<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Archiving and Interchange DTD v1.0 20120330//EN" "JATS-archivearticle1.dtd">
<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Development of the Testbed for Testing Deep Learning Based IDS System for 5G Network</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Roman Odarchenko</string-name>
          <email>odarchenko.r.s@ukr.net</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff3">3</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Azamat Imanbayev</string-name>
          <email>imanbaevazamat@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff3">3</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Alla Pinchuk</string-name>
          <email>pinchuk.ad87@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff3">3</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Bundleslab KFT</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Vali u, 4. 4. em. 2. ajto, Budapest, 1117</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="HU">Hungary</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Kazakh National University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>al-Farabi Street 71, Almaty, 050040</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="KZ">Kazakhstan</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff2">
          <label>2</label>
          <institution>National Aviation University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Lyubomyra Gusara Ave 1, Kyiv, 03058</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff3">
          <label>3</label>
          <institution>THz</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>visible light</addr-line>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>In modern conditions, due to the huge emerging landscape of new cyber threats, global risks and given the most widespread connection of heterogeneous devices to the network via cellular communication networks, the issues of ensuring the necessary level of cybersecurity in these networks are becoming a priority that needs to be addressed as soon as possible. Therefore, in this research, the main attention is paid to the development of IDS for 5G networks based on artificial intelligence. In particular, this work is devoted to the development of the concept of the system, the analysis of existing datasets for its training and the development of the most appropriate test architecture of 5G network or testing the trained AI-based IDS for 5G networks. To build a test network, various options for using open-source solutions were analyzed in detail, among which preference was given to OpenAirInterface. For this architecture, the integration of the developed IDS will be the easiest and most expedient. Also, it will be relatively easy to generate the necessary types of attacks on the network and the corresponding traffic analysis.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>5G</kwd>
        <kwd>6G</kwd>
        <kwd>IDS</kwd>
        <kwd>Artificial Intelligence</kwd>
        <kwd>Deep Learning</kwd>
        <kwd>Machine learning</kwd>
        <kwd>datasets</kwd>
        <kwd>testbed</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        2023 Copyright for this paper by its authors.
communication (VLC), and distributed ledger (DL) technologies like blockchain [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]. From a security
and privacy standpoint, these advancements necessitate a reevaluation of conventional security
practices. Authentication, encryption, access control, communications, and malicious activity
detection must meet the heightened demands of future networks. Additionally, new approaches to
security are required to ensure reliability and privacy. The escalating need for information security in
cellular networks, owing to the proliferation and diversification of cyber attacks, serves as a
prerequisite for such efforts.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Background analysis</title>
      <p>
        In recent years, there has been an increasing focus on research regarding testbeds for simulating
cyberattacks within the cybersecurity community. Numerous cyber range solutions have been
proposed, including NCR [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ], DETERLab [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ], SimSpace [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ], EDURange [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ], CYRA [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ], KYPO [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ],
and CyRIS [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]. Many of these initiatives have centered around the development and integration of
models, tools, and methodologies for defining simulation rules, as well as offering practical guidance
for conducting attack simulations [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ]. While early cyber range systems were physical, more recent
proposals have shifted towards virtual environments, which reduces costs and enhances flexibility
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>However, to the best of our knowledge, there have been no studies on cyberspace systems
specifically designed for 5G cybersecurity testing. Our objective is to propose a system that provides
a fully virtualized 5G network. To overcome the limitations of existing cyberspaces, our research
suggests a new testbed capable of simulating a comprehensive 5G network within a virtual
environment. This approach allows for simplified configuration without the need for complex
hardware components.</p>
      <p>
        One of the shortcomings of existing cyberspaces is the lack of publicly available datasets and
mechanisms for generating high-precision synthetic data. Given that 5G networks face various
security challenges and threats, several papers have proposed using ML/DL methods to automatically
detect malicious network traffic. However, current proposals require significant improvements in
terms of real-time detection and analysis of potential threats [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Furthermore, current proposals largely overlook the integration of ML models in a fully automated
manner and the verification of their functionality in operational environments [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ]. We propose the
use of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for 5G mobile networks, which can monitor traffic in
realtime and identify abnormal patterns.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Problem statement</title>
      <p>Currently, commercial 5G networks are being rapidly deployed in many countries worldwide,
while research and development efforts for enhancing cellular networks towards 6G are ongoing.
In the present landscape, with the emergence of numerous new cyber threats and global risks,
coupled with the extensive connectivity of diverse devices through cellular communication
networks, ensuring a sufficient level of cybersecurity in these networks has become a crucial and
pressing task.</p>
      <p>Hence, the primary objective of this paper is to enhance the security systems of previous
generations of cellular networks, their individual components, and the mechanisms for detecting
cyber incidents. To accomplish these objectives, the following tasks need to be undertaken:
− development of the IA-based IDS for 5G concept;
−
−
development and deployment of the 5G testbed for testing the IDS;
development of appropriate software and its testing on a real cellular network.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Datasets for traffic analysis</title>
      <p>
        The greatest challenge lies in obtaining reliable access to attack detection systems. While the
necessary data can be acquired through network monitoring, most datasets are not publicly
disclosed due to security and privacy concerns. Moreover, gathering information online can be a
costly endeavor. As a result, developers seek to manage their networks or systems using the
available datasets. Malowidzki et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ] and Haider et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ] highlight the complexity of the issue
surrounding the lack of attack analysis datasets and the associated requirements for compilation.
