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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>for Cyber Security Education in Automotive Industry</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Mirko De Vincentiis</string-name>
          <email>mirko.devincentiis@uniba.it</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Anibrata Pal</string-name>
          <email>anibrata.pal@uniba.it</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Azzurra Ragone</string-name>
          <email>azzurra.ragone@uniba.it</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Michele Scalera</string-name>
          <email>michele.scalera@uniba.it</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>University of Bari Aldo Moro, Department of Computer Science</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Via Edoardo Orabona 4, Bari</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="IT">Italy</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2022</year>
      </pub-date>
      <abstract>
        <p>Connected electronic components within vehicles can be exploited by cyber attackers if not properly protected. Controller Area Network (CAN), the standard protocol used by the in-vehicular components to communicate among themselves, lacks security features for data protection. We need methodologies and solutions to increase cybersecurity awareness in the automotive industry to identify and protect vehicles from attacks that can exploit these security lacks. To reach this goal, this paper proposed a methodology to increase cybersecurity education in which education starts from the university using innovative research methodologies and then proposing strategies that could help the automotive industry. The proposed strategy adopts a multi-class Intrusion Detection System to identify CAN attacks.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>Automotive Industry</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        The idea is to support the automotive industry in being able to reconstruct the attack kill chain
and understand the impact of the attack on other components [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5 ref6">5, 6</xref>
        ]. Considering the vehicle as
a collection of software, hardware, electronic, and mechanical components, it is necessary to
understand how an attack could afect each of them and especially to identify security flaws
from the diferent elements [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]. In addition, the vehicles can also communicate with external
components to establish a connection between each other (Vehicle-to-Vehicle) or communicate
with components located aside the roads (Vehicle-to-Infrastructure).
      </p>
      <p>The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the related works; Section 3 explains
the proposed methodology about cyber security education in the automotive field; Section 4
discussed the CAN protocol and the dataset used to validate the model briefly before showing
the experiments and results; and finally Section 5 presents the conclusion and future works.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Related Work</title>
      <p>
        The next-generation vehicles will be subject to new types of attacks that could compromise
not only the safety of the driver but also the reputation of the automotive company. Many of
these attacks can be conducted because the in-vehicle protocols do not implement cybersecurity
mechanisms [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]. In particular, since the CAN is the most used in-vehicle protocol and does
not implement cryptographic and authentication mechanisms, researchers demonstrated that
it is vulnerable to Denial-of-Service (DoS) and injection attacks (such as fuzzy and spoofing)
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref11 ref9">9, 10, 11, 12</xref>
        ]. In August 2021, the ISO/SAE 21434 ”Road vehicles - Cyber Security engineering”
[13] was released to augment the security of the vehicles by enforcing security standards and
recommendations. The document proposed a generic framework regarding the requirements
for Cyber Security risk management for next-generation vehicles. Since it does not provide a
concrete design methodology, it is necessary to provide solutions.
