<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Archiving and Interchange DTD v1.0 20120330//EN" "JATS-archivearticle1.dtd">
<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Private Ad Modeling with DP-SGD</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Carson Denison</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Badih Ghazi</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Pritish Kamath</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Ravi Kumar</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Pasin Manurangsi</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Krishna Giri Narra</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Amer Sinha</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Avinash Varadarajan</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Chiyuan Zhang</string-name>
        </contrib>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>A well-known algorithm in privacy-preserving ML is diferentially private stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD). While this algorithm has been evaluated on text and image data, it has not been previously applied to ads data, which are notorious for their high class imbalance and sparse gradient updates. In this work we apply DP-SGD to several ad modeling tasks including predicting click-through rates, conversion rates, and number of conversion events, and evaluate their privacy-utility trade-of on real-world ads datasets. Our work is the first to empirically demonstrate that DP-SGD can provide both privacy and utility for ad modeling tasks.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;diferential privacy</kwd>
        <kwd>model training</kwd>
        <kwd>ad models</kwd>
        <kwd>CTR</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        We will discuss the ideas that make these results pos- Table 1
sible, such as large batch training, eficient per-example DP-SGD results (average over five runs) on three diferent
gradient norm bounding, and improved privacy account- ads prediction datasets. Each row show the results under
ing. We also provide a comparison of DP-SGD to La- a specific privacy budget . It is common [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14 ref7">7, 14, 15</xref>
        ] to set
belDP [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref13">12, 13</xref>
        ], a DP notion that protects only the labels  = (1/ ), where  is the number of training examples.
and not the features. To the best of our knowledge, ours In this paper, we fix  = 1/ . The percentages are relative
is the first systematic study on training large deep neural ltohseslionscsrefomretnhtec(a,lcu)la-DtePd masod(ela− nd∞∞)/is∞th,ewlohsesreforthies
networks privately for ad prediction tasks. We hope our non-private ( = ∞) baseline. We use AUC loss (i.e., 1 − AUC)
results serve as an optimistic example towards DP train- for pCTR and pCVR, and Poisson log loss for pConvs.
ing of large ad prediction neural networks. We also hope
our detailed studies provide useful information for practi- Privacy Budget Relative Loss Increment (%)
tioners to improve the utility and minimize the overhead () pCTR pCVR pConvs
of DP training.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Background</title>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>Let  be a (stochastic) training algorithm that produces</title>
        <p>a model given a labeled training set. We call two training
sets neighboring if they difer on a single labeled example.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>Definition 1 (Diferential Privacy) . Let  ≥ 0,  ∈ [0, 1].</title>
        <p>A randomized training algorithm  is (,  )-diferentially
private ((,  )-DP) if for all  ⊆ Range() and all
neighboring training sets , ′, it holds that
• pConvs: predict the expected number of conversions
after an ad click; this is a regression problem against
integer count labels.</p>
        <sec id="sec-2-2-1">
          <title>We evaluate pCTR on the public Criteo dataset [16], and</title>
          <p>
            Pr[() ∈ ] ≤  · Pr[(′) ∈ ] + . pCVR, pConvs on a proprietary dataset. We train the
DP-SGD [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
            ] is the most widely used DP training algo- binary classification problems on pCTR and pCVR with
rithm for a deep learning pipeline. Let  be a neural net- the binary cross entropy loss and report the test AUC loss
(i.e., 1 − AUC), and the regression problem on pConvs
work with trainable weights  , and {(1, 1), . . . , ( ,  )}with the Poisson log loss (PLL), and report the test PLL.
be a random mini-batch of training examples. Let ℓ =
ℓ( (), ) be the loss on the th example and let ¯ℓ = Let  () be the scalar prediction (i.e., the logit value) of
r1ith∑m︀s=c1oℓm pbuettehtehaevaevreargaegelogsrsa.dSiteanntd∇ar d¯ℓtarnaidnuinpgdaatleg o- tPhLeLniseudreafinlendeatwsorℓk(,an,(d, b)e)t:h=e ienxtpeg(er (co)u)n− tingla(be)l..