Additionally, these datasets are utilized to assess the accuracy of identifying attacks. The quality of
the data directly impacts the results generated by the network intrusion detection system. In recent
years, the cybersecurity community has made efforts to address this challenge, leading to the
publication of several sets of intrusion detection data. This section will explore commonly used
datasets for Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), taking into account the advantages and
disadvantages of existing datasets.
4.1.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Overview of existing datasets for Traffic Analysis in Mobile Networks</title>
      <p>
        Common properties serve as evaluation criteria to enable a meaningful comparison of statistics
(FAIR Concepts [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ]). This is because each task or scenario is associated with a specific set of data
records. For instance, the ISCX dataset [17] is chosen to emphasize labeling, while the UGR'16
dataset [18] is selected for its ability to capture long-term effects. Figure 1 illustrates four principles
that are closely linked to the aforementioned concept:
Given this concept, this article describes a collection of attack detection data. For the purpose of
this work, several new and popular datasets were selected (see Fig. 2).
4.1.1. KDD-CUP’99
      </p>
      <p>KDD'99 was created in 1999, in which the functions are divided into four groups, such as:
− basic functions
− content features
− time-based traffic features
− host-based traffic features</p>
      <p>Although the number of records is quite large, amounting to 4,898,430 records, four types of
attacks (DoS attacks, R2L, U2R, and Probe) dominate the dataset (see Fig. 3).</p>
      <p>Many studies and projects have been carried out during our lifetime. However, there are two
main issues with this: duplicate records and obsolete records (i.e. no new attacks are included),
which means that each trained model is subject to a partial learning algorithm. Therefore, the
algorithm does not detect rare attacks in the record.
4.1.2. NSL-KDD</p>
      <p>To solve the problem with the KDD-Cup'99 dataset, a new dataset was created called NSL-KDD.
In fact, it is almost identical to its predecessor, except for a few advantages. Firstly, the issue of
duplicate copies of the training dataset is addressed, avoiding biased results. Secondly, there are no
duplicate instances in the test data set, which allowed the researchers to make more practical
applications without random sampling.</p>
      <p>Since this dataset is formed from the previous dataset, it also has 42 functions about different
connections. However, this set is not suitable for the network IDS model because it does not have
public data. Number of samples in NSL-KDD can see Fig. 4.
4.1.3. UNSW-NB15</p>
      <p>The UNSW-NB15 dataset was created in 2015 at the University of New South Wales. There are
over 2.5 million records. The UNSW-NB15 database contains 49 network connectivity indicators
that can be divided into 6 groups:
− Basic features;
− Time features;
− Content features;
− Connection features;
− Additional features;
− Two features for the class label.</p>
      <p>A complete list of attacks in the dataset and their quantities is given in Fig. 5. Each entry contains
information about which of the ten classes of the connection belongs to, regular connections or one
of nine different types of attacks. UNSW-NB15 introduces new IDS datasets and is used in several
recent studies.
4.1.4. CICIDS2017</p>
      <p>CICIDS2017 is a new data collection developed by the Canadian Institute for Cyber Security.
The dataset includes the latest network attacks, but also meets all the criteria for enhanced specific
attacks in the ISCX2012 dataset [19]. Since the launch of CICIDS2017, this database has attracted
researchers to analyse and develop new models and algorithms. However, the best detection models
need to detect all types of attacks, thus traffic data should be combined throughout the day to create
a single data set that uses IDS to produce a typical IDS.</p>
      <p>The data source contains an ML file with 8 CSV files. These files contain information about the
types of attacks over a five-day period, including normal traffic. In some files, binary classification
is convenient, in others you need to create multi-class definition templates. The files containing the
CICIDS-2017 data set are presented in Fig. 6.
It offers different types of attacks based on a 2016 McAfee report and is publicly available.
