<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Archiving and Interchange DTD v1.0 20120330//EN" "JATS-archivearticle1.dtd">
<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>ASTES Journal 4 (3) (2019) 106-116. doi: 10.25046/aj040315.
[22] S. M. T. Toapanta</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
      <issn pub-type="ppub">1613-0073</issn>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1007/978-3-030-36365-9_5</article-id>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Threats and Perspectives of the Implementation of E-Voting in Ukraine</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Oleksandr Markovets</string-name>
          <email>oleksandr.v.markovets@lpnu.ua</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Mykola Buchyn</string-name>
          <email>mykola.a.buchyn@lpnu.ua</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Workshop</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="editor">
          <string-name>Lviv, Ukraine</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Lviv Polytechnic National University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Bandery Str. 12, 79013 Lviv</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2022</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>1097</volume>
      <fpage>425</fpage>
      <lpage>447</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>The article contains an analysis of the problems and prospects of the implementation of electronic voting in Ukraine through the prism of assessing potential threats. An expert survey has been conducted on the threats of implementing electronic voting during elections in Ukraine, which is based on the author's methodology for calculating the level of electronic voting security. Based on the expert assessment of 4 groups of security threats have obtained as a result of the expert survey, the author's assessment of the feasibility and prospects of the implementation of electronic voting in Ukraine was made. Elections, e-voting, expert survey, threats to e-voting, democracy, information security, SCIA-2023: 2nd International Workshop on Social Communication and Information Activity in Digital Humanities, November 9, 2023, Proceedings</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>Ukraine.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>Information and communication technologies are
becoming an attribute of the
modern
development of any civilized society, penetrating to a greater or lesser extent in all spheres of social
life without exception. They create many new opportunities to make our lives more convenient and
comfortable, information more accessible, and industry and production more efficient. At the same
time, the development of information and communication technologies creates many security threats,
ranging from increasing the possibilities of disinformation and manipulation to cybercrime and hacker
attacks.</p>
      <p>The political sphere is no exception to this rule, where the use of information and communication
technologies makes it possible to make the process of communication and interaction between the
government and society more effective and transparent. Today, such phenomena as e-government and
e-democracy are becoming an integral attribute of modern socio-political development. In this
context, the implementation of e-voting during elections becomes an urgent problem. At the same
time, e-voting is characterized by a larger level of security threats, which can be explained by the key
role of the election institution not only in the formation of the political elite, but also in determining
the future vector of social development. Therefore, neglecting security threats in the context of the
implementation of e-voting can not only destroy democracy, but also radically change the vector of
socio-political development of the country.</p>
      <p>For Ukraine, the problem of implementing e-voting is extremely urgent, taking into account the
significant development of information</p>
      <p>and communication technologies and the course of
digitization of the country declared by President V. Zelensky. At the same time, significant security
threats are extremely relevant in the context of the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine. On the one
hand, they are related to Russian aggression against Ukraine, which potentially makes the future
evoting system an object of Russian hacker attacks, especially in conditions of total disinformation and
manipulation by Russia. On the other hand, the low level of democratic development of the states</p>
      <p>2023 Copyright for this paper by its authors.