      </p>
      <p>On the other hand, most of the research works define ML or Deep Learning (DL) techniques as
solutions to increase security in the CAN protocol. Since the ECUs have limited computational
resources, traditional ML algorithms can be used instead of DL models [14]. The Random Forest
model showed good results in identifying attacks on the CAN bus [14, 15, 16].</p>
      <p>It is also important to increase cybersecurity awareness to communicate and counter
cyberattacks [17, 18]. With this consideration, this paper proposed a methodology considering a
cybersecurity framework to increase cybersecurity awareness in the automotive industry. As a
strategy to identify CAN attacks, a multi-class IDS was proposed using a Random Forest model.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Cyber Security Education in Automotive Industry</title>
      <p>Cyber Security education plays an important role in helping data protection in diferent
industries and public ofices by training and preparing security specialists. Although industries
conduct cyber security training from time to time, this is primarily provided by the Universities
through research and collaborations. Figure 1 presents the overall goal and the strategies we
followed regarding cyber security education.</p>
      <p>The principal goal is to educate and train industry resources to raise automotive risk
awareness. To achieve this, we divide the goal into objectives and subsequently into actionable
strategies. To implement the strategies we follow the National Initiative for Cybersecurity
Education (NICE) framework [19]. The principal building blocks of the NICE framework are the
Tasks, Knowledge, and Skills (TKS) statements, which incorporate agility, flexibility,
interoperability, and modularity as important attributes. In our case, the NICE framework (Figure 2) can
be utilized to impart Knowledge, education and training on automotive cyber security domain,
and Skill, technical and business skills to remediate automotive vulnerabilities, to perform
the Task of implementing efective and accurate security measures to remediate automotive
cyber-attacks.</p>
      <p>With reference to the proposed educational strategies and the NICE framework, Figure 3
shows the proposed methodology, where the essential elements for cyber security education
start from the University and terminate in the automotive industry with a possible stakeholder
involved to manage the automotive cyber-attacks. Firstly, the university investigates the
possibilities of new automotive cyber attacks on next-generation vehicles. For example, information
about new attack typologies that may be used to attack vehicles can be used as necessary domain
knowledge (Figure 1, Strategy - 1.1.1) and can be used in education and training. In particular,
understanding what kind of cyber attack is occurring in the vehicle is essential to increase the
competence and the skills of the stakeholders that operate in the automotive field. The use of
Machine Learning algorithms could be a solution for automotive companies to manage cyber
risk and attacks (Figure 1, Strategy - 1.1.2).</p>
      <p>A multi-class Intrusion Detection System (IDS) has been proposed as a solution to identify the
attacks and protect the in-vehicle network. The proposed solution could be extremely useful in
identifying the typology of the attacks and helping the automotive industry to adapt response
solutions based on the attack type. Considering Figure 3, for example, the Security Operation
Center (SOC) Analyst (a professional responsible for a company’s cybersecurity and security
operations), based on the attack that occurred in the vehicle, can make decisions on how to
respond to the attack based on his knowledge and skill [20]. Imparting the knowledge and
understanding of these outcomes across the organization could ensure cyber security awareness
among resources like developers, testers, and architects (Figure 1, Strategy - 1.1.2 and 1.2.1).
Furthermore, the industry can use the knowledge and skills necessary for cyber security to
develop new competencies in the employees to spread and equip specialists for specific cyber
security tasks (Figure 1, Strategy - 1.2.2). The automotive industry, apart from the University
led research and development programs, also should strictly adhere to the ISO/SAE 21434 ”Road
vehicles - Cyber Security engineering” [13] regarding the secure development process and
hardware component. Thus, the industry can assimilate innovative cyber security solutions to
learn to protect particular components from cyber attacks by continuous monitoring, surveys,
and deployment of novel onboard security systems.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Experiment</title>
      <p>This section presents a brief summary of the Controller Area Network, attack typology, and
the dataset for testing the multi-class IDS. Consequently, it presents the multi-class Intrusion
Detection System as a solution for cybersecurity education in the automotive industry, and the
classification results obtained thereof.</p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>4.1. Controller Area Network</title>
        <p>The CAN protocol [21] allows the ECUs to exchange messages between them. To send the
information about a message, the CAN protocol uses the Data frame, which is subdivided into
diferent frames that are Identifier (ID) it is used for the arbitration phase; Data Length Code
(DLC) specify the length of the payload sent by an ECU; Data it contains the information about
