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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>A survey of young people's sentiment towards local democratic innovations</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Martin Karlsson</string-name>
          <email>martin.karlsson@oru.se</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Marius Rohde Johannessen</string-name>
          <email>marius.Johannessen@usn.no</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Mette Sønderskov</string-name>
          <email>mette.sonderskov@inn.no</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Holsetgata 31, 2318 Hamar</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="NO">Norway</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Örebro university</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Fakultetsgatan 1, 702 81 Örebro</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="SE">Sweden</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff2">
          <label>2</label>
          <institution>University of South-Eastern Norway</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Laererskoleveien 40, 3679</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="NO">Norway</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>Concerns about the state of democracy and participation date back several decades. In the 1990's, there were concerns about declining political party membership and voter turnout, and a general political fragmentation. This trend has been strengthened and made visible throughout the 2010's, with increased polarization and populism, and countries moving away from democratic ideals. Democratic innovations, including digital democracy initiatives, are introduced to ”fix” democracies and renew interest, but is the public, especially the younger generation, interested? In this paper, we present the findings of a Swedish survey of youth sentiment towards innovations in local democracy. Our findings indicate that young people generally are supportive of local democratic innovations, but that levels of support vary across age groups as well as between diferent types of democratic innovations. Surprisingly we find that the youngest cohort in our study (16-19) is less supportive of online democratic innovations compared to other groups.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>Democratic innovation</kwd>
        <kwd>digital democracy</kwd>
        <kwd>youth</kwd>
        <kwd>young people</kwd>
        <kwd>Survey</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        Europe and Scandinavia has been concerned with the state of democracy dating back at least
to the 1990’s, when the power and democracy project [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] warned about declining political
party memberships, fragmentation of political parties and a move from broad social
movements towards single-issue politics. Since them, digitalization has been seen as part of the
solution. Scholars, practitioners, political parties and governments have created numerous
digital democracy solutions (Participedia.org), and since 2008-2009 social media entered the
scene as a potential new democratic tool [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        However, the late 2010’s indicated that fragmentation and populist politics continued, with
Trump’s election and Brexit being the most well-known examples [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]. In Scandinavia, we have
seen the rise of right-wing parties and a fragmentation of parliament [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]. Ten parties, several of
which are single-issue or protest-based, are represented in the Norwegian parliament as of the
nEvelop-O
2021 election. In Sweden, the protest-based and right-wing Sweden democrats has made the
creation of a governing coalition dificult since the 2014 election [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>This seeming rise in protest-based voting can perhaps in part be explained by the increasingly
complex definitions and workings of democracy, as shown by Dingwerth (et al) who point out
that the number of actors is increasing and democracy is becoming more international, leading
to complexity and uncertainty about whom to hold accountable for decisions.</p>
      <p>
        Especially among young people, there is an alienation and a strong feeling of distrust towards
political institutions [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6 ref7">6, 7</xref>
        ]. According to Fox [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ] ”Millennials have entered the electorate with the
lowest propensity to participate in politics in the history of British survey research”. The recent
pandemic has led to a further decline in trust, as country after country went into lockdown [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        On the other hand, a survey among Norwegian youth provides a more positive outlook. 75%
report they are somewhat or very interested in politics, and 92% report being interested in
society/social afairs When it comes to participation, they are reluctant to engage in discussions
in public fora such as social media. They prefer to discuss with close friends, family and in
school. Reasons for not participating include not knowing enough about politics, being afraid
of negative feedback and losing friends over political disagreement. 18% report having negative
experiences as a direct result of sharing political opinions, reflecting earlier research claiming
that hateful speech and harassment is limiting the political debate climate [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        This indication that young people are interested in politics, but reluctant to share one’s
opinions outside what is considered ”safe spaces” can be considered problematic in the participatory
liberal model of democracy [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ]. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to further examine young
people’s sentiment towards democratic innovations. Democratic innovations are utilized to
invite groups of citizens who are absent from traditional political arenas (cf. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]: 24-26), and
can be both on- and ofline, or various hybrids. We present the results of a survey of Swedish
youth’s sentiment towards various forms of democratic innovations, and conclude by ofering
recommendations for the design of digital democracy innovations.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Democratic innovations</title>
      <p>
        Democratic innovations are forms of citizen participation initiated by government institutions,
yet at the same time innovative in relation to existing formalized channels of participation
in politics (e.g., voting in elections, party membership, contacting politicians etc.) (cf. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]).
Thus, democratic innovations can be distinguished both from formal political institutions
of participation as well as from bottom-up forms of participation (protest, demonstrations,
participation in and through civil society organizations etc.).
