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  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>December</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Comparison⋆</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Carles Gorriz</string-name>
          <email>carles.gorriz@uab.cat</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, UAB Institute of Law and Technology</institution>
          ,
          <country country="ES">Spain</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2022</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>19</volume>
      <issue>2022</issue>
      <fpage>39</fpage>
      <lpage>59</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>The purpose of this article is to analyse whether the instruments available to combat the abuse of substantial market power are appropriate for big techs. To do so, I dissect Article 102 of the TFEU and Section 2 of the Sherman Act in the light of three paradigmatic cases: Google Search Shopping, Google Android, and Epic Games v. Apple. After introducing the legal rules and cases, I examine the problems created by the concepts of “position of dominance” and “monopolisation”. Next, I explain whether Google's and Apple's practices have been considered “abusive” or “improper” and why. Then, I briefly describe the enforcement procedures and the available remedies and highlight the main issues. Later, I present the existing legislative initiatives in the EU and USA aimed at limiting the power of digital giants. I end with the mandatory conclusions.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>Big techs</kwd>
        <kwd>abuse of dominance</kwd>
        <kwd>monopolization</kwd>
        <kwd>digital markets</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>CEUR
Workshop
Proceedings</p>
      <p>
        But there is a dark side: market congestion [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref2 ref3 ref4">1, 2, 3, 4</xref>
        ]. The markets in which they operate
are often characterized by the absence, or low intensity, of competition. One could think that
it is normal, as these undertakings ofer the best services and goods, and they are the most
innovative. Although it was true at the beginning, it is also right that they prevent competition.
For instance, they carry on practices to drive rivals out of the market, minimize their power
or stop other companies from entering their domains [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ]. They also expand their power to
neighbour markets: They use their dominant position to get into other markets and grow there,
winning space to incumbents or just expelling them. Furthermore, it is a common practice to buy
potential competitors -start-ups that could be a threat in the future (id est, killing acquisition).
Economists warn against market congestion as it damages the economy: business dynamism
decreases, innovation is reduced, wages stagnate, inequality increases both between companies
and socially and the freedom of press is under threat[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]. Careful observation of reality shows a
reaction is taking place. Some scholars hold the necessity to break with the Chicago School and
abandon the consumer welfare paradigm as a fundamental principle of the interpretation and
application of Competition Law. This trend is called the “New Brandeis” School and among
its apostles stands out Lina Khan, a young antitrust scholar chosen by President Joe Biden to
chair the Federal Trade Commission in 2021. Competition authorities have brought multiple
proceedings against digital giants all around the world. They mainly accuse them of abusing
their economic power and of merging potential competitors [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. Finally, some legislators are
reacting to avoid big techs distorting competition. For instance, Germany modernized its
Competition Act (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen) with the GWB Digitalization Act
in January 2021 and the European Union has recently approved the so-called Digital Markets
Act.
      </p>
      <p>In this paper, I focus on the abuse of economic power as it has been the preferred weapon
-but also highly controversial- to fight big techs. I look at the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean to
assess its efectiveness because, despite the diferences in the literalness, they have similar rules.
To analyze them I use three cases as a guide.</p>
      <sec id="sec-1-1">
        <title>1.2. Legislative weapons</title>
        <p>
          The two key rules are Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU) and Section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 2). The former forbids the abuse by one or
more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market if it afects or may afect
trade between Member States. Its second paragraph adds four practices that are considered
abusive. Article 102 can be broken down into three elements. The first one is the position of
dominance; the second, the abuse, and the third one the impact on intracommunity cross-border
trade. Section 2 of the Sherman Act forbids monopolization, the attempt to monopolize and
agreements to monopolize the trade between several States or foreign nations. Three behaviours
are prohibited: monopolization, attempt to monopolize, and conspiracy to monopolize. They
can be sanctioned with a fine of up to 100 million US dollars for corporations or 1 million US
dollars for other persons and, as it can be considered a crime of felony, also with up to ten
years in prison. The typified behaviours are composed of several elements. The monopolization
requires i) the possession of monopoly power in a relevant market, and ii) having wilfully
acquired or maintained it through improper means. Regarding the attempt to monopolize,
courts distinguish three elements: i) predatory or anticompetitive conduct, ii) the intent to
monopolize, and iii) a high possibility to achieve it [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ]. Three are also the elements in the
conspiracy to monopolize: i) an agreement (conspiracy), ii) a specific intent to acquire monopoly
power, and iii) the ability to do so [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>
          Both legal rules deserve three considerations. Firstly, they are extremely cryptic as none
of them defines the key elements. Article 102 does not establish the meanings of dominant
position or abuse, and the practices listed in its second paragraph are considered just examples
of the last factor [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
          ]. The same happens with the American provision: it does not say what
“monopolize” is or what the requirements to establish that an undertaking has breached Section
2 are. Therefore, when construing and applying these legal rules it is essential to pay attention
to the EU and the US case law. Secondly, Article 102 and Section 2 establish an ex post control
system. Their efectiveness consists in sanctioning the enterprises that have carried out the
prohibited conducts, but it depends on three factors: the willingness of antitrust authorities
to fight against powerful enterprises, the possibility of removing the harmful efects that have
occurred, and the deterrent efect of the sanctions.
        </p>
        <p>
          Lastly, both legal rules are designed to be applied to cross-border cases. Section 2 refers
to trade or commerce among several States or with foreign nations. Article 102 includes two
international intra-community conditions: on the one hand, the undertaking under scrutiny
shall have a dominant position in the internal market; on the other, the abuse may afect trade
between Member States. Doubts arise about international extra-community cases; for instance,
when the enterprise that has abused its dominant position does not have the nationality of
one of the twenty-seven Member States, as it normally happens with big techs. The case law
of the EU Courts favours the extraterritorial application of Article 102, but it requires that
the exploitation of the dominant position has efects in the Single Market [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref9">9, 10</xref>
          ]. Originally
the implementation test was applied: it was required that the illegal agreements, practices or
behaviours were enforced in the European Union. Later this requirement was relaxed, in the
sense that it was just necessary that they had (qualified) efects in the EU territory. Today both
tests can ground the efectiveness of aforementioned rule [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
          ].
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-1-2">
        <title>1.3. Google Saga and Epic Games v. Apple</title>
        <p>
          This research is mainly based on three cases: two European and one American. The first deals
with price comparison services (Google Search Shopping) [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
          ]. The European Commission held
that Google had abused its dominant position because it had promoted its service and demoted
its rival ones. The second case deals with Android’s operating system (Google Android) [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
          ].
