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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>II: Cybersecurity Providing in Information and Telecommunication Systems, October</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Properties of Isogeny Graph of Non-Cyclic Edwards Curves</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Serhii Abramov</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Anatoly Bessalov</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Volodymyr Sokolov</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Borys Grinchenko Kyiv University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>18/2 Bulvarno-Kudriavska str., Kyiv, 04053</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2023</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>26</volume>
      <issue>2023</issue>
      <fpage>0000</fpage>
      <lpage>0002</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>Some properties of isogenies of non-cyclic supersingular Edwards curves, which are used in the implementation of the CSIDH algorithm, are considered. This article continues the consideration of properties using the example of these classes of supersingular Edwards curves from previous work. All isogeny calculations are performed using one parameter of the curve equation d. Isogeny properties are modeled on an isogeny graph and are considered graph properties. Recommendations are given for selecting some cryptosystem parameters. It is shown which parameters d are prohibited for use in CSIDH algorithms and that the transition from one isogeny to another is not always possible.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>1 Post-quantum cryptography</kwd>
        <kwd>commutative supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman algorithm</kwd>
        <kwd>curve in generalized Edwards form</kwd>
        <kwd>non-cyclic Edwards curve</kwd>
        <kwd>curve order</kwd>
        <kwd>point order</kwd>
        <kwd>graph of isogeny</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        The works [1] present a modification of the
CSIDH algorithm, built on isogenies of
noncyclic Supersingular Edwards Curves (SEC) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21">2–
6</xref>
        ], instead of traditional curve arithmetic in the
Montgomery form. This Post Quantum
Cryptography (PQC) algorithm differs from
other known algorithms by its minimum key
length, which is close to the prime field
modulus Fp , on which group operations are
performed. An example is given of calculating
the parameters of these curves p = 839 , on the
isogenies of which the algorithm is
implemented.
      </p>
      <p>This article presents new results of
studying isogenies of non-cyclic supersingular
Edwards curves using graphs that were also
previously used in articles [7–9].</p>
      <p>
        At one of the stages of the algorithm, group
operations are performed on lk -isogeny
cycles. The number of steps in operation [ lk ek ]
corresponds to the secret exponent of the
vector Ωκ = (e1, e2, …, eK, …). Work [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16 ref18">10</xref>
        ] justified
the identification of the curves in generalized
Edwards form by one parameter d. It made it
possible to identify quadratic and twisted
Edwards curves (non-cyclic Edwards curves)
over the field Fp by one parameter d .
      </p>
      <p>The article models the choice of a vector of
exponents of a secret key by an isogeny graph
[9]. The study of the parameters of isogenic
curves continued using the example of 840
order curves.</p>
      <p>
        The work [1] considers an example of
constructing isogenies for non-cyclic SEC with
parameters (a = 1) , p = 839 , N E = 840
(66 curves). There are values of 66 parameters
d for all 66 curves and provides calculations
of isogenies of degrees 3, 5, and 7 for 33 curves
in that work. It is shown that the choice of some
curves is unsuccessful (curve with d=733).
This article shows which other d parameters
are prohibited. In addition, it is shown that the
transition from one isogeny to another is not
always possible.
2. Theoretical Foundation
The PQC CSIDH (Commutative SIDH)
algorithm was proposed by the authors of [9]
to solve the key exchange problem
(SIDHSupersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16 ref18">10</xref>
        ]),
based on isogenic mappings of elliptic curves
in general as additive Abelian groups [11–13].
Such a display over a simple field Fp is defined
as the class group action and is commutative.
In comparison with the known original circuit
CRS [14] on non-supersingular curves, the use
of isogenies of supersingular curves made it
possible to speed up the algorithm and obtain
the smallest known key size (512 bits per
[9, 15]).