      </p>
      <p>
        Democratic innovations are often aimed at increasing civic participation among citizens who
are other vice inactive in politics (cf. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]: 24-26). This aim of democratic innovations has
important implications for their design. Not least, such innovations must be steered towards
engaging citizens who are dissatisfied with the current political system (and traditional channels
of participation) in order to get critical input into the policy making process and to increase
political equality [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        In this study we will investigate young citizens sentiments towards four types of democratic
innovations in local democracy (see table 1 below). This typology of democratic innovations is
neither meant to be exhaustive or representative in relation to what democratic innovations are
most commonly implemented in Swedish local democracy. Rather the typology attempts to
reflect important distinctions between diferent types of innovations and their implications for
local democracy. Agenda setting and discussion-oriented innovations are complementary to
and non-threatening towards the strongly party oriented representative democracy of Swedish
local government. Referendums however pose a clear alternative to the process of democratic
decision-making in representative democracy and is much more controversial in the Swedish
context (cf. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ]). Online innovations can take the form of any of the other three categories
and is included to measure and contrast sentiments towards democratic innovations online and
ofline.  
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Methods and material</title>
      <p>The analyses conducted are based on the SOM (Society, opinion and media) survey conducted
by SOM-institute at Gothenburg University, in the autumn of 2020. The survey questions
regarding support for democratic innovations were added by the authors (as well as the primary
Agenda setting
Discussion
E-participation</p>
      <p>Democratic innovations geared
towards influencing the political agenda of
democratic institutions rather than their decisions.</p>
      <p>Most often by giving citizens the opportunity to
place issues on the agenda for local councils and boards.</p>
      <p>Democratic innovations geared towards generating
discussion around local issues and policies.</p>
      <p>Such innovations can (but must not) adopt
ideas from deliberative democracy
Democratic innovations granting citizens
the opportunity to decide or advice
the decision of democratic institutions
by way of voting on
alternative policy directions.</p>
      <p>Online democratic innovations
can take on any of the characteristics
of the types described above
but are utilizing ICTs and the internet.</p>
      <p>Citizens can participate through digital
technology such as computers or smartphones.</p>
      <p>This type of democratic innovation
is often referred to as e-participation.</p>
      <p>Examples
Petitions
Citizens´questions
to policy- makers
Public hearings
Mini-publics
Policy-forums
Local referendums either
initiated by the public
(citizens initiative) or
by government institutions
E-petitions
Online discussion forums
E-voting in referendums
investigator of these survey questions Joachim Åström). All other items used in the analysis
belong to the standard set of questions in the SOM-surveys. The survey was conducted via a
combination of postal and online surveying, and sent to a random sample of 3750 swedes and
received 1875 responses (response rate: 50%).</p>
      <p>The analyses conducted in this study are descriptive crosstabulations. The variables used
in these analyses can be divided in two categories: (1) demographic variables, and (2) support
for democratic innovations. Demographic variables are restricted to the respondents’ age. We
make comparisons of level of support for democratic innovations across age groups using a
categorical variable dividing the respondents in 8 age groups. This variable is devised to create
a nuanced division among young people distinguishing between 16-19 year old, 20-24 year old
and 25-29 year old.</p>
      <p>The variables measuring support for democratic innovations are based on four survey
questions asking the respondents to what extent they find it desirable that their local government
initiate more democratic innovations of four diferent types: (1) innovations aimed to give
citizens influence over the political agenda, (2) innovations oriented towards generating political
discussions around local policy, (3) innovations that gives citizens say over decisions (specifically
in the form of referendums) and (4) innovations that utilizes information and communication
technology. Each question is answered on a scale from 1 (very desirable) to 4 (not at all desirable).</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Analysis and results</title>
      <p>As is evident from table 4 below, the level of support for democratic innovations is generally
strong among Swedish citizens. The table displays the share of citizens in each age group that
ifnd each form of democratic innovation either very or somewhat desirable. More than 60% of
citizens in all age groups are supportive of all four types of democratic innovations. In some
age groups and for some types of innovations the share of respondents supportive is even over
80%. However, beneath this general pattern it is also evident that the level of support is varying
across age groups. For agenda setting innovations and innovations geared towards political
discussion, the most common forms of democratic innovations, support is generally higher
among middle aged and older adults than among the younger groups.</p>
      <p>Notes: underscore signifies the type of DI most supported within each age group. Bold signifies
within which age group the support for a type of DI is strongest.</p>
      <p>
        Regarding support for referendums and online innovations, the pattern is reversed.