The EU competition authority held that Google enjoyed a dominant position in the markets
for licensing smart operating systems, Android app stores, and general search services. It has
abused its economic power by tying the acquisition of the Play Store to the purchase of the
general search app, by tying the license of these two items to the license of the Chrome browser,
by not allowing the instalment of the app store and the general search app in versions of the
Android operating system (OS) not approved by Google, and by sharing part of its earnings
with original equipment manufacturers and mobile network operators on condition they did not
pre-install competing general search services on the devices they commercialized. On Google’s
appeal, the General Court upheld both Decisions (Judgments of 10 November 2021 (T-612/17)
and of 14 September 2022 (T-04/18)). Nonetheless, it agreed with the appellant on some issues
-especially concerning some aspects of the procedure-, which may lead one to think that the
decision of the EU Court of Justice can be diferent. As it happened in the case Intel, the supreme
judiciary European body can annul the appealed resolutions and tip the balance in favour of
the big tech.
        </p>
        <p>The American case is a Judgment of the Northern District Court of California and confronts
Epic Games, Inc, an American videogame and software developer, with Apple Inc (Case No.
4:20-v-05640-YGR).2 The plaintif alleged that the company founded by Steve Jobs had violated
section 2 of the Sherman Act, among other laws, by demanding a commission of 30% of the
revenue generated by the software posted on the app store, for not allowing to create apps
markets inside the App Store, for imposing the exclusive use of its payment system (“In-App
Purchase” or IAP) and for not allowing consumers to be informed of alternatives to the App Store
and to the IAP. The defendant raised a counterclaim alleging that the claimant had unfulfilled
their contract and asked for the payment of the owed sums. Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers
partially dismissed the plaintif’s complaint, stating that Apple neither had monopoly power
nor had abused it. Nonetheless, it held that Apple’s anti-steering clauses breached California’s
Unfair Competition Law, so she ordered this company to stop enforcing them. Nonetheless,
the injunction became inefective because the Court of Appeal of California upheld the request
of the defendant to stay the Order. On the other hand, Judge Gonzalez Roger agreed with
Cupertino’s company and ordered Epic Games to pay the commission that it would have owed
if it had fulfilled the contract. The plaintif appealed against this decision.</p>
        <p>The reasons to compare these cases are three. The most important is that the courts deal
with the core elements of the abuse of dominant position and of monopolization, so they show
which are the dificulties of applying Article 102 and Section 2 in digital markets. Besides, the
main documents are publicly available. Finally, they afect such iconic big techs as Google and
Apple. Nonetheless, it is worth stressing that there is a very important diference between the
European and American cases. The formers are the result of public enforcement: the European
Commission investigated the case for several years and finally issued a decision forbidding
the behaviour and imposing a penalty. The General Court is deciding on the appeal of the
sanctioned undertaking. The American case is a private enforcement procedure: a customer
of Apple sued it because the contractual terms were abusive and the big tech counterclaimed
due to the breach of the contract. There was not an administrative phase before: the American
antitrust agencies did not investigate the case before or ruled on the behaviour of Apple.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Dominant position and monopoly power</title>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>2.1. Dominant position, monopolization and relevant market</title>
        <p>In Judgment Hofmann-La Roche v. Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union
defined the dominant position as “…a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking
which enables it to prevent efective competition being maintained on the relevant market by
2The documentation is
epic-games-inc-v-apple-inc/.</p>
        <p>
          available
at
https://cand.uscourts.gov/cases-e-filing/cases-of-interest/
afording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors,
its customers and ultimately of the consumers…” [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
          ]. The definition entails three elements:
economic power, lack of efective competition, and behavioural independence, being the last
one the distinguishing feature. However, their abstraction leads the European Commission and
the Court of Justice to use structural and behavioural factors to assess whether an enterprise
has a dominant position. The most important is the market share. The European institutions
pay the greatest attention to the market share of the investigated firm. Nonetheless, the ones of
its competitors do also play a capital role to assess whether the former behaves independently.
Other relevant factors are the market and the investigated undertaking’ structures, the existence
of entry and expansion barriers, the ownership of a patent or of a well-known mark, and the
lack of suppliers’ and consumers’ counterpower, among others.
        </p>
        <p>
          Section 2 of the Sherman Act requires monopoly power, which has been defined by the
US Supreme Court as the power to control prices or unreasonably restrict competition in a
given market on a lasting basis [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
          ]. It is necessary to define the relevant market to establish
whether a company enjoys this power. Once defined, courts take into consideration several
factors to decide whether an undertaking controls prices or excludes competition. Although
they vary, attention is normally paid to the market share of the investigated enterprise and of
its rivals, the existence of barriers to entry, the profits of the company, etc. Again, the most
important factor is the market share. The DoJ explains that, according to case law, ninety
percent constitutes monopoly power, and below seventy percent there is no monopoly power
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
          ]. It is worth adding that Section 2 can be applied despite lacking enough market power. The
reason is that it also forbids the attempt to monopolize. However, the investigated firm must
enjoy a significant market power, as courts require that there is a “dangerous probability” that
it achieves a monopoly through anticompetitive conduct [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>
          It is essential to define the relevant market to assess whether an undertaking enjoys a
dominant position or a monopoly power. None of both legal systems have legal rules on this
subject, although the European Commission published a Notice in 1997 explaining its practice
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
          ]. Broadly speaking, the definition is similar in the EU and USA Laws, although diferences
in detail can exist. It is worth remembering, at the outset, that the main purpose of market
definition is to ascertain the competitive constraints to which the investigated undertaking is
subject.
        </p>
        <p>
          Two dimensions compose the relevant market: the product and the geographical ones. The
former comprises the goods or services produced by the investigated undertaking and all the
others that consumers consider interchangeable according to their features, price, use, and
qualities. The geographical market is the area where the dominant enterprise operates [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
          ].