with an optimizer such as SGD or Adam. In DP-SGD, In all our experiments with (,  )-DP, we set  to be
the per-example gradients ∇ ℓ are computed, and then 1/ , where  is the number of training examples in the
rescaled to have a maximum ℓ2-norm . The average of dataset.
the norm-bounded per-example gradients is perturbed by The percentage increases in loss at various privacy
budadding independent Gaussian noise to each coordinate, gets are presented relative to a non-private baseline1 in
and is subsequently passed to the optimizer. The pri- Table 1. We found DP-SGD can properly train the models
vacy parameters  and  depend on the noise multiplier, for all three tasks with a reasonable loss gap, even for very
and other parameters such as the batch size and training high privacy (e.g.,  &lt; 1) regimes. Furthermore, when
imsteps; they can be estimated via privacy accounting [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
            ]. plemented carefully, the computation and memory
overheads can be minimized, allowing a training throughput
similar to the non-private baseline. Next, we present in
3. Summary of Main Results detail the techniques that enabled optimal privacy-utility
trade-of and minimum memory/computation overhead,
respectively.
          </p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-2-2">
          <title>We focus on three common predictions tasks for which Ad Techs build ML models.</title>
          <p>• pCTR: predict the click-through rate for an ad.
• pCVR: predict the conversion rate for an ad click; here,
only whether a conversion takes place matters,
regardless of the number of conversions.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-2-3">
          <title>1Our non-private AUC loss for the pCTR task is 0.1943. We are</title>
          <p>unable to report the absolute non-private baseline losses for pCVR
and pConvs on the proprietary datasets due to confidentiality.</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>4. Privacy-Utility Trade-of</title>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>One of the main obstacles for adopting DP-SGD in real</title>
        <p>world deep learning pipelines is the potential
deterioration of the model performance. Norm-rescaling and
Gaussian noise introduce, respectively, bias and variance
to gradient estimation. As a result, the trained models
have lower performance. In this section, we study these
challenges in detail by using the training setup from the
non-private baseline as the starting point, and describe
various improvements that lead to our main results. We
state our results for Criteo pCTR, but the key points also
hold on other prediction tasks.
With fixed noise multiplier (and other hyperparameters
like the training steps), the norm bound  for each
perexample gradient allows a bias-variance trade-of in the
gradient estimation for a fixed . Specifically, increasing
 reduces bias but increases the variance in gradient
estimation due to the addition of more noise. A proper
choice of  improves the quality of trained model. For
example, Table 2 shows that in a low privacy regime
(where the noise multiplier is smaller), increasing  leads
to better model performance because the added noise is
already small. On the other hand, a large  can hurt
performance in the high privacy regime by requiring
large amounts of noise. Adaptively choosing the norm
bound  has been studied in the literature [22, 23].
4.3. Large Batch Training</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>Batch size is an important hyperparameter that afects</title>
        <p>diferent aspects of DP training. Specifically, increasing
the batch size leads to a larger subsampling ratio, which
implies larger noise multiplier for the same . On the
4.1. Hyperparameter Tuning other hand, increasing the batch size also reduces the
efective noise that is added to the average gradient
beThe hyperparameters for training the non-private base- cause the noised sum of gradients are divided by the
line models in real-world applications are typically ex- batch size [7, Algorithm 1]. Moreover, when fixing the
tensively tuned. However, those hyperparameters are number of training epochs, varying the batch size also
not necessarily the best for training with DP. Figure 1 changes the number of training steps, which afects both
plots the AUC of DP trained models under diferent op- the privacy accounting and model utility.
timizer and learning rate configurations. Specifically, In Figure 2, we plot the relationship between the
Gausthe blue line shows that directly reusing the optimal sian noise standard deviation (std) required to guarantee
hyperparameters for the non-private baseline leads to a certain , when the batch size changes. In Figure 2(a),
significant utility gap comparing to the best hyperparam- we fix the total number of passes (epochs) over the data;
eters re-tuned under DP training. Note that the optimal the noise std continues to decrease as the batch size
inhyperparameters also depend on : SGD with learning creases beyond 106. However, this is not very realistic,
rate 0.1 performs better than with learning rate 0.01 in because with fixed training epochs, increased batch sizes
the low privacy (large ) regime but worse in the high lead to decreased number of training steps. Modern
neuprivacy (small ) regime. For simplicity, we choose a ral networks trained with stochastic optimizers usually
single configuration (SGD-0.01) for the rest of the study; require a minimum number of steps to fit the data well.
