The article includes the analysis of the peculiarities of the using information technologies by Russian Federation in the context of conducting information-psychological special operations in Ukraine at the present stage. Russian information-psychological operations' in Ukraine essence, peculiarities, aims, subjects, objects and distribution channels are disclosed. The periodization of the transformation stages of Russian information-psychological operations against Ukraine is disclosed. The role of modern media in spreading key messages in the context of conducting information-psychological operations in Ukraine is shown. The design of the system for analyzing posts in social media using an object-oriented approach was carried out. Informational technologies, information-psychological operations, messengers, information warfare, information security, cybersecurity, social media, manipulations, propaganda, 0813-0785 (T. Basyuk) ORCID: 0000-0001-8737-5929 (O. Markovets); 0000-0001-9087-5123 (M. Buchyn); 0000-0002-8462-8705 (A. Kovalchuk); 0000-0003Proceedings
The confrontation between states is an integral element of modern international system. Since the emergence of the first political entities its leaders sought to find new effective methods of neutralizing and subjugate opponents. The development of information technologies and increasing role of information in society caused the advent of new techniques of information flows manipulating, which allow changing the object’s of influence mind, values and even the model of behavior.
Information-psychological special operations (next – IPOs) were an important part of states’ foreign policy yet in the XX century. Over the time the role of IPOs as an instrument of achieving governments’ hidden purpose has only been increasing. Information influence was mostly used in the USA and the USSR. After the collapse the Soviet Union became an active subject of conducting information-psychological operations. The state didn’t only become the successor of the USSR, but also inherited and developed all the propaganda methods of waging information warfare against its geopolitical opponents.
One of the vivid examples of waging hybrid warfare is Russian information warfare against Ukraine, in the frames of which the government of the Russian Federation systematically exerts influence on Ukrainian political leadership and population. In this context the research of the essence and peculiarities of information-psychological operations conducted by
2023 Copyright for this paper by its authors. CEUR
ceur-ws.org methods of its implementations for further development of techniques to counter Russian information aggression.
The purpose of the study – is to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the problem of Russian information and psychological special operations in Ukraine and the features of designing a system for countering them.
Research hypothesis – the Russian Federation is currently actively using information and psychological special operations against Ukraine, which pose a significant threat to national security and require the design of a system to counter them.
The following methods were used during the research: logical: analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction; general scientific: historical - to highlight the evolution of Russia's use of IPOs methods in Ukraine; systemic - for consideration of IPOs as a complete system of forms and methods of information influence; structural and functional - to clarify the structure of the IPOs and the peculiarities of the impact of their individual elements: comparative - to compare the goals and means of the IPOs of the Russian Federation in Ukraine from 2000 to today; modeling – for designing a system to counteract Russia's use of IPOs against Ukraine; empirical: the method of document analysis - to determine the regulatory and legal regulation of information influence in the Russian Federation; qualitative and quantitative content analysis - to identify the key messages of Russian propaganda and disinformation at the current stage.
The work includes an introduction, analysis of the source base, the main part, which includes 4 subsections and highlights the main results of the research, conclusions, a list of used literature.
Despite the novelty, information-psychological special operations became the object of research for many scientists, experts and specialists in the field of information technologies. Taking into account the applied nature and the modernity of the described events, the source base of our research includes both scientific publications and analytical materials or news, which reveal certain facts about the use of information-psychological special operations by the Russian Federation.
Literature on the topic of the research can be divided into two groups. The first concerns the
disclosure of general concepts, related to information-psychological operations or related categories.
Thus group includes the researches of information-psychological special operations as one of the
modern instruments of geopolitical confrontation [
This group of sources should also include research on the specifics of information-psychological
special operations and mechanisms of countering informational and psychological influence. In this
context, it is worth mentioning the works devoted to the issue of information security in the frames of
waging a hybrid war and the role of journalism in it [
Considering the fact, that the information-psychological special operations are most widely and effectively used to correct the results of the will of citizens during elections, a number of literary sources refer to the analysis of the impact of information-psychological special operations on the election process and democracy, and especially in the context of the security threats during the use of electronic voting [17], [18].