It requires homogeneity, both with respect to the conditions of competition in the area, as
well as diversity with respect to other zones. Hence, it is possible to define two or more
relevant geographical markets inside the European Union if their competition conditions are
heterogeneous. Regarding methodology, courts and competition authorities normally refer
to supply and demand substitutability. The former one consists in identifying the range of
products that consumers consider as substitutes. One way to ascertain it is to figure the reaction
to a small, durable change in price; essentially, to check whether consumers remain loyal to the
product under scrutiny or whether they prefer the alternatives. Supply substitution identifies
the suppliers that can switch to the product and area under consideration in case there is a
chance to make a good deal. The European Commission refers to a scenario composed of three
elements: i) ability to switch in a short term, ii) without facing important additional costs or
risks, and iii) because of a small but lasting change in prices [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">19</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>
          Defining the relevant market is a very complex task, not only because it requires knowledge of
economics, but also because there is a myriad of diferent products, various levels of substitution
and companies ofering very diferent goods and services [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">20</xref>
          ]. Complexity increases when
applying traditional practices to digital markets. On the one hand, market share loses significance
in determining whether a company has dominance or monopoly power because the importance
of innovation may prevent incumbents or large companies from acting independently and
escaping competitive pressure [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
          ]. On the other, the criteria traditionally used to define the
relevant market may not be appropriate, as the General Court emphasized in Google Android:
“…where traditional parameters such as the price of products or services or the market share
of the undertaking concerned may be less important than in traditional markets, compared to
other variables such as innovation, access to data, multi-sidedness, user behaviour or network
efects”. The Commission is also aware of this reality and is introducing some provisions in this
respect when updating its notice on relevant market definition. 3 For instance, it highlights that
the purpose of the new document is to ease the transition of the Single Market into a green and
digital economy. When explaining the general methodology for defining the product market,
the Commission comments that it will take into consideration not only price variations but also
the level of innovation, because there are sectors and industries where undertakings compete on
parameters other than price. Regarding evidence, it explains that, in rapidly evolving industries,
technological progress can afect existing competitive dynamics. Hence, it will take into account
the expected changes when assessing the evidence on demand hypothetical substitution. The
EU competition authority devotes special attention to markets that have specific circumstances,
as the ones where multi-sided platforms operate. It stresses the dificulty to consider each side
as a diferent market, the importance of network efects as well as the fact that products are
ofered at a zero monetary price. It concludes that the product functionalities, the intended use,
barriers or costs of switching and licensing features should be taken into consideration.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>2.2. Quid iuris with Google and Apple?</title>
        <p>The similarities that exist regarding the definitions of dominant position, monopolization, and
relevant market fade away in the cases under scrutiny. In my humble opinion, it is not a problem
of diferent outcomes -while the European Commission and the General Court held that Google
had a dominant position, Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers refused that Apple had a monopoly
power-, but of the definition of the relevant market; particularly the dificulty of applying
long-established criteria to digital markets and digital giants. For instance, while the European
institutions asserted that operating systems can be the object of a relevant market, the Northern
District Court of California refuses it.</p>
        <p>The dominant position of Google seemed to raise no doubts in Google Search Shopping, as
the General Court asserted that it did not dispute the considerations of the Commission in
this regard. By contrast, the definition of the relevant market sparked controversy in the case
3https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/public-consultations/2022-market-definition-notice_en.
Google Android, since Google argued that Apple exerted competitive pressure regarding the
smart mobile operating system. It had not behaved autonomously but reacted to the business
strategy of Tim Cook’s company. The General Court did not accept this argument and upheld
the European Commission’s analysis because of three reasons. Firstly, Apple did not ofer its
operating system (iOS) to original equipment manufacturers: they could obtain a license and
install Google Android on the devices they manufactured and marketed, but not iOS. Secondly,
Google’s investment in the development of its operating system could not be attributed to
Apple’s competitive pressure, but to the belief that the mobile internet was the future. As the
company directed by Sundar Pichai thought that users would prefer it to the computer one, it
developed an operating system for the mobile device that allowed it to keep controlling the data
source that was essential to its business model. Thirdly, there was no parallelism between the
updates of both operating systems. Since Google achieved a dominant position, the Android
versions lasted longer without changes.</p>
        <p>The decision of Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers was diferent in case Epic Games v. Apple:
She rejected that operating systems could be the object of a market and denied that Apple had
monopoly power. The key laid in the definition of the relevant market. The claimant identified
a foremarket, which targeted the operating system, and two aftermarkets: one for iOS app
distribution and another for iOS app payments. The defendant proposed defining a broader
market, encompassing transactions of all digital games. The judge rejected both proposals
and was very critical with the former one. She stated that there was no market for operating
systems, but for cell phones, which are something more than just an operating system. She put
apps in the spotlight and distinguished two main markets: the apps for games and the rest of
the apps. The case referred to the former ones, which comprised four submarkets: apps for
mobile devices videogames, for personal computer game stores, for console games stores, and
for cloud gaming-based streaming platforms. Again, the first one was the relevant: the dispute
between Epic Games and Apple took place in the mobile gaming apps market.</p>
        <p>This decision leads the Judge to reject that Apple had monopoly power. After defining it as
the capacity to control prices or exclude competition, she asserted that it requires at least 75%
of the market share. Apple did not reach this figure: according to Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, it
just had a 57% of the mobile gaming apps market. And she added three other reasons to support
her appreciation: i) there had been no decrease in transactions in this market -that is what uses
to happen when an undertaking controls it-;4 ii) competitors were lurking -thus, Apple could
not behave independently; and iii) the actor did not focus its attention on the relevant market.
Nonetheless, she acknowledged that the commission charged by Apple was very high, that the
anti-steering clause guaranteed Apple high-profit margins, and that there were high barriers
to entry because potential competitors should attract developers and users at the same time.
Despite the lack of monopoly power, the Judge continued assessing whether the defendant’s
behavior could be considered abusive. The reason was that below the monopoly power quota,
section 1 of the Sherman Act could still be applied. In my view, maybe it could have been
necessary to assess whether Apple could have been attempting to monopolize too.
4I humbly do not share the argument because of the specificities of digital markets. As returns of scale are extreme,
digital giants do not need to reduce their outcome to save costs or increase profits. This is why there has not been
the decrease in transactions that is typical of markets controlled by dominant undertakings.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Abuse and Improper means</title>
      <p>
        It is not enough with huge power (call it dominant position or monopoly): Article 102 and
Section 2 require that the behaviour of the investigated company is unlawful. The problem
is the lack of definition: none of these provisions describe what is abuse or which means are
improper. Thus, the case-law becomes essential. It is worth adding that an expert stresses
that the more important practices in digital markets are self-preference, predatory prices, and
exclusionary practices [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">22</xref>
        ]. They all appear in the three cases under scrutiny.
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>3.1. Meaning of “abuse” in EU Law</title>
        <p>
          Some scholars assert that the European institutions do not use a unique single definition of
“abuse”, but several [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
          ]. I do not completely agree, because they essentially use the
characterisation coined by the European Commission in the 1965 Merger Memorandum: “the exercise
of domain power to obtain advantages that could not have been had if efective competition
had reigned”. The EU Court of Justice has recently applied it in Judgment of 12 January 2023,
where it defined the abuse as the “…recourse to methods diferent from those governing normal
competition…” [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref23">23</xref>
          ]. Nonetheless, it is true that this conception has been reformulated and today
the expression of “competition on the merits” is preferred. But the idea is the same: competing
on merits means that the most eficient enterprise should prevail; id est, the one that ofers the
best, most innovative, or most economical product. In other words, the enterprise that behaves
as if there were eficient competition in the market despite enjoying a dominant position. The
European Union Court of Justice shared this interpretation in case TeliaSonera Sverige [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
          ]. It
asserted that engaging in a practice diferent from that which would have been followed if there
was efective competition and which prevents efective competition from existing in the market
is not competing on merits.
