=Paper= {{Paper |id=Vol-3608/paper2 |storemode=property |title=Threats and Perspectives of the Implementation of E-Voting in Ukraine |pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3608/paper2.pdf |volume=Vol-3608 |authors=Oleksandr Markovets,Mykola Buchyn |dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/scia2/MarkovetsB23 }} ==Threats and Perspectives of the Implementation of E-Voting in Ukraine== https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3608/paper2.pdf
                         Threats and Perspectives of the Implementation of E-Voting in
                         Ukraine
                         Oleksandr Markovets and Mykola Buchyn
                         Lviv Polytechnic National University, Bandery Str. 12, 79013 Lviv, Ukraine


                                         Abstract
                                         The article contains an analysis of the problems and prospects of the implementation of
                                         electronic voting in Ukraine through the prism of assessing potential threats. An expert
                                         survey has been conducted on the threats of implementing electronic voting during elections
                                         in Ukraine, which is based on the author's methodology for calculating the level of electronic
                                         voting security. Based on the expert assessment of 4 groups of security threats have obtained
                                         as a result of the expert survey, the author's assessment of the feasibility and prospects of the
                                         implementation of electronic voting in Ukraine was made.

                                         Keywords 1
                                         Elections, e-voting, expert survey, threats to e-voting, democracy, information security,
                                         Ukraine.

                         1. Introduction
                             Information and communication technologies are becoming an attribute of the modern
                         development of any civilized society, penetrating to a greater or lesser extent in all spheres of social
                         life without exception. They create many new opportunities to make our lives more convenient and
                         comfortable, information more accessible, and industry and production more efficient. At the same
                         time, the development of information and communication technologies creates many security threats,
                         ranging from increasing the possibilities of disinformation and manipulation to cybercrime and hacker
                         attacks.
                             The political sphere is no exception to this rule, where the use of information and communication
                         technologies makes it possible to make the process of communication and interaction between the
                         government and society more effective and transparent. Today, such phenomena as e-government and
                         e-democracy are becoming an integral attribute of modern socio-political development. In this
                         context, the implementation of e-voting during elections becomes an urgent problem. At the same
                         time, e-voting is characterized by a larger level of security threats, which can be explained by the key
                         role of the election institution not only in the formation of the political elite, but also in determining
                         the future vector of social development. Therefore, neglecting security threats in the context of the
                         implementation of e-voting can not only destroy democracy, but also radically change the vector of
                         socio-political development of the country.
                             For Ukraine, the problem of implementing e-voting is extremely urgent, taking into account the
                         significant development of information and communication technologies and the course of
                         digitization of the country declared by President V. Zelensky. At the same time, significant security
                         threats are extremely relevant in the context of the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine. On the one
                         hand, they are related to Russian aggression against Ukraine, which potentially makes the future e-
                         voting system an object of Russian hacker attacks, especially in conditions of total disinformation and
                         manipulation by Russia. On the other hand, the low level of democratic development of the states

                         SCIA-2023: 2nd International Workshop on Social Communication and Information Activity in Digital Humanities, November 9, 2023,
                         Lviv, Ukraine
                         EMAIL: oleksandr.v.markovets@lpnu.ua (O. Markovets); mykola.a.buchyn@lpnu.ua (M. Buchyn)
                         ORCID: 0000-0001-8737-5929 (O. Markovets); 0000-0001-9087-5123 (M. Buchyn)
                                    ©️ 2023 Copyright for this paper by its authors.
                                    Use permitted under Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
                                    CEUR Workshop Proceedings (CEUR-WS.org)



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increases the level of threats from the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine, which can potentially
contribute to the possibility of certain political forces using e-voting for the realization of their own
political goals and falsification of the voting results.
   Therefore, the issue of the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine is relevant and requires
comprehensive research in the context of possible security threats. The problem requires a complex
expert assessment with the aim of analyzing the level of existing security threats and determining, on
the basis of this, the expediency or impracticality of implementing e-voting in Ukraine.

