<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Archiving and Interchange DTD v1.0 20120330//EN" "JATS-archivearticle1.dtd">
<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>On the (Im)Possibility of Estimating Various Notions of Diferential Privacy (short paper)</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Daniele Gorla</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Louis Jalouzot</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Federica Granese</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Catuscia Palamidessi</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Pablo Piantanida</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff3">3</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Dept. of Computer Science, Sapienza University of Rome</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>IT</addr-line>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>ENS de Lyon</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>F</addr-line>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff2">
          <label>2</label>
          <institution>INRIA Saclay and LIX</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>F</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="US">USA</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff3">
          <label>3</label>
          <institution>L2S, CentraleSupélec and CNRS, Université Paris Saclay</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>F</addr-line>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>We analyze to what extent final users can infer information about the level of protection of their data when the data obfuscation mechanism is a priori unknown to them (the so-called “black-box" scenario). In particular, we delve into the investigation of two notions of local diferential privacy (LDP), namely -LDP and Rényi LDP. On one hand, we prove that, without any assumption on the underlying distributions, it is not possible to have an algorithm able to infer the level of data protection with provable guarantees. On the other hand, we demonstrate that, under reasonable assumptions (namely, Lipschitzness of the involved densities on a closed interval), such guarantees exist and can be achieved by a simple histogram-based estimator.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>
        A second variant is the so-called Rényi diferential privacy (RDP) [8], a relaxation of DP based
on the notion of Rényi divergence. More formally, a randomized mechanism  is  -LRDP of
order  &gt; 1 if, for every 1, 2, we have that
 ((1)‖(2)) ≤ 
(
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        )
where  ( · ‖ · ) denotes Rényi divergence [9]. Also here the value of  controls the level of
privacy, in the sense that a smaller  corresponds to a higher privacy.
      </p>
      <p>
        However, both notions of DP are built into existing software products by the producing
companies, and the final users have no way of testing the real level of security (i.e., the real
value of  ). They can only trust the producers, sometimes leading to unexpected (and unwanted)
behaviors. For this reason, we would like to study to what extent final users can infer information
about the level of protection of their data when the data obfuscation mechanism is a priori
unknown to them, and they can only sample from it (the so-called “black-box" scenario). A few
black-box approaches to related problems have been presented in the literature:
• [10] that, given an oracle who has access to the probability density functions on the
outputs, casts the problem of testing diferential privacy on typical datasets (i.e., datasets
with suficiently high probability mass under a fixed data generating distribution) as a
problem of testing the Lipschitz condition. Their result concerns variants of diferential
privacy called probabilistic DP and approximate DP.
• [11] prove both an impossibility result for DP and a possibility result for approximate
DP. Their impossibility result shows that, for any  &gt; 0 and proximity parameter  &gt; 0,
no privacy property tester with finite query complexity exists for DP. Moreover, they
achieve their possibility result using randomized algorithms.
• [12, 13], where the authors focus on (,  )-DP and the estimation of the DP parameters of
a given (unknown) mechanism. In [12] the authors aim to estimate the parameters for a
ifxed pair of adjacent databases by focusing on the relation between the number of samples
required and the accuracy of the estimation, whereas they estimate the parameters of the
mechanism by repeating their estimation on every possible pair. In [13] the authors aim
at estimating, once  is given, the  of a certain (unknown) mechanism by focusing on
polynomial-time approximate estimators on a given subset  of all the possible databases
(thus defining and estimating the notion of relative DP).
• The paper that is most closely related to ours is [14], but there are some diferences. First,
they only consider central DP, whereas we focus on LDP and LRDP. Second, we both
consider a pair of databases/values and evaluate the  for this pair; to compute a better
under-approximation of the overall  , they iterate their method over a (somehow chosen)
ifnite set of pairs without provable guarantees, whereas our method comes equipped
with formal guarantees. Third, we use histograms and rely on the Lipschitzness of the
noise function, whereas they use kernel density estimation and rely on Holder continuity
(a generalization of Lipschitzness). Fourth, we upper bound the number of samples 
needed to achieve a certain precision and confidence in the estimation of  , whereas
their theorem states that the estimation approximates  asymptotically (within a certain
confidence range) as  grows.
