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  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>The Italian Conference on CyberSecurity, May</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Breakthroughs in Testing and Certification in Cybersecurity: Research Gaps and Open Problems</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Said Daoudagh</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Eda Marchetti</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>ISTI-CNR</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Italy</string-name>
        </contrib>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2023</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>0</volume>
      <fpage>3</fpage>
      <lpage>05</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>Software and hardware systems are becoming increasingly complex and interconnected, making their testing and certification more challenging, considering cybersecurity aspects. The trustworthiness, security, and quality of these systems call for innovative approaches to testing and certifications. This paper provides an overview of some of the most promising research directions in software and hardware testing and certification in the cybersecurity area. It outlines some of the critical challenges and opportunities for future research. We discuss each approach's potential benefits and challenges, highlight some key research questions to be addressed in each area, and investigate how they can be used to promote “Full Quality - positive-sum, not zero-sum” in developing software and hardware systems.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;Certification</kwd>
        <kwd>Cybersecurity</kwd>
        <kwd>Open Problems</kwd>
        <kwd>Research Gaps</kwd>
        <kwd>Testing</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>Information Technology (IT) is pervasive in both work and social sectors. Homes, industries,
ofices, cars, streets and public buildings are full of IT devices, systems apps, or electronic
equipment. In our daily lives, under normal conditions, we are usually not worried about
the technology around us. We are reasonably sure that our mobile phones, PC, refrigerator,
electronic device, cars, or even apps, cannot damage our life, steal data, or cause security or
safety issues, because they should have been built according to the required standards, properly
tested and fully certified.</p>
      <p>
        However, we have recently witnessed various examples of malfunctioning or issues like the
following: Tesla had a failure in a flash memory device, causing a safety risk in more than
135,000 vehicles [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]; the New Jersey hospital vaccine scheduling system bug caused 10 to 11
thousand duplicate appointments [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ]; the Zoom app sufered from security issues during the
coronavirus pandemic in 2020 [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        As reported in the recent Cybersecurity Act, “Hardware and software products are
increasingly subject to successful cyberattacks, leading to an estimated global annual cost of cybercrime
of €5.5 trillion by 2021” [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Humans and society trust industries and the best practices they adopt in testing and
certiifcation processes. However, considering that the overall cost of testing is around 40% of the
total development costs of a typical software project [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ], if not stringent and without concrete
safety risks, often verification, validation and assessment procedures are the first to be reduced
or skipped to save cost and time. Additionally, pressure from the need to research new
products, the time to market, and competition forces industries and developers towards massive
widespread integration and the use of available third-party or open-source components that
could surreptitiously increase the cybersecurity risks if not properly tested and certified.
      </p>
      <p>
        In an IT world that is going to be more human-centric and focused on people’s needs
(such as the Internet of People (IoP) manifesto [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]), the presence of evidence of the testing
and certification activity performed needs to become a common practice. We must increase
awareness to avoid “poisoned” IT products as we do for poisoned food. Therefore, the assessed
or certified quality level must be a label for each IT product to establish trust and reduce risks
to security and privacy.
      </p>
      <p>Thanks to the research activity, experience, and collaborations with several partners
involved in the cybersecurity domain during diferent European and National projects (such as
CyberSec4Europe 1, BIECO 2, and NESSoS 3), we matured the awareness that the quality of
digital products (combination of software and hardware) must become a guarantee label, in
the same way as the label we find on the food we buy in supermarkets. In this paper, to share
our multi-year experience and lesson learned, we go inside some of the main breakthroughs of
testing and certification in cybersecurity. In particular, we identify practical research gaps and
open problems and depict some challenging near-future research directions. To provide generic
baseline knowledge about testing and certification in the context of cybersecurity, we let our
analysis be guided by the following General Questions (GQs):
GQ 1: Which is the common perception about testing and certification? In particular,
we investigate the impact of the lack of testing and certification processes on the
trustworthiness and cybersecurity of products used by ordinary people, companies, organizations,
and governments.</p>
      <p>GQ 2: Which could be the consequences of a lack of testing and certification activities?