this already improves the AUC significantly compared In Figure 2(b), we plot the relation under the condition
to using the non-private hyperparameters2. of fixed number of training steps. In this case, the benefit
of large batch sizes plateaus.
2Ideally, hyperparameter tuning should be performed with DP, e.g., Since SGD optimization is itself stochastic, reducing
using [21]. However, following most prior work on DP training, the noise std might not improve the model ad
infiniwe ignore the DP cost for hyperparameter tuning.</p>
        <p>Fixed Epochs
=0.5
=3.0
=10.0
10 3
d
ts
isoe10 4
n
103
104 105
batch size</p>
        <p>106
(a) Fixed epochs
103
104 105
batch size
(b) Fixed steps</p>
        <p>106
epsilon=1.0
Clip Norm</p>
        <p>Microbatch Size
0 5 10Scali1n5g Fa2c0tor 25 30
(a)  = 1.0
0.5 1.0</p>
        <p>B=8,C=32</p>
        <p>B=8,C=16B=8,C=16 B=8,C=16
B=8,C=16
3.0 5.0 10.0
epsilon (log scale)
(b) Tuning for each</p>
        <p>30.0 50.0</p>
        <p>
          Table 3  generally leads to worse model utility.
AUC with large batch size and training epochs on Criteo In our case, with an eficient implementation
(SecpCTR. The results can be compared with Table 2 (batch size tion 5), we do not need to use microbatching. However,
1024, 8 epochs). we empirically found that small  could improve the
 batch size epochs  AUC model utility. One potential reason is that this allows a
diferent kind of bias-variance trade-of from changing
0.5 16,384 64 30 0.7740 ± 0.0003 the norm bound  (Section 4.2). The increased noise
0.5 8,192 32 30 0.7689 ± 0.0003 leads to higher variance in gradient estimation. On the
3.0 16,384 64 30 0.7810 ± 0.0003 other hand, averaging the gradients within the
micro3.0 8,192 32 30 0.7782 ± 0.0003 batch before clipping could potentially reduce the bias
8.0 16,384 64 30 0.7818 ± 0.0003 when there are cancellations. For example, averaging 
8.0 8,192 32 30 0.7799 ± 0.0004 i.i.d. Gaussian vectors reduces the expected norm by a
factor of 1/√︀ . The cancellation of gradient vectors
is hard to characterize theoretically, but as shown in
Figtum. However, larger batches reduce noise, which allows ure 3(a), increasing  moderately indeed improve the
the norm bound  to be increased while keeping the utility for Criteo pCTR. Similar to , the maximum
toltotal added noise and privacy level fixed. Increasing  erable value before it starts hurting the utility increases
can yield performance gains. Specifically, Table 3 shows with . On the other hand,  and  seem to be helping
the model performances on Criteo pCTR with increased with bias reduction in diferent ways, because increasing
batch sizes, training epochs, and norm bound . Com- each of them by the same scaling factor leads to
diferparing with Table 2, large batch sizes lead to significant ent AUC, even though the Gaussian noise scale (i.e., the
performance boost. Note that for  = 0.5, the model can- variance) would be increased by the same amount. As a
not properly train (AUC = 0.5) for  = 30, but reaches result, we could combine the two factors to further boost
AUC = 0.77 when the batch size increases 16× . We note the utility, as verified in Figure 3(b).
