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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Increasing Cybersecurity Awareness and Collaboration in Organisations and Local / Regional Networks: The CS-AWARE-NEXT Project</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Christian Luidold</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff5">5</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Thomas Schaberreiter</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Christian Wieser</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Adamantios Koumpis</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff4">4</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Cinzia Cappiello</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff3">3</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Tiziano Citro</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Jerry Andriessen</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff6">6</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Juha Röning</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>BISG, University of Oulu</institution>
          ,
          <country country="FI">Finland</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>CS-AWARE Corporation</institution>
          ,
          <country country="EE">Estonia</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff2">
          <label>2</label>
          <institution>Department of Computer Science, Università degli Studi di Salerno</institution>
          ,
          <country country="IT">Italy</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff3">
          <label>3</label>
          <institution>Dipartimento di Elettronica</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Politecnico di Milano</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="IT">Italy</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff4">
          <label>4</label>
          <institution>Institute for Biomedical Informatics, University Hospital Cologne</institution>
          ,
          <country country="DE">Germany</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff5">
          <label>5</label>
          <institution>Multimedia Information Systems, University of Vienna</institution>
          ,
          <country country="AT">Austria</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff6">
          <label>6</label>
          <institution>Wise &amp; Munro Learning Research</institution>
          ,
          <country country="NL">Netherlands</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>The Horizon Europe CS-AWARE-NEXT project aims to improve the cybersecurity management capabilities of organisations and local or regional supply networks. These organisations operate in a highly dynamic cybersecurity environment and are required to comply with European legislation, such as the Network and Information Security (NIS/NIS2) directive. To efectively manage cybersecurity, these organisations need to adopt a more dynamic and collaborative approach, building on a shared situational awareness of potential cybersecurity issues relevant to the organisations. It is well known that flexibility increases when the availability of information increases. The goal of the paper is to discuss the architecture required to gather and share relevant information with the organisations in the network. Smart collaboration about cybersecurity data requires intelligent selection of data, adapted to the goals of the collaborative scenario, as well as object oriented interfacing, facilitating the inclusion and selection of particular data types during online interaction. Collaboration about specific data, used as evidence or as resource for discussion, has to take place online due to the opportunistic nature of data selection. In contrast to traditional technologies, we highlight the need for experimenting with novel approaches to information systems engineering which are capable of addressing emerging needs from the inclusion of dedicated Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning modules, and components for self-healing, self-protecting, and self-configuration. CCS CONCEPTS Social aspects of security and privacy, Usability in security and privacy, Systems theory, Interactive systems and tools, Collaborative and social computing systems and tools</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;Business Continuity</kwd>
        <kwd>Disaster Recovery</kwd>
        <kwd>Critical Infrastructure Protection</kwd>
        <kwd>Cybersecurity Management</kwd>
        <kwd>Corporate Information Infrastructures</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        Cybersecurity awareness helps organisations to protect their information systems from
unauthorized behaviour. Its aim is to provide information on the importance of cybersecurity, assist
in identifying potential threats and recommend appropriate responses. CS-AWARE-NEXT is
a follow-up project to CS-AWARE [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref2">1, 2</xref>
        ], a successful H2020 project that concluded in August
2020. CS-AWARE provides an advanced real-time cybersecurity awareness and management
framework and platform implementation for local public administrations and NIS sector
organisations. Its main features include a socio-technical and organisational focus, intra-organisational
collaboration and skill building, multi-lingual semantics support, AI-based real-time awareness
and visualization utilizing threat intelligence, system self-healing and cybersecurity information
sharing. A demo of the CS-AWARE platform is available on the CS-AWARE Corporation’s [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ]
web page.
      </p>
      <p>
        CS-AWARE was designed around the multi-level collaborative European cybersecurity
framework as defined by the European cybersecurity strategy of 2013 [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ] and subsequent legislation,
e.g., NIS directive. A major outcome of the CS-AWARE project was the establishment of the
CS-AWARE Corporation for facilitating the exploitation of the CS-AWARE project results and
to bring the CS-AWARE platform to the market.
      </p>
      <p>
        The European cybersecurity strategy of 2020 [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ] and the updated NIS2 [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ] proposal directive
emphasise the need for stronger collaboration on all levels of the multi-level collaborative
cybersecurity environment. Furthermore, the proposal directive on the resilience of critical
entities [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ] has been designed to replace current legislation for critical infrastructure protection
and builds on the success of the NIS directive by aligning the framework for managing physical
and cyber-physical risks with the collaborative framework defined by the NIS directive for
managing cyber risks.
      </p>
      <p>One may consider CS-AWARE as the first socio-technical cybersecurity platform that
reinforces organisational defences against malicious attacks by ‘mapping’ the grey areas in the
interaction between systems and humans. It aims to make companies and organisations aware
of the unique complex socio-technical relationshipsthat exist, while providing the technical
means to monitor and manage them. As the majority of security technology is almost
exclusively focused on security on the technical level, CS-AWARE considers the systemic aspect of
cybersecurity in an organisation, e.g., network weakness, where clusters of machines interact
without a clear understanding of their connections. It also takes into account the human
element, e.g., where human ‘workarounds’ have been implemented to address system deficiencies.
