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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Extending c-Representations and c-Inference for Reasoning with Infeasible Worlds</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Jonas Haldimann</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Christoph Beierle</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Gabriele Kern-Isberner</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>FernUniversität in Hagen</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Hagen</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="DE">Germany</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>University of Dortmund</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Dortmund</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="DE">Germany</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2023</year>
      </pub-date>
      <fpage>2</fpage>
      <lpage>4</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>Inductive inference operators capture the process of completing a conditional belief base to an inference relation. One such operator is c-inference which is based on the c-representations of a belief base, c-representations being a special kind of ranking functions. c-Inference exhibits many desirable properties put forward for nonmonotonic reasoning; for instance, it fully complies with syntax splitting. A characterization of c-inference as a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) yields a basis for implementing c-inference. However, the definitions of c-representations and of c-inference only take belief bases into account that satisfy a rather strong notion of consistency requiring every possible world to be at least somewhat plausible. In this paper, we extend the definition of c-representations to belief bases that need to satisfy only a weaker notion of consistency where some worlds may be completely infeasible. Based on these extended c-representations, we also extend the definition of c-inference correspondingly, thus covering all weakly consistent belief bases. Furthermore, we develop an adapted CSP characterizing the such extended c-inference that can be used as a basis for an implementation.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;c-inference</kwd>
        <kwd>c-representations</kwd>
        <kwd>inductive inference operator</kwd>
        <kwd>infeasible worlds</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        Ranking functions [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] are commonly used as models for
conditional belief bases. The c-representations [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref3">2, 3</xref>
        ] of
a belief base ∆ are a special kind of ranking functions
modelling ∆ . c-Representations define inductive
inference operators that satisfy most advanced properties of
nonmonotonic inference, particularly syntax splitting [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]
and also conditional syntax splitting [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ]. While initially
introduced only for belief bases satisfying a rather strong
notion of consistency, in this paper we define extended
c-representations that also cover belief bases satisfying
a weaker notion of consistency. In the such extended
c-representations some possible worlds may be assigned
a rank of ∞ indicating them to be completely
infeasible according to ∆ . This allows for realizing a kind of
paraconsistent conditional reasoning based on the strong
structural concept of c-representations.
      </p>
      <p>
        The notion of c-inference was introduced in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6 ref7">6, 7</xref>
        ] as
nonmonotonic inference taking all c-representations into
account. Therefore, the inductive inference operator
cinference inherits the restriction that it is only defined
for strongly consistent belief bases. Using the extended
c-representations we will introduce an extended version
of c-inference that also covers weakly consistent belief
bases.
      </p>
      <p>
        The c-representations of a belief base ∆ can be
characterized by a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP), and
in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6 ref7">6, 7</xref>
        ] it is shown that c-inference can also be
realized by a CSP. Here, we develop both a CSP that
characterizes all extended c-representations and a simplified
version of this CSP the solutions of which still cover all
c-representations relevant for c-inference. Furthermore,
we show how also extended c-inference can be realized
by a CSP.
      </p>
      <p>To summarize, the main contributions of this paper
are:
• extension of c-representations for all weakly
consistent belief bases;
• extension of c-inference to all weakly consistent
belief bases;
• proof of some key properties of extended
cinference;
• construction of a CSP describing extended
crepresentations and then development of a
simplified version of this CSP;
• development of a CSP realizing extended
cinference.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Conditional Logic</title>
      <p>Thus, ∆ is strongly consistent if there is at least one
ranking function modelling ∆ that considers all worlds
A (propositional) signature is a finite set Σ of proposi- feasible. This notion of consistency is used in many
aptional variables. Assuming an underlying signature Σ , proaches, e.g., [12]. The notion of weak consistency is
we denote the resulting propositional language by ℒΣ. equivalent to the more relaxed notion of consistency that
Usually, we denote elements of signatures with lower- is used in, e.g., [13, 14]. Trivially, strong consistency
case letters , , , . . . and formulas with uppercase let- implies weak consistency.
ters , , , . . .. We may denote a conjunction  ∧ 
by  and a negation ¬ by  for brevity of notation.</p>
      <p>The set of interpretations over the underlying signature 3. Inductive Inference
is denoted as Ω Σ. Interpretations are also called worlds
and Ω Σ the universe. An interpretation  ∈ Ω Σ is a The conditional beliefs of an agent are formally captured
model of a formula  ∈ ℒ if  holds in , denoted as by a binary relation |∼ on propositional formulas with
 |= . The set of models of a formula (over a signature  |∼  representing that  (defeasibly) entails ; this
Σ ) is denoted as Mod Σ() = { ∈ Ω Σ |  |= } or relation is called inference or entailment relation.
Difershort as Ω . The Σ in Ω Σ, ℒΣ and Mod Σ() can be ent sets of properties for inference relations have been
omitted if the signature is clear from the context or if the suggested in literature, and often the set of postulates
underlying signature is not relevant. A formula  entails called system P is considered as minimal requirement for
a formula , denoted by  |= , if Ω  ⊆ Ω  . By slight inference relations. Inference relations satisfying system
abuse of notation we sometimes interpret worlds as the P are called preferential inference relations [15, 16].
corresponding complete conjunction of all elements in Every ranking function  induces a preferential
inferthe signature in either positive or negated form. ence relation |∼  by</p>
      <p>
        A conditional (|) connects two formulas ,  and
represents the rule “If  then usually ”, where   |∼   if  () = ∞ or  () &lt;  (). (1)
is called the antecedent and  the consequent of the Note that the condition  () = ∞ in (1) ensures that
conditional. The conditional language is denoted as system P’s axiom (Reflexivity):  |∼   is satisfied for
(dℒit|iℒon)Σals=is{c(alle|d)a |beli,efb∈aseℒ.ΣW}e. Ausefiniatethsereteo-fvacolune-d  I≡n⊥duc.tive inference is the process of completing a given
semantics of conditionals in this paper [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]. For a world belief base to an inference relation. To formally capture
 a conditional (|) is either verified by  if  |= , this we use the concept of inductive inference operators.
falsified by  if  |= , or not applicable to  if
 |= . Popular models for belief bases are ranking Definition 2 (inductive inference operator [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]). An
infunctions (also called ordinal conditional functions, OCF) ductive inference operator is a mapping  : ∆ ↦→ |∼ Δ
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref9">1, 9</xref>
        ] and total preorders (TPO) on Ω Σ [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]. An OCF that maps each belief base to an inference relation s.t. direct
 : Ω Σ → N0 ∪ {∞} maps worlds to a rank such that inference (DI) and trivial vacuity (TV) are fulfilled, i.e.,
at least one world has rank 0, i.e.,  − 1(0) ̸= ∅. The
intuition is that worlds with lower ranks are more plau- (DI) if (|) ∈ ∆ then  |∼ Δ , and
sible than worlds with higher ranks; worlds with rank (TV) if ∆ = ∅ and  |∼ Δ  then  |= .