that large batches have previously been used to improve
DP-SGD for vision and language models [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref8 ref9">10, 8, 9</xref>
          ]. 4.5. Tighter Privacy Accounting
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-3">
        <title>Privacy accounting estimates the privacy budget  for</title>
        <p>
          4.4. Microbatching a DP-SGD trained model according to the specific
hyMicrobatching was originally used to mitigate the com- perparameters such as the noise std, the norm bound
putation and memory overhead of vanilla DP-SGD imple- , the number of training steps, etc. Rényi Diferential
mentations [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ]. It works by partitioning each mini-batch Privacy (RDP) accounting has been the most widely used
of  training examples into “microbatches” of size  , approach in DP-SGD since the original paper [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ]. With
and performing ℓ2-norm rescaling on the average gra- RDP,  can be computed using only the number of epochs,
dient of each microbatch (as oppose to the per-example the batch size, and the noise std.
gradient). With large  , even a vanilla DP-SGD imple- In this paper, we explore latest advances in privacy
mentation could be quite eficient because microbatch accounting to provide tighter estimates. Specifically,
sevaverage gradients can be computed with standard back- eral recent works [24, 25] studied numerical methods for
propagation API. However, because group norm bound- estimating the privacy parameters of a DP mechanism
ing changes the sensitivity of the mean gradient query, to an arbitrary accuracy using the notion of privacy loss
the magnitude of Gaussian noises scale up by a factor of distributions (PLD). A crucial property is that the PLD of
 under the same privacy guarantee. As a result, large a composition of multiple mechanisms is the convolution
Number of steps per second
of their individual PLDs. Thus, Koskela et al. [26] used
the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) in order to speed up
the computation of the PLD of the composition; faster
algorithms and more accurate algorithms have been
proposed in subsequent work [27, 28], and have been the only use embedding and linear layers. As first noted
basis of multiple open-source implementations from both by Goodfellow [33], the per-example gradient norms for
industry and academia including [29, 30, 31]. In particu- fully connected layers can be eficiently estimated with
lar, in this paper, we use the so-called “connect-the-dots” standard backpropagation sans materializing the
per-exalgorithm of Doroshenko et al. [32] for privacy account- ample gradient vectors. Since an embedding layer is
ing. equivalent to a fully connected layer on one-hot encoded
        </p>
        <p>
          Figure 4(a) compares RDP accounting to the improved inputs, Goodfellow’s observation can be used in DP-SGD.
PLD accounting. Because the PLD estimation is tighter, Based on these observations, we implement a two-pass
a given  requires smaller noise than implied by RDP ac- algorithm that computes per-example gradient norms in
counting. We observe consistent improvements of model the first pass and the norm-bounded average gradient
utility across all privacy regimes, with a larger gap for in the second pass. Since most of the computation and
smaller ’s. memory overhead comes from materializing per-example
gradient vectors, our implementation is able to reduce
these significantly. This technique is usually called “ghost
5. Computation &amp; Memory clipping”, and is also efective in private training for
comOverhead puter vision [37] and natural language processing [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14, 15</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>
          We implement this algorithm in JAX [38], and compare
Another obstacle to using DP-SGD in real-world deep to a baseline implementation using JAX just-in-time (JIT)
learning systems is the potential computation and mem- compilation, which is already faster than a vanilla
impleory overhead. A naive implementation of DP-SGD that mentation as reported in Subramani et al. [35], as well as
explicitly computes each per-example gradient can lead the non-private baseline (called Baseline).
to several orders of magnitude more memory consump- Figure 4(b) plots the number of examples per second
tion and computational cost. Therefore, eficient imple- using diferent training algorithms and batch sizes. We
mentations of DP-SGD have been studied from various observe that Fast-DP-SGD scales similarly to the
nonangles, including micro-batching [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ], layer-specific al- private baseline, and the computation overhead is
negligorithms [33, 34], just-in-time compilation [35], and ap- gible for intermediate to large batch sizes. On the other
proximation via random projections [36]. hand, the JIT based implementation is not only slower
        </p>
        <p>Here we demonstrate that when implemented with but also incapable of handling batch sizes larger than 64
care, DP-SGD can be run with small computation and because its memory overhead grows linearly with the
memory overheads for ads prediction models. This is batch size. The maximum batch size that each algorithm
enabled by the following observations: 1. To bound sen- can handle on a single GPU is documented in Table 4. We
sitivity, we only need per-example gradient norms, not can see that the batch size cap is the same for
Fast-DPper-example gradient vectors. 2. Once per-example gra- SGD and the non-private baseline, demonstrating that
dient norms are computed, the norm-bounded average the memory overhead is negligible.
