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  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>SEBD</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>IoT Security: Exploring Strategies and Approaches</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Claudia Greco</string-name>
          <email>claudia.greco@dimes.unical.it</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Testing</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Code Obfuscation</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>IoT Security, Vulnerability Discovery, Firmware Re-hosting, Attack Detection and Prediction</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Penetration</addr-line>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>University of Calabria</institution>
          ,
          <country country="IT">Italy</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2023</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>31</volume>
      <fpage>02</fpage>
      <lpage>05</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>That of IoT security is an extensive and tough field, which presents significant challenges that can be tackled from various perspectives, ranging from defensive to ofensive approaches. The purpose of my research is to explore new attack vectors and protective techniques to address the myriad vulnerabilities plaguing IoT devices, specifically focusing on software security. This goal is pursued by exploring multiple aspects of IoT security, including Binary Analysis of firmware, IoT Penetration Testing and Vulnerability Assessment, and Attack Detection and Prediction, and Code Obfuscation.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>Nowadays, we are witnessing a major breakthrough in the computational landscape, since
an ever-growing number of everyday objects is incorporating computational power and is
continuously connected to the Internet. We are constantly surrounded by a plethora of
computing devices and we are living the Internet of Things (IoT) revolution, where objects are
becoming smarter and smarter and it looks like there is no application scenario where the
extensive connectivity and availability of these devices can be avoided. On the one hand we
have a new, glowing set of useful (or often just funny) functionalities for our appliances and
even great opportunities for many diferent ecosystems, such as daily living, healthcare and
Industrial Control Systems, to cite a few. The other side of the coin, however, is not as shiny as
we may expect. Disastrous security breaches, lack of appropriate security and safety measures,
jeopardized privacy, get headlines everyday and IoT devices are dangerously appealing to
attackers and they are often considered low hanging fruits for their easy-to-exploit vulnerabilities.
It is straightforward to notice how a careful, security oriented assessment of such devices is
mandatory. However, traditional analysis techniques are often not applicable at all in the IoT
scenario.</p>
      <p>That of IoT Security, along with cybersecurity in general, is a vast topic that encompasses
various diferent point of views, each with its own challenges. In my early doctoral studies
I analyzed IoT system devices from the “outside”, by considering them as black boxes and
assessing their security from an external viewpoint. My initial focus, described in section 1.1,
was on scrutinizing the communications between devices, primarily examining jamming attacks
in drone networks and studying the connections and security issues correlated with such
interactions.</p>
      <p>In the meantime, I began to study Penetration Testing and Vulnerability Assessment processes
and how they apply to IoT environments. My intensive study in this field led me to write a
comprehensive literature review paper related to the various applications, limitations, and
future work of penetration testing in IoT-related scenarios. Through my research, I have gained
a deep understanding of the challenges and opportunities associated with IoT security, and the
importance of efective penetration testing in identifying and mitigating potential vulnerabilities.
The literature review paper, detailed in section 1.2, presents a critical analysis of existing research
in the field, highlighting the key issues and trends that are shaping the future of IoT penetration
testing.</p>
      <p>Another technique for analyzing IoT system security by treating devices as black boxes was
to examine log data related to activities. The outcome of this approach was the development of
a method for identifying and predicting malicious activities in Industrial Control Systems by
integrating machine learning techniques with the mathematical model of TPP. This research
line is described in more detail in section 1.3.</p>
      <p>Subsequently, I shifted my attention towards the inner workings of IoT devices and how to
assess their security by not simply relying on an external viewpoint. This led me to investigate
ifrmware and I discovered that the existing dynamic analysis techniques are not suitable for
IoT environments. This observation resulted in the design of a new methodology to enable the
application of traditional dynamic analysis techniques to firmware, as discussed in section 2.</p>
      <p>As I delved further, my focus shifted towards understanding the internal structure of firmware
and how binaries can be targeted by attackers, piquing my interest in the concept of obfuscation
and software protection in general.</p>
      <sec id="sec-1-1">
        <title>1.1. Jamming Detection in FANETs</title>
        <p>As wireless networks play an increasingly key role in everyday life, it is necessary to secure
them from radio frequency attacks, such as jamming, which are hard to detect, especially
because they may be easily mistaken for other network conditions. Jamming attacks are the
equivalent of Internet Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks for radio signals. In particular, jamming
is the act of disturbing radio (wireless) communications by causing their
Signal-to-Interferenceplus-Noise-Ratio (SINR) to decrease, typically transmitting on the same frequency and with the
same modulation as the signal to be disturbed.</p>
        <p>
          Many of the existent solutions are not suitable for the context of specific wireless networks,
such as drone networks, whose nodes are highly mobile and usually have limited computational
capabilities and energy resources. For these reasons I designed a framework for jamming
detection in drone networks, relying on a distributed approach based on supervised machine
learning techniques, namely, Multi-layer Perceptrons and Decision Trees [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>Given a reference data packet traceset, the proposed framework computes some predefined
metrics, such as throughput, PDR and RSSI, which vary during a jamming attack, and that
can therefore be used as features to detect it. The framework was evaluated using datasets
coming from both real and simulated communication scenarios. In particular, I used datasets
from publicly available standardized jamming attack scenarios with IEEE 802.11p radio data,
and datasets generated via NS3-based simulation from networks of drones using WiFi. The
performance of the classifiers is shown to improve as the sampling time of the packets decreases.