CS-AWARE is designed to detect and manage these blind spots in a unique and innovative way.
S3C’23: Sustainable, Secure, and Smart Collaboration Workshop, Hosted by CHITALY 2023, SEPTEMBER 20–22, 2023,
TURIN, ITALY
∗Corresponding author.
†These authors contributed equally.
nEvelop-O</p>
      <p>christian.luidold@univie.ac.at (C. Luidold); thomas.schaberreiter@cs-aware.com (T. Schaberreiter);
(J. Röning)</p>
      <p>© 2023 Copyright for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
Workshop
Proceedings
htp:/ceur-ws.org CEUR Workshop Proceedings (CEUR-WS.org)</p>
      <p>ISN1613-073</p>
      <p>Cybersecurity is socio-technical in nature and heavily depends on the human factor in an
organisation, and the interactions between humans and systems. All the security in the world
cannot prevent malicious behaviours that exploit human ignorance and vulnerability. Thus,
cybersecurity is an organisational issue that goes beyond the IT department and needs to be
treated accordingly by cybersecurity solutions. What sets CS-AWARE apart is its organisation
centric approach, as opposed to other event centric approaches. CS-AWARE allows
organisations to define what is normal or abnormal based on their specific business, social and technical
context. AI/machine learning is used to identify abnormal behaviour based on those patterns,
contextualized with information about the threat/attack causing this behaviour, and provide
tailored mitigations to counter the attacks – in line with, and supported by, European collaborative
cybersecurity legislation (e.g., NIS/NIS2). The socio-technical consideration of cybersecurity,
holism and systemic thinking, sustainable skill transfer to organisations/collaboration, and
focus on supporting legal cybersecurity compliance eforts (e.g., NIS, GDPR) constitute the
unique and distinguishing characteristics of CS-AWARE in the cybersecurity ecosystem.</p>
      <p>The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a reference scenario to cater for the
management of local and regional incidents and risks. As story-telling was one of the main
methodologies for working with our end users (the other being the soft systems methodology),
our aim for the scenarios was to collect as much actionable information as possible. Section 3
presents the methodological framework that is later (in Section 5) ‘translated’ into a system.
This comprises three diferent levels which are presented separately in respective subsections,
followed by a discussion of the organisational policies for sharing data among diferent
stakeholders. Section 4 presents what we call the AI pipeline of the system that aims to support
operations within the multi-level European cybersecurity framework, by means of filtering
relevant data, and identifying and correcting errors and inconsistencies. To our knowledge,
this is a distinct and innovative element of our approach, as there are no other systems that
ofer such functionality in the addressed field. Section 5 presents the architecture of the system
with elaborate information on the platform user interfaces and the interaction elements of the
system. For this reason, we have included suficient number of visuals (screenshots and flow
diagrams), to enable a better understanding of the platform. The last two Sections 6 and 7
present related work in the field, and also some aspects that we consider important for future
research activities.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. CS-AWARE-NEXT Motivating Scenario</title>
      <p>To illustrate more concretely what CS-AWARE aims to accomplish, we present the context of a
prototypical case that can take place in every organisational context, both public and private. It
concerns the review (by several stakeholders), of a cybersecurity incident that took place at
one company. In this particular case no other companies were attacked, but the local server,
maintained through a third-party company, was afected causing the loss of 2 months of data.
As a result, the configuration was changed, a newer version of Windows was installed, and also
a hardware firewall.</p>
      <p>Usually, only a few people from the IT department are involved in handling an incident;
perhaps some managers, and some users had experienced problems with access to and retrieval
of Information. Usually, after an incident has been resolved, it is not reviewed, and business
continues as if nothing happened. However, in our scenario, this review is extensive and
involves many stakeholders. In particular, stakeholders from other organisations in the region
are included in the review as well, because they are part of the same supply chain. This requires
collaboration, and when executed well, all involved will have increased awareness of this type of
incident, and of the internal machinery of incident handling, and risk management. Moreover,
the company would have increased resilience against attackers, and improved business recovery.</p>
      <p>This could be achieved through a review of supply chain interdependencies, finding
weaknesses and problems that came to surface during the attack. Among many things, this requires
awareness of the dependencies within and between local and regional organisations, joint
security policies, or awareness of the diferences, awareness of supplier cybersecurity awareness
and standards. Clearly, much can only be resolved through collaboration and the sharing of
many policies and data. Some information comes from the Internet, some from social media,
some from places where information about cybersecurity issues is shared. Other knowledge is
from a specific organisation, including incident history. There is a third level that is relevant as
well, which we call the ecosystem level, where knowledge is shared that is relevant for local
and regional organisations. In this contribution, we discuss this sharing of information, and the
supporting architecture.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Information Sharing for Cybersecurity Awareness</title>
      <p>In the continuously evolving landscape of cybersecurity, it is crucial for organisations to stay
ahead of potential threats. An established approach to achieve this is through collecting,
processing, analysing, and correlating data from various sources to facilitate the understanding
of motives, targets, and behaviours of potential threat actors. This allows organisations to
make informed decisions regarding proactive measures to increase their resilience against
cyber-attacks and mitigation actions to decrease their impact.</p>
      <p>One of the issues addressed in Section 2 is the gap in awareness, the ability to collaborate
efectively, and ultimately the availability of data and information when dealing with
cybersecurity incidents that are not contained within one organisation, but span across an organisations