Complete data set format with 2,830,743 instances with 15 class tokens (1 normal and 14 attacks)
and 79 features (78 features and 1 for attack type tokens).</p>
      <p>CSE-CIC-IDS2018 is the latest version of the CSE Intrusion Detection dataset, which collected
10 days of network traffic. It has been extended due to the criteria used to create CIC-IDS201.</p>
      <p>It has a similar structure to CICIDS2017 but is built around a large network of simulated users
and attacking machines. The main purpose of this dataset is to train and predict models to detect
insecure traffic based on anomalies. As with many network attack data sets, the data sets have class
imbalances. Data-level algorithms or methods can be used to eliminate this problem. The attack
scenarios with percentage distribution are shown in Fig. 7 below.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Issues with IDS benchmark datasets</title>
      <p>As mentioned earlier, there are a sufficient number of available datasets for training and
predicting network intrusion detection systems. However, only a limited number of these datasets
contain relevant types of attacks and features that are practical for implementing models. This
section discusses the main challenges faced by researchers working on intelligent intrusion
detection systems.</p>
      <p>First and foremost, collecting reliable research data is extremely difficult. Technology evolves
rapidly, with security threats and new attacks constantly emerging. Consequently, datasets quickly
lose their relevance and value within the cybersecurity community. Another challenge is data
integrity. Researchers need to incorporate not just CSV files, but also audit logs and raw network
data. Audit logs provide valuable information about cyberattacks, while raw data enhances threat
detection capabilities.</p>
      <p>The evolving landscape of attacks poses another challenge. As technology advances, hackers
adapt their attack methods to current systems and software, leading to the emergence of new and
deprecated attack types. This creates a perpetual cycle. To address this, researchers can either
employ new datasets or utilize dataset generators that simulate hacker behavior and create
appropriate attacks.</p>
      <p>Furthermore, the generated datasets must be as realistic as possible to be applicable in practical
network environments. This means including normal traffic from various end-user workstations
and servers. Otherwise, the trained model may not be suitable for a specific computer network.
Privacy considerations also come into play when working with datasets. While an organization's
computer networks are the most trusted sources of data, they are often unwilling to share their audit
logs or network logs due to privacy policies. As a result, researchers mostly rely on popular datasets,
which are modeled data rather than real network traffic data.</p>
      <p>The need for labeling is crucial in both supervised and unsupervised learning approaches. Labels
are essential for calculating the accuracy of the employed algorithms. Experts typically gather
secure network activity in cyberspaces before launching attacks on network traffic. They first
establish normal traffic patterns and then introduce attacks. Some experts inject attacks into normal
traffic, while others manually label the data, which is a more laborious process.</p>
      <p>Additionally, the establishment of dataset criteria plays an important role. Markus Ring [20]
discusses common aspects of dataset descriptions and classifies them into five categories.</p>
      <p>Finally, for a dataset to be valuable, it must gain broad acceptance within the research
community. Without this support, the dataset may only be utilized in a limited number of research
projects.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>5. AI-based IDS for 5G concept</title>
      <p>Currently, the implementation of intelligent analytics is essential across various wireless
networks, ranging from local networks to remote clouds. Network traffic prediction and estimation
are critical for network operations and management, including congestion management, routing,
resource allocation, service level agreement management, and other network responsibilities [21].
Therefore, the utilization of machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) will play a
significant role. In a hierarchical order, we can consider the following:
− Artificial intelligence serves as a crucial component in comprehending vast amounts
of data. It finds application in various areas, such as data preparation, data retrieval,
data flow visualization, geospatial tracking, and real-time tracking.
− Machine learning tackles the challenge of dealing with large volumes of data in 5G
networks. It utilizes specialized algorithms that enable computers to learn and adapt.
As the size of data on the network grows due to connected sensors, traditional
methods of tracking and identifying patterns become insufficient. Machine learning
surpasses conventional data analysis approaches by analyzing data from multiple
sources and establishing logical connections among them.</p>
      <p>Future opportunities for 5G networks encompass reliable analysis, network optimization, and
improved efficiency in business solutions. Automation of the anomaly detection (AD) process is
another potential benefit, as it can significantly contribute to operational and management systems.
Consequently, this reduces the number of false positives and enhances the understanding of the
underlying cause of anomalies. Figure 8 illustrates the automated anomaly analysis process.</p>
      <p>In this regard, it is necessary to develop new models and methods of Internet traffic in 5G
networks, which will become the main types of networks connecting existing networks. Since each
IoT application is characterized by individual network traffic parameters and the principle of
interaction between physical and virtual Internet objects, it is necessary to develop models and
methods for the interaction of IoT applications in 5G networks.</p>
      <p>Despite significant progress, the 5G specification provides mobile operators with some
guidance on how to ensure that their 5G networks truly support AI/ML. Much remains to be done
to further simplify AI/ML-enabled networks and implement the core concepts of AI and ML as
underlying network structures, including:
− Individual system of collecting detailed data;
− Demonstration of RAN capabilities for optimizing user networks and services;
− RAN programming, RAN service architecture supporting AI/ML;
− Data transfer and analysis/implementation of AI/ML to enable effective innovation;
− Open datasets in wireless networks to accelerate the development of algorithms and new</p>
      <p>AI applications in wireless networks.</p>
      <p>As networks evolve beyond 5G, artificial intelligence could become an integral part of the
overall blueprint for a holistic approach to managing this complex system.</p>
      <p>The basic concept of using a network access discovery system, developed using ML and
DL methods, includes the following three main steps, as shown in Fig. 9.</p>
      <p>
        This figure shows relatively recent work on NIDS using machine and deep learning. After a
brief analysis of the works [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13, 22-24</xref>
        ], it can be seen that in lots of them traditional machine
learning algorithms have been used, and deep learning is still in its early stages of development.