        </p>
        <p>
          For the same reason, both the Commission and the Court of Justice admit that there may be
objective justifications for allegedly abusive conducts [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref24">24</xref>
          ]. Theoretically, an “abuse” could not
be justified since it is a behaviour that collides with the essential values or principles of a legal
system. Therefore, Article 102 does no establish the possibility of an exemption like Article
101(3) TFEU. Nonetheless, when applying that provision, the competition authorities and the
courts should assess the “merits” of the behaviour. Thus, not only its negative efects but also
the positive ones; for instance, whether the conduct is objectively necessary because of technical
or commercial reasons, or whether the restrictive efects are outweighed by eficiencies or by
the benefits to consumers.
        </p>
        <p>
          European institutions impose a special responsibility on dominant undertakings: they should
not prevent the existence of efective competition in the market [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref23 ref25">25, 23</xref>
          ]. But this obligation
does not contradict the concept of abuse. Firms that do enjoy a dominant position are not
prohibited from competing, even aggressively [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref26 ref27">26, 27</xref>
          ]. They are just required not to end an
eficient and fair competitive situation in the market. They must not engage in behaviours that
would drive competitors as eficient as them out of the market. But there is no protection for
rivals who are not so attractive to consumers.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>3.2. Meaning of “improper means” in US Law</title>
        <p>
          Despite the diferences in the wording of Article 102 and Section 2, there are some parallels that
make their comparison easier and allow drawing conclusions. Firstly, the Sherman Act does
not forbid monopoly power per se. Although it is associated with detrimental consequences
for consumers (lower output, higher prices, and less innovation), the DoJ explains that it is
not necessarily so, because monopolies are normally the outcome of eficiency. “An eficient
ifrm may capture unsatisfied customers from an ineficient rival and this is precisely the sort of
competition that promotes the consumer interest that the Sherman Act aims to foster” [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17 ref28">17, 28</xref>
          ].
What Section 2 sanctions is acquiring or maintaining the monopoly power through improper
means [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref29 ref30">29, 30</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>
          The problem lies in qualifying a conduct as improper. And here it is another similarity with
the EU, as American courts hold a doctrine like “competition on merits”. The US Supreme Court
comments that improper means are those diferent from ofering a superior product or business
acumen [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref31">31</xref>
          ]. Essentially, the monopolist respects the law if it sells a better or cheaper product,
a wide range of goods or services, or innovates; in other words, if it ofers a new product that is
more attractive to consumers than the existing ones. The consequence can be that less attractive
competitors -whose products are less appealing to consumers- are expelled from the market.
But it does not imply a breach of Antitrust Law, because the aim is not to protect competitors
but competition -id est, “…the process of competition on the merits and the economic results
associated with workable competitions” [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref30">30</xref>
          ]. Due to this reason, the DoJ stresses that vigorous
competition is not forbidden. Section 2 just prohibits “a specific intent to destroy competition
or build monopoly” [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>It is dificult to decide whether the conduct of a monopolist breaches Section 2 because
most market behaviours generate eficiencies and, at the same time, exclude competitors.
Indeed, practices that only generate eficiencies or that are pure predatory or exclusionary
are exceptions. Therefore, per se solutions are not common and the courts must carry out
assessments that are highly complex and consume a lot of time and resources. To avoid them
and increase legal certainty the DoJ asked for tests and proof allocation rules that eased the
analysis. Unfortunately, the dificulty is so high that the Supreme Court has established specific
tests only for predatory pricing and bidding. In the absence of a special rule regarding the
valuation of a behaviour, courts follow a three steps procedure. The assessment starts with
the duty of the plaintif to demonstrate that the monopolist harmed the competitive process
and consumers. If this requirement is met, it is the turn of the monopolist to demonstrate the
objective justifications for its behaviour. Whether it succeeds, it has neutralized the accusation
of violating Section 2. Nonetheless, the plaintif still has the chance to show that the negative
efects of the behaviour outweigh the positive ones or that there were alternative behaviours that
were less detrimental. Lastly, the DoJ explains that this system imposes a special responsibility
to monopolist enterprises as a certain practice can be held illegal just if carried on by a company
that has monopoly power, but be considered legal if it does not have such power.</p>
        <p>It is worth adding that Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers made a particular enforcement of
the antitrust rules on Epic Games v. Apple since she applied Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act together. She grounded this decision in the fact that it is quite common in case law and
that Apple had no monopoly power. However, she found that one of the essential elements of
Section 1 was missing: it could not be considered that there had been an agreement because
Apple imposed the contractual terms; it did not seek the consensus of its partners. However, as
this solution could clash with the objectives of Antitrust Law, she continued with the analysis.
Secondly, although she tried to refer to each behaviour separately, she often carried on a joint
assessment or she referred the analysis of a particular practice to the appraisal done on the
others. The cause is the application of the rule of reason. As the practices under scrutiny were
not per se forbidden, Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers applied the three-step analysis characteristic of
the rule of reason. Lastly, she did not limit herself to assessing Apple’s behaviour according to
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. On the one hand, she also applied State Laws, especially
the California’s Cartwright Act and the California’s Unfair Competition Law. On the other,
she also ruled on Apple’s counterclaim stating that Epic Games breached the license contract
(Developer Product Licensing Agreement).</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-3">
        <title>3.3. Improper practices of Google and Apple</title>
        <sec id="sec-3-3-1">
          <title>3.3.1. Self-preferencing (Google Search Shopping</title>
          <p>Self-preferencing is a common practice among big techs and consists in promoting its own
products before the ones of competitors. The case Google Search Shopping represents a good
example as the European Commission held that it constituted an abuse of a dominant position,
and the General Court upheld its decision. It started in 2002 as Alphabet’s subsidiary began
providing its own price comparison service in the framework of its general search services. In
2005 it separated them, and in 2007 renamed the former one; but it did not have success until
it changed the algorithm, which applied only to rival services, and improved its service with
eye-catching techniques. Since that moment, Google price comparison results appeared at the
top of its general search services page, provided with rich graphical features and images. The
results of competitors appeared lower on Google’s general search site, without a rich format,
images, and additional information on the products. According to the European competition
authority, the outcome was an increase in Google’s trafic to its service and a reduction in the
rivals.</p>
          <p>
            Among the diferent issues that the General Court had to deal with, we focus on three. Firstly,
it shared the view of the European Commission that Sundar Pichai’s company had abused its
dominant position. It qualified the practice under scrutiny as discrimination, which is forbidden
by letter c) of Article 102 TFEU [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref32">32</xref>
            ]. It refuted the argument that the dominant undertaking was
just competing on merits; particularly, that its aim was qualitatively improving its service. The
Court stressed that Google applied the enhancement only to its comparison price service. On
the other hand, the changes introduced in the algorithm applied only to competitors’ services
and not to Google’s one. Thus, the Court held that there had been discrimination: diferent
treatment had been provided depending on the origin of the service -whether they came from
competitors or from Google itself. Secondly, the sanctioned company complained that the
European Commission had not applied the case law on essential facilities. It argued that the
European competition authority considered that its company refused to supply services to
competitors, but it had not proved that they were indispensable and that there was a risk
of eliminating all competition. The General Court refused that the European Commission
had not followed the doctrine Bronner [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref33">33</xref>
            ], because it was not a case of refusal to supply
but of discrimination. Although it recognised that the Google search service is similar to
an essential facility, the competition authority didn’t blame Google for denying access to it,
but for promoting its service and demoting the competitors ones. Thirdly, the General Court
declined the appellant’s argument that the European Commission had not proved the lack of
anticompetitive efects. It asserted that the competition authority demonstrated that Google’s
behaviour led to an increase in the trafic to its service and a decrease in its competitors. Thus,
they had significant material efects. Lastly, it also refuted the objective justifications invoked
by Google. The European Commission had not sanctioned it by improving the quality of its
services, but due to discrimination. Likewise, the appellant did not prove that it was impossible
to provide equal treatment, especially since the improvements applied to its services could not
be applied to the competitors.