CEUR</p>
      <p>ceur-ws.org
increases the level of threats from the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine, which can potentially
contribute to the possibility of certain political forces using e-voting for the realization of their own
political goals and falsification of the voting results.</p>
      <p>Therefore, the issue of the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine is relevant and requires
comprehensive research in the context of possible security threats. The problem requires a complex
expert assessment with the aim of analyzing the level of existing security threats and determining, on
the basis of this, the expediency or impracticality of implementing e-voting in Ukraine.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>2. Related Works</title>
      <p>The work is based on and continues the publication of the authors entitled "Threats of the
Implementation of E-Voting and Methods of Their Neutralization", in which the authors consider the
main threats that may arise to the authorities in the context of the implementation of e-voting during
elections. Having singled out 4 groups of threats to e-voting (threats to democracy; threats due to
illegal entry; threats to technological integrity; threats to legitimacy), the authors proposed a formula
for calculating the level of security (threat level) for e-voting, which should become an indicator for
making a decision on implementation or refusal to implement e-voting in a particular country.</p>
      <p>
        The author's idea provided that the proposed formula for calculating the security level (threat
level) for e-voting is determined on the basis of conducted expert surveys. Therefore, our article
contains a comprehensive analysis of the conducted expert survey on the feasibility of implementing
e-voting in Ukraine in view of the existing security threats [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        The work also used some previous author's ideas related to special methods of personal data
processing during elections" [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ], as well as information security during e-voting, threats and
mechanisms for their neutralization, in particular, by using blockchain technology [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Given the relevance of the research, the issue of e-voting and neutralization of security threats that
potentially accompany the use of electronic vote detection systems has become the object of
considerable attention from both Ukrainian and foreign scientists. As a rule, characterizing the
existing research on e-voting in general, it is worth noting their interdisciplinary nature. After all, the
study of e-voting and the existing threats to its implementation requires an understanding of both the
technical features of the functioning of e-voting systems and the informational features of the modern
world. In addition, given the fact that the institution of elections is a political category and an attribute
of democracy, its professional assessment is impossible without the involvement of political science
researchers in the analysis. Therefore, a qualitative and comprehensive study of e-voting should be
interdisciplinary and, as a rule, involves the cooperation of scientists - representatives of various
sciences and fields of knowledge.</p>
      <p>Scientific researches devoted to the study of the problem of e-voting and the threats of its
implementation can be conditionally divided into two groups. The first group includes scientific
works that consider the problems of e-voting in general, or individual aspects of electronic expression
of will. The second group includes the study of e-voting on the examples of specific foreign countries.</p>
      <p>
        The first group includes, in particular, scientific articles devoted to such problems as: technical
capabilities and security of e-voting [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]; the problem of e-voting security in smart communities [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ];
mechanisms for ensuring the integrity of stored e-voting data [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]; assessment of the e-voting system
based on recommendations of the Council of Europe [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]; methods and algorithms for the
performance of individual operational tasks related to the protection of the state information space [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ];
the relationship between elections and democracy in general, as well as the influence of information
and communication technologies on the effectiveness of election procedures and the level of
democracy [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ]; peculiarities, problems and perspectives of the functioning of e-democracy and
e-government [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ], [13]; knowledge about cyber security and their influence on the use of
information and communication technologies in general, and the use of social networks, in
particular [14], etc.
      </p>
      <p>The first group of sources also includes a number of scientific articles devoted to the problems of
e-voting and the mechanisms of their solution. It is, in particular, about the analysis of such problems
of e-voting and ways to solve them, as the use of blockchain technology during e-voting to strengthen
the security of voting [15], [16]; use of an advanced e-voting protocol based on public key
cryptography [17]; the problem of confidentiality of elections and paper verification of results during
the use of e-voting [18], [19]; the problem of using the voter's ID card and fingerprint technology
during e-voting [20], etc.</p>
      <p>The second group of scientific works includes researches that relate to the specifics and problems
of using e-voting during elections on the example of individual countries or regions. In this context, it
is worth mentioning, first of all, Latin American researchers who most actively cover this issue on the
example of Latin American countries. Among them, there are works that relate to the analysis of
evoting in a whole set of countries in the region, in particular, they contain an analysis of the threats
and risks of existing e-voting systems in such Latin American countries as Brazil, Ecuador, and
Colombia. The authors emphasize the need to take into account cultural, technological accessibility
and social conditions in the studied countries when using e-voting [21]. It is also worth mentioning
the research on e-voting systems in individual countries, such as Ecuador [22], Brazil [23] or
Indonesia [24], [25].</p>
      <p>In conclusion, we can state that the problem of e-voting is relevant and has become the subject of
research by many scientists from various fields of science, especially in the context of the reliability
and security of e-voting. However, modern science still lacks a comprehensive analysis of the threats
of e-voting, as well as an expert assessment and calculation of the level of threats, which could be
used as an indicator for making a decision on the implementation of e-voting or refusal to use it. In
view of what has been said, the subject of our article is relevant and needs more thorough research.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>3. Results and Discussion</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>3.1. Peculiarities of the expert survey on determining the level of threats to the implementation of e-voting</title>
      <p>
        As already mentioned, this publication is an empirical continuation of the authors' previous article,
in which they proposed their own methodology for calculating the level of threats that may be present
in the event of the implementation of e-voting [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. In order to calculate the level of threats to the
implementation of e-voting using the example of Ukraine, the authors developed and conducted an
anonymous expert survey using a Google form, which lasted 3 months - from April to June 2023. 50
experts who are citizens of Ukraine and represent 5 categories of respondents took part in the survey:
1. Scientists. The purpose of involving this category of experts was to obtain a scientific
(theoretical) justification of the feasibility of introducing e-voting through the prism of
existing security threats. The selection of this category of respondents was based on
searching for keywords in the titles of their scientific publications in Google Academy.