∞ are considered infeasible. OCFs are lifted to
formulas by mapping a formula  to the smallest rank of a An inductive inference operator  is a preferential
model of , or to ∞ if  has no models. An OCF  is a inductive inference operator if every inference relation
model of a conditional (|), denoted as  |= (|), |∼ Δ in the image of  satisfies system P.
if  () = ∞ or if  () &lt;  ();  is a model of a p-Entailment [15, 16]  : ∆ ↦→ |∼ Δ is the most
belief base ∆ , denoted as  |= ∆ , if it is a model of every cautious preferential inductive inference operator. It is
conditional in ∆ . characterized by system P in the way that it only licenses
      </p>
      <p>
        Note that there are diferent definitions of consistency inferences that can be obtained by iteratively applying
of a belief base in the literature. To distinguish two difer- the rules of system P to the belief base. Every other
preferent notions of consistency that both occur in this paper ential inductive inference operator extends p-entailment.
we call one notion of consistency strong consistency and While extending p-entailment and adding some more
the other notion weak consistency, as suggested in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ]. inferences to the induced inference relations is usually
desired, p-entailment can act as guidance for example
for inferences of the form  |∼⊥ which can be seen as
representations of “strict” beliefs (i.e.,  is completely
unfeasible).
      </p>
      <p>
        Definition 1 ([
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ]). A belief base ∆ is called strongly
consistent if there exists at least one ranking function 
with  |= ∆ and  − 1(∞) = ∅. A belief base ∆ is weakly
consistent if there is a ranking function  with  |= ∆ .
Postulate (Classic Preservation) (adapted from [14]).
      </p>
      <p>An inductive inference operator  : ∆ ↦→ |∼ Δ satisfies
(Classic Preservation) if for all belief bases ∆ and ,  ∈ ℒ
it holds that  |∼ Δ ⊥ if  |∼ Δ ⊥.</p>
      <p>System Z is an inductive inference operator that is
defined based on the Z-partition of a belief base [ 17].</p>
      <p>Here we use an extended version of system Z that also
covers weakly consistent belief bases and that was shown
to be equivalent to rational closure [18] in [19].</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>4. Consistency of Belief Bases</title>
      <p>Let us illustrate weak and strong consistency with an
example.</p>
      <p>Example 1. Let Σ = , , ,  be a signature. The belief
bases ∆ 1 = {(⊥|⊤)} and ∆ 2 = {(⊥|), (|), (|)}
are not weakly consistent and thus also not strongly
consistent. The belief base ∆ 3 = {(⊥|)} is weakly
consistent but not strongly consistent. The belief base ∆ 4 =
{(|), (|)} is strongly consistent and thus also weakly
consistent.</p>
      <p>Definition 3 ((extended) Z-partition). A conditional
(|) is tolerated by ∆ = {(|) |  = 1, . . . , }
if there exists a world  ∈ Ω such that  verifies (|) For every weakly consistent belief base ∆ there is a
and  does not falsify any conditional in ∆ , i.e.,  |=  world that does not falsify any conditional in ∆ .
and  |= ⋀︀</p>
      <p>=1( ∨ ).</p>
      <p>The (extended) Z-partition EZP (∆) = (∆ 0, . . . , ∆ , Lemma 3. For every weakly consistent belief base ∆ there
∆ ∞) of a belief base ∆ is the ordered partition of ∆ that is is an  ∈ Ω s.t.  does not falsify any conditional in ∆ .
constructed by letting ∆  be the inclusion maximal subset
of ⋃︀ = ∆  until ∆ +1 =</p>
      <p>= ∆  that is tolerated by ⋃︀
∅. The set ∆ ∞ is the remaining set of conditionals that
contains no conditional which is tolerated by ∆ ∞.</p>
      <p>Proof. Because ∆ is weakly consistent, there is a ranking
function  with  |= ∆ . Let  ∈  − 1(0). Towards a
contradiction, assume that there is a (|) ∈ ∆ that is</p>
      <p>Because the ∆  are chosen inclusion-maximal, the Z- falsified by , i.e.,  |= . For  to accept (|) it
partition is unique [17]. must be either  () = ∞ or  () &lt;  (). Because
 |=  and  () = 0 we have  () ̸= ∞. Because
Definition 4 ((extended) system Z). Let ∆ be a belief  () ⩽ 0 and there are no ranks below 0 the condition
base with EZP (∆) = (∆ 0, . . . , ∆ , ∆ ∞). If ∆ is not  () &lt;  () does not hold. This is a contradiction;
weakly consistent, then let  |∼ Δ  for any ,  ∈ ℒ. hence  does not falsify any conditional in ∆ .</p>
      <p>Otherwise, the (extended) Z-ranking function  Δ is
deifned as follows: For  ∈ Ω , if one of the conditionals in It is well-known that the construction of the extended
∆ ∞ is applicable to  define  Δ() = ∞. If not, let ∆  be Z-partition EZP (∆) is successful with ∆ ∞ = ∅ if ∆
the last partition in EZP (∆) that contains a conditional is strongly consistent. We can also use the extended
Zfalsified by . Then let  Δ() =  + 1. If  does not fal- partition to check for weak consistency. The following
sify any conditional in ∆ , then let  Δ() = 0. (Extended) proposition summarizes the relations between EZP (∆)
system Z maps ∆ to the inference relation |∼ Δ induced by and the consistency of ∆ .