supply ecosystem. We have identified the need to improve cybersecurity awareness and
collaboration in this context, especially when dealing with local/regional networks, as much of the
supply chain dependencies of an organisation still have a local/regional context. Henceforth,
we use data-driven collaboration as a collaborative approach where users are provided with a
continuous view of data to enhance the availability and referentiality of information, enabling
them to efortlessly keep up with messages and reply in context, even on complex topics that
involve significant amounts of data. To that end, we have identified the need for a data-driven
collaboration platform that connects individual organisations and that utilises all the available
data and intelligence to foster and facilitate collaboration on cybersecurity.</p>
      <p>In this chapter, we propose a three-level framework for classifying and analysing
cyberrelated data: internal data, ecosystem data, and global data. We also discuss the organisational
policies for sharing data among diferent stakeholders.</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>3.1. Data to Improve Cybersecurity Awareness and Collaboration</title>
        <p>Cybersecurity awareness and collaboration are critical to helping organisations protect their
assets from those seeking to compromise them. Yet, many organisations struggle to develop
and maintain a strong culture of cybersecurity among their employees, partners, and customers.
One way to overcome these challenges is to provide relevant and timely information about
the cyber threat landscape, best practices for cybersecurity awareness, and the benefits of
collaboration among stakeholders, using data collected from a variety of sources, according to
the data-driven approach of CS-AWARE.</p>
        <p>We rely on a diverse set of cybersecurity related data to contextualize cyber incidents, with
knowledge and intelligence created by others in order to facilitate the prevention and mitigation
of cyber incidents, as well as helping people in an organisation to manage cybersecurity in the
most holistic, eficient and efective way possible. Table 1 summarises the knowledge sources
that are available to facilitate data-driven collaboration in CS-AWARE-NEXT.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>3.2. Data at Diferent Levels</title>
        <p>We categorize the knowledge sources set out in Table 1 with respect to our proposed three-level
framework regarding its availability for stakeholders: Internal data, ecosystem data, and global
data. A schematic illustration is provided in Figure 1. The goal of this framework is to facilitate
the correlation and enrichment of data to support cybersecurity awareness, the understanding
of incidents anomalies in an organisational network and in its supply chain, while enabling
user-defined privacy settings to prevent unintended disclosure of internal data.
• Internal data: This refers to the data generated and collected within an organisation’s
own network. Defined as Organisational Cybersecurity Knowledge and
Organisational Incident History, it includes user activity logs, firewall logs, antivirus alerts,
system configurations, vulnerability scans, network topology maps, asset inventories,
and incident reports, but also best practices, cybersecurity strategies, and lessons learned.
Internal data can help organisations monitor their own security posture, identify threats
and anomalies, perform analysis and forensics, and execute mitigation actions. However,
to provide a comprehensive view of the threat landscape or the threat actor’s objective,
internal data may not be suficient.
• Ecosystem data: This refers to the data shared among organisations having common
interests and goals, e.g., by being part of the same sector, supply chain, or interest group.
It consists of anonymized internal data, which is further enhanced by the Ecosystem
Knowledge provided by members of the ecosystem. Ecosystem data can help an
organisation gain insight from the experiences and resources of other organisations, improve
the ability to detect and prevent threats, and enhance collaboration and coordination.
• Global data: This refers to the data available from public or oficial sources that provide
varying degrees of breadth and detail about cyber threats and current trends. Defined as
Social Media and Threat Intelligence, it includes news articles, blog posts, social media
posts, announcements from government agencies and public administrations, as well as
OSINT feeds from organisations and communities. Global data can help an organisation
Social Media Discussions about security relevant aspects by relevant people in the
security community or from relevant discussion groups/channels. Social
media often provides the first discussions about novel attacks that slowly
spread among organisations. Social media discussions can help pinpoint
and identify abnormal behaviour observed, without necessarily being
able to derive mitigation measures from such conversations.</p>
        <p>Threat Intelligence Threat intelligence represents structured or semi-structured information
about threats and attacks, often including detailed information about
how to detect such threats or attacks (indicators of compromise) and
mitigation actions (courses of action). Threat intelligence is often provided
by authorities like CERTs/CSIRTS, by commercial threat intelligence
providers, or by open communities.</p>
        <p>Organisational Cybersecurity This is a novel type of knowledge not available in this form outside of
CSKnowledge AWARE. This knowledge is created for each organisation using CS-AWARE
based on socio-technical analysis, and it contains knowledge items for
each asset that range from general (e.g., human-readable description) to
very specific (e.g., asset inventory).</p>
        <p>Organisational Incident His- In addition to detailed knowledge about an organisation, an incident
tory history for each past incident is available, containing knowledge items
like the incident timeline and, ultimately, the mitigation mechanisms
applied to resolve the incident.</p>
        <p>Ecosystem Knowledge The ecosystem knowledge that can be created through CS-AWARE-NEXT
is not yet fully defined since the project is still in its early stages at the
time of writing. However, CS-AWARE-NEXT will facilitate the creation
of knowledge items relating to ecosystem collaboration that are not
available through other sources. It will include:
• An ecosystem map similar to the system dependency graph in
organisations. It will be able visually to represent a local/regional
ecosystem and its relevant dependencies. The ecosystem elements
will be formed around organisations and services supplied or
consumed by organisations.