2. Related Works
    The work is based on and continues the publication of the authors entitled "Threats of the
Implementation of E-Voting and Methods of Their Neutralization", in which the authors consider the
main threats that may arise to the authorities in the context of the implementation of e-voting during
elections. Having singled out 4 groups of threats to e-voting (threats to democracy; threats due to
illegal entry; threats to technological integrity; threats to legitimacy), the authors proposed a formula
for calculating the level of security (threat level) for e-voting, which should become an indicator for
making a decision on implementation or refusal to implement e-voting in a particular country.
    The author's idea provided that the proposed formula for calculating the security level (threat
level) for e-voting is determined on the basis of conducted expert surveys. Therefore, our article
contains a comprehensive analysis of the conducted expert survey on the feasibility of implementing
e-voting in Ukraine in view of the existing security threats [1].
    The work also used some previous author's ideas related to special methods of personal data
processing during elections" [2], as well as information security during e-voting, threats and
mechanisms for their neutralization, in particular, by using blockchain technology [3].
    Given the relevance of the research, the issue of e-voting and neutralization of security threats that
potentially accompany the use of electronic vote detection systems has become the object of
considerable attention from both Ukrainian and foreign scientists. As a rule, characterizing the
existing research on e-voting in general, it is worth noting their interdisciplinary nature. After all, the
study of e-voting and the existing threats to its implementation requires an understanding of both the
technical features of the functioning of e-voting systems and the informational features of the modern
world. In addition, given the fact that the institution of elections is a political category and an attribute
of democracy, its professional assessment is impossible without the involvement of political science
researchers in the analysis. Therefore, a qualitative and comprehensive study of e-voting should be
interdisciplinary and, as a rule, involves the cooperation of scientists - representatives of various
sciences and fields of knowledge.
    Scientific researches devoted to the study of the problem of e-voting and the threats of its
implementation can be conditionally divided into two groups. The first group includes scientific
works that consider the problems of e-voting in general, or individual aspects of electronic expression
of will. The second group includes the study of e-voting on the examples of specific foreign countries.
    The first group includes, in particular, scientific articles devoted to such problems as: technical
capabilities and security of e-voting [4]; the problem of e-voting security in smart communities [5];
mechanisms for ensuring the integrity of stored e-voting data [6]; assessment of the e-voting system
based on recommendations of the Council of Europe [7], [8]; methods and algorithms for the
performance of individual operational tasks related to the protection of the state information space [9];
the relationship between elections and democracy in general, as well as the influence of information
and communication technologies on the effectiveness of election procedures and the level of
democracy [10], [11]; peculiarities, problems and perspectives of the functioning of e-democracy and
e-government [12], [13]; knowledge about cyber security and their influence on the use of
information and communication technologies in general, and the use of social networks, in
particular [14], etc.
    The first group of sources also includes a number of scientific articles devoted to the problems of
e-voting and the mechanisms of their solution. It is, in particular, about the analysis of such problems
of e-voting and ways to solve them, as the use of blockchain technology during e-voting to strengthen
the security of voting [15], [16]; use of an advanced e-voting protocol based on public key
cryptography [17]; the problem of confidentiality of elections and paper verification of results during
the use of e-voting [18], [19]; the problem of using the voter's ID card and fingerprint technology
during e-voting [20], etc.
   The second group of scientific works includes researches that relate to the specifics and problems
of using e-voting during elections on the example of individual countries or regions. In this context, it
is worth mentioning, first of all, Latin American researchers who most actively cover this issue on the
example of Latin American countries. Among them, there are works that relate to the analysis of e-
voting in a whole set of countries in the region, in particular, they contain an analysis of the threats
and risks of existing e-voting systems in such Latin American countries as Brazil, Ecuador, and
Colombia. The authors emphasize the need to take into account cultural, technological accessibility
and social conditions in the studied countries when using e-voting [21]. It is also worth mentioning
the research on e-voting systems in individual countries, such as Ecuador [22], Brazil [23] or
Indonesia [24], [25].
   In conclusion, we can state that the problem of e-voting is relevant and has become the subject of
research by many scientists from various fields of science, especially in the context of the reliability
and security of e-voting. However, modern science still lacks a comprehensive analysis of the threats
of e-voting, as well as an expert assessment and calculation of the level of threats, which could be
used as an indicator for making a decision on the implementation of e-voting or refusal to use it. In
view of what has been said, the subject of our article is relevant and needs more thorough research.