gradients can be computed using standard backpropaga- The experiments above were done on a single GPU.
tion with reweighted loss. 3. Most ads prediction models The batch size can be easily scaled beyond the maximum</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-4">
        <title>Tomkins for their comments.</title>
        <p>0.1 0.25 0.5 1.0 3.0 5.0 10.0 30.0 50.0</p>
        <p>Privacy Budget (epsilon)
value in Table 4 by using multi-device data parallelism,
and gradient accumulation across multiple
backpropagation steps.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>6. Comparison to Label DP</title>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>Label diferential privacy (LabelDP) [ 39] is a notion where</title>
        <p>
          the features are public and only the labels need privacy
protection. It has been recently studied in deep
learning [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref13">12, 13</xref>
          ], and more specifically in ad modeling [ 40].
In this section, we compare DP-SGD with LabelDP
algorithms under the same privacy budget . (Note that this is
not an apples-to-apples comparison since unlike DP-SGD,
LabelDP protects only the labels; furthermore, since we
use randomized response as our LabelDP algorithm, we
have  = 0.)
        </p>
        <p>From Figure 5, we observe that LabelDP generally
provides higher utility in low privacy (large ) regimes, while
DP-SGD outperforms it in high privacy (small ) regimes.
The behavior in high privacy regimes is counter-intuitive
because DP-SGD has stronger privacy guarantees yet
provides better utility.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>7. Conclusions</title>
      <p>In this work we showed that it is possible to privately
train ad models using DP-SGD, while neither significantly
sacrificing utility nor incurring computational cost. An
interesting research direction is to develop new private
training algorithms for “hybrid DP”—an interpolation
between vanilla DP and Label DP in which some but
not all of the features are public. Another line of work
would be to study if the low-rank nature / sparsity of the
gradients can be exploited to reduce the noise needed for
private training.</p>
      <p>Acknowledgments</p>
      <sec id="sec-5-1">
        <title>We thank Silvano Bonacina and Samuel Ieong for many useful discussions and Christina Ilvento and Andrew</title>
        <p>[15] J. He, X. Li, D. Yu, H. Zhang, J. Kulkarni, Y. T. Lee, [33] I. Goodfellow, Eficient per-example gradient
comA. Backurs, N. Yu, J. Bian, Exploring the limits of putations, arXiv preprint arXiv:1510.01799 (2015).
diferentially private deep learning with group-wise [34] J. Lee, D. Kifer, Scaling up diferentially private deep
clipping, in: ICLR, 2022. learning with fast per-example gradient clipping,
[16] Criteo-Labs, Display advertising challenge: Predict PoPETS (2021) 128–144.</p>
        <p>click-through rates on display ads, 2014. URL: https: [35] P. Subramani, N. Vadivelu, G. Kamath, Enabling
//www.kaggle.com/c/criteo-display-ad-challenge. fast diferentially private SGD via just-in-time
com[17] M. Zaheer, S. Reddi, D. Sachan, S. Kale, S. Kumar, pilation and vectorization, in: NeurIPS, 2021, pp.</p>
        <p>Adaptive methods for nonconvex optimization, in: 26409–26421.</p>
        <p>NIPS, 2018. [36] Z. Bu, S. Gopi, J. Kulkarni, Y. T. Lee, H. Shen, U.
Tan[18] J. Duchi, E. Hazan, Y. Singer, Adaptive subgradient tipongpipat, Fast and memory eficient
diferenmethods for online learning and stochastic opti- tially private-SGD via JL projections, in: NeurIPS,
mization., JMLR 12 (2011). 2021, pp. 19680–19691.