2. Our contributions
We first focus on (
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ) and try to estimate the (equivalent) quantity
 ⋆(1, 2) d=ef
      </p>
      <p>sup
∈(1,2)
log
︂( | (|1) )︂
| (|2)
where (1, 2) d=ef { ∈  | | (|1) &gt; 0 ∧ | (|2) &gt; 0}. In this setting, an estimator
˜ is an algorithm that takes in input a pair (1, 2), a precision  and a confidence  (with
 &gt; 0 and 0 &lt;  &lt; 1), and returns a real that is supposed to approximate  ⋆(1, 2) for at most
the precision with probability at least the confidence. Our first main result states that such an
estimator cannot exist:
Theorem 1 (Impossibility). For every  &gt; 0 (precision), 0 &lt;  &lt; 1 (confidence), 1, 2 ∈  ,
and probabilistic estimator algorithm ˜ that almost surely terminates, there exists a probability
distribution | such that</p>
      <p>Pr (︀ ⃒⃒  ⋆(1, 2) − ˜(1, 2, ,  )⃒⃒ &gt;  )︀ &gt; 1 − .</p>
      <p>
        We remark that this impossibility result is very strong: it shows that no estimator exists, even
if (
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ) we are not very demanding about the precision and the confidence (namely, even if  is
large and  is small), (
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ) even if the number of samples is unbounded and (
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ) the estimator is
adaptive (namely, it can decide on the fly whether to stop or to continue sampling, based on
previous samples).
      </p>
      <p>By contrast, if we confine ourselves to the continuous case and assume that the densities
2
| (·| 1) and | (·| 2) over  = [, ] are -Lipschitz with  &lt; (− )2 , then a probabilistic
histogram-based estimator exists, whose pseudocode is provided in Algorithm 1. For the desired
precision  , the estimator first divides  into  sub-intervals, each of width  d=ef − , where
 d=ef ⌈︂ 6( − ) ⌉︂
 
and
 d=ef</p>
      <p>1
 −  −
( − )
2
.</p>
      <p>In particular, we set 0 =  and +1 =  + ; one can readily check that  = . Then, the
estimator chooses  (the number of samples) such that
where  is defined as</p>
      <p>2(1 −  ) + 4 (, , / 12) ≤ 1 − ,
 (, , ) d=ef exp ︁( − (− 1)2 )︁
1+
+ exp ︁( − (1− − )2 )︁</p>
      <p>
        2
1 − (1 − )
(note that  is exponentially decreasing in  and ). The estimator then invokes the sampler
 times both for 1 and for 2 (lines 4-7), counts the number of samples that appear in each
sub-interval (lines 8-14), and considers these numbers as the approximations of | (·| 1) and
| (·| 2) in that sub-interval; so, it computes their ratio and returns the highest value. The
fact that this algorithm has provable guarantees is the second main result of our paper.
(
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        )
(
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        )
(
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        )
(
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        )
Theorem 2 (Correctness). Let densities | (·| 1) and | (·| 2) over  = [, ] be -Lipschitz,
with  &lt; (− 2)2 . For every  &gt; 0 (precision) and 0 &lt;  &lt; 1 (confidence):
      </p>
      <p>Pr (︀ Algorithm 1 succeeds and | ⋆(1, 2) − ˜(1, 2, , , ,  )| ≤  )︀ ≥ .
Once we have this estimator for a single pair of values, we then aim at estimating the overall
 , i.e.</p>
      <p>⋆(| ) d=ef</p>
      <p>
        sup  ⋆(1, 2).
1,2∈
(
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        )
To this aim, we assume  to be a closed interval as well, divide it in  buckets (for a proper ),
take the mid-points of all the buckets, run the previous estimator for all pairs of mid-points,
and return the maximum. The details are given in Algorithm 2. If we also assume | (|· ) to
be -Lipschitz, for some  and for all  ∈  (so any doubly diferentiable function satisfies
this requirement), this new algorithm is able to estimate the overall  with provable guarantees
as established in the following result, where we say that the algorithm succeeds if at least one
invocation of Algorithm 1 succeeds. This is our third main result.