Although NIDS has been extensively studied, the most significant changes have only occurred in
the content of the data set, which contains information about attack patterns.
      </p>
      <p>Machine learning algorithms such as K-Nearest Neighbor (CNN), Support Vector Machine
(SVM), Artificial Neural Network (ANN), K-Means Clustering, Fast Learning Network have
already been used by others.</p>
      <p>For example, in the research paper [25] presented six different machine learning models (Decision
Tree, Random Forest, K Nearest Neighbors, Adaboost, Gradient Boosting, and Linear Discriminant
Analysis) using one of the latest datasets, namely CSE-CIC-IDS2018. SMOTE was used by
multiplying the data from the minority group to reduce unbalanced factors. Overall, their studies
were able to improve the accuracy of the model from 4.01% to 30.59%.</p>
      <p>At the same time, Yao et al. [26] proposed a multilevel structure of the IDS model called
Multilevel Semi-Supervised ML (MSML) which also uses the RF model. The main idea is to
redirect to the next model if it is not checked. The experimental results showed the advantage of
the model in detecting attacks even on small samples in the dataset.</p>
      <p>The next work is devoted to the ANN-based intrusion detection model. This algorithm is
different in that it can perform non-linear simulations using large amounts of data. However, this
model has drawbacks: it takes a long time, slows down the learning process, and makes the solution
inefficient. To solve this problem, Huang et al. [27] suggested using the Extreme Learning Machine
(ELM) as it has a direct connection to one of the hidden layers which analytically determines the
output weights . The author's research became the basis for the work of other researchers such as Li
et al. [28] suggested the idea of using the Fast Learning Network. The problem was that this
algorithm was based on a parallel connection of a multi-layer neural network and a single-layer
forward neural network.</p>
      <p>Ali and others [29] continued the Fast Learning Network model idea in the KDD Cup'99
dataset using a particle swarm optimization known as PSO-FLN. After comparing the performance
of their model with other optimization algorithms, they concluded that their model was superior,
showing an increase in the number of neurons in the hidden layer. Despite good results, this model
suffered from low accuracy for lower attack classes. Also, some deep learning models have been
built due to their efficiency and autonomy of learning important features of the dataset. A notable
example is the research paper by Naseer et al. [30], who compared different DL and ML models.
As a result, Deep CNN and LSTM outperformed the rest.</p>
      <p>A lot of work has been done with AutoEncoder (AE) in intrusion detection systems. For
reference, this is one of the most popular deep learning methods as it matches the best features of the
dataset. There are several subtypes of AE such as Stacked, Sparse and Variational AE. Shone et al.
[31] proposed an IDS based on the deep AE method and ML RF. Their work was successful in terms
of computation and time, using only the AE coding part to make it work asymmetrically. Experiments
were performed on two datasets such as KDD Cup '99 and NSL-KDD. Compared to Alrawashdeh et
al. [32] and their deep trust network models, the author's model was better, although not useful for
detecting R2L and U2R attacks. This was due to the selection of a dataset that did not contain such
cases.</p>
      <p>Yang et al. proposed using the Stacked Sparse Autoencoder (SSAE) to extract high-level
feature representations from intrusive behavioral information [33]. As a result, they found that high
dimensional sparse features are more discriminatory for intrusion behavior than previous methods,
and the base classification process is greatly accelerated by using high dimensional sparse features.
While this model provides adequate detection rates for U2R and R2L attacks, it is still lower than
other dataset classes. The same methodology was followed by the authors of [34] using AE and
SVM. The results show an overall performance improvement over other DL and ML models.</p>
      <p>A review of the literature shows that more work is needed to characterize the features of
network attacks. After all, by defining a common pattern, it is possible to provide high accuracy for
all attacks in the dataset. Many also use outdated datasets that do not have the new attack spectrum.