[19] D. P. Kingma, J. Ba, Adam: A method for stochastic [37] Z. Bu, J. Mao, S. Xu, Scalable and eficient
trainoptimization, in: ICLR, 2015. ing of large convolutional neural networks with
[20] I. Loshchilov, F. Hutter, Decoupled weight decay diferential privacy, in: NeurIPS, 2022.</p>
        <p>regularization, in: ICLR, 2019. [38] J. Bradbury, R. Frostig, P. Hawkins, M. J. Johnson,
[21] A. Gupta, K. Ligett, F. McSherry, A. Roth, K. Talwar, C. Leary, D. Maclaurin, G. Necula, A. Paszke, J.
VanDiferentially private combinatorial optimization, derPlas, S. Wanderman-Milne, Q. Zhang, JAX:
comin: SODA, 2010, pp. 1106–1125. posable transformations of Python+NumPy
pro[22] O. Thakkar, G. Andrew, H. B. McMahan, Diferen- grams, 2018. URL: http://github.com/google/jax.
tially private learning with adaptive clipping, in: [39] K. Chaudhuri, D. Hsu, Sample complexity bounds
NeurIPS, 2021, pp. 17455–17466. for diferentially private learning, in: COLT, 2011,
[23] V. Pichapati, A. T. Suresh, F. X. Yu, S. J. Reddi, S. Ku- pp. 155–186.</p>
        <p>mar, AdaCliP: adaptive clipping for private SGD, [40] B. Ghazi, P. Kamath, R. Kumar, E. Leeman, P.
ManuarXiv preprint arXiv:1908.07643 (2019). rangsi, A. Varadarajan, C. Zhang, Regression with
[24] S. Meiser, E. Mohammadi, Tight on budget? Tight label diferential privacy, in: ICLR, 2023.
bounds for -fold approximate diferential privacy, [41] I. Loshchilov, F. Hutter, SGDR: stochastic gradient
in: CCS, 2018, pp. 247–264. descent with warm restarts, in: ICLR, 2017.
[25] D. M. Sommer, S. Meiser, E. Mohammadi, Privacy
loss classes: The central limit theorem in diferential
privacy, PoPETS (2019) 245–269. A. Training Details
[26] A. Koskela, J. Jälkö, A. Honkela, Computing tight
diferential privacy guarantees using FFT, in: AIS- The Criteo pCTR dataset [16] contains around 40
milTATS, 2020, pp. 2560–2569. lion examples. The raw dataset comes with a labeled
[27] S. Gopi, Y. T. Lee, L. Wutschitz, Numerical compo- training set and an unlabeled test set. We split the raw
sition of diferential privacy, in: NeurIPS, 2021, pp. training set chronologically into a 80/10/10 partition of
11631–11642. train/validation/test sets. The reported metrics are on
[28] B. Ghazi, P. Kamath, R. Kumar, P. Manurangsi, this labeled test split. Each example consists of 13 integer
Faster privacy accounting via evolving discretiza- features, 26 categorical features, and one binary label.