• A history of collaboration within the ecosystem, both for
cybersecurity issues that span across multiple organisations in the local
supply ecosystem, and for cybersecurity incidents for which an
individual organisation seeks knowledge and collaboration within
the ecosystem in order to resolve the incident.
• A general history of experiences and stories that collaborators on
the ecosystem might want to share to help other organisations in
similar situations.
stay informed about latest cyber incidents and developments, understand the motivations
and objectives of threat actors, and identify emerging threats and vulnerabilities.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-3">
        <title>3.3. Organisational Policies for Sharing Data</title>
        <p>Having defined the knowledge sources and the diferent levels of data to be shared, one problem
remains: The sharing policies of individual organisations. Organisations are reluctant to share
internal data with others for various, albeit legitimate, reasons. The disclosure that they have
been the victim of a cyber-attack could be damaging to their reputation, and the sharing of
internal network topology data could raise new security concerns due to lack of trust. In
addition, organisations may be reluctant to participate in information sharing activities due to
legal challenges or confidentiality concerns.</p>
        <p>Organisations can implement organisational data sharing policies that outline the rules
and principles of what data can be shared with other organisations to address these concerns
and facilitate data sharing for cybersecurity awareness and collaboration. A key aspect is
pseudonymization, anonymization, and selective selection of data fields to share. Compliance
with applicable laws and regulations is also important.</p>
        <p>By incorporating shared internal data from others, as well as data from the global level, and
using it to correlate and enrich their own data, organisations can increase their understanding
of cyber incidents and anomalies in their network. This can improve their awareness of
cybersecurity and their ability to collaborate with other organisations in their industry or
supply chain, as well as with government authorities.</p>
        <p>To facilitate information sharing, HCI issues should be considered in designing user-friendly
interfaces for organisations to share their data according to their needs, to access data from
diferent ecosystems and at the global level, and to communicate and collaborate with other
organisations and authorities.</p>
        <p>Organisations can improve cybersecurity awareness and collaboration while protecting
sensitive information by addressing these concerns, developing efective organisational policies,
and incorporating HCI principles for user-friendly data sharing and communication.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. AI-based Data Analysis Pipeline</title>
      <p>As described in the previous sections, cybersecurity awareness is enabled by information
sharing. As described in Section 3.2 data are shared at diferent levels; organisations can
exchange information with each other, or the CS-AWARE platform can broadcast information
gathered from external sources, such as social media or threat intelligence feeds. However, to
be efective, the information that is shared must be reliable.</p>
      <p>To this aim, the goal is to develop an efective and eficient AI pipeline that can operate within
the multi-level European cybersecurity framework to ensure the quality of data used by the AI
at the time it is collected. This will be done by using an appropriate data preparation pipeline
that, by means of normalization and cleaning components, can filter relevant data and identify
and correct errors and inconsistencies. In this way, it is possible to build a high-quality input
dataset that is analysed with AI/ML-based models. Such analyses go from simple tasks such
as finding outliers, to more complex activities such as correlation or prediction of anomalous
events detected within organisations. In particular, the analysis pipeline is composed of the
following steps:
1. Data collection and cataloguing: The design of a proper data lake architecture is a
prerequisite for the ingestion of internal and external sources that will be described in the data
catalogue, and the efective use of modern AI models applicable to the CS-AWARE-NEXT
context.
2. Data preparation and quality assurance: We define it as the set of pre-processing operations
performed in early stages of a data analysis pipeline. Data preparation includes many
diferent cleaning and normalization components, and users often experience dificulties
in selecting the pre-processing methods that can optimize the final results. For this reason,
data preparation is often performed by using the most commonly used data standardization
and cleaning techniques to guarantee a certain data quality level. Building on previous
experience with application-aware data quality (DQ) assessment, the definition of the
data preparation pipeline will be driven by the socio-technical analysis provided in other
parts of this project to support the proposed pre-processing and DQ activities.