Although both the designed classifiers obtain good performance in terms of jamming detection
accuracy, the Multi-layer Perceptron resulted being more efective than the Decision Tree when
applied to a novel communication scenario for which had not been trained.</p>
        <p>The proposed framework reaches a satisfactory accuracy level of 96%, while requiring low
computational and hardware capabilities, thus proving to be suitable for resource-constrained
drone networks. To prove the actual usability of the proposed framework, it was tested on a
constrained device such as the Raspberry Pi 3, showing that its measured execution times and
storage consumption enable its use on limited devices.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-1-2">
        <title>1.2. IoT Penetration Testing</title>
        <p>
          I performed a comprehensive review of the literature on penetration testing and vulnerability
assessment of IoT devices and systems, with the aims of obtaining an in-depth understanding
of the existing state-of-the-art advances. [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
          ]. The literature was explored by systematically
consulting popular research motors and using combinations of selected keywords. Specifically,
a total of 99 articles published between 2015 and 2021 was reviewed to identify existing and
potential IoT penetration testing applications and proposed approaches.The purpose of the
review was to find an answer and possibly open a discussion around the following questions:
• RQ1: What are the IoT security issues that penetration testing can help identify?
• RQ2: What penetration testing frameworks have been proposed for IoT systems?
• RQ3: How AI has been used to provide autonomous penetration testing?
        </p>
        <p>This study gave me the opportunity to better understand how the processes of penetration
testing and vulnerability assessment can become even more challenging when applied to IoT
environments. Due to the complex nature of IoT, involving a wide variety of technologies,
traditional pentesting results being insuficient. With traditional pentesting, testers usually have
to deal with Windows or Linux operating systems, TCP/IP protocols and common applications.
On the contrary, IoT presents a wide number of new architectures such as ARM, MIPS, PowerPC,
along with new operating systems such as FreeRTOS and VxWorks, and new communication
protocols and technologies such as ZigBee, BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy), SDR (Software Defined
Radio), and NFC (Near Field Communication). In the traditional internet, many attacks involve
an end user to open an email or click a malicious link, while the mindset behind IoT attacks
is very diferent. In addition, the interconnectivity and interdependency between devices and
systems in the ecosystems can also introduce vulnerabilities due to new updates or new exploits
being made available.</p>
        <p>The discussion carried out in the paper led to the identification of a number of open research
challenges related to the application of traditional vulnerability assessment techniques to IoT
systems.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-1-3">
        <title>1.3. Identification and Prediction of Security Threats in Industrial Scenarios using Neural Network based Temporal Point Process</title>
        <p>
          In recent years we have witnessed a rising paradigm shift in the Industrial Control Systems
(ICS) landscape, since an ever-increasing number of technologies and devices are migrating
from a traditional mechanical or electrotechnical often closed system, landing to integrated
modern control systems. The new generation of ICS is based on a tight connection among
components, made possible by the spread of both commercial of-the-shelf ( COTS) products
and open protocols, as well as by the price reduction of the hardware components needed for
the development of these architectures. However, if on the one hand, the interconnection and
the remote availability of ICS led to a reduction of the costs for industrial operators and to an
increased eficiency, on the other hand, the growing complexity is coupled with an increasing
attack surface [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
          ] and on a change in the profile of the attacker, who is no more necessarily
an insider, but can be an external actor exploiting the remote functionalities of the system.
The high number of software components generate an endless stream of data of a diferent
nature, ranging from network captures to application logs, from hardware monitoring logs to
user interaction, and so on. The analysis of the generated data represents a task of primary
importance because it often allows to thwart attacks even before they happen [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
          ]. However, for
this to occur, we cannot rely only on the ability of system administrators and domain experts
of noticing relevant actions in huge software logs, but we need automated techniques able to
analyze in a fast and reliable way all the information available [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5 ref6 ref7 ref8">5, 6, 7, 8</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>
          Critical infrastructures represent nowadays an extremely attractive target for criminals, as
demonstrated by recent attacks (e.g. Stuxnet and Flame) and talks or academic papers [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref9">9, 10</xref>
          ].