3. Results and Discussion
3.1. Peculiarities of the expert survey on determining the level of threats to
the implementation of e-voting
   As already mentioned, this publication is an empirical continuation of the authors' previous article,
in which they proposed their own methodology for calculating the level of threats that may be present
in the event of the implementation of e-voting [1]. In order to calculate the level of threats to the
implementation of e-voting using the example of Ukraine, the authors developed and conducted an
anonymous expert survey using a Google form, which lasted 3 months - from April to June 2023. 50
experts who are citizens of Ukraine and represent 5 categories of respondents took part in the survey:
   1.     Scientists. The purpose of involving this category of experts was to obtain a scientific
          (theoretical) justification of the feasibility of introducing e-voting through the prism of
          existing security threats. The selection of this category of respondents was based on
          searching for keywords in the titles of their scientific publications in Google Academy.
          Such keywords were "electronic voting", "electronic elections", "electronic democracy",
          "electronic governance", "elections", "democracy". This category of respondents was the
          most numerous (given the importance of thorough scientific research as a condition for
          effective implementation of e-voting) and included 25 experts (50%).
   2.     Analyst experts. The involvement of this category of respondents was also aimed at
          obtaining a theoretical assessment of the feasibility of introducing e-voting and the
          presence of security threats. However, analyst experts, unlike scientists, in our opinion, to a
          greater extent assess the threats of e-voting in the context of the analysis of related socio-
          political processes in the state. The selection of this category of respondents took place
          according to a principle similar to that of scientists, but based on the analysis of their posts
          on social networks such as Facebook and Instagram. 6 analyst expert (12%) took part in the
          survey.
   3.     Public and political figures and politicians. This category of respondents was involved in an
          expert survey with the aim of analyzing the practical side of the implementation of e-
          voting, as well as taking into account the level of probability of making an authoritative
          decision regarding the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine. During the selection of this
          category of respondents, we tried to take into account the political preferences of the
          respondents (their affiliation to the government and the opposition), as well as the level of
          their activity (national and local). In total, 8 respondents from this category (16%) took part
          in the expert survey.
   4.     Members of public organizations. This category of respondents was involved in an expert
          survey in order to obtain a comprehensive assessment of the feasibility of implementing e-
          voting from the standpoint of the level of democracy, non-involvement and taking into
          account practical experience. The criteria for selecting this category of respondents was the
          relevance of the sphere of activities of public organizations to democracy and elections.
          Among the organizations whose members took part in the expert survey were the
          Committee of Voters of Ukraine, the Public Network "OPORA" and the International
          Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). 6 members of the mentioned public organizations
          (12%) took part in the expert survey.
   5.     Information technology specialists. The involvement of this category of respondents was
          determined by the need to assess the technical possibilities for the implementation of e-
          voting and to determine the level of informational threats characteristic of the e-voting
          system. 5 IT specialists (10%) took part in the expert survey.
   This selection and coverage of expert respondents enabled the authors to obtain answers to various
aspects of the implementation of e-voting and security threats: theoretical significance and practical
value of the implementation of e-voting; political aspects that will determine the likelihood of e-
voting implementation and technical issues related to its use; the impact of e-voting on the level of
democracy, etc.
   Communication with the respondents took place through various communication channels,
depending on the characteristics of the respondents and available contact information. The main
communication channels were the following: e-mail; social networks Facebook and Instagram; Viber;
Telegram; WhatsApp etc.

Table 1.
Peculiarities of conducting an expert survey on the identification of threats to the implementation of
e-voting
  Category of      Criteria and method of           Purpose of           Number of           % of
 respondents                 selection             engagement           respondents      respondents
   Scientists         Keyword search of          Comprehensive               25              50 %
                       titles of scientific  scientific (theoretical)
                   publications in Google      assessment of the
                             Academy               feasibility of
                                            implementing e-voting
    Analyst        Keyword search of post Theoretical assessment              6              12 %
    experts        titles on Facebook and      of the feasibility of
                            Instagram       implementing e-voting
                                              in the context of the
                                             analysis of social and
                                               political processes
   Social and          Belonging to the           Analysis of the             8              16 %
    political         government or the         practical side and
  figures and        opposition. Level of      assessment of the
   politicians       activity (national or        probability of
                             regional)      implementing e-voting
                                                    in Ukraine
 Members of         The relevance of the         Comprehensive                6              12 %
     public          sphere of activity of     assessment of the
 organizations public organizations to             feasibility of
                        democracy and       implementing e-voting
                             elections      from the standpoint of
                                            the level of democracy,
                                              non-involvement and
                                               taking into account
                                               practical experience
 Information        Activities related to         Assessment of              5               10 %
  technology            information           technical capabilities
   specialists       technologies and         and determination of
                   information security            the level of
                                             information threats for
                                             the implementation of
                                                     e-voting