tion, in: ICML, 2022, pp. 7470–7483. We preprocess each integer feature with a log
transfor[29] L. Prediger, A. Koskela, Code for computing tight mation.</p>
        <p>guarantees for diferential privacy., https://github. The neural network consists of six layers. In the first
com/DPBayes/PLD-Accountant, 2020. layer, each categorical feature is mapped into a dense
[30] Google’s DP Library., DP Accounting Library, feature vector via an embedding layer. The embedding
https://github.com/google/diferential-privacy/ dimension is decided via a heuristic rule as int[2 0.25],
tree/main/python/dp_accounting, 2020. where  is the number of unique tokens in each
categor[31] Microsoft., A fast algorithm to optimally compose ical feature. The dense features are then concatenated
privacy guarantees of diferentially private (DP) with the log-transformed integer features to form the
mechanisms to arbitrary accuracy., https://github. first layer representation. This representation are fed
com/microsoft/prv_accountant, 2021. into four fully connected layers, each with an output
di[32] V. Doroshenko, B. Ghazi, P. Kamath, R. Kumar, mension of 598 and a ReLU activation function. Finally,
P. Manurangsi, Connect the dots: Tighter dis- a fully connected layer is used to compute the scalar
crete approximations of privacy loss distributions, prediction (the logit). There are around 78M trainable
PoPETS (2022) 552–570. parameters in this neural network model.</p>
        <p>The network is trained with binary cross entropy loss.</p>
        <p>Unless otherwise specified, we train the network for five
epochs, and we scale the base learning rate with a cosine
decay [41]. In the non-private baseline, we use the Yogi
optimizer [17] with a base learning rate of 0.01, and a
batch size of 1024.</p>
        <p>Directly reusing the same hyperparameters for private
training leads to suboptimal results. We discuss how to
achieve better privacy-utility trade-of by adjusting
different hyperparameters in Section 4. Even though the
analysis shows that optimal hyperparameters could be
diferent for diferent range of privacy budget ’s, for
simplicity, we use a fixed value for most of
hyperparameters in the final results of Criteo pCTR in Table 1: SGD
optimizer with base learning rate 0.01, momentum 0.9,
batch size 65,536, and training for 150 epochs. We only
tune the norm bound  ∈ {1.0, 10.0, 50.0, 100.0} and
microbatch size  ∈ {1, 4, 8} for each  separately.</p>
        <p>The model and training setup for the pCVR and pConvs
are similar, except that the pConvs come with integer
labels, thus are trained and evaluated with a Poisson log
loss (PLL). Specifically, let  () be the scalar prediction
from the final layer of the neural network, interpreting
exp( ()) as predicting the mean of a Poisson
distribution, then the log-likelihood of the integer label  is</p>
        <p>() − exp( ()) − log(!).</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-2">
        <title>The maximum (log-)likelihood training objective is thus equivalent to minimizing the following PLL function:</title>
        <p>ℓ( , (, )) = exp( ()) −  ().
(1)</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-3">
        <title>Note the log(!) term is dropped since it is independent</title>
        <p>of the trainable parameters  . Therefore this is an
unnormalized PLL.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
    <ref-list>
      <ref id="ref1">
        <mixed-citation>
          [1]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>C.</given-names>
            <surname>Dwork</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>F.</given-names>
            <surname>McSherry</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>K.</given-names>
            <surname>Nissim</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A. D.</given-names>
            <surname>Smith</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private data analysis</article-title>
          ,
          <source>in: TCC</source>
          ,
          <year>2006</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>265</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>284</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref2">
        <mixed-citation>
          [2]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>C.</given-names>
            <surname>Dwork</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>K.</given-names>
            <surname>Kenthapadi</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>F.</given-names>
            <surname>McSherry</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>I. Mironov</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
            <surname>Naor</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Our data, ourselves: Privacy via distributed noise generation</article-title>
          ,
          <source>in: EUROCRYPT</source>
          ,
          <year>2006</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>486</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>503</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref3">
        <mixed-citation>
          [3]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>N.</given-names>
            <surname>Papernot</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
            <surname>Abadi</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>U.</given-names>
            <surname>Erlingsson</surname>
          </string-name>
          , I. Goodfellow,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>K.</given-names>
            <surname>Talwar</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Semi-supervised knowledge transfer for deep learning from private training data</article-title>
          ,
          <source>arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.05755</source>
          (
          <year>2016</year>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref4">
        <mixed-citation>
          [4]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>N.</given-names>
            <surname>Papernot</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
            <surname>Song</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>I. Mironov</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Raghunathan</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>K.</given-names>
            <surname>Talwar</surname>
          </string-name>
          , Ú. Erlingsson,
          <article-title>Scalable private learning with pate</article-title>
          , arXiv preprint arXiv:
          <year>1802</year>
          .
          <volume>08908</volume>
          (
          <year>2018</year>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref5">
        <mixed-citation>
          [5]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>P.</given-names>
            <surname>Kairouz</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>B.</given-names>
            <surname>McMahan</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
            <surname>Song</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>O.</given-names>
            <surname>Thakkar</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Thakurta</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Z.</given-names>
            <surname>Xu</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Practical and private (deep) learning without sampling or shufling</article-title>
          ,
          <source>in: International Conference on Machine Learning, PMLR</source>
          ,
          <year>2021</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>5213</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>5225</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref6">
        <mixed-citation>
          [6]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>N.</given-names>
            <surname>Ponomareva</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>H.</given-names>
            <surname>Hazimeh</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Kurakin</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Z.</given-names>
            <surname>Xu</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>C.</given-names>
            <surname>Denison</surname>
          </string-name>
          , H. B.