Such keywords were "electronic voting", "electronic elections", "electronic democracy",
"electronic governance", "elections", "democracy". This category of respondents was the
most numerous (given the importance of thorough scientific research as a condition for
effective implementation of e-voting) and included 25 experts (50%).
2. Analyst experts. The involvement of this category of respondents was also aimed at
obtaining a theoretical assessment of the feasibility of introducing e-voting and the
presence of security threats. However, analyst experts, unlike scientists, in our opinion, to a
greater extent assess the threats of e-voting in the context of the analysis of related
sociopolitical processes in the state. The selection of this category of respondents took place
according to a principle similar to that of scientists, but based on the analysis of their posts
on social networks such as Facebook and Instagram. 6 analyst expert (12%) took part in the
survey.
3. Public and political figures and politicians. This category of respondents was involved in an
expert survey with the aim of analyzing the practical side of the implementation of
evoting, as well as taking into account the level of probability of making an authoritative
decision regarding the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine. During the selection of this
category of respondents, we tried to take into account the political preferences of the
respondents (their affiliation to the government and the opposition), as well as the level of
their activity (national and local). In total, 8 respondents from this category (16%) took part
in the expert survey.
4. Members of public organizations. This category of respondents was involved in an expert
survey in order to obtain a comprehensive assessment of the feasibility of implementing
evoting from the standpoint of the level of democracy, non-involvement and taking into
account practical experience. The criteria for selecting this category of respondents was the
relevance of the sphere of activities of public organizations to democracy and elections.
Among the organizations whose members took part in the expert survey were the
Committee of Voters of Ukraine, the Public Network "OPORA" and the International
Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). 6 members of the mentioned public organizations
(12%) took part in the expert survey.
5. Information technology specialists. The involvement of this category of respondents was
determined by the need to assess the technical possibilities for the implementation of
evoting and to determine the level of informational threats characteristic of the e-voting
system. 5 IT specialists (10%) took part in the expert survey.
      </p>
      <p>This selection and coverage of expert respondents enabled the authors to obtain answers to various
aspects of the implementation of e-voting and security threats: theoretical significance and practical
value of the implementation of e-voting; political aspects that will determine the likelihood of
evoting implementation and technical issues related to its use; the impact of e-voting on the level of
democracy, etc.</p>
      <p>Communication with the respondents took place through various communication channels,
depending on the characteristics of the respondents and available contact information. The main
communication channels were the following: e-mail; social networks Facebook and Instagram; Viber;
Telegram; WhatsApp etc.