3. AI data correlation models: Building on the data quality assurance and cataloguing
activities, the AI models for data correlation and contextualisation can rely on efective and
eficient access to the data via a data-lake interface with the use of AI technologies such
as deep learning and reinforcement learning for anomaly and threat detection,
contextualization with threat intelligence, and to support the design of mitigation and self-healing
strategies (including disaster recovery and business continuity) tailored to individual
organisational set-ups.</p>
      <p>A reference implementation of AI based data quality assessment and correlation framework,
as well as its operational integration, will be provided in the context of the CS-AWARE platform.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. CS-AWARE-NEXT Architecture</title>
      <p>The CS-AWARE approach relies on two main user interfaces for awareness and collaboration to
allow the users to interact with the data collected and analysed by the CS-AWARE AI, and to
perform the processes designed by CS-AWARE to allow for efective and eficient handling of
cybersecurity incidents within organisations and in the context of local/regional ecosystems.
Both interfaces follow a human centric approach, facilitating knowledge creation and knowledge
management by key stakeholders, and supporting them in their activities through automation
in a natural and intuitive way.</p>
      <p>CS-AWARE platform UI: Is designed to create cybersecurity awareness based on a
sociotechnical and data driven approach within individual organisations, and provides cybersecurity
incident management procedures that assist the relevant stakeholders in an organisation to
resolve or mitigate incidents eficiently and efectively.</p>
      <p>CS-CONNECT: Is designed to allow data-driven collaboration and knowledge creation/
knowledge management by facilitating topical discussions to resolve cybersecurity problems
within individual organisations, or more complex incidents spanning multiple organisations of
an ecosystem.</p>
      <p>In the following, we are introducing the core concepts that define the user interaction in
CS-AWARE and CS-CONNECT.</p>
      <sec id="sec-5-1">
        <title>5.1. CS-AWARE Platform UI</title>
        <p>
          The CS-AWARE platform UI is designed around the knowledge created through socio-technical
analysis of an organisation. CS-AWARE focuses on a novel approach to socio-technical
cybersecurity management in organisations, following a data-driven approach to create awareness
by, in a first step, working with the only people able to understand how an organisation really
works; the people working in an organisation and with organisational IT services, systems
and networks on a daily basis. CS-AWARE has developed a novel socio-technical system and
dependency analysis methodology based on the tried and proven soft systems methodology,
(SSM) [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ] in order to generate an organisational knowledge repository relating to cybersecurity
relevant assets. In the CS-AWARE approach, as depicted in Figure 2, the results of this analysis
are prepared in a machine-readable form through the CS-AWARE platform, in order to collect all
this multi-stakeholder knowledge in one single place, and to be able to act on this information
in an automated way in order to create awareness and deal with incidents.
        </p>
        <p>The CS-AWARE platform provides automation to monitor identified assets, and detect and
contextualise incidents using the data sources and AI capabilities described in previous sections.
In this Section we focus on how the platform UI supports users once an anomaly or incident has
been brought to the attention of the user. While the platform UI has several usage scenarios,
we will focus on the simplest one as illustrated in Figure 3, a user is made aware of an incident,
understands how to resolve the issue, implements a resolution, and adds to the organisational
knowledge by commenting on the resolution. Figure 3 illustrates 8 steps that can be taken by
the CS-AWARE platform user to resolve an issue (Steps 1-1 to 1-8).</p>
        <p>In Step 1-1, the user is made aware of threats detected by the CS-AWARE platform (Figure
4). The CS-AWARE threat overview contains a visual representation of the existing events
according to their threat classification and severity in the dart board on the left side. On the
right side a list of existing events is listed, giving information about the severity state, date,
person assigned to the event, threat classification, location of the event within the system and
threat name.</p>
        <p>In step 1-2, the user can review the threat details and context (Figure 5). Each threat event
has a detailed view that is accessible by clicking on the event in the CS-AWARE threat overview.
The information given in this view includes the type of threat, the general threat group, the
location within the system and a detailed description that can contain context as well as potential
mitigation options to address the threat.</p>
        <p>In Step 1-3, the user can review detailed information about the observed threat (Figure
6). Each threat event has a detailed accounting of the parameters that were used to detect
and compile the event in the “Observed Data” tab. The concrete content of this tab is highly
dependent on the defined monitoring pattern and the information sources that are utilized by
those patterns.</p>
        <p>In Step 1-4, the user can review the system overview (Figure 7), the representation of
organisational assets and dependencies created together with organisational stakeholders during
socio-technical analysis. The system overview depicts the asset and dependency graph of the
systems that are monitored. Threat events are visualized in this view at the location they were
detected in, the severity is indicated by the diferent coloured borders of each node. The right
side contains a description and other context information about each asset, as well as the list of
threats that are associated to the asset.</p>
        <p>At this point, the user has reviewed all the awareness and context information provided by
the CS-AWARE platform to help the user implement measures to mitigate the incident. If the