          <string-name>
            <surname>McMahan</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Vassilvitskii</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Chien</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Thakurta</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>How to DP-fy ML: A practical guide to machine learning with diferential privacy</article-title>
          ,
          <source>J. Artif. Intell. Res</source>
          .
          <volume>77</volume>
          (
          <year>2023</year>
          )
          <fpage>1113</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>1201</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref7">
        <mixed-citation>
          [7]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
            <surname>Abadi</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Chu</surname>
          </string-name>
          , I. Goodfellow, H. B.
          <string-name>
            <surname>McMahan</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>I.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Mironov</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>K.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Talwar</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>L. Zhang,</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Deep learning with diferential privacy</article-title>
          ,
          <source>in: CCS</source>
          ,
          <year>2016</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>308</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>318</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref8">
        <mixed-citation>
          [8]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Kurakin</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
            <surname>Chien</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
            <surname>Song</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>R.</given-names>
            <surname>Geambasu</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Terzis</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Thakurta</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Toward training at ImageNet scale with diferential privacy</article-title>
          ,
          <source>arXiv preprint arXiv:2201.12328</source>
          (
          <year>2022</year>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref9">
        <mixed-citation>
          [9]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
            <surname>De</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>L.</given-names>
            <surname>Berrada</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
            <surname>Hayes</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S. L.</given-names>
            <surname>Smith</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>B.</given-names>
            <surname>Balle</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Unlocking high-accuracy diferentially private image classification through scale</article-title>
          ,
          <source>arXiv preprint arXiv:2204.13650</source>
          (
          <year>2022</year>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref10">
        <mixed-citation>
          [10]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>R.</given-names>
            <surname>Anil</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>B.</given-names>
            <surname>Ghazi</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>V.</given-names>
            <surname>Gupta</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>R.</given-names>
            <surname>Kumar</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>P.</given-names>
            <surname>Manurangsi</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Large-scale diferentially private BERT, in: EMNLP (Findings</article-title>
          ),
          <year>2022</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref11">
        <mixed-citation>
          [11]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>N.</given-names>
            <surname>Ponomareva</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
            <surname>Bastings</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
            <surname>Vassilvitskii</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Training text-to-text transformers with privacy guarantees</article-title>
          ,
          <source>in: ACL (Findings)</source>
          ,
          <year>2022</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>2182</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>2193</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref12">
        <mixed-citation>
          [12]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>B.</given-names>
            <surname>Ghazi</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>N.</given-names>
            <surname>Golowich</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>R.</given-names>
            <surname>Kumar</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>P.</given-names>
            <surname>Manurangsi</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>C. Zhang,</surname>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Deep learning with label diferential privacy</article-title>
          , in: NeurIPS,
          <year>2021</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>27131</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>27145</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref13">
        <mixed-citation>
          [13]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
            <surname>Malek Esmaeili</surname>
          </string-name>
          , I. Mironov,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>K.</given-names>
            <surname>Prasad</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>I.</given-names>
            <surname>Shilov</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>F.</given-names>
            <surname>Tramer</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Antipodes of label diferential privacy: PATE and ALIBI</article-title>
          , in: NeurIPS,
          <year>2021</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>6934</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>6945</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref14">
        <mixed-citation>
          [14]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>X.</given-names>
            <surname>Li</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>F.</given-names>
            <surname>Tramer</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>P.</given-names>
            <surname>Liang</surname>
          </string-name>
          , T. Hashimoto,
          <article-title>Large language models can be strong diferentially private learners</article-title>
          ,
          <source>in: ICLR</source>
          ,
          <year>2022</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
    </ref-list>
  </back>
</article>