3.2. Expert assessment of the
implementation of e-voting in Ukraine
expediency
and
features
of
the</p>
      <p>An expert survey on threats to the implementation of e-voting can be conditionally divided into
two parts. The first one is devoted to general questions regarding the expediency, prospects and
features of the implementation of the e-voting system in general, and in Ukraine, in particular. The
second part contains an expert assessment of the level of danger of each of the security threats that
will potentially appear in the event of the implementation of e-voting. In general, the authors, while
conducting an expert survey, set themselves the final goal - to calculate the level of threats to the
implementation of e-voting in Ukraine, which will be the basis for justifying the final expediency or
impracticality of using this type of voter expression of will.</p>
      <p>The first part of the survey has an auxiliary character, and also partially performs a verification
role in relation to the second part of the survey. The results of respondents' answers to the first
(general) part of the survey will make it possible not only to tentatively check the validity of the
formula proposed by the authors, but also to understand the expediency and validity of its individual
components.</p>
      <p>According to the results of the survey, 42% of respondents (21 responses) were against the
implementation of e-voting in Ukraine. Instead, 58% (29 responses) expressed their support for the
idea of implementation e-voting in Ukraine.</p>
      <p>If analyzed in terms of categories of respondents, the highest level of support for the
implementation of e-voting in Ukraine was observed among public and political figures and
politicians - 75%. In our opinion, this can be explained by the lack of a comprehensive understanding
of the threats of e-voting and political expediency (the idea of introducing e-voting is popular among
voters, so it can contribute to obtaining image bonuses for those politicians who will promote this
idea.</p>
      <p>From the obtained result, it can be assumed that the high level of support among politicians for
electronic voting in Ukraine can potentially contribute to its implementation in our country. After all,
it is the politicians who will make the final legislative decision regarding the application /
nonapplication of this type of expression of will in Ukraine.</p>
      <p>Instead, representatives of public organizations turned out to be the biggest opponents of the idea
of implementing e-voting in Ukraine - 66.6%. This, in our opinion, can be explained by the fact that
the mentioned category of respondents is most thoroughly familiar with all the nuances and problems
that accompany e-voting. More detailed information on the level of expert support for e-voting is
presented in Table 2.</p>
      <sec id="sec-5-1">
        <title>Proponents of evoting (number) 15</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-2">
        <title>Proponents of evoting (%) 60 %</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-3">
        <title>Opponents of evoting (number) 10</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-4">
        <title>Opponents of e</title>
        <p>voting (%)
40 %</p>
        <p>Among the 29 experts who supported the idea of introducing e-voting in Ukraine, the majority
consider it expedient to introduce such a variant of e-voting as completely remote voting using a
smartphone or laptop. 18 experts (62.1%) spoke in favor of this type of e-voting. Instead, 6
respondents (20.7%) supported the idea of voting on a special electronic machine that will be placed
at the polling station. Another 5 experts (17.2%) consider it expedient to use the system of optical
scanning of ballots in Ukraine.</p>
        <p>In the context of the research of the problem of the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine, it was
important for us to get an expert opinion on the time frame within which it is possible to use the
evoting system in Ukraine. The answers of 28 respondents (1 of the respondents who expressed
support for e-voting did not answer this question) who supported the idea of introducing e-voting in
Ukraine were distributed as follows: 5 (17.9%) respondents believe that e-voting in It can be
implemented in Ukraine in 1-2 years; 11 respondents each (39.3%) supported the idea of introducing
e-voting in Ukraine in a period of either 3-5 years or 6-10 years; 1 more respondent (3.6%) expressed
the opinion that it will take more than 10 years to implement e-voting in Ukraine.
24 experts also answered questions about the shortcomings of e-voting, which stand in the way of
its implementation in Ukraine. Respondents consider opportunities for correction of voting results by
the Ukrainian authorities to be the biggest obstacle to the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine. This
option was supported by 21 experts (87.5%). Experts consider the next most significant obstacle to be
the presence of external threats that can nullify the result of willpower. 19 experts (79.2%) voted for
this option. Interestingly, one of the experts additionally pointed out the possibility of cyber-attacks
from the Russian Federation as one of the threats to e-voting. However, this threat, in our opinion, can
be considered a component of external threats in general, which was one of the options proposed to
experts as part of the survey of options.</p>
        <p>Other disadvantages of e-voting, according to experts, are much less significant obstacles to the
implementation of e-voting in Ukraine. In particular, the difficulty of understanding e-voting by
Ukrainian voters was noted by 9 (37.5%) experts as an obstacle. Another 8 respondents (33.3%)
consider the lack of necessary technological equipment an obstacle to the implementation of e-voting
in Ukraine. 2 experts (8.3%) consider the excessive cost of this type of expression of will to be a
problem for the use of e-voting in Ukraine.</p>
        <p>In addition, 47 experts out of 50 answered questions about the potential benefits that the state and
voters will receive from the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine. In particular, experts consider the
speed of vote counting to be the greatest advantage of e-voting. This option was supported by 37
experts (78.7%). Another 34 respondents (72.3%) supported the idea that the e-voting system is
convenient for voters. Other advantages of e-voting proposed by the authors have a slightly lower
level of support among experts. In particular, 21 experts (44.7%) consider the advantage of e-voting
to be increased turnout at elections; 17 experts (36.2%) – financial profitability of the e-voting
system; 15 experts (31.9%) - positive impact of e-voting on ecology; 14 experts (29.8%) – reducing
opportunities for falsifications and errors.</p>
        <p>Experts were also able to offer their options for the advantages of e-voting. In particular, one of the
experts attributed the prevention of falsifications to the advantages of e-voting, as well as the
possibility for voters who cannot be at the polling station on the day of voting to express their will.