      </p>
      <p>Let the curve E order NE contains points
of small odd orders lk , k = 1,2,..., K. Then
there is an isogenic curve E same order NE .</p>
      <p>In the algorithm, repeating this operation
ek times denoted by [lk ek ]* E . Isogeny
exponent values ek  Z determine the length
of the chain of isogenies of degree lk . In [12],
the range of exponent values was adopted
[−m  ek  m], m = 5, K = 74, which provides
a 128-bit security level against quantum
computer attacks. Negative values of the
exponent mean a transition to a supersingular
quadratic torsion curve [1].</p>
      <p>Non-interactive Diffie-Hellman key
exchange involves three stages [9]. The second
stage is the Calculation of public keys. Each
participant using his secret key
 A = (e1, e2 ,.., eK ) builds an isogenic mapping
A = [l1e1 , l2e2 ,..,lK eK ] and calculates the curve
EA =  A * E0 . For each li is calculated exactly
ei isogeny.</p>
      <p>In [11] the mapping formulas  (P) are
given for SEC, depending on two parameters a
and d. It shows that  (x, y) is l -isogeny from
the curve Ea,d into a curve Ea,d with
parameters:
a = a l , d  = d l A8 ,</p>
      <p>s  ,
A = i=1 i
(1)</p>
      <p>The parameter d uniquely defines the curve.
We will use (1) to calculate the parameters of
the chain of isogenies.</p>
      <p>In [1] the implementation of the CSIDH
algorithm on quadratic and twisted (SECs),
forming quadratic torsion pairs with the same
order is considered. Such curves exist only
when
and
have
order
N E = N Et = p + 1= cn (n − odd ), c  0 mod 8.
Let such a pair of curves contain kernels of the
3rd, 5th, and 7th orders with the value n = 105,
then the minimum prime p = 8т −1 = 839
and the order of these curves N E = 8n = 840 .
The parameter d of the entire family made 418
quadratic Edwards curves. This parameter is
equal squares d = r 2 mod p,r = 2.419.
From these 66 pairs of quadratic and twisted
SECs with parameters [1] a = 1 и  (ad ) = 1
were found.</p>
      <p>For the first curve Ed (0) = E144 in [1], 3-,
5and 7-isogenies were constructed and the
parameters d (i) of isogenic chains of curves
Ed (i) ,i = 0,1,2,...,Т were found. Curve E144
gives rise to a chain of isogenies of degree 3
with a period of 33. It includes half of all curves
of order 840. Let’s call them the first segment
of curves. Chains 5 and 7 of isogenies also
consist of these same curves.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>3. Isogeny Graph</title>
      <p>Fig. 1 shows the graph of these isogenies of the
first segment. The graph shows one chain of
3isogenies, where the values of the parameter d
of the isogenic curves are shown inside the
yellow, green, and gray rectangles. The chain
starts from curve d=144 and the next
calculated isogeny is located clockwise.</p>
      <p>Isogenies of degrees 5 and 7 form two
chains of each degree (two pairs). In Fig. 1,
chains of isogenies of degree 5 are indicated by
solid arrows and degrees 7 by dotted arrows.
The first chain of each pair contains identical
curves from 1/3 of all curves, i.e. have a period
of 11 (in Fig. 1a they are indicated in yellow).
The second of each pair of chains contains
curves from the second one-third of all curves
(indicated in green in Fig. 1b). And one-third
does not have isogenies 5 and 7 degrees
(empty points of the graph are indicated in
gray).</p>
      <p>In addition to the above, this work also
presents isogeny graphs containing the second
half of 66 curves of order 840 (second
segment) Fig. 2. They also form a chain of
3isogenies with a period of 33 and a pair of
chains of 5 and 7 isogenies with a period of 11.
The first curves are marked in yellow. The
second curve is marked in green. In the chain
of 3-isogenies, the starting point was the point
d = 784 from Table 1 [1] (Fig. 2).</p>
      <p>The structure of all isogenies of Edwards
supersingular curves is presented in Fig. 3. All
curves form two non-intersecting segments of
33 curves in every. The curves of each
segment form one chain of isogenies of degree
3 (period 33) and a pair of chains of degrees 5
and 7. A total of 2 chains of 3-isogenies, 4
chains of 11 order isogenies of degree 5, and 4
chains of 11 order isogenies of degree 7.</p>
      <p>Table 1 shows some of the points of each
segment and which chains of isogenies of
degrees 5 and 7 these points are included in.