          </p>
          <p>In summary, regarding the qualification of self-preferencing, the General Court stressed that
Google’s conduct was forbidden not only because it promoted its service, but also because it
had demoted the rivals. Thus, the abuse comes from the combination of both practices: the
promotion of its specialized comparing system and, at the same time, the demotion on its general
results page of competing comparison shopping services. It also added that the diference in
treatment was not the consequence of the diferent relevance claimed in the light of comparison
criteria. Although it seems that dominant undertakings have a duty to equal treatment, it is
worth highlighting that the Court took into consideration the extraordinary power of Google.
It asserted that it had a superdominant position that made it a gatekeeper, and that it was
protected by high barriers of entrance. Then, the doubt remains: does a dominant enterprise
that is not a gatekeeper have the duty to provide equal treatment?
3.3.2. Tying
The second behaviour that deserves analysis is tying, as large undertakings appeal to this
practice to leverage their power to new markets. It consists of linking the product for which
they wish to acquire greater power to the product over which they already have a position of
dominance, so customers can only acquire the last one if they also buy the former. Google used
this practice in the framework of the Mobile Application Distribution Agreements (MADAs):
original equipment manufacturers that desired a licence of the Google’s app store (the famous
Play Store) and/or of the general search app had to pre-install the Chrome browser in the devices
they produce. Thanks to this arrangement, the company directed by Sundar Pichai ensured
that smartphones and other mobile devices running the Android operating system contained
its two main sources of data: the search app and the Chrome browser.</p>
          <p>
            The Commission held that these practices breached Article 102 because they gave the
dominant a significant advantage over its competitors, who could not ofset. Besides, they helped
Google to maintain its market power, they deterred innovation and damaged, directly or
indirectly, consumers. The General Court upheld the Decision in the Judgment of 14 September
2022. It explained that, as it stressed in case Microsoft vs Commission, tying practices are illegal
if five requirements are met: i) the tying and tied products are two separate products; ii) the
undertaking concerned is dominant in the market for the tying product; iii) it does not give
customers a choice to obtain the tying product without the tied product; iv) the practice in
question ‘forecloses competition’; and v) it is not objectively justified [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref34">34</xref>
            ].
          </p>
          <p>In Google Android doubts afected the fourth requirement. The Commission and Google
discussed whether it was met; particularly, whether it was necessary to prove that a restriction
of competition had efectively taken place or whether it was enough with the evidence of its
capacity to restrict competition. The General Court supported the last interpretation and held
that the Commission had provided suficient evidence. Although, in theory, original equipment
manufacturers could pre-install competing apps and services, in practice they did not do so
because of the tying agreements. Therefore, it concluded that the combined efects of the
dominant’s agreements and practices hindered the pre-installation of competing general search
apps and browsers.</p>
          <p>
            Tying also raised a concern in Epic Games v. Apple, although without major treatment.
The claimant argued that the defendant tied its payment system to the distribution of apps:
Apple forced developers to accept the In-App Purchase (IAP) if they wanted to use its store to
commercialize products. The Judge of the Northern District Court of California referred to case
Jeferson Parish [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref35">35</xref>
            ] to ground the illegality of tying when three requirements are met: i) the
defendant should have tied the sale of two separate products; ii) the defendant should possess
suficient economic power in the market of the tying product to force the buyer to purchase the
tied on, and iii) that practice should afect a not insubstantial volume of trade in the market for
the tying product [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref36">36</xref>
            ]. Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers rejected Epic Games’ allegation on the
grounds of two reasons: integration and consumer demand. She stressed that the IAP was not a
separate product from the store of applications, but it was integrated into the operating system
of devices using iOS. Furthermore, Epic Games did not demonstrate that there was a demand
for the IAP separately from the App Store or iOS.
          </p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-3-3-2">
          <title>3.3.3. Exclusivity agreements and prices</title>
          <p>The General Court dealt with two kinds of exclusivity practices in case Google Android and
held diferent solutions. The first practice referred to Android forks, which are variations of the
operating system developed by third parties. The problem laid with the variations that Google
had not qualified as compatible, because it did not allow its services and apps to be used with
them. Indeed, it conditioned the licence of the Play Store and of the search app to accepting
anti-fragmentation obligations -id est, not using versions of the operating system that did not
pass the compatibility test. The European Commission held that it was an abuse of its dominant
position because these variations competed with Android and, hence, they were a menace for
Google. By prohibiting their installation, the subsidiary of Alphabet hindered the development
of the variations of its operating system, reinforced its dominant position in national markets
for general search service, deterred innovation, and damaged consumers.</p>
          <p>On appeal, the dominant undertaking argued that the anti-fragmentation agreements were
necessary to preserve the Android ecosystem as an open-source model, from which consumers
benefited. The General Court rejected this argument based on two premises. The first one
was that non-compatible variations were licensing operating systems and, therefore, rivals of
oficial Android. The second argument was that anti-fragmentation agreements forced original
equipment manufacturers to refuse them, so developers were discouraged to make products
that competed with the oficial version. The consequence was upholding the appealed Decision.</p>
          <p>The second exclusivity practice referred to the revenue share agreements, by which Google
granted original equipment manufacturers and mobile network operators a percentage of its
advertising profits if they did not pre-install competing general search services in the devices
they produced or commercialized. The European Commission considered these agreements
were “exclusivity payments” and held them abusive because they reduced the incentives to
pre-install competing services, they created or increased barriers to access to markets for general
search services, they deterred innovation and they lacked objective justifications.</p>
          <p>The General Court agreed that revenue share agreements were exclusionary practices similar
to loyal rebates and they should be assessed according to the “As Eficient Competitor” test. 5
Consequently, the European competition authority should have demonstrated that the behaviour
under scrutiny excluded a competitor which hypothetically was equally eficient, charged
customers the same prices as Google, and faced the same costs. In this case, the European
judiciary accepted the appellant’s argument and annulled the Decision on this subject. On
the one hand, it criticized the competition authority because the market share afected by this
practice was not relevant. On the other, the European Commission erred in applying the AEC
test.</p>
          <p>In Epic Games vs Apple the Judge examined three exclusivity practices: i) the prohibition
to create app markets inside the App Store, ii) the obligation to use Apple’s payment system
(In-App Purchase), and iii) the anti-steering clause. They prevented competition, so they were
detrimental to consumers and developers since there was no competitive pressure on prices
-this was why Apple had maintained over the years a commission of 30%, which was very high-.
