present/yuri-bezmenov/.