 Δ.</p>
      <p>For strongly consistent belief bases the extended
system Z coincides with system Z as defined in [ 17, 12]. Note
that for any belief base ∆ the OCF  Δ is a model of ∆ .</p>
      <p>
        Lemma 1 ([
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ]). For a weakly consistent belief base ∆
and a formula  we have  Δ() = ∞ if  |∼ Δ ⊥.
      </p>
      <p>
        Lemma 2 ([
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ]). Let ∆ be a belief base with EZP (∆) =
(∆ 0, . . . , ∆ , ∆ ∞). A world  ∈ Ω falsifies a conditional
in ∆ ∞ if it is applicable for a conditional in ∆ ∞.
      </p>
      <p>Proof. Direction ⇒: Assume that  falsifies a conditional
in ∆ ∞. Then this conditional is applicable for .</p>
      <p>Direction ⇐: Assume that  is applicable for at least
one conditional (|) ∈ ∆ ∞. There are two possible
cases: Either  falsifies one of the other conditionals in
∆ ∞ or not. In the first case the lemma holds. In the
second case, towards a contradiction, we assume that 
does not falsify (|). If  is applicable and does not
falsify (|) then  must verify (|). That implies
that (|) is tolerated by ∆ ∞ which contradicts the
construction of EZP (∆) .</p>
      <p>Proposition 1. Let ∆ = {(1|1), . . . , (|)} be
a belief base with EZP (∆) = (∆ 0, . . . , ∆ , ∆ ∞).
(1.) ∆ is not weakly consistent if ∆ ∞ = ∆ and
1 ∨ · · · ∨</p>
      <p>≡ ⊤ .
1 ∨ · · · ∨</p>
      <p≯≡ ⊤ .
(2.) ∆ is weakly consistent if ∆ ∞ ̸= ∆ or
(3.) ∆ is strongly consistent if ∆ ∞ = ∅.</p>
      <p>Continuing Example 1, for the not weakly consistent
∆ 2 we have EZP (∆ 2) = (∆ 2∞) with ∆ 2∞ = ∆ and
 ∨  ∨  ≡ ⊤ . For the weakly consistent ∆ 3 we have
EZP (∆ 3) = (∆ 3∞) with ∆ 3∞ = ∆ but  ̸≡ ⊤ . For the
strongly consistent ∆ 3 we have EZP (∆ 4) = (∆ 40) with
∆ 40 = ∆ and ∆ 4∞ = ∅.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>5. Generalizing c-Representations</title>
      <p>For strongly consistent belief bases, c-representations
have been defined as follows.</p>
      <p>
        Definition 5 (c-representation [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref3">2, 3</xref>
        ]). A
crepresentation of a belief base ∆ = {(1|1),
. . . , (|)} over Σ is a ranking function  ⃗
constructed from integer impacts⃗ = ( 1 , . . . ,  ) with
  ∈ N0,  ∈ {1, . . . , } assigned to each conditional
(|) such that  ⃗ accepts ∆ and is given by:
 ⃗ () =
∑︁
1⩽⩽
|=
 .
      </p>
      <p>(2)
We will denote the set of all c-representations of ∆ by
Mod Σ(∆) .</p>
      <p>A belief base ∆ that is not strongly consistent will
not have a c-representation: by Definition 5, a
crepresentation of ∆ is a finite ranking function modelling
∆ ; if ∆ is not strongly consistent, such a ranking function
cannot exist.</p>
      <p>To work with belief bases that are only weakly
consistent, we need a more general definition of
crepresentations. A ranking function that is a model of a
weakly but not strongly consistent belief base must assign
rank ∞ to some worlds. To achieve this while keeping a
construction of c-representations similar to the one given
in (2), we extend the definition of c-representations to
allow infinite impacts.









(|) ( |) (|)</p>
      <p>impact on  ⃗ ()
v
f
v
f
−
−
v
v
f
f
−
−
− − −
− − −
−
−
f
f
v
v</p>
      <p>Proof. Because ∆ is weakly consistent, there is at least
one world  ∈ Ω Σ that does not falsify any of the
conditionals (see Lemma 3). This implies  ⃗ () = 0. Thus,
 ⃗ is a ranking function.</p>
      <p>For every (|) ∈ ∆ it holds that  ⃗ () = ∞
Definition 6 (extended c-representation). An extended because every model of  falsifies the conditional
c-representation of a belief base ∆ = {(1|1), (|) with impact ∞. For  ⃗ () we have either
. . . , (|)} over Σ is a ranking function  ⃗ con- (1.)  ⃗ () = 0 or (2.)  ⃗ () = ∞. In case
structed from impacts⃗ = ( 1 , . . . ,  ) with   ∈ (1.) we have  ⃗ () = 0 &lt; ∞ =  ⃗ (). In
N0 ∪ ∞,  ∈ {1, . . . , } assigned to each conditional case (2.) we have  ⃗ () = ∞ and  ⃗ () =
(|) such that  ⃗ accepts ∆ and is given by: ∞ and therefore  ⃗ () = ∞ because  ⃗ () =
 ⃗ () = ∑︁   (3) (mi|n{)⃗. T(hus,) ,⃗ ⃗ |=( ∆.)}. In both cases  ⃗ accepts
1⩽⩽
|=
We will denote the set of all extended c-representations of
∆ by Mod Σ(∆) .</p>
      <p>Example 2. Let Σ = {, ,  } and ∆ = {(|), ( |),
(|)}. Note that ∆ is weakly consistent but not strongly
consistent. Then the ranking function  ⃗ displayed in
Table 1 is an extended c-representation of ∆ induced by the
impacts⃗ = (∞, 1, ∞).</p>
      <p>Proposition 3 also illustrates that in extended
crepresentations worlds may have rank infinity
without the belief base requiring this. In an extended
crepresentation of ∆ only those worlds need to have rank
infinity that have rank infinity in the z-ranking  Δ of ∆ .</p>
      <p>Proposition 4. Let ∆ be a weakly consistent belief base.</p>
      <p>If  Δ() = ∞ for a world , then  ⃗ () = ∞ for all
c-representations  ⃗ of ∆ .</p>
      <p>Every c-representation of a strongly consistent belief Proof. Assume that  Δ() = ∞. Let EZP (∆) =
base ∆ is obviously an extended c-representation of ∆ . {∆ 0, . . . , ∆ , ∆ ∞} be the extended Z-partition of ∆ .