      </p>
      <p>Theorem 3. Let  = [, ],  = [, ], and | be such that, for every  ∈  , | (·| ) is
-Lipschitz, for  &lt; 2/( − )2, and that, for every  ∈ , | (|· ) is -Lipschitz, for some
. For every  &gt; 0 (precision) and 0 &lt;  &lt; 1 (confidence), we have that</p>
      <p>Pr (︀ Algorithm 2 succeeds and | ⋆(| ) − ˜(,  , , , ,  )| ≤  )︀ ≥ .</p>
      <p>We note that the Lipschitzness assumptions required by our theorems are met by the two
most widely used DP mechanisms, namely Laplacian and Gaussian [15, 16]. Then, we validate
2: Output: ˜(, 
, , , ,</p>
      <p>)
1: Input: (= [, ]),  (= [, ]), , , , 
3: Let  ≥</p>
      <p>
        3(− ) , where  is defined in eq. (
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        )
4: Divide  in  buckets, with  the mid-point of bucket 
5: for all {,  } ⊆ {
does; this parameter depends on , ,
      </p>
      <p>
        and ||, and we discover that the strongest dependency
is on  . Then, we compare the estimated  against the real one and we discover that the
number of samples required to have satisfactory results in practice is significantly lower than
the theoretical one (i.e., that of (
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        )). Furthermore, we study the proportion of estimated  that
are close to  within  across 100 executions for diferent values of the number of samples. We
discover that the lowest number of samples that yields a proportion greater than  is around
400 times lower than the theoretical one in this case.
      </p>
      <p>
        Finally, our last bunch of results is on LRDP (see eq. (
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        )), for which we mimic the steps
outlined above, with similar outcomes. In this setting, the impossibility result is more surprising:
indeed, if there is some output where the probabilities difer significantly but the probability of
this output is low, then one would think that this would not violate the RDP guarantee since
Rényi divergence averages over all outputs, instead of taking the pointwise maximum. However,
we formally prove that this is not the case. Then, we adapt the two estimators by requiring
more complex bounds both on the number of experiments and on the number of intervals
required. In particular, for the estimator ˜ (1, 2, , , , 
of sub-intervals and the number  of samples are such that
) (see Algorithm 1), the number 
( − )(2 − 1)
2 0′( − 1)
≤

2
1
      </p>
      <p>− 2(1 −  0) − 2 (,  0,  ′) ≥ 
and  ′ = min ︁( 2(′2( −− 11)) , 2lo g− 21 )︁ . The returned value is  −1 1 log ∑︀ 1 (︁  )︁ 

mator ˜ (,  , , , ,</p>
      <p>
        ) (see Algorithm 2), the new number of buckets is  ≥
where  is defined in eq. (
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ) and  0 = −  −
def 1
(2− ) ,  1 d=ef − 1 + (2− ) ,  d=ef  20 − 1 1 , ′ d=ef  1 0− 1 ,
 . For the
esti3(2 − 1)(− )
2( − 1)′ 0
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>LRDP.</title>
      <p>and, of course, we invoke the estimator ˜ (1, 2, , , ,  ) modified as described above for</p>
      <p>We run experiments similar to the ones for LDP that confirm the quality of our approach
also for LRDP. In particular, for this second setting the gap between the number of samples
suficient for achieving the guarantees of the theorem and the theoretical one is even more
dramatic than for LDP: here the practical one is around 105 times smaller.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>For all details, we refer the reader to [17].</title>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
    <ref-list>
      <ref id="ref1">
        <mixed-citation>
          [1]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>C.</given-names>
            <surname>Dwork</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Diferential privacy</article-title>
          ,
          <source>in: 33rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP)</source>
          , volume
          <volume>4052</volume>
          <source>of LNCS</source>
          , Springer,
          <year>2006</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>1</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>12</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref2">
        <mixed-citation>
          [2]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Diferential</given-names>
            <surname>Privacy</surname>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Team (Apple Inc.), Learning with privacy at scale</article-title>
          ,
          <year>2017</year>
          . https: //machinelearning.apple.com/research/learning
          <article-title>-with-privacy-at-scale.</article-title>
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref3">
        <mixed-citation>
          [3]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>C.</given-names>
            <surname>Dwork</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Diferential privacy: A survey of results</article-title>
          ,
          <source>in: 5th International Conference on Theory and Applications of Models of Computation (TAMC)</source>
          , volume
          <volume>4978</volume>
          <source>of LNCS</source>
          , Springer,
          <year>2008</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>1</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>19</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref4">
        <mixed-citation>
          [4]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Ú.</given-names>
            <surname>Erlingsson</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>V.</given-names>
            <surname>Pihur</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Korolova</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>RAPPOR: randomized aggregatable privacy-preserving ordinal response</article-title>
          ,
          <source>in: Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)</source>
          , ACM,
          <year>2014</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>1054</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>1067</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref5">
        <mixed-citation>
          [5]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Machanavajjhala</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>D.</given-names>
            <surname>Kifer</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
            <surname>Abowd</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
            <surname>Gehrke</surname>
          </string-name>
          , L. Vilhuber, Privacy:
          <article-title>Theory meets practice on the map</article-title>
          ,
          <source>in: 24th International Conference on Data Engineering</source>
          , IEEE,
          <year>2008</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>277</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>286</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref6">
        <mixed-citation>
          [6]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Narayanan</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>V.</given-names>
            <surname>Shmatikov</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>De-anonymizing social networks</article-title>
          ,
          <source>in: 30th Symposium on Security and Privacy</source>
          , IEEE,
          <year>2009</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>173</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>187</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref7">
        <mixed-citation>
          [7]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M. S.</given-names>
            <surname>Alvim</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>K.</given-names>
            <surname>Chatzikokolakis</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>C.</given-names>