In addition, research using class imbalance techniques to prevent infrequent attacks on datasets is
limited.</p>
      <p>So, it is critical to implement an effective security system to protect the 5G network from these
threats. One such security system is the Intrusion Detection System (IDS).</p>
      <p>An IDS is a software or hardware system that monitors network traffic for signs of malicious
activity or policy violations. The IDS is designed to detect and alert network administrators to any
suspicious behavior that could compromise the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of a
network. Identifiers may be implemented in various parts of the network such as user equipment
(UE), radio access network (RAN), and core network (CN).</p>
      <p>The implementation of IDS in the 5G network is of paramount importance due to the
significant increase in the number of connected devices and the amount of data that is transmitted
over the network. With the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT), a huge number of devices with
different levels of security are connected to the network, making it vulnerable to attacks. In addition,
the 5G network is expected to support critical applications such as autonomous vehicles, remote
healthcare, and industrial automation that require a high level of security and reliability.</p>
      <p>IDS can help mitigate the security risks associated with 5G by providing real-time detection
and alerting of malicious activity. Identifiers can detect various types of attacks, including distributed
denial of service (DDoS), malware, and intrusion attempts. With IDS, network administrators can
quickly respond to security incidents and take appropriate action to prevent further damage.</p>
      <p>In conclusion, the implementation of IDS is critical to the security and reliability of the 5G
network. As the number of connected devices and the amount of data transferred over the network
increases, security risks also increase. An IDS can help detect and mitigate these risks by providing
real-time detection and alerting of malicious activity. Therefore, it is important to prioritize the
implementation of IDS in the 5G network to ensure the security and reliability of the network.</p>
      <p>Software-defined security can be used to create an intelligent core network intrusion detection
system, given that two key components of the 5G network - the RAN and the core network - are
fully virtualized and defined by software. This makes it possible to develop an automated security
system in which copies of the traffic from the reverse connection and the core network are sent to
the SDS for analysis, as described in [35]. It is important to note that traffic copies do not have any
impact on network performance during the analysis phase. However, before determining whether
the traffic is anomalous or not, pre-processing is required to ensure that the data is suitable for use
with machine learning or deep learning models. Anomalies can then be analyzed using appropriate
algorithms and the results stored in the Policy Manager database. These results are then sent to the
VNF manager, which updates the IDS module. The time it takes to process the model plays a vital
role in the presentation of the end results and determines when the template should be run to keep
the module's policies up to date. Using this method, you can automate detection, update the database
of attacks, and take the necessary actions to protect your network from intrusions.</p>
      <p>Physically, this concept can be implemented in the form of a Cyber incident response platform
for 5G cellular networks, which will receive data on the security status, cyber idents directly from
various network nodes (Fig. 3).</p>
      <p>
        IDS presented on Figure 10, was described in more details in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ]. It was only trained, but not
tested in real environment. That is why it was decided to deploy 5G network testbed for conducting
all the necessary tests.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>6. 5G network testbed development and deployment</title>
      <p>Now let's move on to the development of a test bench for revalidation of the IDS in 5G measure
(Fig. 10).</p>
      <p>Also, some logical blocks can be used for dermal use of them in the same tools, which were
examined during the research.</p>
      <p>First of all, the general scheme of the network was development. Thus, the network contains the
following components: CORE (network core), RAN (Radio Access Network), MEC (Multi-access
Edge Computing), and UE (User Equipment) (Fig.11).</p>
      <p>After analyzing different open-source projects [36] for deploying a 5G network, the following
software was chosen:
− Network core: SD-CORE (ONF)
− RAN: openairinterface5G (OAI)
− SMO (Service management and orchestration): Aether ROC (ONF)
Currently, a possible open-source project for MEC deployment was not
considered.</p>
      <p>In the context of open-source, hardware was considered. It was decided to deploy a network core
on the virtual machine on the server with Ubuntu OS, 16GB RAM, 512GB ROM, 16 CPU, and Intel
Core processor. Because SDR needed a USB connection with RAN, a PC was chosen. It is also on
Ubuntu OS and Intel Core processor, but 8GB RAM, 256GB ROM, and 6 CPU. As a transceiver,
SDR Ettus USRP B210 was selected. On the Figure 12 showed a scheme that includes hardware
and software.</p>
      <p>The full scheme includes communication between all deployed network components, IP
addresses, software and hardware (Fig. 13).
Additionally, a monitoring system Grafana was deployed.</p>
      <p>Before using the network for our goals, it was tested with a simulator of UE and gNodeB. For
this, the gNBSim [37] project was chosen. In this case, the network core was tested for serviceability.
Results of testing showed on Figure 14. During test, five profiles were tested:
− UE registration procedure;
− PDU session establishment (Registration + UE initiated PDU Session Establishment + User</p>
      <p>Data packets);
− UE deregistration procedure (Registration + UE initiated PDU Session Establishment + User</p>
      <p>Data packets + Deregister);
− AN release (Registration + UE initiated PDU Session Establishment + User Data packets +</p>
      <p>AN Release);
− UE trigger service request (Registration + UE initiated PDU Session Establishment + User</p>
      <p>Data packets + AN Release + UE Initiated Service Request).</p>
      <p>LTE. As we do not currently have the required SDR, similarly, an LTE network scheme
was developed and selected software and hardware (Fig.15).
Thus, for network core uses SD-CORE (EPC), and for RAN uses srsLTE (eNodeB). Regarding
hardware, VM for EPC, Raspberry Pi for RAN, were used, and as a transceiver uses LimeSDR.</p>
      <p>The similar deployment scheme that includes communication between all deployed
network components, IP addresses, software and hardware on the Figure 16.</p>
      <p>After configuration of RAN and EPC, a smartphone was prepared for connection
(SIMcard programming and APN configuration). Figure 18 showed a successful UE attaching.