By definition of  Δ there exists a conditional (|) ∈
Proposition 2. Let ∆ be a strongly consistent belief ∆ ∞ s.t.  |= . Because (|) ∈ ∆ ∞ the conditional
base. Every c-representation  ⃗ of ∆ is an extended c- (|) is not tolerated by ∆ ∞, so there is a conditional
representation of ∆ .
(′|′) ∈ ∆ ∞ that is falsified by  (this can be (|) Proposition 6. Let ∆ be a belief base with EZP (∆) =
again). {∆ 0, . . . , ∆ , ∆ ∞}, and let  ∈ Ω . We have that</p>
      <p>Towards a contradiction assume that there is a c-  () = ∞ for all  ∈ Mod Δ if  |=  for some
representation  ⃗ of ∆ with  ⃗ () &lt; ∞. As  ⃗ models (|) ∈ ∆ ∞.
∆ and thus also (′|′) there must be a world 1 that
verifies (′|′) and satisfies  ⃗ (1) &lt;  ⃗ (). With the Proof. Direction ⇒ If  () = ∞ for all  ∈ Mod Δ
same argumentation there must be another conditional then there is no  ⃗ ∈ Mod Δ with  ⃗ () &lt; ∞. With
(1|1) ∈ ∆ ∞ that is falsified by 1, and another world Proposition 5 this implies  Δ() = ∞. By Definition 4
2 that verifies (1|1) and satisfies  ⃗ (2) &lt;  ⃗ (1). this is the case if a conditional in ∆ ∞ is applicable for .
Repeating this argumentation we obtain an infinite chain Assume  |=  for some (|) ∈
of worlds 1, 2, . . . s.t.  ⃗ (1) &gt;  ⃗ (2) &gt; . . .. But ∆ ∞D.irTehcetnio nΔ⇐() = ∞ and with Proposition 4 we have
 () = ∞ for all  ∈ Mod Δ.
as there are only finitely many worlds (and also because
there are only finitely many ranks below  ⃗ (1)) such a
chain cannot exist. Contradiction.</p>
      <p>Proposition 5. Let ∆ be a weakly consistent belief base.</p>
      <p>There is a c-representation  ⃗ of ∆ with  ⃗ () &lt; ∞ for
all worlds  with  Δ() &lt; ∞.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>6. Extending c-Inference</title>
      <p>
        c-Inference [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6 ref7">6, 7</xref>
        ] is an inference operator taking all
crepresentations of a belief base ∆ into account. It was
originally defined for strongly consistent belief bases.
      </p>
      <p>
        Proof. Let ∆ = {(1|1), . . . , (|)} be a Definition 7 (c-inference, |∼ Δ [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]). Let ∆ be a strongly
w{∆ ea0k,l.y. . c,o∆nsi,st∆en∞t }bbeeliethfebeaxstee.ndedLeZt-pEaZrtPiti(o∆)n o=f∆ . icnofnesriesntecnetfbroemliefbianstehaencodnlteetxto,f∆  ,bdeefnoortmedublays. |∼ isΔac-,
Construct an impact vecto⃗r for ∆ as follows. Let  0 = 1
and   = |∆ 0 ∪ · · · ∪ ∆ − 1| ·  − 1 + 1 for  = 1, . . . , . if  |∼   holds for all c-representations  of ∆ .
For (|) with (|) ∈ ∆  let   =   for  &lt; ∞ Now we use extended c-representations to extend
and   = ∞ for  = ∞. By construction, for worlds  c-inference for belief bases that may be only weakly
that do not falsify a conditional from ∆  ∪· · ·∪ ∆  ∪∆ ∞ consistent. Extended c-inference takes all extended
cwe have  ⃗ () &lt;   . representations of ∆ into account.
      </p>
      <p>⃗ is a c-representation of ∆ : Let (|) be any
conditional in ∆ . If (|) ∈ ∆ ∞ then  Δ() = ∞ by Definition 8 (extended c-inference, |∼ Δ). Let ∆ be a
the definition of  Δ which implies with Proposition 4 belief base and let ,  ∈ ℒ. Then  is an extended
cthat  ⃗ () = ∞ and therefore  ⃗ |= (|). Oth- inference from  in the context of ∆ , denoted by  |∼ Δ ,
erwise, we have (|) ∈ ∆  with  &lt; ∞. Then for if  |∼   holds for all extended c-representations  of
any world ′ falsifying (|) we have  ⃗ () &gt;   ; ∆ .
hence  ⃗ () ⩾   . Because (|) ∈ ∆  , there First, let us verify that extended c-inference is indeed
issifya awcoornldditio′ntahlaitnv∆ erifie∪s · · · ∪(|∆ ) ∪an∆ d ∞do.eTshenroetfofrael-, wapitrhefce-riennfetiraelnicnedufocrtisvteroinnfgelryenccoensoipseternattobretlhieaft bcaosinesc.ides
 ⃗ () &lt;   . Thus,  ⃗ () &lt;   ⩽  ⃗ ()
and  ⃗ |= (|). Proposition 7. Extended c-inference is an inductive
in</p>
      <p>Furthermore, it holds that  ⃗ () = ∞ if  falsifies a ference operator.
conditional in ∆ ∞. Therefore,  ⃗ () &lt; ∞ for all worlds
 with  Δ() &lt; ∞.</p>
      <p>Using Proposition 4 we can see that for all worlds 
the c-representation constructed in the proof of
Proposition 5 satisfies that  ⃗ () &lt; ∞ if  Δ() &lt; ∞. Using
Lemma 1 we have  ⃗ () &lt; ∞ if  does not entail ⊥
with p-entailment.</p>
      <p>Lemma 4. Let ∆ be a weakly consistent belief base. There
is an extended c-representation  ⃗ of ∆ such that for all
 ∈ Ω we have  ⃗ () &lt; ∞ if  |̸∼ Δ ⊥, where the world
 is considered as a formula on the right side of the “if”.</p>
      <p>Another consequence of Propositions 4 and 5 is the
following.</p>
      <p>Proof. We need to show that extended c-inference
satisifes (DI) and (TV). (DI) is trivial: Every c-representation
of ∆ accepts the conditionals in ∆ by definition.