In particular, we analyze the damage of an inadequate testing and certification process
for IT products and technologies and the possible mitigation strategies.</p>
      <p>GQ 3: What could be the worst scenario? We analyze the most famous disasters caused by
a lack of testing and certification activity in cybersecurity, and we envision the possible
ones.</p>
      <p>GQ 4: What are the main research gaps? We explore recent research trends in
cybersecurity testing and certification to identify the main gaps to be addressed to ensure the
development of trustworthy, secure, and sustainable technology aligned with social and
ethical values, inclusiveness, and legal requirements.
1CyberSec4Europe: https://cybersec4europe.eu/
2BIECO: https://www.bieco.org/
3NESSoS: https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/256980
GQ 5: Which are the pressing research problems? We explore some cutting-edge research
directions in software and hardware testing and each approach’s potential benefits and
challenges.</p>
      <p>The reply to the above questions provides a set of research directions for advancing state of the
art in software and hardware testing and certification in the cybersecurity domain. Additionally,
the paper contributes to improving the general background knowledge and highlighting the
challenges and opportunities for strengthening software and hardware systems’ trustworthiness,
security, and quality.</p>
      <p>Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses GQ 1
by providing an overview of who is expected to be afected by changes in cybersecurity testing
and certification practices, and Section 3 discusses the potential impact of these changes (GQ
2). In Section 4, we examine GQ 3 and explore potential research gaps (GQ 4) in Section 5,
whereas in Section 6, we highlight future research directions (GQ 5). Finally, Section 7 provides
concluding remarks and outlines potential future work.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Which is the common perception about testing and certification?</title>
      <p>
        The lack of testing and certification processes can afect everyone directly or indirectly using
products or technologies. For instance, babies could be damaged by a toy going out of control;
Generation Alpha or Zeta could be unconsciously deceived by appealing apps maliciously
stealing their pictures; companies can be afected by ransomware hidden in useful plug-ins
or libraries; organisations and governments can be subjected to cybersecurity attacks. Of
course, testing and certification are not the only means of avoiding such critical situations.
Everything has to be executed correctly at every phase of the development process. Significant
progress has been made in the field of software system security since its early stages [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]. As
evidenced by the several national and European initiatives and call-for-proposals (such as those
belonging to the Cluster 3 Work Programme 2023 - 2024, for instance, and, in particular, the
Increased cybersecurity), it is recognised the urgent necessity to respond to the challenges
related to the increasing persistent security threats to fight with proper (digital) weapons
against the cybercrime and the natural and artificial disasters, as well. Reliable techniques,
tools and methodologies for conducting advanced analysis and verification, as well as dynamic
testing of hardware and software components that may be vulnerable or insecure, necessitate the
implementation of best practices for cybersecurity issues. Hence, it is crucial to focus on software
development tools, IT security metrics, and guidelines to ensure the security of products and
services throughout their entire lifecycle 4. So far, various initiatives and frameworks have been
developed to face those issues, such as NIST’s Secure Software Development Framework [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ],
OWASP’s Software Assurance Maturity Model [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ], Microsoft’s SDL [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ], ETSI’s standard 303
645 [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ], and the Cybersecurity Body of Knowledge [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ] [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ].
4More information can be found at the following link: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies
      </p>
      <p>
        However, conceiving and developing (by-design) quality products is crucial but insuficient
per se to meet the final requirements: building the product right does not guarantee building the
right product [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ]. Testing and certification remain pivotal for trustworthiness and cybersecurity
assurance and for guaranteeing that a product is designed and manufactured with quality as a
primary objective. Therefore, as long as stakeholders (ordinary people, companies, organisations,
and governments) do not firmly demand transparent, labelled, tested and certified products, the
situation will hardly change, and cybersecurity risks will remain on the agenda.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Which could be the consequences of a lack of testing and certification activities?</title>
      <p>What is the expected damage without an adequate testing and certification process?
Unfortunately, there are many aspects to be considered:
Hardware/software failure: It has been estimated that nearly 80% of unexpected downtime
can be ascribed to HW/SW failures and power outages. Proper storage backups can be an
ad hoc solution in most cases, but preventing failure would be less costly and risky.