            <surname>Palamidessi</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Pazii</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Local diferential privacy on metric spaces: Optimizing the trade-of with utility</article-title>
          ,
          <source>in: 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium</source>
          , IEEE,
          <year>2018</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>262</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>267</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref8">
        <mixed-citation>
          [8]
          <string-name>
            <surname>I. Mironov</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Rényi diferential privacy</article-title>
          ,
          <source>in: 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium</source>
          , IEEE,
          <year>2017</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>263</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>275</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref9">
        <mixed-citation>
          [9]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Rényi</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>On measures of entropy and information</article-title>
          ,
          <source>in: 4th Berkeley symposium on mathematical statistics and probability</source>
          , volume
          <volume>1</volume>
          ,
          <year>1961</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>547</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>561</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref10">
        <mixed-citation>
          [10]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>K.</given-names>
            <surname>Dixit</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
            <surname>Jha</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
            <surname>Raskhodnikova</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Thakurta</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Testing the lipschitz property over product distributions with applications to data privacy</article-title>
          ,
          <source>in: 10th Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC)</source>
          , volume
          <volume>7785</volume>
          <source>of LNCS</source>
          , Springer,
          <year>2013</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>418</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>436</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref11">
        <mixed-citation>
          [11]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A. C.</given-names>
            <surname>Gilbert</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>McMillan</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Property testing for diferential privacy</article-title>
          ,
          <source>in: 56th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing</source>
          , IEEE,
          <year>2018</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>249</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>258</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref12">
        <mixed-citation>
          [12]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>X.</given-names>
            <surname>Liu</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
            <surname>Oh</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Minimax optimal estimation of approximate diferential privacy on neighboring databases</article-title>
          ,
          <source>in: Proc. of Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)</source>
          , volume
          <volume>32</volume>
          ,
          <year>2019</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref13">
        <mixed-citation>
          [13]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Y.</given-names>
            <surname>Lu</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Y.</given-names>
            <surname>Wei</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
            <surname>Magdon-Ismail</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>V.</given-names>
            <surname>Zikas</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Eureka: A general framework for black-box diferential privacy estimators</article-title>
          ,
          <source>IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch</source>
          .
          <article-title>(</article-title>
          <year>2022</year>
          )
          <fpage>1250</fpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref14">
        <mixed-citation>
          [14]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Ö. Askin</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>T.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Kutta</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>H.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Dette</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Statistical quantification of diferential privacy: A local approach</article-title>
          ,
          <source>in: 43rd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy</source>
          , IEEE,
          <year>2022</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>402</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>421</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref15">
        <mixed-citation>
          [15]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>C.</given-names>
            <surname>Dwork</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>F.</given-names>
            <surname>McSherry</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>K.</given-names>
            <surname>Nissim</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A. D.</given-names>
            <surname>Smith</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private data analysis</article-title>
          ,
          <source>in: Third Theory of Cryptography Conference</source>
          , volume
          <volume>3876</volume>
          of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer,
          <year>2006</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>265</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>284</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref16">
        <mixed-citation>
          [16]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>C.</given-names>
            <surname>Dwork</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Roth</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>The algorithmic foundations of diferential privacy</article-title>
          ,
          <source>Found. Trends Theor. Comput. Sci. 9</source>
          (
          <year>2014</year>
          )
          <fpage>211</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>407</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref17">
        <mixed-citation>
          [17]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>D.</given-names>
            <surname>Gorla</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>L.</given-names>
            <surname>Jalouzot</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>F.</given-names>
            <surname>Granese</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>C.</given-names>
            <surname>Palamidessi</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>P.</given-names>
            <surname>Piantanida</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>On the (im)possibility of estimating various notions of diferential privacy</article-title>
          ,
          <source>CoRR abs/2208</source>
          .14414 (
          <year>2022</year>
          ). URL: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2208.14414.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
    </ref-list>
  </back>
</article>