user is not yet confident in their ability to resolve the issue using the information available
to them, they can seek additional help and expertise outside the CS-AWARE platform, e.g.,
through the collaborative cybersecurity features provided by CS-CONNECT, as described in
Section 5.2. After an incident has been handled or mitigated satisfactorily, CS-AWARE ofers
reporting functionality to add to the organisational knowledge in order to be able to handle
similar incidents more eficiently in future.</p>
        <p>In step 1-5, the user can comment on the state of the threat (Figure 8). For later
reference, a comment about the course-of-action taken to resolve an issue outside the CS-AWARE
environment can be given.</p>
        <p>To conclude threat handling in step 1-6, a user can mark a threat “resolved” if the appropriate
course of action could be taken, or “ignored” if the threat has been considered not relevant to
the specific context (Figure 9).</p>
        <p>As optional steps 1-7 and 1-8, users can review closed threats and their incident handling
details, as depicted in Figure 10 and Figure 11 respectively. An organisation’s incident history
is an important element of the organisational cybersecurity knowledge repository in order
to be able to handle similar incidents more efectively in future, and it is also an important
cybersecurity management indicator, allowing to reason about an organisation’s cybersecurity
management performance.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-2">
        <title>5.2. CS-CONNECT</title>
        <p>Collaboration is an important element in resolving cybersecurity issues. CS-CONNECT is
designed to bring together stakeholders from ecosystems that belong together, e.g., by sharing
the same goals, culture, or contextual knowledge to be able to help resolve cybersecurity issues
eficiently and efectively within the community. To this end, CS-CONNECT follows a
datadriven approach to collaboration, providing the ability to group context information about an
incident (and relevant stakeholders from the community) together to discuss about incidents
and find solutions that work in each specific context.</p>
        <p>Following the same usage scenario as in the previous section, will show how CS-CONNECT
can assist a CS-AWARE platform user to discuss an incident that was detected by the CS-AWARE
platform, because the user was not able to resolve the incident on their own by just relying on
the context information provided by the CS-AWARE platform. In this scenario, the user is able
to provide all the relevant contextual information in CS-CONNECT and ask community users
for assistance to resolve the issue. Please keep in mind that CS-CONNECT is currently still in
active development, and this section describes an early maturity state of the tool.</p>
        <p>The CS-CONNECT functionality is built on top of the Mattermost collaboration platform
1 and inherits all its collaboration and team management features. The CS-CONNECT
functionalities to enable data-driven collaboration are implemented as plug-ins to Mattermost. In
CS-CONNECT we have multiple organisations that are part of the ecosystem. To access them,
the platform provides users with a dashboard where all the data of all organisations can be
accessed (Figure 12).</p>
        <p>By clicking on any of organisation, users can access the incident overview for an organisation
(Figure 13) displaying data similarly to CS-AWARE threat overview in Figure 4.</p>
        <p>The detailed view of each incident (Figure 14 and Figure 15) can be accessed by clicking on
the corresponding row in the CS-CONNECT incident overview. This view provides information
such as the incident description, a network representation of the organisation’s system where
1https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost
the incident occurred, and the incident history. In CS-CONNECT, each incident is associated
with a network because the platform manages multiple organisations, unlike CS-AWARE which
only manages a single organisation.</p>
        <p>At the end of the detailed view, users have the option to either create a new channel to
collaborate on the incident, (Figure 16) or access the existing channel dedicated to the incident
(Figure 17). Clicking on either the create channel or existing channel option will redirect the
user to the corresponding channel, where they can initiate collaboration with other users. This
functionality enables seamless communication and collaboration around the incident among
users within the platform.</p>
        <p>When users access the channel, they will be presented with the Mattermost channel view,
enhanced by the CS-CONNECT right-handed sidebar (Figure 18 and Figure 19). This sidebar
includes all the information available in the incident detailed view, allowing users to easily
access it during their discussions. The sidebar can be expanded by clicking on the expand icon
(the first icon from the left in the top-right corner) or closed by clicking on the close icon (the
second icon from the left in the top-right corner). If the sidebar is closed, it can be reopened by
clicking on the CS-CONNECT icon, which is the first icon in the channel header.</p>
        <p>Moreover, from this view, users can also return to the CS-CONNECT dashboard (Figure 20).
They can do so by clicking on the icon in the top-left corner of the Mattermost channel view
and selecting “CS-AWARE-CONNECT” to access the dashboard. This allows users to seamlessly
navigate between the channel view and the CS-CONNECT dashboard for a comprehensive
collaboration experience.</p>
        <p>In the channel, users can actively engage in discussions regarding the incident (Figure 21). To
illustrate the platform’s collaborative capabilities, we will now present an example discussion
between two users, Alice and Bob, regarding the DoS attack 2 incident in the
DEMO-CS-AWAREEU organisation. The purpose of this discussion is to showcase how the platform facilitates
collaboration among users in addressing the incident.</p>
        <p>The discussion begins with Alice initiating the conversation by requesting other users (in this
case, only Bob) to discuss the DoS attack 2 incident in the DEMO-CS-AWARE-EU organisation.