Nevertheless, the Judge held that the procompetitive efects outweighed the anticompetitive ones.
She attached huge importance to the fact that these restrictions allowed Apple to build a secure
and protected digital environment. The iOS and the Apple Store were excellent at defending
against malware, ofensive content, and fraud, as well as preserving privacy. Consumers and
developers benefited from this “walled garden”: as the former ones felt safe, they relied on
the apps commercialized in the oficial store. Secondly, the Judge accepted the defendant’s
argument that Apple’s policy fostered interbrand competition: while Apple ofered a closed
ecosystem, Google’s one was open. Hence, she stated: “That distinction ultimately increases
consumer choice by allowing users who value open distribution to purchase Android devices,
while those who value security and the protection of a ‘walled garden’ to purchase iOS devices”
(page 146). She also underlined that there had not been a decrease in the number of apps in the
Apple Store; indeed they had increased a 1200
5Paragraphs 640 f. The AEC test has raised several problems in cases related with technologic markets; for instance
in Intel. The EU Court of Justice annulled the Judgment of the General Court because it did not assess all of Intel’s
allegations regarding that test. It explained that loyalty rebates could be considered unlawful if the undertaking had
a dominant position. But, if the investigated enterprise proved that it was not capable of restricting competition or
that its behaviour did not foreclose the market, the Commission had to assess the possible existence of a strategy
aiming to exclude competitors that were at least as eficient as the dominant firm. Although the Commission held
that the rebates meant per se an abuse, it applied the AEC test. Hence, the General Court had to examine “whether
the Commission had carried out the AEC test in accordance with the applicable rules and without making any
errors”. As it did not do so and it also did not carry out the alternative calculations proposed by Intel, the judgment
was not in accordance with law. Vide the Judgment of 6 September 2017, cit. Four and a half years letter, the
General Court decided again on the Decision C(2009) 3726 final and this time annulled it on the grounds that the
application of the AEC test was flawed.</p>
          <p>The outcome was diferent under the California’s Unfair Competition Law. Epic Games
not only claimed that Apple had breached the Sherman Act but also some State Laws, and
it succeeded in proving that the anti-steering clause represented an unfair practice. Section
17200 of the Business and Professional Code of California forbids “…any unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business or practice”. Judge Gonzalez Rogers held that Apple had not committed
an unlawful act -she had previously rejected that it had breached Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act-, but its behaviour was unfair as it collided with the policy or spirit of Antitrust
Laws. Her decision was grounded on two tests. According to the tethering one, the Judge of
the Northern District Court of California held that the anti-steering clause collided with the
legislative policy, because it reduced the information available to consumers and developers, it
decreased innovation, and it made it possible for Apple to maintain a too high remuneration.
Regarding the balancing test, she rejected the defendant’s argument of the similarity with
brick-and-mortar stores as digital platforms are diferent. Apple’s one was a black box: it
imposed silence to control the information and to prevent consumers from getting informed
as well as the substitutability between platforms. Therefore, the Judge ordered an injunction
forbidding Apple to prohibit developers to include in their app functions that direct consumers
to rival purchasing mechanisms or to communicate with consumers.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-3-3-3">
          <title>3.3.4. Predatory prices</title>
          <p>In Epic Games v. Apple, the Judge assessed whether a commission of 30% of the revenues
generated in the app store was predatory. The percentage was quite high and lacked justification,
as Apple had established it accidentally when started commercializing the app store. It harmed
consumers and developers because the prices increased, and fewer resources could be applied to
innovation. It had lasted for a long time without variation, despite the complaints of developers
and the pressure of regulators. Notwithstanding, the Judge of the Northern District of California
ruled in favour of the defendant, on three grounds. First and most important, it was a reward for
Apple’s intellectual property -although Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers recognised that the defendant
had not proved the suitability of the 30% commission, which seemed too high. Secondly, it
was a remuneration for giving access to Apple’s audience, which had a high value. Lastly, the
Judge accepted the defendant’s argument that other platforms applied similar commissions.
However, she acknowledged rivals used to negotiate downward while Apple did not reduce its
remuneration.</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Enforcement and remedies</title>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>4.1. Enforcement</title>
        <p>The cases under scrutiny illustrate the two enforcement possibilities that exist, with their
lights and shadows. The private enforcement consists of litigation in the courts against the
undertaking (or undertakings) that has (have) restricted competition. The plaintif can be
a particular individual (either a consumer or a corporation) or a public agency (normally, a
competition authority) looking for the cessation of the illegal behaviour or the compensation
of damages. It usually has the advantage of speed, as Epic Games v. Apple demonstrates. The
plaintif went to court in the late summer of 2020 and about a year later the judge issued her
decision. The problem is that procedure, and especially evidence, is enormously demanding;
so much so, that it seems unlikely for a lawsuit brought by a consumer or a small or medium
enterprise can succeed. For instance, the definition of the relevant market is extremely dificult.
In Epic Games v. Apple, Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Reyes held a definition diferent from the ones
proposed by the parties, and this disparity was key to the result since Epic Games could not
prove that Apple had a monopoly power or used improper means.</p>
        <p>
          Public enforcement is an administrative procedure carried out by a competition authority
against one or several undertakings to put an end to an infringement, restore competition,
and deter the commission of future violations. It may also produce a judicial process if the
sanctioned enterprise is not satisfied with the administrative decision and appeals to the courts.
Moreover, it can also be followed by a private enforcement procedure if victims decide to claim
damages. It has the advantage that an administrative body, that uses to have great investigating
powers, prosecutes the restrictive practice. However, the costs of the enforcement proceedings,
especially when dealing with big undertakings, can be extraordinarily high and the resources
of competition authorities are always finite [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
          ]. Besides, it must be taken into consideration
that false negatives and false positives appear and their consequences can be critical when
dealing with big firms. And the same happens with procedural errors because they can lead
to the nullity of a sanctioning Decision as occurred in the case Qualcomm [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21 ref37">37, 21</xref>
          ]. For these
reasons, competition authorities must be very careful in choosing which wars to fight and gather
the necessary evidence to demonstrate that the undertaking(s) under investigation has(have)
infringed the law. On the other side of the scale it is time, as the duration of administrative
and judicial proceedings of public enforcement can be very long; something that is particularly
pernicious in digital markets due to the vertiginous speed of technological change and the
impossibility of resurrecting disappeared competitors, as the case Intel illustrates.6
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>4.2. Remedies</title>
        <p>
          The remedies provided by Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Article 102 of the TFEU are diferent.