3.2. Expert assessment of the expediency and features of the
implementation of e-voting in Ukraine
    An expert survey on threats to the implementation of e-voting can be conditionally divided into
two parts. The first one is devoted to general questions regarding the expediency, prospects and
features of the implementation of the e-voting system in general, and in Ukraine, in particular. The
second part contains an expert assessment of the level of danger of each of the security threats that
will potentially appear in the event of the implementation of e-voting. In general, the authors, while
conducting an expert survey, set themselves the final goal - to calculate the level of threats to the
implementation of e-voting in Ukraine, which will be the basis for justifying the final expediency or
impracticality of using this type of voter expression of will.
    The first part of the survey has an auxiliary character, and also partially performs a verification
role in relation to the second part of the survey. The results of respondents' answers to the first
(general) part of the survey will make it possible not only to tentatively check the validity of the
formula proposed by the authors, but also to understand the expediency and validity of its individual
components.
    According to the results of the survey, 42% of respondents (21 responses) were against the
implementation of e-voting in Ukraine. Instead, 58% (29 responses) expressed their support for the
idea of implementation e-voting in Ukraine.
    If analyzed in terms of categories of respondents, the highest level of support for the
implementation of e-voting in Ukraine was observed among public and political figures and
politicians - 75%. In our opinion, this can be explained by the lack of a comprehensive understanding
of the threats of e-voting and political expediency (the idea of introducing e-voting is popular among
voters, so it can contribute to obtaining image bonuses for those politicians who will promote this
idea.
    From the obtained result, it can be assumed that the high level of support among politicians for
electronic voting in Ukraine can potentially contribute to its implementation in our country. After all,
it is the politicians who will make the final legislative decision regarding the application / non-
application of this type of expression of will in Ukraine.
    Instead, representatives of public organizations turned out to be the biggest opponents of the idea
of implementing e-voting in Ukraine - 66.6%. This, in our opinion, can be explained by the fact that
the mentioned category of respondents is most thoroughly familiar with all the nuances and problems
that accompany e-voting. More detailed information on the level of expert support for e-voting is
presented in Table 2.

Table 2.
The level of experts' support for the idea of implementing e-voting in Ukraine
   Category of      Proponents of e- Proponents of e-         Opponents of e-       Opponents of e-
  respondents        voting (number)         voting (%)       voting (number)         voting (%)
    Scientists              15                  60 %                 10                 40 %
Analyst experts             4                 66,6 %                  2                33,3 %
    Social and              6                  75 %                   2                 25 %
political figures
and politicians
 Members of                 2                 33,3 %                  4                66,6 %
      public
 organizations
  Information               2                  40 %                   3                 60 %
   technology
    specialists
      Total                29                  58 %                   21                42 %




Figure 1: Distribution of experts

    Among the 29 experts who supported the idea of introducing e-voting in Ukraine, the majority
consider it expedient to introduce such a variant of e-voting as completely remote voting using a
smartphone or laptop. 18 experts (62.1%) spoke in favor of this type of e-voting. Instead, 6
respondents (20.7%) supported the idea of voting on a special electronic machine that will be placed
at the polling station. Another 5 experts (17.2%) consider it expedient to use the system of optical
scanning of ballots in Ukraine.