On the monitoring we can see the following information about UE: IMSI, active time, throughput
by uplink and downlink.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>7. Conclusions</title>
      <p>Currently, commercial 5G networks are being extensively deployed in numerous countries
worldwide, while research and development efforts for advancing cellular networks towards 6G are
ongoing. In the present era, with the rapid emergence of new cyber threats and global risks,
combined with the widespread connection of diverse devices through cellular communication
networks, ensuring the requisite level of cybersecurity in these networks has become an urgent
priority.</p>
      <p>Therefore, in this and previous studies, significant emphasis has been placed on the development
of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for 5G networks based on artificial intelligence. This work
aims to develop the system concept, analyze existing datasets for training purposes, and devise a
suitable test architecture for evaluating the AI-based IDS specifically designed for 5G networks.</p>
      <p>To construct the test network, various options utilizing open-source solutions were meticulously
examined, with a preference given to OpenAirInterface. This choice ensures seamless and practical
integration of the developed IDS into the architecture. Additionally, generating the required types
of attacks on the network and conducting corresponding traffic analysis will be relatively
straightforward.</p>
      <p>Future research endeavors will focus on assessing the performance of the developed system
within the established testbed infrastructure.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-10">
      <title>8. Acknowledgements</title>
      <p>This work was supported in part by the European Commission under the 5GASP: 5G
Application &amp; Services experimentation and certification Platform (H2020 – ICT-2020, grant
agreement ID: 101016448). The views expressed in this contribution are those of the author and do
not necessarily represent the project.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-11">
      <title>9. References</title>
      <p>Blomberg, J.-W. Boiten, L. B. da Silva Santos, P. E. Bourne, та ін., The FAIR Guiding
Principles for scientific data management and stewardship, Sci. Data 3.1 (2016).
doi:10.1038/sdata.2016.18.
[17] A. Shiravi, H. Shiravi, M. Tavallaee, A. A. Ghorbani, Toward developing a systematic
approach to generate benchmark datasets for intrusion detection, Comput. &amp; Secur. 31.3
(2012) 357–374. doi:10.1016/j.cose.2011.12.012.
[18] G. Maciá-Fernández, J. Camacho, R. Magán-Carrión, P. García-Teodoro, R. Therón, UGR‘16:
A new dataset for the evaluation of cyclostationarity-based network IDSs, Comput. &amp; Secur.
73 (2018) 411–424. doi:10.1016/j.cose.2017.11.004.
[19] Datasets | Research | Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity | UNB. URL:
https://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/index.html.
[20] M. Ring, S. Wunderlich, D. Scheuring, D. Landes, A. Hotho, A survey of network-based
intrusion detection data sets, Comput. &amp; Secur. 86 (2019) 147–167.
doi:10.1016/j.cose.2019.06.005.
[21] A. R. Abdellah, O. A. K. Mahmood, A. Paramonov, A. Koucheryavy, IoT traffic prediction
using multi-step ahead prediction with neural network, у: 2019 11th International Congress on
Ultra Modern Telecommunications and Control Systems and Workshops (ICUMT), IEEE,
2019. doi:10.1109/icumt48472.2019.8970675.
[22] M. Pawlicki, M. Choraś, R. Kozik, Defending network intrusion detection systems against
adversarial evasion attacks, Future Gener. Comput. Syst. 110 (2020) 148–154.
doi:10.1016/j.future.2020.04.013.
[23] C. Zhang, P. Patras, H. Haddadi, Deep Learning in Mobile and Wireless Networking: A
Survey, IEEE Commun. Surv. &amp; Tutor. 21.3 (2019) 2224–2287.
doi:10.1109/comst.2019.2904897.
[24] M. Yao, M. Sohul, V. Marojevic, J. H. Reed, Artificial Intelligence Defined 5G Radio Access</p>
      <p>Networks, IEEE Commun. Mag. 57.3 (2019) 14–20. doi:10.1109/mcom.2019.1800629.
[25] G. Karatas, O. Demir, O. K. Sahingoz, Increasing the Performance of Machine Learning-Based
IDSs on an Imbalanced and Up-to-Date Dataset, IEEE Access 8 (2020) 32150–32162.
doi:10.1109/access.2020.2973219.
[26] H. Yao, D. Fu, P. Zhang, M. Li, Y. Liu, MSML: A Novel Multilevel Semi-Supervised Machine
Learning Framework for Intrusion Detection System, IEEE Internet Things J. 6.2 (2019) 1949–
1959. doi:10.1109/jiot.2018.2873125.
[27] G.-B. Huang, Q.-Y. Zhu, C.-K. Siew, Extreme learning machine: Theory and applications,</p>
      <p>Neurocomputing 70.1-3 (2006) 489–501. doi:10.1016/j.neucom.2005.12.126.