Notably, in Alice’s initial message, there are two hyperlinks: “Demo CS-AWARE EU” and “Demo
CS-AWARE EU.Incidents.DoS attack 2.” A hyperlink is a unique reference to an information
in the platform. These hyperlinks are generated by Alice using the platform’s hyperlinking
mechanism, which allows users to easily locate and share data within the platform through
a few clicks or by typing hyperlinks in the chat. The first hyperlink directs the user to the
incident overview for the organisation, while the second hyperlink redirects the user to the
incident’s detailed view.</p>
        <p>In response to Alice’s message, Bob asks about the date when the incident was initially
reported.</p>
        <p>In response to Bob’s question, Alice wants to provide the information that the incident was
reported on 23/02/2023 at 13:45, as indicated in the history table. Alice aims to make this
information easily accessible to Bob. To accomplish this, Alice utilizes a hyperlink to the specific
row corresponding to the reporting date of the incident.</p>
        <p>By hovering over the row in the history table, a dedicated icon (Figure 22) appears, allowing
Alice to generate a hyperlink directly to that row. Once the hyperlink is generated, it is
automatically copied to Alice’s clipboard, enabling them to easily paste it into their message
and share it in the chat (Figure 23). This ensures that Bob can quickly access the relevant
information with a simple click on the hyperlink provided by Alice.</p>
        <p>Once the message containing the hyperlink is sent in the chat, the platform renders the
hyperlink in a human-readable format to ensure that the message remains easily readable for
users. When a user, such as Alice, clicks on the hyperlink (Figure 24), the platform highlights
the hyperlinked data, bringing it to the user’s attention. This allows the user to quickly access
the discussed data and easily comprehend the context of the conversation. By providing this
functionality, the platform facilitates eficient information retrieval and enables users to respond
within the relevant context of the discussion.</p>
        <p>After receiving Alice’s message, Bob examines the incident and starts to suspect that the
ifrewall component in the organisation’s system is involved. Bob wants to share this opinion
with Alice and decides to generate a hyperlink to the component in the incident’s system for
easy reference. Bob has two options for generating the hyperlink: clicking on the component
in the system data view or typing the reference in the chat.</p>
        <p>Bob chooses to type the reference in the chat. To generate a hyperlink through typing, Bob
uses the “&amp;” character, which indicates that a hyperlink should be generated using the reference
provided within the parentheses. In this case, Bob wants to reference the firewall component in
the incident’s system, so the reference is constructed as follows: the incident’s name followed
by a dot, then the desired incident’s data (system), followed by a dot, and finally the desired
information in the data (firewall). The resulting reference is &amp;(DoS attack 2.System.Firewall).
When the message is sent, this reference is converted into a hyperlink (Figure 27).</p>
        <p>While typing the reference, the platform assists Bob by providing suggestions based on the
context (Figure 25) and the content already typed (Figure 26). In Figure 25, Bob is provided with
suggestions related to the discussed incident (DoS attack 2) and the organisations managed by
CS-CONNECT. These suggestions serve as starting points for constructing the hyperlink, and
for each piece of information, the platform provides further suggestions based on the available
data. This functionality applies to any information within the platform, including organisations,
incidents, and their respective data.</p>
        <p>When Alice receives Bob’s message, they click on the hyperlink (Figure 28), and in the same
way it happened for the history, the firewall component is highlighted in the system and brought
to Alice’s attention.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>6. Related Work</title>
      <p>As mentioned in [8], “Information sharing between national stakeholders but even in cross
country cases is one important aspect for cyber security. Knowledge on tackling cyber-attacks,
incident response, mitigation measures, and preparatory controls can be shared between the
relevant stakeholders”. The automation of the cybersecurity information exchange process in
the context of incident and risk management for organisations is still in its infancy, and an
integration with modern and dynamic incident and risk management platforms like CS-AWARE
has great potential for increasing the eficiency of information sharing through automation.
In fact, collaboration and information sharing is already operational to some extent on the
European and national levels (e.g., between competent authorities, CSIRTs). Still, when it comes
to utilization of threat intelligence by individual organisations and local/regional networks in
their day-to-day cybersecurity incident and risk management, there is currently little awareness
and supporting procedures/tools available to streamline the process. The information sharing
framework builds on the results of the CS-AWARE project 2, which integrates threat intelligence
in a central way for dynamic cybersecurity management in organisations, and ofers the technical
means to share cybersecurity information/evidence with relevant authorities in the
multilevel cybersecurity environment. Other European projects investigated the issues related to
information sharing and collaboration. For instance, H2020 ROUTE-TO-PA 3 aims to improve
collaboration and transparency in the public sector. The SPOD platform was developed in this
project as a collaborative and social place for discussion and problem resolution. Collaboration
has been thoroughly discussed also in [9], which provides an elaborated analysis of what
it means to collaborate, particularly in educational contexts. The cybersecurity context has
been considered in [10]: the authors review the cybersecurity information-sharing literature,
categorizing the identified papers based on their main focus and methodological approaches
implemented to the cybersecurity information-sharing problem. [11] instead highlighted the
importance of organisations relying on cyberspace as a mission-critical asset requiring advanced
situational awareness to maintain a tactical advantage over emerging threats. In the paper,
a new cyber–situational awareness framework relies on the OODA (observe, orient, decide,
act) cycle to provide near real-time cognitive mapping for corporate environments. Several
contributions can then be considered for data analysis. In the context of European projects, it is
relevant to cite the CRIMSON project 4 that proposed an innovative AI framework to handle
real-time image collection and analysis. Despite the context of the application being profoundly
diferent, the variety and sensitive nature of the data remains. CS- AWARE-NEXT will use
similar algorithms (Deep and transfer learning) and methods for data collection and processing.