Natural disasters and emergencies: Lack of testing and certification of the processes and
procedures for resuming operations/data and systems in case of (natural) disaster or
emergencies can be extremely costly and cause the loss of business continuity.
Human factor: Even not intentionally, humans may inevitably cause mistakes or execution
of unexpected procedures. Testing based on user profiles or exploiting machine learning
approaches could avoid or predict possible misbehaviour or accidental situations.
Usercentred assessment processes and training programmes could be essential for minimising
human damage and avoiding permanent losses.</p>
      <p>Cybersecurity attack: Because society and organisations increasingly rely on digital
information for daily operations, cybersecurity attacks can be more dangerous. Currently, 95%
of companies invest in testing and certification activities only after a disaster and then
actuate a recovery plan (reactive behaviour). Predicting vulnerabilities and providing
solutions before a cybersecurity attack is mandatory (proactive behaviour). The penetration
test is pivotal for avoiding and anticipating cyberattacks by hackers who are trying to
exploit potential vulnerabilities to access company networks and steal confidential data
or inject malicious codes.</p>
      <p>High expectations: In our hyper-connected world, where IT products need to be available
24h7d without disruptions, failures and loss of services are costly disasters for companies
and favour their competitors. Therefore, robust testing and certification processes, which
can assure the quality of services and make it possible to establish a suitable recovery
plan, are pivotal activities.</p>
      <p>Trust or reputation damage: Loss of trust or damage to a reputation is mostly translated
into a loss of customers, and hence a loss of revenue: trust and reputation are nearly
impossible to regain. Testing and certification are among the most efective means of
avoiding this problem.</p>
      <p>
        Compliance requirements: Nowadays, business continuity is not just a mere desire: it is
becoming a requirement, especially for Operators of Essential Services (OESs) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ]. All of
them must follow specific and strict regulations and standards. That means that adopting
certification processes and maintaining their product certification is becoming a legal
obligation and ofers a competitive advantage within the reference market.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. What could be the worst scenario?</title>
      <p>
        Figuring out what could happen without testing and certification should not point to the future
but simply to the past. Most worst-case scenarios have already been covered in the newspapers,
the default reports and disaster documentation. The worst-case bugs history started as soon as
the first computer was massively used and included:
• The Ariane 5 Disaster, 4th June, 1996. During the launch of the Ariane 5 spacecraft, 37
seconds after the first rocket ignited, it started flipping in the wrong direction, and less than
two seconds later, the whole world observed its self-destruction. The problem was quickly
identified as a software bug in the rocket’s inertial reference system and, unfortunately,
could have been easily solved with a trivial integration testing procedure [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ].
• The Mars Climate Orbiter, 23rd September, 1999. During its descent into the Martian
atmosphere, the Mars Climate Orbiter was reoriented to pass behind Mars and successfully
enter its orbit. Unfortunately, this did not happen: the craft was not on the correct
trajectory and was finally lost without a trace. The root cause analysis of this error
yielded a long chain of wrong or unexpected events, which included: the incidental
arrangement of solar panels on the craft due to the solar sail efect; the use of two
diferent units in the Ground Control software (data provided using imperial units and
pound-seconds on the sender side but expected in metric units on the receiver side); and
ifnally, human errors in communications. Again, proper integration testing procedures
and correct use of standards and assessment procedures would have avoided such a
critical disaster [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ].
• Therac-25. During the period from 1992 to 1998, reports about radiation overdoses
caused by the 80’s computer-controlled radiation therapy were published. In particular,
six documented accidents occurred, resulting in deaths or severe injuries. The causes
were identified as personnel’s application of incorrect procedures and the weaknesses
of the software used for assuring safety. In particular, all accidents involving software
resulted from flawed software requirements. Application of certification processes and a
proper system and acceptance testing process would have again avoided significant loss
of life [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ].
• Knight Capital Group. On 1st August 2012, during a software update of the production
server, an incorrect configuration of an old (2003) system caused 97 email notifications and
the execution of 4 million unexpected trades. That led to a $460 million loss and the risk
of bankruptcy. The post-analysis highlighted that the program believed it was in a test
environment and executed trades as quickly as possible without worrying about losing
the spread value. As in the previous cases, the testing process would have discovered that
misbehaviour and avoided using obsoleted, not aligned software [18].