[28] G. Li, P. Niu, X. Duan, X. Zhang, Fast learning network: a novel artificial neural network with
a fast learning speed, Neural Comput. Appl. 24.7-8 (2013) 1683–1695.
doi:10.1007/s00521013-1398-7.
[29] M. H. Ali, B. A. D. Al Mohammed, A. Ismail, M. F. Zolkipli, A New Intrusion Detection
System Based on Fast Learning Network and Particle Swarm Optimization, IEEE Access 6
(2018) 20255–20261. doi:10.1109/access.2018.2820092.
[30] S. Naseer, Y. Saleem, S. Khalid, M. K. Bashir, J. Han, M. M. Iqbal, K. Han, Enhanced Network
Anomaly Detection Based on Deep Neural Networks, IEEE Access 6 (2018) 48231–48246.
doi:10.1109/access.2018.2863036.
[31] N. Shone, T. N. Ngoc, V. D. Phai, Q. Shi, A Deep Learning Approach to Network Intrusion
Detection, IEEE Trans. Emerg. Top. Comput. Intell. 2.1 (2018) 41–50.
doi:10.1109/tetci.2017.2772792.
[32] K. Alrawashdeh, C. Purdy, Toward an Online Anomaly Intrusion Detection System Based on
Deep Learning, у: 2016 15th IEEE International Conference on Machine Learning and
Applications (ICMLA), IEEE, 2016. doi:10.1109/icmla.2016.0040.
[33] B. Yan, G. Han, Effective Feature Extraction via Stacked Sparse Autoencoder to Improve
Intrusion Detection System, IEEE Access 6 (2018) 41238–41248.
doi:10.1109/access.2018.2858277.
[34] M. Al-Qatf, Y. Lasheng, M. Al-Habib, K. Al-Sabahi, Deep Learning Approach Combining
Sparse Autoencoder With SVM for Network Intrusion Detection, IEEE Access 6 (2018)
52843–52856. doi:10.1109/access.2018.2869577.
[35] Lam, Jordan, Robert, Abbas, Machine learning based anomaly detection for 5g networks.</p>
      <p>arXiv preprint arXiv:2003.03474 (2020).
[36] GitHub - calee0219/awesome-5g: Awesome lists about 5G projects. URL:
https://github.com/calee0219/awesome-5g.
[37] GitHub - omec-project/gnbsim: gNB simulator. URL: https://github.com/omec-project/gnbsim.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
    <ref-list>
      <ref id="ref1">
        <mixed-citation>
          <article-title>[1] The importance of 5G technology</article-title>
          . URL: https://securecommunications.airbus.com/en/meetthe
          <article-title>-experts/the-importance-of-5g-technology.</article-title>
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref2">
        <mixed-citation>
          [2]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>W.</given-names>
            <surname>Saad</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
            <surname>Bennis</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
            <surname>Chen</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <source>A Vision of 6G Wireless Systems: Applications</source>
          , Trends, Technologies, and Open Research Problems, IEEE Netw.
          <volume>34</volume>
          .3 (
          <year>2020</year>
          )
          <fpage>134</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>142</lpage>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .1109/mnet.001.1900287.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref3">
        <mixed-citation>
          [3]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S. A.</given-names>
            <surname>Abdel Hakeem</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>H. H.</given-names>
            <surname>Hussein</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>H.</given-names>
            <surname>Kim</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <source>Security Requirements and Challenges of 6G Technologies and Applications, Sensors</source>
          <volume>22</volume>
          .5 (
          <year>2022</year>
          )
          <year>1969</year>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .3390/s22051969.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref4">
        <mixed-citation>
          [4]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Telecom</given-names>
            <surname>Storefront</surname>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Solutions</article-title>
          . URL: https://www.ncr.com/telecom-technology/telecomstorefront-solutions
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref5">
        <mixed-citation>
          [5]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Ibrahim</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>V.</given-names>
            <surname>Ford</surname>
          </string-name>
          , Observations, Evaluations, and
          <article-title>Recommendations for DETERLab from an Educational Perspective</article-title>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
            <surname>Cybersecur</surname>
          </string-name>
          .
          <source>Educ. Res. Pract. № 1</source>
          (
          <year>2021</year>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref6">
        <mixed-citation>
          [6]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>C.</given-names>
            <surname>Jian</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>H.</given-names>
            <surname>Shi</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>B.</given-names>
            <surname>Krieg-Brückner</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>SimSpace: A Tool to Interpret Route Instructions with Qualitative Spatial Knowledge, у: Benchmarking of Qualitative Spatial and Temporal Reasoning Systems</article-title>
          , Stanford,
          <year>2009</year>
          , p.
          <fpage>47</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>48</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref7">
        <mixed-citation>
          [7]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>R.</given-names>
            <surname>Weiss</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>F.</given-names>
            <surname>Turbak</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
            <surname>Mache</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M. E.</given-names>
            <surname>Locasto</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Cybersecurity Education and Assessment in EDURange</article-title>
          ,
          <source>IEEE Secur. &amp; Priv. 15.3</source>
          (
          <year>2017</year>
          )
          <fpage>90</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>95</lpage>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .1109/msp.