Another expert noted that e-voting has advantages not only for voters, but also for the state. In
addition, 3 experts believe that e-voting has no advantages at all. At the same time, 2 of them
additionally justify their position: one sees that the reason for this is the criminal Ukrainian
authorities; another justifies the lack of advantages of e-voting by the frequent changes in the electoral
legislation in Ukraine.
3.3.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Expert assessment of threats to e-voting</title>
      <p>The second part of the expert survey aimed to find out the opinion of the respondents regarding the
level of danger of each of the specific threats of e-voting, which were divided into 4 groups: threats to
democracy; threats due to illegal interference; technical serviceability threats; threats to legitimacy.</p>
      <p>
        According to the formula for calculating the level of e-voting threats developed by the authors [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ],
experts assessed the level of influence (danger) of each of the 13 e-voting threats in the range from 0
to 100, where 0 is the absence of e-voting danger, and 100 is the maximum level of e-voting danger.
In addition, the experts had to establish coefficients for determining the threats of e-voting, which
were calculated in the range from 0 to 1, where the greater the value of the coefficient, the more
negative and significant was the impact of a specific threat on the implementation of e-voting. At the
same time, within each of the specified groups of threats, the sum of the coefficients had to be 1.
      </p>
      <p>Summary data on experts' assessment of the level of threats to e-voting are given in Table 6.
SP(EV)</p>
      <sec id="sec-6-1">
        <title>Threats to technical serviceability: Tech(EV)</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-6-2">
        <title>The problem of uninterrupted functioning of the e- 43,6 voting system: UT(EV)</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-6-3">
        <title>Low quality of the Internet connection: IC(EV) 38,6</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-6-4">
        <title>Threats to legitimacy: Leg(EV)</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-6-5">
        <title>Difficulty of e-voting: PB(EV) 36,64</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-6-6">
        <title>Psychological barriers to the perception of e-voting: 40,56 CS(EV) 0,53 0,47</title>
        <p>As we can see, according to experts, the most dangerous in the context of the implementation of
evoting in Ukraine are such threats as hacker attacks on the e-voting system, as well as violations of
free and public elections. Instead, the least negative impact in the context of the use of e-voting in
Ukraine, according to experts, will be the complexity of e-voting, the quality of the Internet
connection and psychological barriers to the perception of e-voting.
3.4.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Calculation of the threat level of e-voting in Ukraine</title>
      <p>
        Having received the results of an expert survey on threats to the implementation of e-voting, based
on the methodology developed in the previous publication [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ], we will first calculate the level of each
of the 4 groups of threats to e-voting, and then determine the general level of threats that could
potentially appear in the context of implementation in Ukraine e-voting.
      </p>
      <p>Level of threats to democracy:
Dem(EV) = (0,23х54,4+0,18х45,34+0,2х49,36+0,17х48,64+0,22х52,3)/100 = 0,5
Level of threats due to illegal interference:
Int(EV) = (0,24х49,5+0,29х57,58+0,24х48.38+0,23х47,2)/100 = 0,51
Level of threats regarding technical serviceability:
Tech(EV) = (0,53х43,6+0,47х38,6) / 100 = 0,41
Level of threats to legitimacy:
Leg(EV) = (0,46х35,64+0,54х40,56) / 100 = 0,38</p>
      <p>Having determined the level of expert assessment of each of the groups of threats to e-voting, we
can calculate the overall level of threat, which will be potentially characteristic of Ukraine in the
event of the implementation of e-voting:</p>
      <p>ET(EV) = (0,5+0,51+0,41+0,38)/4 = 0,45</p>
      <p>In the previous publication, the authors established the gradation of the level of danger of e-voting,
distinguishing 3 levels of security:</p>
      <p>Level 1 (values from 0 to 0.2) – low threat of negative impact of e-voting. In this case, the
implementation of e-voting is possible and will not cause any significant threats.</p>
      <p>Level 2 (values from 0.21 to 0.5) is an average level of danger regarding the implementation of
evoting. In this case, the use of e-voting is possible provided that the most important shortcomings and
threats are eliminated.</p>
      <p>
        Level 3 (values from 0.51 to 1) – high level of danger, which makes it impossible to implement
evoting [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>The aforementioned gradation of e-voting security levels will be applied to the analysis of the
results of the expert survey. The characteristics of the level of threats in the context of the
implementation of e-voting in Ukraine are depicted in more detail in Table 8.</p>
      <sec id="sec-7-1">
        <title>Threats of e-voting in Ukraine</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-2">
        <title>Threats to democracy Dem(EV)</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-3">