Another group of literary sources refer to the practice of information-psychological operations conducted by the Russian Federation. On the one side, this group includes the literature, which generally characterize the Russian Federation as the subject of information-psychological special operations at the present [19], [20], [21]; reveals the anatomy of Russian disinformation [22]; examines Russian Internet policy as network authoritarianism and the mechanism of using information as a geopolitical tool [23]; reveals Russia's information war against the West through the Russian government's use of hacking, propaganda and election manipulation [24]. On the other side, this group also consists of researches of peculiarities of conducting information-psychological special operations against Ukraine. In particular, it goes about the general analysis of Russian information campaigns against Ukraine [25]; research of the reasons of an aggressive behavior and the full-scale invasion on the territory of Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022 [26]; disclosure of the features of disinformation in the media space during the war in Ukraine, aimed at forming the opinion that the culprit of Russia's invasion of Ukraine is the USA, NATO and Ukrainian society [27]; field studies of disinformation during the Russian-Ukrainian war through the prism of the perception and opinion of the Ukrainian population regarding the manipulation of information [28], etc.
The basis of the source base of the research are the works of Ukrainian and foreign researches, analytical reports of NATO, field manuals of the Armed Forces of the USA, legislation of the Russian Federation as well as publications of the online newspapers. At the same time, despite considerable attention to the problem of the information and psychological influence of the Russian Federation in foreign countries, the studying of the Russian IPO in Ukraine from the 2000s to now remains fragmented, and therefore requires deeper and more careful analysis.
Information- psychological special operations is one of the examples of selective and purposeful use of information flows in order to influence the target audience. It should be mentioned, that in foreign sources (mostly English-language) the separate forms and abbreviations of the concept are used: «PSYOPS» - psychological operations and «IO» - information operations, as well as «IPO» information-psychological operation.
The evolution of the means of information and psychological influence as well as differences in its
exerting in different states caused the emergence of various approaches to definition of the concept
“information-psychological special operations”. The origin of the term is associated with the creation
of the propaganda division led by the military intelligence of the American Expeditionary Force in
1918, and its first used – with the surrender messages sent to the Japanese mainland in 1945. The term
remained generic for decades, despite the fact its components were actively used by the countries of
the world [
The official definition of “psychological operations” was firstly established in the field manual of
the Armed Forces of the USA in 1979. It was mentioned, that the psychological operation
encompasses political, military, economic and ideological actions, which are planned and conducted
with the aim of creating in neutral, friendly and hostile foreign groups emotions, attitudes or behavior,
favorable for the achievement of national goals [
One of the modern definitions, suggested by Ukrainian researchers V. Zhadko and Y.
Kharytonenko explains IPOs as the planned use of technologies and means of spreading information
for influencing the people’s mind in a broad sense; and as an instrument of influence, which is
practically used during combat operations with the aim to demoralize opponent – in narrow sense [
Definition of IPOs Political, military, economic, ideological actions
Goal of the IPOs
Creation of emotions, attitudes or behavior, Planned use of technologies and means of
spreading information Instrument of influence during combat
operations Complex of measures of the information flows
manipulations Communicative technologies which is favorable for the achievement of
national goals
Influencing the people’s mind
Demoralization of the opponents
Achievement the advantage over the enemy Change of the people’s behavior by influencing the target audience’s psychological state
One more definition was suggested by NATO and the US Ministry of Defense. It separates the
concepts “psychological” (PSYOP) and “information” (IO) operations. ІО is explained as integral use
of information possibilities during combat operations in order to influence, obstruct, corrupt and usurp
decision-making of actual and potential adversaries with the simultaneous protection of the domestic
one. IO is first of all military activities in information space, which has exactly defined goals, and also
includes offensive and defensive measures aimed at influencing the opponents decisions and
manipulating information and information systems. Instead psychological operations are the
preplanned activities, which involve the use of communication methods and the other resources on the
target audience to influence their attitude, behavior, perception and interpretation of the reality. It is
emphasized that PSO is build on a certain psychological theme (a prepared narrative or idea), and the
greater the sensitivity of the target audience to the topic or tool of PSYOP, the greater the probability
of success of the operation. In accordance to the mentioned above, PSYOPs are conducted in
peacetime, and IO – during military operations [
Influence, obstruction, corrupting, usurping the decisionmaking with the simultaneous protection of the domestic one.
Manipulation of information Context of application
During military operations
Psychological operations Pre-planned activity, which
includes application of communicative methods
Influence on the target audience’s attitudes, behavior, perception and interpretation of
the reality.