      </p>
      <p>Past mistakes have likely been resolved, and lessons learnt, but challenges, vulnerabilities
and new scenarios are constantly emerging. Who does not remember the Millennium bug [19]?
Or the 2018 cyberattack that interrupted communications on the Midcontinent Independent
System Operator? Or even the six/seven hours of the global unavailability of the social network
Facebook and its subsidiaries in October 2021 [20]? Or the recent ransomware attacks on the IT
network?</p>
      <p>The smart and quick discovery and provision of new technologies, programming languages
and systems obliges testing and certification to continuously jump “Back to the Future” and
provide new means, strategies and processes to prevent future worst-case scenarios. Indeed,
history teaches that the past can always turn into the future and vice-versa.</p>
      <p>What is the worst that can happen? A life without testing and certification means lacking
quality, eficiency and trust in every system and software package.</p>
      <p>Indeed, testing and certification seek to mitigate the risks of safety, security and privacy loss
or absence for anyone worldwide. Who would use a machine without it being tested? Who
would be willing to set up a medical facility without being certified? Who could think to give a
child toys that put their life at risk?</p>
      <p>
        Unsafe, not secure or not trustable HW or SW products, elements, components, and libraries
make the world dangerous: they can cause environmental disasters; they can play a role in
the default or bankruptcy of companies, industries and even nations; they can impact essential
services [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ] (e.g., energy, transport, financial and banking, healthcare, drinking water supply
&amp; distribution, and digital infrastructures); they can compromise health systems or medical
devices. The current international situation can also paint even more dramatic scenarios:
HW/SW vulnerabilities and security threats could be exploited to allow terrorist attacks on
nuclear power plants and military bases.
      </p>
      <p>Luckily, in this catastrophic apocalyptic scenario, learning from the past and focusing on the
future, research and industry are starting to understand the importance of strict collaboration
in testing and certification to prevent disasters before they happen efectively.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. What are the main research gaps?</title>
      <p>Considering that “Program testing can be used to show the presence of bugs, but never to show
their absence. (Dijkstra)” [21], exhaustive testing is usually impossible, and issues and problems
in testing and certification are far from being exhausted. New challenges are continuously added
in parallel with developing new technologies, features, languages, and application domains and
discovering new vulnerabilities and threats. In particular, the following areas are recent trends
in research activities, presented without any specific priority order.</p>
      <sec id="sec-5-1">
        <title>5.1. Human-centred testing and certification</title>
        <p>Supporting human-centred testing and certification approaches can guide, improve and assess
technological development in line with social and ethical values, sustainability and
trustworthiness. Additionally, increasing inclusiveness by supporting the gender and diversity balance of
diferent stakeholders involved in the testing and certification approach can ensure trustworthy
public awareness, the broad adoption of IT methods, and the adoption of standards to increase
transparency and openness [22].</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-2">
        <title>5.2. Integrated cybersecurity and functional safety certification</title>
        <p>Besides interleaving and overlapping several aspects of cybersecurity and safety, a gap exists
in providing a comprehensive framework and technical standards for their full integration.
Indeed, safety assurance/certification cannot be achieved without considering the impact of
cybersecurity vulnerabilities and threats on the system [23]. Thus, there is a need to provide a
functional safety/cybersecurity assurance risk-based integrated approach [24].</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-3">
        <title>5.3. Quantitative and qualitative testing and certification</title>
        <p>Accountability and replicability are essential characteristics of cybersecurity modelling, testing
and certification approaches and require methods and means for quantitative and qualitative
collection and the analysis of results and data. Thus, the availability of open-source data sets
and conformance test suites as the facilities for the setting up and execution of controlled
experiments should be improved [25, 26]. In particular, challenges focus on the following:
1. Improving formal methods for quantitative security modelling and analysis and their
application to risk management, enriching their data-driven aspects, e.g., synthesising
and refining models from (possibly underspecified) attack scenarios and validating them
concerning data from previous attacks.
2. Realisation of modelling, testing, and certification approaches driven by cybersecurity
risks.
3. Making data collection, quantification approaches/tools, and result analysis more
accessible to practitioners and open-access communities.