Therefore,  |∼ Δ  for every (|) ∈ ∆ . (TV) is also clear:
For ∆ = ∅ the only c-representation is  = 0. In this
case  accepts only conditionals (|) with  = ⊥,
which are conditionals with  |= .</p>
      <p>Proposition 8. For strongly consistent belief bases,
extended c-inference coincides with normal c-inference.</p>
      <p>Proof. Let ∆ = {(1|1), . . . , (|)} be a strongly
consistent belief base and ,  ∈ ℒ. We need to show
that  |∼ Δ  if  |∼ Δ .</p>
      <p>Direction ⇒: Let  |∼ Δ , i.e., every extended c- Proposition 9. Extended c-inference is preferential, i.e.,
representation models (|). As every c-representation it satisfies system P.
is an extended c-representation (Proposition 2), every
c-representation models (|). Thus,  |∼  . Proof. Every ranking function, and thus every extended
repDreirseecnttiaotinon⇐m:odeLlest(|)|∼. ΔWe nee,di.teo., sheovwerythact-
tci-ornep.rTehseenitnatteiorsne,citniodnucoefstwaoprperfeerfeernetniatliailnifnefreernecnecererlae-any extended c-representation  ⃗ models (|). If⃗ lations is again preferential. As extended c-inference is
contains only finite values it is a c-representation and the intersection of the inference relations induced by
thus models (|) by assumption. each extended c-representation, extended c-inference is</p>
      <p>Assume that ⃗ contains infinite entries. Let preferential.</p>
      <p>EZP (∆) = {∆ 0, . . . , ∆ , ∆ ∞} be the extended toler- Proposition 9 implies that extended c-inference
capahnacvee p∆ar∞tit=ion∅o.fL∆ et. fBien⃗c(au)s=e∆ { is s|tro∈ng{ly0,c.o.n.s,ist}en,t,w&lt;e tu.reFsurpt-heenrtmaiol mree,netx,teid.ee.,d icf-infer|∼enΔce cointhciedneswit|∼h
Δp∞} be the set of finite values in impact vector ⃗ and entailment on entailments of the form  |∼⊥ which can
0 = 1 + |fin⃗( )| · max(fin⃗( )). Now construct⃗  be seen as representations of “strict” beliefs (i.e.,  is
from⃗ as follows. For (|) ∈ ∆ 0 with   = ∞ let completely unfeasible).
  = 0. Let 1 = (0 + 1) · |{ (|) ∈ ∆ 0 |   =
∞}|. For (|) ∈ ∆ 1 with   = ∞ let   = 1. Proposition 10. Extended c-inference satisfies (Classic
Let 2 = (1 + 1) · ⃒⃒ {(|) ∈ ∆ 1 |   = ∞}⃒⃒ . For Preservation).
(|) ∈ ∆ 1 with   = ∞ let   = 2; and so on.</p>
      <p>By construction the sum of the impacts in fin⃗( ) is less
than 0 and the sum of the impacts of the conditionals
in ∆ 0 ∪ · · · ∪ ∆  is less than  for  = 0, . . . , .</p>
      <p>Let   =  ⃗  . Now verify that:</p>
      <p>Proof. We need to show that  |∼ Δ ⊥ if  |∼ Δ ⊥.</p>
      <p>Using Lemma 1 it is suficient to show that  |∼ Δ ⊥ if
 () = ∞.</p>
      <p>Direction ⇐: Let  Δ() = ∞. Then Proposition 4
states that  ⃗ () = ∞ for every c-representation  ⃗ ()
of ∆ . Thus,  |∼ Δ ⊥.</p>
      <p>Direction ⇒: Let  |∼ Δ ⊥, i.e., there is no
crepresentation  ⃗ of ∆ s.t.  ⃗ () &lt; ∞. By
Proposition 5 we have  Δ() = ∞.
2. |∼   ⊆ |∼</p>
      <p>an inference in |∼ ⃗ .
1.   is a c-representation of ∆ . For this we need
to check that   models all conditionals in ∆ .</p>
      <p>⃗ , i.e., every inference in |∼   is also
From (1.) it follows that   is a model of (|), because Extended c-inference does not satisfy Rational
 |∼ Δ . With (2.) it follows that (|) is modelled Monotony (RM) as c-inference already violates (RM).
by  ⃗ .</p>
      <p>Ad (1): Let (|) ∈ ∆ . We distinguish three cases.</p>
      <p>Case 1:  ⃗ () &lt;  ⃗ () &lt; ∞ 7. CSPs for Extended
In this case   () &lt;   () &lt; 0 and therefore c-Representations
  |= (|).</p>
      <p>Case 2:  ⃗ () &lt; ∞ and  ⃗ () = ∞ In this section, we investigate constraint satisfaction
In this case   () &lt; 0 &lt;   () and therefore problems (CSPs) dealing with extended c-representations.
  |= (|). In Section 7.1, after presenting a constraint system
de</p>
      <p>Case 3:  ⃗ () = ∞ and  ⃗ () = ∞ scribing all extended c-representations of a belief base,
As|s=umethaatn(d|fal)siifiessinn o∆ co.nTdhiteionntahleirne i s∆ a0w∪o· · r·∪ld ∆ s.t.. wtaekedsevtheeloepfecatssiomfpcloificnadtiitoionnoaflsthinis c∆on∞strianitnotascycsoteumnttrhigatht
Therefore,   () &lt;  and thus   () &lt;  . Any from the beginning. In Section 7.2 we show how extended
model of  falsifies (|), therefore   () &gt; c-inference can be realized by a CSP.
 . Thus, we have   () &lt;  &lt;   () and
theArdef(o2r.e):  Ass|=um(eth|at). |∼    . There are two cases. 7.1. Describing Extended</p>
      <p>Case 1:   ( ) &lt; 0 c-Representations by CSPs
In this case   ( ) &lt;   ( ) &lt; 0 and therefore
 ⃗ ( ) &lt;  ⃗ ( ) &lt; ∞. Hence,  |∼ ⃗  .</p>
      <p>Case 2:   ( ) ⩾ 0
In this case  ⃗ ( ) = ∞ and therefore  |∼ ⃗  .</p>
      <p>Let us continue by showing some further properties
of extended c-inference.</p>
      <p>
        The c-representations of a belief base ∆ can conveniently
be characterized by the solutions of a constraint
satisfaction problem. In [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ], the following modelling of
c-representations as solutions of a CSP is introduced.