The former relies on criminal sanctions as the monopolization is considered a felony. The court
can order imprisonment for less than 10 years and a fine of 100.000.000,- US dollars in the case of
corporations or 1.000.000,- US dollars for other types of persons. Nonetheless, civil enforcement
is preferred, and the typical remedies are available to plaintifs [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
          ]. Private claimants normally
ask for an injunction requiring the defendant to cease the illegal behaviour and the compensation
of (treble) damages [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
          ]. Instead, competition agencies request criminal consequences or
structural and conduct measures that put an end to the restrictions of competition.
        </p>
        <p>
          Article 102 of the TFEU does not establish any remedy, so it is necessary to appeal to the
rule that develops it: Regulation 1/2003. Article 7(1) gives the Commission the power to adopt
6Advanced Micro Devices Inc (AMD) complained to the European Commission about Intel’s practices in 2000. The
European competition authority oficially initiated the investigation in 2004 and in 2009 adopted a Decision holding
that the investigated enterprise had abused its dominant position. Five years later, the General Court upheld its
decision, but in 2017 the Court of Justice annulled that Judgment based on errors in the assessment of evidence.
The case returned to the General Court which in 2022 ruled in favour of Intel and annulled the decision of the
Commission, which has appealed against the Judgment.
any measure, proportional to the infringement, to eliminate the restriction of competition.
Remedies can be structural or behavioural, but the last ones are preferred -the former can
only be adopted when behavioural measures are not so efective or when they would be more
onerous for the sanctioned undertaking. The practice of the European competition authority
reflects this preference, as it does not appeal to structural measures. The reasons could be
that splitting up undertakings is very dificult as it means allocating staf and assets that serve
the firm as a whole and it can imply eliminating eficiencies that have been very dificult to
achieve [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
          ]. But it is also worth taking into consideration the reluctance to adopt structural
measures against non-European undertakings. On the other hand, agreements between the
investigated enterprise and the competition authority are possible and eficient. Essentially, they
consist in accepting the commitments ofered by the dominant, thus terminating the procedure,
and saving resources. Nonetheless, the authority should devote time, efort, and resources to
monitoring the compliance with commitments.
        </p>
        <p>The analysis of the cases under consideration reflects the above explanation. Epic Games
asked for the compensation of damages and an injunction to finish the unlawful practice. As the
Judge mostly dismissed the action, she only ordered Apple not to use the anti-steering clause.
Nonetheless, this remedy became inefective because the defendant’s appeal succeeded and the
California Court of Appeals postponed the injunction indefinitely. On the other hand, Apple’s
counterclaim prospered: Judge Gonzalez Rogers upheld it, declared that Epic Games breached
the contract, and ordered it to pay the amounts that would have accrued under the contract.</p>
        <p>In the three Google Decisions, the Commission ordered to cease the illegal conduct, not to
engage in the same or similar behaviors in the future and imposed a total fine of around eight
billion euros. The efectiveness of these measures raises doubts. Although this quantity seems
very high to the average human, it is debatable whether they have a disincentive efect on an
undertaking as powerful as Google. On the other hand, the behavioral obligations are aimed to
put an end to the competition restrictions, but they are not restoring the original conditions
of the market - the competition that existed before the forbidden conduct had efects. In my
humble opinion, the Commission should have adopted more resolute remedies, like the ones
it established in the Microsoft case when it ordered the dominant to disclose the necessary
information for developers to make the software compatible with Windows and to ofer a
version of the operating system without the Windows Media Player.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. New laws and ex ante controls</title>
      <p>
        The efectiveness of current legislation raises concern. The International Monetary Fund and
some economists warn about the menace that big techs represent, so they call for keeping
markets open and competitive, avoiding high access barriers, and impeding the exercise of
market power [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref2 ref3 ref5">1, 2, 3, 5</xref>
        ]. They do not ask for new competition laws, but they criticize current
enforcement practices, which should be improved. They also oppose dividing large companies
because it can lead to a loss of eficiency; it is wiser to regulate them. On the other hand,
they alert about the dangers of concentrations, as large enterprises can use them to eliminate
potential rivals. Thus, they propose to forbid mergers except when their parties prove that the
outcome will be the maintenance or increase of competition.
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-5-1">
        <title>5.1. Digital Markets Act</title>
        <p>The European Union has echoed these requests and has approved a regulation that imposes ex
ante remedies to gatekeepers: the so-called Digital Markets Act.7 It aims to achieve contestable
and fair competition in the digital sectors where gatekeepers are present (Article 1(1). The
scope of application is structured around the core platform services ofered by gatekeepers to
business or end users established or located in the European Union. The two main elements are
core platform services and gatekeepers. Article 2(2) defines the former by listing the services
that it comprises: a) online intermediation services, b) online search engines, c) online social
networking services, d) video-sharing platform services, e) number-independent interpersonal
communications services, f) operating systems, g) web browsers, h) virtual assistants, i) cloud
computing services, and j) online advertising services. The list can be increased if the
Commission considers that there are new practices that are unfair, that limit the contestability in
markets, and which are not properly ruled by the Act (Article 19).</p>
        <p>Gatekeepers are undertakings that provide core platform services, have a huge economic
power and control access to digital markets and how competition develops in them. Article
3(1) defines them by three features: (i) they have a strong market influence, (ii) they provide
core platform services that constitute a gateway for professional users to reach end users,
and (iii) they have an entrenched and durable position. As these qualities are quite abstract
and their application could raise doubts, paragraph 2 establishes the presumption that they
are present when certain economic thresholds are exceeded. Nonetheless, it is a prima facie
presumption that can be challenged. It is important to stress two issues. On the one hand, only
the enterprises that have been qualified as “gatekeepers” by the European Commission are
subject to the obligations established by the Digitals Markets Act concerning the core platform
services assigned. In other words, it is necessary a specific qualification act for an enterprise to
have the status quo and duties of gatekeepers. On the other hand, this qualification does not
depend on the possession of a dominant position. The European Commission will establish
it based on the economic thresholds provided by Article 3(2). Since it is not applying Article
102, it does not need to define the relevant market and determine whether the investigated
undertaking has enough market power to operate independently within it.</p>
        <p>Undertakings qualified as gatekeepers have a special responsibility, as they need to comply
with obligations and prohibitions to guarantee open and fair competition in digital markets.