4. Improving the eficacy and eficiency of the testing and certification processes, making
them more focused on qualitative properties.
5. Making testing and certification by design, guided by user stories, domain-specific needs
requirements, and standards.
6. Providing metrics, guidelines, and approaches for securing products and services
throughout their lifetime.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-4">
        <title>5.4. Automation of testing and certification</title>
        <p>Testing and certification are complex, costly and time-consuming activities. Reducing the
efort and mitigating the cybersecurity cost and risk is a significant challenge for attainable
automation [27]. Important directions are:
1. Developing advanced techniques, finding innovative support procedures to (fully)
automate the diferent activities, or providing metrics, guidelines and approaches applicable
throughout the overall process lifetime.
2. Providing a holistic methodology that integrates runtime and design-time methods
applicable at diferent specification levels—such as firmware, communication protocols,
stacks, operating systems (OSs), and application programming interfaces (APIs)—and that
considers the integration of software and hardware.
3. Specifying and developing manageable and human-centric KPIs, metrics, procedures, and
tools for dynamic and automatic cybersecurity certification from chip to software and
service levels.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-5">
        <title>5.5. Diversity, heterogeneity and flexibility of environments</title>
        <p>Diversity, heterogeneity, and flexibility are challenging for testing and certification proposals.
In particular, any approaches and solutions provided should move according to vertical and
horizontal research levels. Indeed, ecosystems and systems of systems (SoSs) rely on the
continuous integration of components, apps, and devices developed using diferent languages
and operating systems and on combining and accessing thousands of device-browser-platform
combinations simultaneously. To avoid the risk of becoming outdated, testing and certification
need highly flexible and modular schemes that rapidly adapt to the changes and updates of
the technological environment and elements at each horizontal or vertical level. Additionally,
to follow the rapid and pervasive evolution of the diferent supply chain environments [ 28]
(such as the Critical Infrastructures (CIs) 5), and new technologies [29, 30, 31, 32] (such as
the metaverses 6), holistic, modular proposals are necessary, able to efectively and eficiently
validate, verify and certify the diferent HW/SW elements under real user conditions and
considering other interacting systems and application domains.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-6">
        <title>5.6. Including legal aspects inside testing and certification</title>
        <p>The interplay between HW and SW elements in current systems promotes a new direction
for cybersecurity testing and certification research: to include legal aspects in the verification,
validation and assessment procedures [33]. The legal framework and technical standards must
be considered necessary parameters during the development life cycle (for more details, we refer
to [34]). Indeed, cybersecurity vulnerabilities may cause legal violations, especially in sensitive
applications such as healthcare. The future direction is to ensure that cybersecurity, safety and
legal requirements are tested and certified as inseparable aspects of the same process [34].
5Critical Infrastructures (CIs) are defined as essential large-scale systems or Systems of Systems (SoSs) that are
crucial for the proper functioning of critical societal functions and the well-being of individuals, as stated by the
relevant European Council Directive [28].