Table 3.
Level of expert support for specific types of e-voting in Ukraine
                  Type of e-voting                            Support level      Support level (%)
                                                               (quantity)
    Remote voting using a smartphone or laptop                    18                  62,1 %
Voting on a special electronic machine at the polling              6                  20,7 %
                       station
         System of optical scanning of ballots                     5                  17,2 %
                        Total                                     29                  100 %

   In the context of the research of the problem of the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine, it was
important for us to get an expert opinion on the time frame within which it is possible to use the e-
voting system in Ukraine. The answers of 28 respondents (1 of the respondents who expressed
support for e-voting did not answer this question) who supported the idea of introducing e-voting in
Ukraine were distributed as follows: 5 (17.9%) respondents believe that e-voting in It can be
implemented in Ukraine in 1-2 years; 11 respondents each (39.3%) supported the idea of introducing
e-voting in Ukraine in a period of either 3-5 years or 6-10 years; 1 more respondent (3.6%) expressed
the opinion that it will take more than 10 years to implement e-voting in Ukraine.
Table 4.
Time frames for the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine.
  The period required for the implementation of e-         Respondents             Respondents (%)
                  voting in Ukraine                         (number)
                      1-2 years                                 5                       17,9 %
                      3-5 years                                11                       39,3 %
                     6-10 years                                11                       39,3 %
                More than 10 years                              1                       3,5 %
                        Total                                  28                       100 %

    24 experts also answered questions about the shortcomings of e-voting, which stand in the way of
its implementation in Ukraine. Respondents consider opportunities for correction of voting results by
the Ukrainian authorities to be the biggest obstacle to the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine. This
option was supported by 21 experts (87.5%). Experts consider the next most significant obstacle to be
the presence of external threats that can nullify the result of willpower. 19 experts (79.2%) voted for
this option. Interestingly, one of the experts additionally pointed out the possibility of cyber-attacks
from the Russian Federation as one of the threats to e-voting. However, this threat, in our opinion, can
be considered a component of external threats in general, which was one of the options proposed to
experts as part of the survey of options.
    Other disadvantages of e-voting, according to experts, are much less significant obstacles to the
implementation of e-voting in Ukraine. In particular, the difficulty of understanding e-voting by
Ukrainian voters was noted by 9 (37.5%) experts as an obstacle. Another 8 respondents (33.3%)
consider the lack of necessary technological equipment an obstacle to the implementation of e-voting
in Ukraine. 2 experts (8.3%) consider the excessive cost of this type of expression of will to be a
problem for the use of e-voting in Ukraine.

Table 5.
Obstacles to the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine.
    Obstacles to the implementation of e-voting in           Respondents           Respondents (%)
                          Ukraine                             (number)
  Possibilities for adjustment of voting results by the          21                     87,5 %
                   Ukrainian authorities
 The presence of external threats that can neutralize              19                   79,2 %
                  the result of willpower
The difficulty of understanding e-voting by Ukrainian              9                    37,5 %
                          voters
     Lack of necessary technological equipment                     8                    33,3 %
                 Excessive cost of e-voting                        2                    8,3 %
   The possibility of cyber-attacks from the Russian               1                    4,2 %
                        Federation

   In addition, 47 experts out of 50 answered questions about the potential benefits that the state and
voters will receive from the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine. In particular, experts consider the
speed of vote counting to be the greatest advantage of e-voting. This option was supported by 37
experts (78.7%). Another 34 respondents (72.3%) supported the idea that the e-voting system is
convenient for voters. Other advantages of e-voting proposed by the authors have a slightly lower
level of support among experts. In particular, 21 experts (44.7%) consider the advantage of e-voting
to be increased turnout at elections; 17 experts (36.2%) – financial profitability of the e-voting
system; 15 experts (31.9%) - positive impact of e-voting on ecology; 14 experts (29.8%) – reducing
opportunities for falsifications and errors.
Table 6.
Advantages of the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine.
  Advantages of the implementation of e-voting in        Respondents                 Respondents (%)
                      Ukraine                             (number)
              Speed of vote counting                         37                           78,7 %
              Convenience for voters                         34                           72,3 %
         Increase in turnout at elections                    21                           44,7 %
               Financial profitability                       17                           36,2 %
            Positive impact on ecology                       15                           31,9 %
 Reducing opportunities for falsification and errors         14                           29,8 %

   Experts were also able to offer their options for the advantages of e-voting. In particular, one of the
experts attributed the prevention of falsifications to the advantages of e-voting, as well as the
possibility for voters who cannot be at the polling station on the day of voting to express their will.
Another expert noted that e-voting has advantages not only for voters, but also for the state. In
addition, 3 experts believe that e-voting has no advantages at all. At the same time, 2 of them
additionally justify their position: one sees that the reason for this is the criminal Ukrainian
authorities; another justifies the lack of advantages of e-voting by the frequent changes in the electoral
legislation in Ukraine.