They are provided by Chapter III and referred to each of the core platform services established
by the Commission regarding a singular undertaking. Articles 5, 6, and 7 set up the main
ones, most of which come from previous European competition cases, like the ones we have
studied. For instance, the gatekeeper shall not treat more favourably, in raking, indexing and
crawling, its services and products rather the similar ones of third parties -besides it shall apply
transparent, fair, and non-discriminatory conditions to such rankings-; it shall allow business
users to communicate and promote ofers to end users through the channels they wish; it shall
not impose the use of identification services, web browser engines or payment services; it
7Regulation (UE) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and
fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828. Although it entered
into force on November 1st, 2022, its legal eficiency is delayed until May 2nd, 2023 or June 25th, 2023. Cfr. Article
54.
shall allow and technically enable the use of third-party software applications and software
application stores using its operating system; and it shall allow providers of services and of
hardware efective interoperability with their products.</p>
        <p>Articles 8 and 12 complement them. The former provides for the possibility for the
Commission to establish measures to ensure that a given undertaking complies with its obligations and
that these are efective in preserving competition in the market. Article 12 empowers it to update
the list of obligations. Due to the risks that mergers create, Article 14 requires gatekeepers to
provide information on the concentrations they wish to carry out and the techniques used to
draw up the consumer profiles they apply to their basic platform services. All these obligations
are self-executing: gatekeepers should fulfil them without the necessity of a request from a
public body.</p>
        <p>As it could not be otherwise, the European Commission is vested with powers of investigation
and punishment. Chapter IV establishes three possible market investigations that are addressed
to the designation of an undertaking as a gatekeeper, to assess whether an enterprise has
systematically unfulfilled its duties, and to decide the necessity for adding new elements to
the basic platform services or for identifying new pernicious practices to combat. Secondly,
the powers of investigation that the Digital Markets Act grants the Commission are similar to
those provided for in Regulations 1/2003 and 139/2004. It is worth commenting that it expressly
adds the possibility of analysing the algorithms used by the gatekeeper and of appointing
“verification agents” to make sure that an undertaking complies with its obligations. On the
other hand, some defence rights are explicitly recognized to gatekeepers, such as the right to be
heard and the right of access to the file. Regarding the sanctions, they are like the Competition
Law ones. For instance, Article 30(1) establishes the possibility to impose a fine of up to 10</p>
        <p>The assessment of the Digital Markets Act is positive because it will improve competition
in digital markets. One example is the rumour that Apple will allow third-party app stores on
iPhones and iPads in order to accommodate to the new legislation. Nonetheless, some issues
raise concern. Firstly, its complexity: it is a dificult rule to interpret and apply. Indeed, it is
mainly addressed to big enterprises that have enough economic and legal resources to deal
with such a challenging text. But it is worth remembering that it is a Regulation, so it can be
directly enforced by national courts (for instance, in the event of actions for damages against
gatekeepers that had unfulfilled their obligations). Secondly, the only competent authority to
enforce the Act is the European Commission, which workload will be considerably increased.
Although the overseeing of its compliance does not lay on the DG Comp but rather on the DG
Connect, it remains to be seen whether the Commission has suficient resources to carry out
the supervision. Thirdly, it will be necessary to draw a line separating regulation and defence of
competition. The reason is that Article 1(5) forbids Member States to impose other obligations
on gatekeepers aimed at ensuring contestable and fair markets. But Article 1(6) gives preference
to Competition Law, both EU and domestic, over the Digital Markets Act. Thus, a problem
appears: Member States cannot establish new obligations on gatekeepers, but nothing forbids
them to approve new antitrust rules that can be applied to them. Lastly, Digital Markets Act
provides public measures, but it does not rule on private enforcement. The question arises as to
which rules will become applicable if gatekeeper breaches cause harm to users and they claim
compensation.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-2">
        <title>5.2. American Innovation and Choice Online Act</title>
        <p>A similar legislative proposal exists in the United States: the American Innovation and Choice
Online Act (AICOA - S. 2992). The bill was introduced in Congress by David Ciccilline on June
11th, 2021 and Senators Amy Klobuchar and Charles Grassley released an updated version in
May 2022. Although it has not yet been approved, I will try to briefly draw a parallel with the
EU Digital Markets Act.</p>
        <p>Regarding the purpose, the AICOA seems less ambitious, because it declares being focused
on fighting “certain discriminatory conduct(s) by covered platforms”. By contrast, the Digital
Markets Act aims to achieve a market in which fair and contestable competition reigns. The
central element of the AICOA’s scope of applications is the “covered platform”. The bill defines
it in Section 2(5) in terms of several parameters, among which are its monthly active users, the
annual sales volume, and the market capitalization. These parameters are closely reminiscent
of the quantitative criteria used by the Digital Markets Act to presume that a company meets
the qualitative requirements to be considered a gatekeeper. Therefore, both figures can be
considered equivalent, especially if we also take into consideration that only the undertakings
appointed by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice are qualified as
“covered platforms”. However, the EU Regulation stresses the role of gatekeepers as a gateway
for business users to reach end users. On the other hand, there is no reference in AICOA to
core platform services, but all the products ofered by covered platforms are subject to it.</p>
        <p>Section 3 lists the behaviours forbidden to covered platforms. Among them, the following
stand out: self-preferencing own products over those of other business users of the platform,
limiting the ability of business users to compete with the covered platform, discriminating
among the business users, restricting the interoperability, conditioning the access to the covered
platform on the acquisition of products or services which are not intrinsic to the last one, using
non-public data obtained from the platform by the interaction with the goods or services of
its business users, and impeding or hindering uninstalling software applications that were
preinstalled on the covered platforms. Section 3 lists some defences that exonerate the platform
from liability, like protecting the safety, user privacy, or the security of non-public data, as well
as maintaining or substantially enhancing the core functionality of the platform.</p>
        <p>The bill also establishes some remedies; for instance, a civil penalty of up to 15% of the total
United States revenue or the injunctions necessary to prevent, restraint, or prohibit violations
of the Law. The enforcement will be the responsibility of the Federal Trade Commission, the
Attorney General, and the attorney general of the States.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>6. Conclusions</title>
      <p>The two main legal provisions to fight against the abuses of big techs are Article 102 of the TFEU
and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Their efectiveness raises doubts. Firstly, they were created
and developed on non-digital markets. Secondly, the dominant position and the monopoly
power depend on the definition of the relevant market. The criteria traditionally used to define
it are not suitable for digital markets because they do not take into considerations elements
that are essential in digital markets. Thirdly, the high degree of abstraction of the “competition
on merits” paradigm deprives the qualification of a behaviour as abusive or improper of legal
certainty. Fourthly, the enforcement of Article 102 and Sections 2 face the problems of obtaining
the necessary evidence, of errors in the procedure and, in the case of public enforcement,
slowness. Lastly, it is doubtful that the remedies applied by the European Commission succeed
in restoring eficient competition and deterring further abuses. Because of these reasons, the
Digital Markets Act should be welcomed as it provides an ex ante control and it may alleviate
the Commission’s burden of proof, since behaviours that are contrary to it may be considered
abusive.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>Project Reorientación de los instrumentos jurídicos para la transición empresarial hacia la
economía del dato. Proyectos de Generación de Conocimiento 2021 del Ministerio de Ciencia e
Innovación. PID2020-113506RB-100 (2021-2024). IP PhD José Antonio Fernández Amor.</p>
    </sec>
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