Preparation and spreading the narratives and ideas
Peacetime
In our opinion, information-psychological special operations should be understood as the complex of particular actions, which has relevant information spreading and interpretation, involves manipulation, misrepresentation, and aims to shape the object’s certain emotional and psychological state and reactions, needed by the subject.
It should be mentioned, the term IPOs is often used in the context together with the concept “information warfare”, which unlike IPOs is more strategic in nature. Thus, it can be argued that information warfare is a complex of information and psychological special operations.
Modern researchers distinguish offensive and defensive IPOs (although a significant part of such
operations is mixed). By the goals and orientation, the operations aimed at making the decisions
required by the customer, obtaining or demonstrating compromising material, disrupting the political
system and/or society, as well as destabilizing the opponent are also identified. Short-term (up to 2
weeks), medium-term (up to a month) and long-term (more than 4 weeks) are distinguished by the
criterion of duration [
In the Allied Doctrine on Psychological Operations, developed by NATO, the following categories
of IPOs are defined: strategic (planned operations to gain support and strengthen cooperation with
friendly and neutral audiences as well as weaken the capabilities and desire of enemy audiences to
carry out aggressive actions); crisis (operations, which are the part of the settlement of crisis situations
and are conducted to create a favorable atmosphere and desire for cooperation between the parties to
the conflict and the civilian population); military (as part of combat operations against a defined target
audience in order to defeat the enemy or eliminate his desire to continue aggression) [
According to the statements of V. Horbulin, the main goal of IPOs is the manipulation of the target
audience’s consciousness. And the tasks can be the following: changing or fixing in the people’s
consciousness particular views and ideas, misinforming and intimidating the population, as well as
weakening the existing beliefs, which form the basis of society. Another scientists V. Petryk
distinguishes such goals as: inducement to make decision beneficial to the initiator, obtaining
compromising material for its further use and destabilization of the social/political/economic order
[
Considering the fact, that IPOs are conducted in both peace- and wartime, the following
distribution of operation tasks can be made. In peacetime: destabilization of socio-political situation in
the country; demoralization of the civilian population and the military; creating and aggravating
contradiction between political forces, creating prerequisites for a social explosion. In wartime:
undermining the psychological and morale of the opponent’s army; creation and exacerbation of
contradictions between the military, society and political forces; supporting the opposition and
inciting it to confront the authorities [
Based on the analyzed approaches to defining IPOs, the following goals of the informationpsychological special operations can be distinguished (see Figure 1).
Spreading disinformatio
n Inducement to make the particular decisions
Demoralization of society
Change of the
basic society’s values Main goals of IPOs
Intimidation
Destabilizatio n of the society
Ensuring victory in the elections to the right politicians Shaping the subject’s positive image
Shaping the opponents’ negative external image
The subjects of IPOs are the people and sources, which are directly engaged in exerting
information and psychological influence, in particular: political authorities and state special services,
media, non-governmental organizations, Internet-platform etc. [
The objects of IPOs (or the target audience) are the people or groups of people, whom the
specified influence is directed to. According to the US Field Statute “Psychological Operations,
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures”, published in 2003 there exist several types of the objects of
influence (see Table 4) [
Characteristics of the objects of IPOs
Small social groups, families and companies Political or governmental structures, organizations and
associations Large groups of people who share certain demographic
characteristics A group of people identified only by a common geographic area Individuals or small groups who may have significant power over
others Persons to whom members of the target audience address for the
information or its interpretation
The choice of the target audience varies depending on the type and purpose of the IPOs. In general, the targets of IPOs are: military personnel (both authorities and soldiers), political leaders and representatives of governmental structures, civilians, religious, ethnic and cultural groups, business representatives, mass media, academic groups, public activists and non-governmental organizations. The subjects of IPOs can influence both the audience in a foreign state and their own.
The effectiveness of IPOs mostly depends on the right choice of channels for the distribution of
the narratives needed for the subjects. Among the main channels of spreading information for the
IPOs are the following (see Figure 2) [
Television Radio Programs and
special applications
Printed media
Main channels (ways) of spreading information in
IPOs
Distributed printed materials
Social media Online platforms Specially trained communicator s
Outdoor advertising
Through these channels such methods of IPOs as disinformation, propaganda, psychological
pressure, spread of rumors, diversification of public opinion are applied [
mass activities of people.