6The World Economic Forum [29], the Metaverses Standards Forum [30], the Open Metaverses Interoperability
Group [31], and the Metaverses Interoperability Community Group at the W3C [32] are examples of metaverses
initiatives and actions.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>6. Which are the pressing research problems?</title>
      <p>As the complexity and interconnectedness of software and hardware systems continue to grow,
testing these systems efectively is becoming more challenging. To ensure the reliability, security,
and quality of these systems, we advance to exploring innovative approaches to testing, from
leveraging AI/ML/DL to gamification and crowd-sourced testing. In this section, we explore
some of the cutting-edge research directions in software and hardware testing and the potential
benefits and challenges of each approach.</p>
      <p>Testing the unknown. SoSs continuously integrate various new devices and components;
some of them could be untested and any intrinsic flaws will be inherited. The research
should pave the way to new testing paradigms to achieve self-adaptive testing
methodologies aiming at ensuring that unknown and untested components and devices are trustable
and have good quality before they join the SoS. In other words, this research should
promote “Full Quality – positive-sum, not zero-sum.” 7
Testing of AI/ML/DL. Provide testing methodologies and tools that can be suitable for
revealing bugs in artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML) or deep learning (DL)
applications. The study should consider the following three main aspects: (1) the required
conditions (correctness, robustness, security and privacy); (2) the AI, ML or DL items
(e.g., the data, the learning program, or the framework used); and (3) the involved testing
activities (test case generation, test oracle identification and definition, and test case
adequacy criteria).</p>
      <p>Using AI/ML/DL for testing. Provide AI/ML/DL-based methodologies and tools that can
help perform most testing tasks, such as test-case generation, test-case classification,
oracle derivation or mutation analysis, to cite a few. Therefore, this research aims to
leverage state-of-the-art AI/ML/DL technologies to aid software and hardware testers in
achieving the desired quality driven by testing data.</p>
      <sec id="sec-6-1">
        <title>Understanding the testability of the metaverse. Improve the understanding of the chal</title>
        <p>lenges of testing the metaverse by considering three testing pillars: cybersecurity, aimed
at security testing; API testing, crucial for guaranteeing interoperability, which is a
fundamental characteristic of the meta experience; and interactive and immersive testing,
which puts the human at the core of testing meta experiences.</p>
        <p>We are all testers. Improve the understanding of the role of humans in the testing process. The
research should provide theories, insights, and practical solutions for engaging people
in the testing and assessment of digital products and services, considering diferent
dimensions of (digital) ethnography. The starting point for this kind of research should
be gamification, which aims to convert testing tasks to gameplay components, and
crowd-sourced testing (also known as crowdtesting), which is an emerging approach for
involving users and experts in testing activities.
7This term is inspired by the well-known privacy by design principle “Full functionality: positive-sum, not
zerosum” [35].</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>7. Conclusion and Future Work</title>
      <p>In this paper, we summarized our research activity, experience, and awareness about testing and
certification in cybersecurity matured during multi-year collaboration in diferent European and
National projects. Focusing on complex and interconnected systems, we discussed the limitations
of available approaches and highlighted innovative opportunities to improve modern software
and hardware systems’ trustworthiness, security, and quality. Guided by five general questions,
we identified practical research gaps and open problems and depicted some challenging
nearfuture directions. In particular, we presented several cutting-edge research directions, including
testing the unknown, testing AI/ML/DL applications, using AI/ML/DL for testing, understanding
the testability of the metaverse, and involving humans in the testing process. We discussed
each approach’s potential benefits and challenges and provided tangible examples of problems
to motivate future research in these areas.</p>
      <p>The analysis provided in this work highlighted that testing and certification still have an
essential role in industries, companies, society, and individuals. The paper aimed to provide
valuable insights and guidance for researchers and practitioners in software and hardware
testing and certification and inspire further research in the areas.</p>
      <p>The evidence collected in this paper evidence that complex and interconnected software and
hardware systems still look for efective and eficient cybersecurity approaches and solutions
for their testing and certification. Thus the analysis presented is a starting point for this future,
and other open research questions can be conceived and addressed.</p>
      <p>In our future work, we will exploit the lesson learned in this paper to investigate open new
research directions. Thus our research activity will be devoted to improving the investigation
of testing the unknown, i.e., new testing paradigms that can ensure the trustability and quality
of unknown and untested components and devices. Similarly, in the area of testing AI/ML/DL
applications, further work will be devoted to diferent paths, such as: i) analyze testing and
certification methodologies and tools that can reveal bugs and ensure the correctness, robustness,
security, and privacy of these applications; ii) investigate how AI/ML/DL can aid testing and
certification activity to achieve the desired quality using testing data.</p>
      <p>Additionally, in the emerging domain of the metaverse, further research will be devoted to
analyzing specific cybersecurity challenges. Finally, in involving humans in the testing process,
future work will be dedicated to emerging theories, insights, and practical solutions (such as
gamification and crowd-sourced testing) for engaging people in the testing and certification of
digital products and services.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>This work was partially supported by the project SERICS (PE00000014) under the NRRP MUR
program funded by the EU - NGEU, by the European pilot CyberSec4Europe H2020 Grant
Agreement No. 830929 (https://cybersec4europe.eu/), and by BIECO H2020 Grant Agreement
No. 952702 (www.bieco.org).</p>
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