The attacks target various kinds of ICS or SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition)
systems, including industrial sectors such as automotive [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11 ref12">11, 12</xref>
          ], aerospace [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13 ref14">13, 14</xref>
          ],
electricity [15, 16], oil and gas [17, 18], to cite a few. Due to the peculiar nature of the systems, it
is straightforward to note that traditional approaches based on blacklisting (or whitelisting)
activities are likely to fail, because, even if we are able to enumerate all malicious activities, we
may incur in attacks that are the combination of several diferent actions that, when analyzed
individually, are not considered menaces at all. There is a lot of information that can be inferred
by the correct analysis of a log, and this knowledge can help to provide a roadmap to the origin
of a specific threat, to identify the agents involved and even to predict future unauthorized
behaviors, both from inside attackers and external ones [19, 20, 21].
        </p>
        <p>In my research, I have been focusing on the analysis of logs related to industrial systems
from a security viewpoint. My goal is to provide a novel approach to label malicious activity
in logs and even predict potential future attacks. My approach is based on Marked Temporal
Point Processes (MTPPs), a probabilistic stochastic framework which showed its efectiveness in
diferent domains [ 22], such as earthquake prediction, aftershocks, healthcare, financial trends,
activity daily living prediction [23, 24] and so on, but that has found less attention than it
deserves in security oriented scenarios.</p>
        <p>MTPP provides a useful representation of event streams and knowledge of attack information,
making it a suitable technique for future research. The paper [25] and its extension [26] provide
theoretical background on MTPP and problem formulation and modeling approach. I use
Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) instead of a standard Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) for
prediction model, and Recurrent marked TPP to model mark of an event and its occurring time.
We implemented two diferent approaches, namely RMTPP and ERPP, to learn the conditional
intensity function without any prior assumptions. Our experimental evaluation concludes that
the proposed approach can identify malicious activities and predict future attacks in ICS.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Firmware Vulnerability Discovery</title>
      <p>During my research I also explored the field of Binary Analysis and the applicability of traditional
analysis techniques to embedded devices firmware. When it comes to dynamic analysis, indeed,
traditional techniques are often not applicable at all in the IoT scenario. The dynamic analysis
of the firmware of embedded devices is usually based on firmware re-hosting , which implies
that its code is run in a virtual environment, with an appropriate level of accuracy such that
the firmware itself is convinced to be executed on real hardware. The goal of transparently
emulating a firmware is unsurprisingly hard to achieve, because usually the firmware interacts
with on-chip and of-chip peripherals, such as sensors, actuators, communication interfaces,
GPIO ports, just to cite a few. Moreover, the enormous heterogeneity in embedded hardware
and architectures, as well as the vendor specific highly-integrated chip designs poses additional
challenges in the emulation of a firmware.Several techniques have been proposed in literature
following diferent approaches, such as hardware-in-the-loop [27, 28, 29, 30, 31], OS or hardware
abstractions [32, 33, 34], and learning [35, 36], but they all present individual limitations, along
with the fact that they all involve binary instrumentation to intercept calls to functions that
perform I/O interactions. The limit behind this is that binary instrumentation is slow and
makes the use of dynamic analysis techniques that require an high number of fast executions
impractical. I cooperated with the proposal of a new approach for enabling faster security
assessment of re-hosted firmware, based on firmware rewriting [ 37]. The idea behind our
proposal is to rely on firmware code rewriting to integrate models of interactions between the
ifrmware and hardware directly into the firmware binaries themselves, in order to avoid the
binary instrumentation layer.</p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>2.1. Conclusion and Future Work</title>
        <p>The field of cybersecurity encompasses a vast range of challenges that can be approached
from various perspectives. The domain of IoT is particularly intriguing due to the resource
constraints in terms of computation and memory, which present numerous challenges for the
implementation of eficient mitigations. Furthermore, the widespread adoption of IoT devices
introduces security challenges due to the multitude of vulnerabilities they exhibit and the
accompanying potential for exploitation. Throughout this doctoral program, multiple aspects
of IoT security are being analyzed, employing diverse techniques to address various challenges
from diferent angles, all converging towards a common overarching objective. The goal is
to enhance the security of IoT systems by identifying and mitigating potential threats arising
from malicious code and vulnerabilities that can undermine the integrity and confidentiality
of software components. As part of forthcoming research, I am currently engaged in the
development of sophisticated methodologies designed to proficiently identify malicious code
and vulnerabilities in software, even when confronted with obfuscation techniques. These
methodologies aim to overcome the challenges posed by code obfuscation and provide robust
detection capabilities that can efectively discern and address potential threats in software
systems. By enhancing the resilience of detection mechanisms, this research aims to advance the
ifeld of cybersecurity and contribute to the development of comprehensive and reliable solutions
for identifying and mitigating malicious code and vulnerabilities in software architectures.
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