First chains
b
0
59
First chains
76
3
chain of 3-isogeny
SEC (1st segment of</p>
      <p>33 curves)
02
0
28
0
59
7
7
0
2
52
73
15
4
52
5</p>
      <p>7
42
7-isogeny 3
6
5
Make a transition between chains of isogenies
of degrees 5 and 7 (in both directions) only if
their numbers in the pair match (i.e. within the
same color of yellow or green in Fig. 1 and
Fig. 2). You can also switch to the chain of
3isogenies at any step, and from the chain of
3isogenies you can get to the chains of 5 and 7
isogenies only at 11 points of the chain of
3isogenies. In the first segment, you can go to
the first chain of 5 and 7 isogenies only from
yellow points 144, 76,258, 293, 243, 2, 788,
636, 112, 182, 752, and to the second chain
from green points. And accordingly for the
second segment.</p>
      <p>The graph shows that the exponent in the
vector Ωκ = (e1, e2, …, eK) corresponding to
isogeny l3 3 degrees must be a multiple of 3.
Only after every 3 steps, you can get to points
coinciding with the graph of 5 or 7 isogenies.
66 SEC order 840</p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>1st segment (33 curves)</title>
        <p>Chain 3-isogenic period 33
11 curves 11 curves 11 curves
1st
chain</p>
        <p>2nd
chain
5-isogeny
period 11
1st
chain</p>
        <p>2nd
chain</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>7-isogeny</title>
        <p>period 11</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-3">
        <title>2nd segment (33 curves)</title>
        <p>Chain 3-isogenic period 33
11 curves 11 curves 11 curves
1st
chain</p>
        <p>2nd
chain
5-isogeny
period 11
1st
chain</p>
        <p>2nd
chain</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-4">
        <title>7-isogeny period 11 Figure 3: Structure of SEC isogenies of the 840th order</title>
        <p>Fig. 4 shows examples of graph transitions
for group operations a) Е144 *[l33 l53 l72] = Е243
and b) Е289*[l36 l52 l72] = Е433.</p>
        <p>Transitions are carried out between
isogenies with parameters: d = 144-&gt;243 and
d = 144-&gt;243.</p>
        <p>6 93
Е144 *[l33 l53 l72] = Е243
88
0
05</p>
        <p>4
6
72
1
12
1
38
0
66
The figure shows that the number of steps
along the chain of 3-isogenies is always a
multiple of 3. Otherwise, it is impossible to get
to the chains of isogenies of degrees 5 and 7.
The figure shows steps 3 and 6 along the chain
of 3-isogenies.
half, and this must be taken into account when
implementing the CSIDH algorithm. It should
be noted that given the huge number of
isogenies in real systems, these restrictions
have virtually no effect on the security of the
cryptosystem.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>4. Conclusion</title>
      <p>The graph (Fig. 1 and 2) is not fully connected
and therefore not all paths between vertices
are accessible.</p>
      <p>It is not possible to move from a chain of
3isogenies to the rest at an arbitrary point in the
graph. You need to choose steps in the
3isogeny chain not arbitrarily, but so as not to
end up in empty points of the graph.</p>
      <p>The first and second (yellow and green)
chains of each pair do not have common curves
(common points of the graph), so a direct
transition between them is not possible. This
transition can be made by returning to the 3rd
order chain and passing along several steps so
as not to end up in an empty (gray) point. The
transition between segments is generally
impossible because the corresponding graphs
do not have common points.</p>
      <p>Such properties of the isogeny graph
somewhat limit the freedom of wandering
around the graph and the number of paths
between curves is reduced by approximately</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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          <year>2020</year>
          )
          <fpage>30</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>39</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
    </ref-list>
  </back>
</article>