3.3.    Expert assessment of threats to e-voting
   The second part of the expert survey aimed to find out the opinion of the respondents regarding the
level of danger of each of the specific threats of e-voting, which were divided into 4 groups: threats to
democracy; threats due to illegal interference; technical serviceability threats; threats to legitimacy.
   According to the formula for calculating the level of e-voting threats developed by the authors [1],
experts assessed the level of influence (danger) of each of the 13 e-voting threats in the range from 0
to 100, where 0 is the absence of e-voting danger, and 100 is the maximum level of e-voting danger.
In addition, the experts had to establish coefficients for determining the threats of e-voting, which
were calculated in the range from 0 to 1, where the greater the value of the coefficient, the more
negative and significant was the impact of a specific threat on the implementation of e-voting. At the
same time, within each of the specified groups of threats, the sum of the coefficients had to be 1.
   Summary data on experts' assessment of the level of threats to e-voting are given in Table 6.

Table 7.
The results of the expert assessment of the threat level of e-voting in Ukraine.
               Threats of e-voting: ET(EV)                    Level of impact of         Value of
                                                               threats (0-100)       coefficients (0-1)
                                     Threats to democracy Dem(EV)
  Violation of the principle of free elections: FE(EV)               54,4                  0,23
 Violation of the principle of equal elections: EE(EV)              45,34                  0,18
 Violation of the principle of direct elections: DE(EV)             49,36                  0,2
  Violation of the principle of secret voting: SB(EV)               48,64                  0,17
 Violation of the principle of public elections: PE(EV)              52,3                  0,22
                               Threats due to illegal interference: Int(EV)
    Falsification of e-voting results by the election                49,5                  0,24
                administration: FoR(EV)
   Hacker attacks on the e-voting system: HA(EV)                    57,58                  0,29
  The possibility of creating a transit server: FS(EV)              48,38                  0,24
 Vulnerability of voters' personal electronic devices:               47,2                  0,23
                       SP(EV)
                            Threats to technical serviceability: Tech(EV)
The problem of uninterrupted functioning of the e-                 43,6                  0,53
               voting system: UT(EV)
   Low quality of the Internet connection: IC(EV)                  38,6                  0,47
                                    Threats to legitimacy: Leg(EV)
           Difficulty of e-voting: PB(EV)                         36,64                  0,46
Psychological barriers to the perception of e-voting:             40,56                  0,54
                       CS(EV)




Figure 2: A graph comparing the dependence of the Level of impact of threats on the Value of
coefficients

   As we can see, according to experts, the most dangerous in the context of the implementation of e-
voting in Ukraine are such threats as hacker attacks on the e-voting system, as well as violations of
free and public elections. Instead, the least negative impact in the context of the use of e-voting in
Ukraine, according to experts, will be the complexity of e-voting, the quality of the Internet
connection and psychological barriers to the perception of e-voting.

3.4.    Calculation of the threat level of e-voting in Ukraine
   Having received the results of an expert survey on threats to the implementation of e-voting, based
on the methodology developed in the previous publication [1], we will first calculate the level of each
of the 4 groups of threats to e-voting, and then determine the general level of threats that could
potentially appear in the context of implementation in Ukraine e-voting.
   Level of threats to democracy:
   Dem(EV) = (0,23х54,4+0,18х45,34+0,2х49,36+0,17х48,64+0,22х52,3)/100 = 0,5
   Level of threats due to illegal interference:
   Int(EV) = (0,24х49,5+0,29х57,58+0,24х48.38+0,23х47,2)/100 = 0,51
   Level of threats regarding technical serviceability:
   Tech(EV) = (0,53х43,6+0,47х38,6) / 100 = 0,41
   Level of threats to legitimacy:
   Leg(EV) = (0,46х35,64+0,54х40,56) / 100 = 0,38
   Having determined the level of expert assessment of each of the groups of threats to e-voting, we
can calculate the overall level of threat, which will be potentially characteristic of Ukraine in the
event of the implementation of e-voting:
   ET(EV) = (0,5+0,51+0,41+0,38)/4 = 0,45
   In the previous publication, the authors established the gradation of the level of danger of e-voting,
distinguishing 3 levels of security:
   Level 1 (values from 0 to 0.2) – low threat of negative impact of e-voting. In this case, the
implementation of e-voting is possible and will not cause any significant threats.
   Level 2 (values from 0.21 to 0.5) is an average level of danger regarding the implementation of e-
voting. In this case, the use of e-voting is possible provided that the most important shortcomings and
threats are eliminated.
   Level 3 (values from 0.51 to 1) – high level of danger, which makes it impossible to implement e-
voting [1].
   The aforementioned gradation of e-voting security levels will be applied to the analysis of the
results of the expert survey. The characteristics of the level of threats in the context of the
implementation of e-voting in Ukraine are depicted in more detail in Table 8.