      </p>
      <p>For a belief base ∆ = {(1|1), . . . , (|)} over Σ
the constraint satisfaction problem for c-representations
of ∆ , denoted by CRΣ(∆) , on the constraint variables
{ 1, . . . ,  } ranging over N0 is given by the constraints
cr Δ, for all  ∈ {1, . . . , }:
(cr Δ)</p>
      <p>The constraint cr Δ is the constraint corresponding to
the conditional (|). The sum terms are induced by
the worlds verifying and falsifying (|), respectively.</p>
      <p>A solution of CRΣ(∆) is an -tuple ( 1, . . . ,  ) ∈
N0. For a constraint satisfaction problem CSP , the
set of solutions is denoted by Sol (CSP ). Thus, with
Sol (CRΣ(∆)) we denote the set of all solutions of
CRΣ(∆) . The solutions of CRΣ(∆) correspond to the
c-representations of ∆ .</p>
      <p>
        Proposition 11 (soundness and completeness of
CRΣ(∆) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]). Let ∆ = {(1|1), . . . , (|)} be
a belief base over Σ . Then we have:
      </p>
      <p>Mod Σ(∆) =
{ ⃗ |⃗ ∈ Sol (CRΣ(∆)) }
(4)
Let (|) ∈ ∆ . There are three cases.</p>
      <p>Case 1:  ⃗ () = ∞ and  ⃗ () = ∞
In this case  ⃗ () = ∞ and therefore  ⃗ |= (|).</p>
      <p>Case 2:  ⃗ () = ∞ and  ⃗ () &lt; ∞
In this case  ⃗ ( &gt;  ⃗ () &lt; ∞ and therefore
 ⃗ |= (|).</p>
      <p>Case 3:  ⃗ () &lt; ∞
In this case min∈ΩΣ ∑︀ 1⩽⩽   =  ⃗ () &lt;</p>
      <p>|= |= 
∞; hence the condition in (cr  Δ) before the or is not
satisfied.</p>
      <p>Because⃗ ∈ Sol (CRΣ(∆)) it must satisfy all
constraints in CRΣ(∆) including (cr  Δ). Because the
condition before the or is violated, it must hold that
 
 
 
⇔
⇔
⇔
min
∈ΩΣ ̸=
|= |= 
min
∈ΩΣ ̸=
|= |=</p>
      <p>If we want to construct a similar CSP for extended
c-representations, we have to take worlds and formulas
with infinite rank into account.
and therefore  ⃗ |= (|).</p>
      <p>Completeness: Let  ⃗ be an extended
cDefinition 9 (CRΣ(∆) ). Let ∆ = {(1|1), . . . , representation of ∆ with impact vector ⃗ . We
(|)} be a belief base over Σ . The constraint satisfac- need to show that⃗ ∈ Sol (CRΣ(∆)) , i.e., that⃗
tion problem for extended c-representations of ∆ , denoted satisfies every constraint ( cr  Δ) in CRΣ(∆) . Because
by CRΣ(∆) , on the constraint variables { 1, . . . ,  }  ⃗ is an extended c-representation of ∆ , we have
ranging over N0 ∪ {∞} is given by the constraints cr  Δ,  ⃗ |= (|). This requires either (1.)  ⃗ () = ∞
for all  ∈ {1, . . . , }: or (2.)  ⃗ () &gt;  ⃗ (). In case (1.) it is
min∈ΩΣ ∑︀ 1⩽⩽   =  ⃗ () = ∞ and the
(cr  Δ) min ∑︁   = ∞ or |= |=</p>
      <p>∈|=ΩΣ 1|=⩽⩽  wcoencdaitniosneebewfoitrhe tthhee oerquiniv(eclrencΔe)triasnsasftoisrfiemd.aItniocnassein(2t.h)e
  &gt; ∑︁   − ∑︁   tShoeunodrnisesssatpiasfiertd.oIfnthbiosthprcoaosefsth⃗at stahteiscfieosn(dcitri on Δb)e.hind
 ⃗ () &gt;  ⃗ ()
Proof. Soundness: Let⃗ be an impact vector in
Sol (CRΣ(∆)) . Because ∆ is weakly consistent, there
is a world  that does not falsify any conditional in ∆ ;
therefore  ⃗ () = 0 and  ⃗ is a ranking function. It is
left to show that  ⃗ satisfies all conditionals in ∆ .</p>
      <p>The requirement for weak consistency in
Proposi</p>
      <p>Again, each constraint cr  Δ corresponds to the con- tion 12 is necessary because for a belief base ∆ that
ditional (|) ∈ ∆ . is not weakly consistent it holds that Mod Δ = ∅ but
Sol (CRΣ(∆)) = ( ∞, . . . , ∞). If we rule out the
soluProposition 12 (soundness and completeness of tion (∞, . . . , ∞) by adding a constraint, Proposition 12
CRΣ(∆) ). Let ∆ = {(1|1), . . . , (|)} be a also holds for not weakly consistent belief bases.