        <title>Value 0,5</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-4">
        <title>Threats due to illegal interference: 0,51 Int(EV)</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-5">
        <title>Threats to technical serviceability: 0,41</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-6">
        <title>Tech(EV)</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-7">
        <title>Threats to legitimacy: Leg(EV) 0,38</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-8">
        <title>Threats of e-voting in total: ET(EV) 0,45</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-9">
        <title>Threat level</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-10">
        <title>Average</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-11">
        <title>High</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-12">
        <title>Average</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-13">
        <title>Average</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-14">
        <title>Average</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-15">
        <title>Possible actions regarding the implementation of evoting</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-16">
        <title>Implementation is possible</title>
        <p>after elimination of key
shortcomings and threats</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-17">
        <title>Implementation is impossible</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-18">
        <title>Implementation is possible</title>
        <p>after elimination of key
shortcomings and threats</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-19">
        <title>Implementation is possible</title>
        <p>after elimination of key
shortcomings and threats</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-20">
        <title>Implementation is possible after elimination of key shortcomings and threats Figure 3: The results of an expert survey of threats to the implementation of e-voting</title>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>4. Conclusions</title>
      <p>Summarizing, we can see that according to the results of an expert survey of threats to the
implementation of e-voting in Ukraine, the situation regarding the use of e-voting is quite ambiguous.
On the one hand, the general level of threats to e-voting is average, which does not prevent, according
to the defined gradation, the possibility of its implementation in practice.</p>
      <p>On the other hand, the general level of threats to the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine,
although average, is close to the upper limit of its value. Moreover, one group of e-voting threats
(threats to democracy) is at the extreme upper value of the medium level (0.5), while the other group
of threats (threats due to illegal interference) reaches the minimum value (0.51) of the high level of
evoting threats.</p>
      <p>The results of the experts' answers contained in the first (general) part of the study showed the
relative validity of the methodology proposed by the authors for calculating the level of threats from
the introduction of e-voting in Ukraine. Such results of the expert assessment of the level of threats to
e-voting in Ukraine correlate to some extent with the general attitude of experts to the idea of
introducing e-voting. The fact that 42% of experts opposed the implementation of e-voting in
Ukraine, in our opinion, roughly corresponds to the upper limit of the average level of danger of the
implementation of e-voting. Also, the obstacles identified by experts that stand in the way of the
introduction of e-voting in Ukraine are to some extent correlated with the assessment of the level of
threats from the introduction of voting using e-voting systems in our country.</p>
      <p>The results of an expert calculation of the level of threats to the implementation of e-voting in
Ukraine showed that the system of e-voting is quite dangerous in Ukrainian realities. Therefore, the
implementation of e-voting in Ukraine is possible only after a thorough and comprehensive analysis
of all existing threats, the development of effective mechanisms for their neutralization and the
comprehensive application of these mechanisms in practice.</p>
      <p>Since the first two groups of threats (threats to democracy and threats due to illegal interference)
are the most threatening in the context of the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine, it can be
assumed that the level of threats to the use of the e-voting system will become significantly lower in
two cases. First, the level of threats to democracy will be greatly reduced by raising the political
consciousness and culture of citizens and representatives of the authorities. In this case, the authorities
will be less inclined to falsify the results of e-voting, and ordinary citizens will have more control
over the actions of the authorities, reducing opportunities for abuse.</p>
      <p>Secondly, the neutralization of the external threat from Russia will significantly reduce the
opportunities for illegal interference in the process and results of e-voting. Therefore, the
democratization of Ukrainian society and the victory over the Russian aggressor can significantly
reduce the level of threats to the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine in the future.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>5. References</title>
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