Table 8.
Characteristics and consequences of calculating the level of threats to the implementation of e-
voting in Ukraine
Threats of e-voting in Ukraine       Value       Threat level      Possible actions regarding
                                                                   the implementation of e-
                                                                   voting
Threats to democracy Dem(EV)         0,5         Average           Implementation is possible
                                                                   after elimination of key
                                                                   shortcomings and threats
Threats due to illegal interference: 0,51        High              Implementation is impossible
Int(EV)
Threats to technical serviceability: 0,41        Average           Implementation is possible
Tech(EV)                                                           after elimination of key
                                                                   shortcomings and threats
Threats to legitimacy: Leg(EV)       0,38        Average           Implementation is possible
                                                                   after elimination of key
                                                                   shortcomings and threats
Threats of e-voting in total: ET(EV) 0,45        Average           Implementation is possible
                                                                   after elimination of key
                                                                   shortcomings and threats
Figure 3: The results of an expert survey of threats to the implementation of e-voting




4. Conclusions
    Summarizing, we can see that according to the results of an expert survey of threats to the
implementation of e-voting in Ukraine, the situation regarding the use of e-voting is quite ambiguous.
On the one hand, the general level of threats to e-voting is average, which does not prevent, according
to the defined gradation, the possibility of its implementation in practice.
    On the other hand, the general level of threats to the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine,
although average, is close to the upper limit of its value. Moreover, one group of e-voting threats
(threats to democracy) is at the extreme upper value of the medium level (0.5), while the other group
of threats (threats due to illegal interference) reaches the minimum value (0.51) of the high level of e-
voting threats.
    The results of the experts' answers contained in the first (general) part of the study showed the
relative validity of the methodology proposed by the authors for calculating the level of threats from
the introduction of e-voting in Ukraine. Such results of the expert assessment of the level of threats to
e-voting in Ukraine correlate to some extent with the general attitude of experts to the idea of
introducing e-voting. The fact that 42% of experts opposed the implementation of e-voting in
Ukraine, in our opinion, roughly corresponds to the upper limit of the average level of danger of the
implementation of e-voting. Also, the obstacles identified by experts that stand in the way of the
introduction of e-voting in Ukraine are to some extent correlated with the assessment of the level of
threats from the introduction of voting using e-voting systems in our country.
    The results of an expert calculation of the level of threats to the implementation of e-voting in
Ukraine showed that the system of e-voting is quite dangerous in Ukrainian realities. Therefore, the
implementation of e-voting in Ukraine is possible only after a thorough and comprehensive analysis
of all existing threats, the development of effective mechanisms for their neutralization and the
comprehensive application of these mechanisms in practice.
   Since the first two groups of threats (threats to democracy and threats due to illegal interference)
are the most threatening in the context of the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine, it can be
assumed that the level of threats to the use of the e-voting system will become significantly lower in
two cases. First, the level of threats to democracy will be greatly reduced by raising the political
consciousness and culture of citizens and representatives of the authorities. In this case, the authorities
will be less inclined to falsify the results of e-voting, and ordinary citizens will have more control
over the actions of the authorities, reducing opportunities for abuse.
   Secondly, the neutralization of the external threat from Russia will significantly reduce the
opportunities for illegal interference in the process and results of e-voting. Therefore, the
democratization of Ukrainian society and the victory over the Russian aggressor can significantly
reduce the level of threats to the implementation of e-voting in Ukraine in the future.

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