          <year>2017</year>
          .
          <volume>54</volume>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref8">
        <mixed-citation>
          [8]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
            <surname>Smyrlis</surname>
          </string-name>
          , I. Somarakis, G. Spanoudakis, G. Hatzivasilis, S. Ioannidis,
          <string-name>
            <surname>CYRA: A ModelDriven CYber Range Assurance</surname>
            <given-names>Platform</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , Appl. Sci.
          <volume>11</volume>
          .11 (
          <year>2021</year>
          )
          <article-title>5165</article-title>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .3390/app11115165.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref9">
        <mixed-citation>
          [9]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
            <surname>Vykopal</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>R.</given-names>
            <surname>Oslejsek</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>P.</given-names>
            <surname>Celeda</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
            <surname>Vizvary</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>D.</given-names>
            <surname>Tovarnak</surname>
          </string-name>
          , KYPO Cyber Range: Design and
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Use</given-names>
            <surname>Cases</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <source>у: 12th International Conference on Software Technologies, SCITEPRESS - Science and Technology Publications</source>
          ,
          <year>2017</year>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .5220/0006428203100321.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref10">
        <mixed-citation>
          [10]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>C.</given-names>
            <surname>Pham</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>D.</given-names>
            <surname>Tang</surname>
          </string-name>
          , K.-i. Chinen, R. Beuran, CyRIS, у:
          <source>SoICT '16: Seventh International Symposium on Information and Communication Technology</source>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>ACM</surname>
          </string-name>
          , New York, NY, USA,
          <year>2016</year>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .1145/3011077.3011087.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref11">
        <mixed-citation>
          [11]
          <string-name>
            <surname>M. M. Yamin</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>B.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Katt</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>V.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Gkioulos</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Cyber ranges and security testbeds: Scenarios, functions, tools and architecture</article-title>
          ,
          <source>Comput. &amp; Secur</source>
          .
          <volume>88</volume>
          (
          <year>2020</year>
          )
          <article-title>101636</article-title>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .1016/j.cose.
          <year>2019</year>
          .
          <volume>101636</volume>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref12">
        <mixed-citation>
          [12]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>N.</given-names>
            <surname>Chouliaras</surname>
          </string-name>
          , G. Kittes,
          <string-name>
            <surname>I. Kantzavelou</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>L.</given-names>
            <surname>Maglaras</surname>
          </string-name>
          , G. Pantziou,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M. A.</given-names>
            <surname>Ferrag</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Cyber Ranges and TestBeds for Education, Training</article-title>
          , and Research, Appl. Sci.
          <volume>11</volume>
          .4 (
          <year>2021</year>
          )
          <year>1809</year>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .3390/app11041809.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref13">
        <mixed-citation>
          [13]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Imanbayev</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
            <surname>Tynymbayev</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>R.</given-names>
            <surname>Odarchenko</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
            <surname>Gnatyuk</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>R.</given-names>
            <surname>Berdibayev</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Baikenov</surname>
          </string-name>
          , N. Kaniyeva,
          <source>Research of Machine Learning Algorithms for the Development of Intrusion Detection Systems in 5G Mobile Networks and Beyond, Sensors</source>
          <volume>22</volume>
          .24 (
          <year>2022</year>
          )
          <article-title>9957</article-title>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .3390/s22249957.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref14">
        <mixed-citation>
          [14]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
            <surname>Rawat</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Srinivasan</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>V.</given-names>
            <surname>Ravi</surname>
          </string-name>
          , U. Ghosh,
          <article-title>Intrusion detection systems using classical machine learning techniques vs integrated unsupervised feature learning and deep neural network, Internet Technol</article-title>
          . Lett. (
          <year>2020</year>
          ). doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .1002/itl2.
          <fpage>232</fpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref15">
        <mixed-citation>
          [15]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>W.</given-names>
            <surname>Haider</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
            <surname>Hu</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
            <surname>Slay</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>B. P.</given-names>
            <surname>Turnbull</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Y.</given-names>
            <surname>Xie</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Generating realistic intrusion detection system dataset based on fuzzy qualitative modeling</article-title>
          ,
          <source>J. Netw. Comput. Appl</source>
          .
          <volume>87</volume>
          (
          <year>2017</year>
          )
          <fpage>185</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>192</lpage>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .1016/j.jnca.
          <year>2017</year>
          .
          <volume>03</volume>
          .018.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref16">
        <mixed-citation>
          [16]
          <string-name>
            <surname>M. D. Wilkinson</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Dumontier</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>I. J.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Aalbersberg</surname>
            , G. Appleton,
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Axton</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Baak</surname>
          </string-name>
          , N.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
    </ref-list>
  </back>
</article>