weakly consistent belief base over Σ . Then we have: The resulting CSP CRΣ(∆) is not a conjunction of
inequalities any more, but it now contains disjunctions
Mod Σ(∆) = { ⃗ |⃗ ∈ Sol (CRΣ(∆)) } (5) and is thus more complex. However, for the computation
of extended c-inference we can construct a simplified CSP
CRS Σ(∆) that still yields all extended c-representations
necessary for c-inference. This is possible, because from
Propositions 4 and 5 we already know which worlds
must have rank infinity and which worlds may have</p>
      <p>Soundness:
is a vector⃗</p>
      <p>Because   =
∈ Sol (CR∈SΣ( ∆))+∞. By definition, there</p>
      <p>Let⃗ Δ
such tha⃗t</p>
      <p>=⃗ +∞.</p>
      <p>∞ for every (|) ∈ ∆ ∞ and due to
Mod Δ. in ∆ ∞ is applicable have rank  ⃗ () = ∞. Therefore,</p>
      <p>Lemma 2, all worlds  for which one of the conditionals
all conditionals in ∆ ∞ are accepted by  ⃗ .</p>
      <p>For any conditional (|) ∈ ∆</p>
      <p>∖ ∆ ∞ there is at
least one world  that verifies</p>
      <p>(|) without
falsifying a conditional in ∆ ∞ (otherwise (|) would not
be tolerated by ∆ ∞). Because every world that
falsiifes a conditional ( | ) with  ∈/ Δ also falsifies</p>
      <p>∞, the world  does not falsify any
Otherwise, for  ⃗ () &lt;
such conditional ( | ) with impact ∞. Therefore,
 ⃗ () &lt; ∞. If  ⃗ () = ∞ then  ⃗ |</p>
      <p>= (|).</p>
      <p>∞, there is a world that
falsifies</p>
      <p>(|) without falsifying a conditional in ∆ ∞.</p>
      <p>In this case it is  ∈ Δ and the CSP CRS Σ(∆)
the constraint (crs Δ) which must hold for⃗  :</p>
      <p>contains
holds for all c-representations  in Mod Δ if  |∼  
 in Mod Δ.</p>
      <p>Proof. Direction ⇐: Observe that Mod Δ ⊆
Therefore, if  |∼   holds for all c-representations 
in Mod Δ, then  |∼   holds for all c-representations</p>
      <p>Direction ⇒: Show this by contraposition. Assume
of   i∈n thMepodroΔofwoifthProp|≁o sitio.nU8siwnge tchaencfinodnsatruct′io=n
that 
  that is a c-inference of ∆
c-representation  ′ with  |̸∼  ′ .</p>
      <p>Therefore, if  |≁   then  |≁  ′ . Hence, there is a</p>
      <p>As already indicated above, the c-representations in
Mod Δ can then be represented by a simplified CSP.</p>
      <p>Definition 11 (CRS Σ(∆) ). Let ∆ =
ance partition EZP (∆) =
(|)} be a belief base over Σ
with the extended
toler</p>
      <p>{(1|1), . . . ,
{
∆ 0, . . . , ∆ , ∆ ∞}. Let
Δ = { |( | ) ∈ ∆ ∖
∆ ∞ s.t.</p>
      <p>The simplified constraint satisfaction problem for
extended c-inference of ∆ , denoted by CRS Σ(∆) , on the
constraint variables { 1 , . . . ,   },</p>
      <p>∈ Δ ranging
over N0 is given by the constraints crs Δ, for all  ∈ Δ:
(crs Δ)
⇔
⇔
(* )
⇔
⇔
 
 
 
 ⃗ () &gt;  ⃗ ().</p>
      <p>Therefore,  ⃗ |= (|).</p>
      <p>The equivalence (* ) holds, because there is a model for</p>
      <p>̇
 that does not falsify a conditional in ∆ ∞, we have
  = ∞ for all ( | ) with  ∈/ Δ, and therefore
min
∈ΩΣ ∈Δ
|=˙ |= 
∑︁
  =
min
∈ΩΣ 1⩽⩽
|=˙ |= 
∑︁</p>
      <p>For any world  with  Δ() &lt; ∞ it holds that all
conditionals in ∆ ∞ are not applicable in . Therefore,
 ⃗ () is the sum of some of the impacts in⃗  ; and
because⃗  ∈ N0 we have  ⃗ () &lt; ∞.</p>
      <p>In summary,  ⃗ ∈ Mod Δ.</p>
      <p>Completeness: Let  ∈ Mod Δ be an extended
c-representation. Let⃗ ∈ (N0 ∪ ∞) be an impact
vector such that  =  ⃗ . Because of Proposition 13,
w.l.o.g. we can assume   = ∞ for all (|) ∈ ∆ ∞.</p>
      <p>Furthermore, w.l.o.g, we can assume   = ∞ for all
conditionals (|) ∈ ∆ ∖ ∆ ∞ which are falsified only
by worlds  that also falsify a conditional in ∆ ∞ – all
worlds for which these impacts apply already have rank
∞ because of the impacts for ∆ ∞.</p>
      <p>The vecto⃗r is a combination of a vecto⃗r  of impacts
  for  ∈ Δ, and a vector (∞, . . . , ∞) of size  − | Δ|
of impacts for conditionals ( | ) with  ∈/ Δ.</p>
      <p>For every  ∈ Δ, by construction of Δ there is at
least one world  falsifying (|) without falsifying
a conditional in ∆ ∞. Then,  Δ() &lt; ∞ because 
falsifies no conditionals in ∆ ∞ and due to Lemma 2;
therefore   &lt;  ⃗ () &lt; ∞ because  ⃗ ∈ Mod Δ.</p>
      <p>Hence⃗,  ∈ N0.</p>
      <p>It is left to show that⃗  is a solution of CRS Σ(∆) ,
i.e., that for every  ∈ Δ it satisfies the constraint
(crs Δ). As  ⃗ is a model of ∆ , it satisfies the
conditional ( | ) ∈ ∆ . By construction of Δ, there
is at least one world  falsifying ( | ) without
falsifying a conditional in ∆ ∞. As established above, the
rank of such a world in  ⃗ is finite, and thus  ⃗ () is
finite. To satisfy( | ) it is necessary that  ⃗ () &gt;
 ⃗ (). Using the equivalence transformation in the
Soundness part of this proof, we obtain that (crs Δ)
holds for   .</p>
      <p>The following example illustrates how CRS Σ(∆) is
simpler than CRΣ(∆) .</p>
      <p>Example 3. Let Σ = {, , } and ∆ = {(⊥|), (|),
(|)}. The CSP CRΣ(∆) over  1,  1,  3 ∈ N0 ∪ ∞
contains the constraints
min
∈ΩΣ ̸=1
|=∧⊥ |= 
∑︁</p>
      <p>The extended Z-partition of ∆ is EZP (∆) =
(∆ 0, ∆ ∞) with ∆ 0 = {(|), (|)} and ∆ ∞ =
{(⊥|)}. The conditional (|) cannot be falsified
without also falsifying (⊥|) ∈ ∆ ∞. Therefore, Δ = {3}
and the CSP CRS Σ(∆) over  3 ∈ N0 contains only the
constraint
(crs3 Δ)
 3 &gt;</p>
      <p>∑︁
min
∈|=ΩΣ ∉=3Δ
|=</p>
      <p>∑︁</p>
      <p>which simplifies to  3 &gt; 0. For⃗ ∈ +∞ it holds that</p>
      <p>Δ
 1 =  2 = ∞ and  3 ∈ Sol (CRS Σ(∆)) .</p>
      <sec id="sec-5-1">
        <title>7.2. Check for Extended c-Entailment by</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-2">