In the paper [12], the authors present a comprehensive view on “AI-driven Cybersecurity” that
can play an important role for intelligent cybersecurity services and management. This paper
highlighted that several works focused on deep learning have recently been studied in the field.
For example, methods of detection of network attacks based on deep learning techniques are
studied in [13][14][15]. The social media analysis will take instead inspiration from the results
of the SSIX 5 project that provided a tool for analysing and understanding social media users’
interest and sentiment for any given topic. To this end an advanced Big Data pipeline has been
deployed to analyse millions of social media conversations using machine learning and NLP.
CS-AWARE-NEXT will build on this experience by adopting social media listening and analysis
components, including NLP techniques for multi-language text interpretation.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>7. Conclusions and Future Work</title>
      <p>Smart collaboration about cybersecurity data in our proposal requires intelligent selection of
data, adapted to the goals of the collaborative scenario, as well as object oriented interfacing,
allowing users an easy way to include and select particular data types during their online
interaction. Collaboration about particular data, used as evidence or as resource for discussion,
necessarily has to take place online, because of the opportunistic nature of data selection in
such interaction.</p>
      <p>One of the recommendations of a study conducted for the European Commission regarding
‘Simulation, visualisation and visual computing technologies: EU position and future potential’
3https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/645860
4https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101016923
5https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/645425
concerned the development of what was named as ‘next generation digital companions capable
to provide assistance to users and to communicate with them in a natural way within mixed
reality scenarios’ [16]. What mainly we see as a part that we should concentrate our future
research and development activities for the improvement of our platform are mainly related to
the improvement of the user experience and bringing closer if not together HCI and AI aspects.</p>
      <p>For example, moving from the concept of CS-AWARE as-a-platform to its constituent enabling
technologies, one may see the need to promote the design of what one might call as a ‘next
generation of personal assistants’. In fact, and although personal assistants, virtual
companions or avatars are certainly not a novelty within the human-computer interaction landscape,
however, technologies developed so far were afected by severe usability restrictions, and at
a great part because of limited language and / or poor semantic understanding capabilities.
Nonetheless, over the last few years, language technologies have progressed to such an extent
that the idea of being able to develop virtual companions capable to provide assistance to users
and to communicate with them in a natural way, is now within reach not only by the research
community but also by a large amount of general users in a variety of organisations. An example
of advancement of language technologies is the very recent developments with the proliferation
of ChatGPT and the deployment of large language models [17], something not possible only
few years ago.</p>
      <p>From the current research work perspective, the above has not been given priority in our
agenda so far, as we aimed to build a fully operational system that could be adopted by public
administrations which has been the initial target audience, and in particular local authorities,
while later on we extended this to address also end-users from critical NIS sector such as health
and water management, as well as SMEs. What we see as an important issue here is not only
how realistic but also how trustworthy will be the behaviours of such companions or assistants
within cybersecurity or other forms of emergency management scenarios.</p>
      <p>Another important aspect for consideration in our future research agenda relates to the use and
deployment of advanced data analytics platforms and infrastructures applying, amongst others,
distributed learning and artificial intelligence approaches to query and aggregate eficiently,
efectively, and securely data from multiple sources for multiple use cases. In our current
planning, we have foreseen a core set of use cases related to organisational cybersecurity
awareness, cybersecurity collaboration through information sharing and, what we preferred to
call, system self-healing [18].</p>
      <p>For each of these three core Use Cases we have identified aspects where our technology and
business readiness levels need to improve, like for instance the visualisation components, so that
these shall allow to visualize incidents in the particular organisational system and dependency
set-up and provide mitigation options and cybersecurity management features to address each
particular incident.</p>
      <p>However, again, what we may have failed to identify and may now need to pursue as a priority,
is the need to capitalise on new approaches towards better sharing and integration and use of
cybersecurity-related real-world and research data to improved decisions. To this, there are two
ways of sharing data: According to the first, data are ‘handed out’ in terms of pseudonymised
or even if necessary, fully anonymised data from multiple sites (in our case this may be the
customers’ base of CS-AWARE) in order to allow for central analysis procedures to take place on
the integrated dataset. This is also called ‘bring-the-data-to-the-analysis’ and was historically
the way an analysis taking data from multiple locations into account has been performed. As
sharing of retrospective data from organisations without informed consent is not allowed to
take place, this ‘traditional’ data pulling method will not be utilised for analysing retrospective
incident data. This is why infrastructures supporting a distributed analysis have been developed
in recent years. Their goal is to keep the data within institutional borders, analyse these data
partitions separately, and finally combine the individual results by either sequentially updating
the final model with results from single institutions, or eventually merging the intermediate
results. Such infrastructures follow the principle ‘bring-the-analysis-to-the-data’ leading to
federated learning. This approach comes with privacy-by-design, since no individual data are
shipped outside the particular organisations that own the data.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and
innovation programme under grant agreement No 101069543.
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