16–19yearolds are the group most supportive of referendums (the least popular form of democratic
innovation across the whole population), and what is more, referendums is even the most widely
supported out of the four forms of democratic innovation in this age group. This result may
reflect a greater tendency towards supporting direct democracy in younger segments of the
population found in earlier research. Similar findings in earlier studies have been discussed as
potentially related to greater dispersion of post-materialistic values in younger generations as
well as reflecting that young people have weaker attachments to established political institutions
such as political parties [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Lastly, as might be expected, the level of support for online democratic innovations is much
stronger in younger age categories (20-49 years old), while less supported by older middle-aged
citizens and older citizens (50-85). For citizens in their 20s and 30s this form of democratic
innovation is the most widely supported among the four types analysed. There is however, one
exception from this age-related pattern, within the youngest group (16-19) support for online
innovations is quite sparsely dispersed as only 62,5% of the respondents in this age category
ifnds initiating online democratic innovations very or somewhat desirable. This is a somewhat
puzzling result given that this is a group of citizens in which ICT use is widely disseminated and
frequent. For instance, the Swedish survey of internet habits from 2021 found that computer
and smartphone use was most widely adopted among citizens between 15 and 19 [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Our results indicate that not only is online innovations the least supported form of democratic
innovations within this age category but also that online innovations are more widely supported
in a majority of the other age groups. While it might seem logical to assume that a group
of citizens in which ICTs are almost universally adopted would be supportive of democratic
innovations utilizing such technologies, their attitudes tell a somewhat diferent story. This
result contrasts greatly with earlier evidence on the relationship between age and e-participation
that generally show that young people are more likely to participate in e-participation (cf. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Notes: Bold signifies within which type of democratic innovation has received the highest
frequency of answers within each answer category.</p>
      <p>
        In table 5 above, we will look more closely at the support for democratic innovations among
young people (age 16-19). The analyses presented in table 4 makes it evident that beneath the
pattern of broad support for all four types of democratic innovations, there are some important
variations between the diferent types of innovations. Discussion oriented innovations and
referendums garners less strong support (”very desirable”) as well as less strong antipathy (”very
undesirable”) compared to the other categories of democratic innovations. Hence, sentiments
towards these types of innovations are less polarized, and evoke a broad yet ”lukewarm” support.
This is expected for discussion-oriented innovations that earlier studies have shown to be less
polarizing, among citizens [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
        ] as well as administrators [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">19</xref>
        ] and policy-makers [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">20</xref>
        ]. It is
however more surprising that referendums, a controversial form of citizen participation in the
context of Swedish local democracy, is less polarized. As stated above, it is also evident that
referendums are the forms of democratic innovation that garners the greatest overall support
from young citizens, indicating that this demography are more open to direct democracy and
challenging the structures of representative democracy compared to other citizens. Democratic
innovations focused on agenda setting is the most widely supported form of democratic
innovation among Swedish citizens overall (see table 4 above). While support for this type of
innovation is broad also among young citizens. There is a somewhat greater antipathy towards
agenda setting innovations among young citizens compared to discussion-oriented innovations
as well as referendums (5.6% find it very undesirable).
      </p>
      <p>The share of young citizens who find each type of democratic innovation ”very undesirable”
is worthy of extra attention. As is evident from table 4 above, online innovations are found very
undesirable from a larger share of young swedes (9.7%) compared to other types of innovations.
This is important since democratic innovations generally engage only a fraction of the public in
actual participation. The support for such innovations among citizens who are not likely to
participate is therefore important for the democratic legitimacy of democratic innovations. It is
thus important to pay attention to the antipathy towards democratic innovations as a way of
measuring the legitimacy of such innovations among citizens who are likely not to participate
themselves.</p>
      <p>The evidence concerning online innovations points to a need for caution. The youngest
cohort of citizens are, as we have shown above, less supportive of online democratic innovations
compared to most other age groups. Further, the antipathy towards online innovations is
non-negligible as about one in ten young citizens finds this form of democratic innovation very
undesirable. This finding should be taken into consideration in relation to the common practice
of using online channels of citizen participation in eforts to reach and mobilize young citizens
(cf. [21]: 51-52).</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Discussion</title>
      <p>This study aims to further our understanding of young peoples sentiments towards democratic
innovations in local democracy by way of analysing survey data among Swedish citizens.
Democratic innovations ofer important channels for citizen participation in local politics alongside
traditional channels of participation: both government initated (voting, party membership etc.)
and citizen iniated (protest, demonstrations, civil society organizations etc.). However, local
democratic innovations seldom reach a scale of participation that supports legitimate claims of
representing the view of the whole citizenry. Rather, such processes often engage only hundreds
or even dozens of citizens. Threfore the democratic legitimacy of democratic innovations rests
heavily on two factors: (1) the representativeness of those who participate in relation to the
whole demos and (2) the level of support for democratic innovation among non-participants.
This study ofers new insights into the latter of these factors.</p>
      <p>We generally find broad support for local democratic innovations among Swedish citizens
across innovation types as well as age groups. There are however important variations to
consider. Young citizens are found to be more supportive of referendums, a more radical form of
democratic innovation that challenges the logic of democratic policy-making in representative
democracy, compared to older citizens. Further, and more surprisingly, we find that the youngest
cohort in our study (age 16-19) are less supportive of online democratic innovations compared
to most other age groups. This finding contrasts with earlier studies that have found young age
as a strong determinant of online participation. While our finding does not directly contradict
earlier studies: a lower support for online participation could theoretically emerge in a group
of citizens where online participation is high, it might put them in a new light.. What our
ifndings indicates is that the support for online participation among young people who do
not participate in online democratic innovations may be relatively low. This finding puts the
legitimacy of online democratic innovations among young people in question and should be
taken into consideration when designing democratic innovations targeting young citizens.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>This work is partially funded by the the Research Council of Norway, project number 310122:
Konsept for styrket demokratimedvirkning (”Consept for strengthening democratic influence”).
councillors in sweden, Local Government Studies 38 (2012) 795–815.
[21] A. Khan, S. Krishnan, Social media enabled e-participation: Review and agenda for future
research, E-service Journal 10 (2017) 45–75.</p>
    </sec>
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