the message. The arbitration phase in the CAN protocol is used to avoid collision when two or
more ECUs send messages simultaneously.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>4.2. Attack Typology</title>
        <p>There are three identified attack scenarios that can be conducted in internal networks of vehicles:
Denial-of-Service (DoS) comprises sending high-priority messages to block communication
with other nodes; Fuzzy, sends a spoofed random CAN ID, causing a change in vehicle behavior;
and Spoofing consists of sending messages of a specific ID [ 22, 12].</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-3">
        <title>4.3. Car-Hacking Dataset</title>
        <p>The Hacking and Countermeasure Research Lab (HCRL) published a dataset called Car-Hacking
Dataset1 [23, 22] that contains real CAN messages from a Hyundai’s YF Sonata logged using an
OBD-II port. The authors of the dataset also performed three attacks: Denial of Service (DoS),
Fuzzy, and Spoofing. The Car-Hacking Dataset is subdivided into four datasets: DoS, Fuzzy,
Spoofing Revolutions Per Minute (RPM), and Spoofing Gear. The authors inject the CAN ID
’0316’ for the Spoofing RPM. Instead, the CAN ID is ’043f’ for the Spoofing Gear. Each of these
contains normal and attack messages.</p>
        <p>
          The data attributes present in the datasets are Timestamp is the recorded time; CAN ID,
the identifier of the message in hexadecimal form; DLC indicates the number of bytes from 0
to 8; DATA the payload in hexadecimal form from DATA[0]-DATA[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ]; Flag T represents an
injected message while R a normal message.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-4">
        <title>4.4. Multi-class IDS solution</title>
        <p>The Multi-class IDS is tested on CAN data, a popular in-vehicle network protocol. A Random
Forest model was trained using the state-of-the-art Car-Hacking Dataset dataset containing real
CAN messages from real vehicles. The experiments were conducted on a device with an Intel
Core i7-11800H processor and 32 GB of RAM using Python 3 and the Scikit-learn library [24].</p>
        <p>
          Figure 4 shows the proposed IDS methodology. The DoS, Fuzzy, Spoofing RPM, and Spoofing
GEAR datasets were padded in the pre-processing phase. The padding process adds a ’00’ value
where the DATA attribute is Not a Number (NaN). This process avoids removing examples from
the datasets. After this phase, the DATA and CAN ID were transformed from hexadecimal to
1https://ocslab.hksecurity.net/Datasets/car-hacking-dataset
decimal. Then, the datasets were relabeled by mapping T with 1 (for DoS), 2 (for Fuzzy), 3 (for
Spoofing GEAR), 4 (for Spoofing RPM), and R with 0 for no attack message. Since the datasets
are unbalanced, the random under-sampler was used for the majority class, which is the normal
class. Finally, the processed dataset was concatenated to make a multi-class classification. After
the pre-processing phase, the attributes were scaled using the MinMaxScaler2 in a range of
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">0, 1</xref>
          ], and the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was used. The default parameters were
used for Random Forest. Finally, the concatenated dataset was split into 70% for training and
30% for testing. Accuracy, Precision, Recall, and F1-Score were used to evaluate the Random
Forest model, and the results are shown in Table 1. The proposed approach obtained 100% for
the DoS, Spoofing GEAR, and Spoofing RPM. For the Fuzzy attack, instead, the model reached
99.98% due to the randomness of the CAN ID and DATA, which leads the model to classify the
normal messages as Fuzzy sometimes.
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Conclusion and Future Work</title>
      <p>Cybersecurity is critical in the automotive field because if an attack occurs in a vehicle, it
could compromise the driver’s life. For this reason, education about the cybersecurity of the
automotive industry is important to protect cars from cyber attacks. To reach this goal, this
paper proposed a methodology considering the NICE framework where the education starts
from the university using innovative research methodologies and then proposing strategies that
could help the automotive industry improve vehicle security. This strategy uses a multi-class
IDS with a Random Forest model to identify three important CAN attacks: DoS, Fuzzy, and
Spoofing. The results show that this model reached good results with a state-of-the-art dataset
and could improve the security of the in-vehicle network. In future work, we plan to create a
Random Forest model that can be deployed on an ECU to detect CAN attacks, and to analyse
the dynamical behaviour of data [25, 26].</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>This study has been partially supported by the following projects: SSA (Secure Safe Apulia –
Regional Security Center, Codice Progetto 6ESURE5) and KEIRETSU (Codice Progetto V9UFIL5)
2https://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.preprocessing.MinMaxScaler.html
funded by ”Regolamento regionale della Puglia per gli aiuti in esenzione n. 17 del 30/09/2014
(BURP n. 139 suppl. del 06/10/2014) TITOLO II CAPO 1 DEL REGOLAMENTO GENERALE
”Avviso per la presentazione dei progetti promossi da Grandi Imprese ai sensi dell’articolo 17 del
Regolamento”; and SERICS (Security and Rights In the CyberSpace - PE00000014) under the MUR
National Recovery and Resilience Plan funded by the European Union - NextGenerationEU.
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