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    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Vulnerabilities of Mediated Embodiment: Towards Unmasking Security and Privacy Risks of Ability-Mediating Wearables</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Radu-Daniel Vatavu</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>MintViz Lab, MANSiD Research Center, Ştefan cel Mare University of Suceava</institution>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>Wearables designed to mediate user perception and/or action present specific challenges regarding the security and privacy of their users. The objective of this position paper is to raise awareness about the potential threats that arise when mediating user perception and action through technology that draws from wearable computing, ambient intelligence, and virtual and augmented reality environments. As the boundaries between these areas of computing become increasingly blurred, security and privacy threats escalate. Consequently, it is crucial to start examining the potential risks associated with wearable systems that provide highly personal, embodied, and intimate experiences taking place on the user's body or experiences that are integrated with the body.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;Wearable computing</kwd>
        <kwd>mediated embodiment</kwd>
        <kwd>mixed reality</kwd>
        <kwd>augmented reality</kwd>
        <kwd>ambient intelligence</kwd>
        <kwd>mediated reality</kwd>
        <kwd>security</kwd>
        <kwd>privacy</kwd>
        <kwd>threats</kwd>
        <kwd>sensorimotor realities</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
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    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        As wearable devices, such as smart watches, glasses, and jewelry, become more complex in terms
of sensing and processing capabilities due to manufacturers striving to deliver more features
at lower costs, uninformed users can easily become exposed to various security and privacy
attacks [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. At the same time, a diversity of ambient devices, from personal assistants to smart
home entertainment systems, can sense, process, and share increasingly more data about their
users and environments [2]. Furthermore, the increasing accessibility of virtual and augmented
reality (VR/AR) systems introduces specific risks for consumers of virtual content [3].
      </p>
      <p>Although the scientific community has systematically uncovered and documented security
and privacy threats within these individual areas of computing, recent advancements at the
intersection of these areas present new challenges and give rise to new concerns. One example
is the emergence of on-body interaction [6], on-body companion robots [7], and the integration
between personal computing devices and the user’s body [8], which enable the new experience of
mediated embodiment [9], but also open up new possibilities for malicious actors to compromise
users’ security and privacy. For instance, Figure 1, top shows Fingerhinter [4], a device designed
to deliver on-finger kinesthetic feedback, i.e., hyper-extensions of the index finger that signal
various notifications to the user. By repurposing the user’s body for output, Fingerhinter
demands control over a body part with direct implication on the perceived sense of agency and
bodily integration with technology. Potential attack risks in this context target compromised
dexterity, denial of movement, and physical harm to the wearer and others. Figure 1, bottom
shows ARTV journeys [5], an AR system for television, where users can choose their preferred
view of a movie rendered in a hybrid, physical-virtual environment, e.g., from a virtual screen
resembling a conventional TV set to high immersion in the story of the movie displayed in the
living room around the user. As users navigate through diferent representations of the same
content, they willingly embrace mediation of their perception of the physical reality around
them. Potential attacks for the ARTV journey system include injection of malicious content and
delivery of fake news, both of which can have a detrimental impact on users’ perception of the
physical world around them.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Roadmap to Identifying Security and Privacy Threats of</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Ability-Mediating Wearables</title>
      <p>
        We start our discussion from a set of threat categories that have been documented for
wearables [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] and consumer VR systems [3]. Shrestha and Saxena [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] listed several security and
privacy requirements for wearable computing systems. Security requirements include
confidentiality (i.e., only authorized parties should be able to access data from the wearable), integrity
(unauthorized parties should not be able to modify the data recorded by the wearable),
availability (resistance against denial-of-service attacks), authentication (only the legitimate owner
should be allowed to access the wearable), access control (use of data from wearables should be
controlled via access policies), and nonrepudiation (the wearable cannot deny being the source
of the data it generated). Privacy requirements refer to device identification (i.e., wearables
should not be traced by unauthorized parties), device log and measurement (data logs from the
wearable should not be accessible by unauthorized parties), and the wearer and bystanders (who
should not be identified using the data from the wearable). Regarding consumer VR devices as
a specific category of wearable systems, Casey et al. [ 3] identified several types of immersive
attacks: the chaperone attack (i.e., modification of the virtual world boundaries), overlay attack
(overlaying unwanted content on the user’s view), disorientation attack (inducing dizziness or
confusion experienced by the immersed user), and the human joystick attack (controlling the
user’s physical movement to a specific physical location without the user’s knowledge).
      </p>
      <p>This prior work also applies to wearable systems designed to mediate perception and/or
motor action. However, there are specific risks that can be identified for these systems when the
attack targets a user’s ability, such as impairing vision or hindering dexterity. Unmasking such
attacks needs a proper conceptual framework for perception and action-mediation systems. To
this end, we propose several directions to guide future work in this area:
• Sensorimotor Realities (SRs) [10] are a recently introduced concept in the XR landscape
that provides a technology-agnostic framework for computer-mediated perception and
motor action. By building on the principle of mediation, SRs capitalize on the
heterogeneity of human sensorimotor abilities to support conceptualization, characterization, and
design of computer technology that leverages existing abilities in new, computer-mediated
worlds. The SRs conceptual space consists of six dimension: sensory mediation, motor
mediation, virtuality, imaginarity, body augmentation, and environment augmentation.
For example, motor mediation specifies the efect that a device has on a specific motor
ability, from amplification (to enhance an existing motor ability, e.g., lifting heavier objects
that normally possible) and extension (motor skills are enabled beyond the possibilities
ofered by one’s anatomy, e.g., a sixth finger to grasp and hold large objects) to diminution
(restriction of the limits of motor action) and contraction (refusal of a motor ability). Due
to its specific focus on abilities and ability-mediating design [ 10], the SRs conceptual
space may be used to identify relevant security and privacy threats that may lead to
attacks targeting a specific sensorimotor ability.
• Vatavu [11] identified parallels between the foundational principles of ambient
intelligence and AR systems, and reported a significant philosophical overlap between their
visions: the concept of an environment that undergoes a form of augmentation, the
process of an integration involving the environment, and the emergence of a new type of
media congruent with the characteristics of the environment. These parallels identify
key elements that may constitute the vehicles for potential attacks: alteration of the
environment, the characteristics and implementation technology of the integration, and
injection and overlay of attacker-generated media.
• Human-computer integration [8], the computing paradigm where humans and computers
are closely interwoven, opens another direction for identifying risks of perception and
motor-mediation wearables. The process of human-computer integration can be
characterized as either symbiosis or fusion through the map of integration, a two-dimensional
conceptual space with the agency axis (humans are in control, shared control, and device
control) and the integration scale (organ, individual, and societal).</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>3. Conclusion</title>
      <p>Understanding the new risks posed by wearable systems designed to mediate user perception
and/or action requires careful consideration as we move towards unprecedented levels of
immersive environments and integration between humans and computers. This process needs
the use of appropriate conceptual frameworks, including technological ones [8, 10, 11] as
proposed in this work, as well as cultural and philosophical frameworks [12] that provide a
broader context. It is the author’s hope that this position paper will inspire further investigations
towards attack-resilient mediated embodiment.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>This work was supported by a grant of the Ministry of Research, Innovation and Digitization,
CNCS/CCCDI-UEFISCDI, project number PN-III-P4-ID-PCE-2020-0434 (PCE29/2021), within
PNCDI III. The photographs from Figure 1 were made by Adrian-Vasile Catană (top) and Cristian
Pamparău (bottom).
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