        <title>Testing a CSP for Solvability</title>
        <p>
          In [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ] a method is developed that realizes c-inference
as a CSP. The idea of this approach is that in order to
check wheter  |∼ Δ  holds, a constraint encoding
that  |∼ ⃗  does not hold is added to CRΣ(∆) . If
the resulting CSP is unsovable,  |∼ ⃗  holds for all
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>8. Conclusions and Future Work</title>
      <p>solutions⃗ of CRΣ(∆) . Based on this idea, we develop
a CSP that allows doing something similar for extended
c-inference.</p>
      <p>
        In this paper, we introduced extended c-representations
as a generalization of c-representations for also
Definition 13. Let ∆ = {(1|1), . . . , (|)} be a weakly consistent belief bases. Based on extended
belief base and let Δ be as defined in Definition 11. The c-representations we developed extended c-inference
constraint ¬CRΔ(|) is given by which is an extension of c-inference. We investigated
min ∑︁   ⩾ min ∑︁  . (7) the basic properties of extended c-representations and
|= ∈Δ |= ∈Δ extended c-inference. Additionally, we developed a CSP
|= |= that characterizes extended c-representations. We
introProposition 17. Let ∆ be a weakly consistent belief base. duced a simplified version of this CSP that still describes
Then  |∼ Δ  if either  Δ() = ∞ or (︀  Δ() &lt; all extended c-representations relevant for c-inference,
∞ and CRS Σ(∆) ∪ ¬CRΔ(|) is unsolvable )︀ . and we showed how extended c-inference can be
realized by a CSP. Note that our concept of extended
Proof. Direction ⇒: Assume that  |∼ Δ  and that c-representations can be used not only to define extended
 Δ() &lt; ∞. Then  () &lt; ∞ for all  ∈ Mod Δ c-inference; analogously, it yields extended versions of
by the definition of Mod Δ. Therefore,  () &lt; ∞ for credulous and weakly skeptical c-inference [20, 21]
covall  ∈ Mod Δ. Furthermore,  |∼ Δ  implies that ering also weakly consistent belief bases.
for every  ∈ Mod Δ, we have  |∼  . Therefore, Nonmonotonic inference is closely connected to belief
 () &lt;  () for every  ∈ Mod Δ, and because revision [22]. The idea that some formulas are completely
of Proposition 15  ⃗ () &lt;  ⃗ () for every⃗ ∈ infeasible, that is used for inference here, also occurs in
Δ+∞. We have credibility limited revision [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">23</xref>
        ]. In [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">24</xref>
        ], a single
“inconsis ⃗ () &lt;  ⃗ () tent world” is used for the representation of inconsistent
⇔ min ∑︁   &lt; min ∑︁   tbheeliecofnstnaetcetsioinn tbheetwcoenenteixntdoufcbtievleieifnefexrpeanncseiofrno.mDrwaewaiknlgy
|= 1⩽⩽ |= 1⩽⩽ consistent belief bases to these belief change approaches
|= |= remains for future work.
(⇔*) min ∑︁   &lt; min ∑︁  . Future work also includes to further investigate the
|= ∈Δ |= ∈Δ properties of extended c-inference. For instance, we will
|= |= investigate whether extended c-inference also satisfies
Equivalence (* ) holds because the ranks of the minimal syntax splitting and conditional syntax splitting [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4 ref5">4, 5</xref>
        ],
models of  and  are finite and therefore do not and we will broaden the map of relations among
inducviolate a conditional (|) with  ∈/ Δ. tive inference operators developed in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">25</xref>
        ] to extended
      </p>
      <p>
        Therefore, ¬CRΔ(|) does not hold for any so- c-inference and to other inductive inference operators
lution of CRS Σ(∆) , implying that CRS Σ(∆) ∪ taking also weakly consistent belief bases into account.
¬CRΔ(|) is unsolvable. Similarily as it has been done for c-inference [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15 ref16">26, 27</xref>
        ], we
      </p>
      <p>
        Direction ⇐: Assume that either  Δ() = ∞ plan to realize extended c-inference as a SAT and as an
or (︀  Δ() &lt; ∞ and CRS Σ(∆) ∪ ¬CRΔ(|) is SMT problem and to implement it in the InfOCF platform
unsolvable )︀ . There are three cases. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17 ref18">28, 29</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Case 1:  Δ() = ∞ and  Δ() = ∞
Then  Δ() = ∞ and, by Proposition 4,  () = ∞ for
every  ∈ Mod Δ. Therefore  |∼ Δ .</p>
      <p>Case 2:  Δ() &lt; ∞ and  Δ() = ∞
Then, by the definition of Mod Δ, we have  () &lt;
∞ and, by Proposition 4,  () = ∞ for every  ∈
Mod Δ. Therefore,  () &lt;  () for every  ∈
Mod Δ and hence  |∼ Δ  by Proposition 14.</p>
      <p>Case 3:  Δ() &lt; ∞
Then, by assumption, CRS Σ(∆) ∪ ¬CRΔ(|) is
unsolvable and  Δ() &lt; ∞. This implies that
¬CRΔ(|) is false for every⃗  ∈ Sol (CRS Σ(∆)) .</p>
      <p>In this case, using the equivalence transformations in the
part of the proof for Direction ⇒, we have  ⃗ () &lt;
 ⃗ () for every⃗ ∈ Δ+∞. With Proposition 16 it
follows that  |∼ Δ .</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>This work was supported by the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation), grant
BE 1700/10-1 awarded to Christoph Beierle as part of
the priority program “Intentional Forgetting in
Organizations” (SPP 1921). Jonas Haldimann was supported by
this grant.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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