Purposeful distraction of the political authorities’ attention of the state (by artificially drawing attention to a certain range of problems), which prevent it from concentrating on solving urgent and important issues for the
state and society.
Intimidation of the object and influence on his psyche forcing him to act accordingly to a certain pattern of behavior.
Dissemination of information (mostly disinformation) among the masses though unofficial channels to complicate the object’s activities.
Destabilization of the country or region; Intensification of opposition movements;
Publicity of scandalous court
proceedings;
Introduction of sanctions, etc.
Dissemination of information about existing or false threats;
Blackmailing Committing acts of terrorism and mass
massacres;
Taking hostages, etc.; Dissemination of information to
demoralize; Dissemination of information to
intimidate; Dissemination of information to disintegrate
IPOs are often conducted during elections and are used as one of the forms of foreign interference in the election process. It can be explained by the important role, the elections play in the development of a democratic society, being the main attribute, indicator and catalyst of democracy [29]. On the other hand, the results of elections define the strategic direction of each state’s development. Thus, external influence on the election process and its results allows the aggressor to achieve its global goals by conducting IPOs. It is especially common in terms of using informationcommunicative technologies and electronic voting in particular, which must be reliably protected from foreign information influence [17], [18].
Fighting IPOs is an important issue for each state. However, the difficulty of сountering IPOs is in
the actual absence of the possibility of prosecuting the object of informational-psychological
operations as the characteristic features of information-psychological influence are its latency and the
absence of direct proves of aggression, with the simultaneous infliction of significant damage to the
target object without declaring was or terminating diplomatic relations. Another difficulty is an
identification of the primary sources of influence and determining the true intentions, means and
methods of the subjects’ actions [
Legal regulation of the information sphere as a mechanism for countering IPOs is also difficult. This can be explained, in particular, by the low efficiency of such a mechanism. In addition, the high level of legal regulation of the information sphere has a negative impact on the level of democracy and freedom of speech, limiting, in this way, the possibilities for countering IPOs in democratic countries.
The implementation of countermeasures against informational and psychological influence at the
state level can be carried out by the implementation of counteroperations aimed at the opponents or
the implementation by specially developed state security policy. The negative impact can be
neutralized by conducting information-explanatory campaigns for the population, using all available
channels of information dissemination; delivering truthful information to citizens and the international
community about the actions of country’s political leaders and its military structures; monitoring the
information space and immediate responding to the identified active and potential subjects of
influence; the unification of society around national values and the integration of citizens for the joint
fight against external threats; forming positive image of the state and its political authorities, etc. [
However, some of the most effective and universal mechanisms for counteracting informational and psychological influence are a high level of consciousness and culture of citizens, a high level of awareness and intelligence of individuals, in particular, their information literacy, a high level of critical thinking. These make individuals significantly less vulnerable to IPSO, minimize the effectiveness of informational and psychological influence .
Formation of the security strategy Public exposure of the evidence of IPOs
Informationexplanatory campaigns Mechanisms of counteraction to
IPOs
Conducting counteroperation
Monitoring of information
space Formation of national values
Formation of the state’s positive image
After the collapse of the USSR, despite the factual end of the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the USA, the competition in information sphere was increasing. At the times of B. Yeltsyn’s presidency several strategic documents were published, in which it was mentioned, that information and psychological operations became an integral element of the national security strategy.
The new era of understanding the advantages of waging “information wars” started with the coming to power in Russia of V. Putin in early 2000s. In the following years, a number of strategic security documents, which highlighted the presence of information threats to Russia from other states, seeking to dominate in the global information space in influence the government and the population was noted. These documents also declared the need for countering the other states’ use of technologies to achieve aggressive military and political goals as well as the key role of information activities in Russian security strategy.
The main reason for Russia's active use of IPOs at the current stage lies in the geopolitical interests and imperial ambitions of the current Russian political elite. The effort to be one of the poles of influence and to increase its dominance on the planet is realized, including, due to the spread of informational and psychological influence both on its own audience and on the population of other countries of the world.
Since the restoration of Ukrainian independence, the country has also been informationally influenced by the Russian Federation. Having studied the peculiarities of Russian IPOs in Ukraine (including conducting content-analysis of Russian media), we consider it appropriate to define 4 main periods: 2000-2007; 2008-2013; 2014-2021; from 2022 – till now.
The beginning of the mentioned periodization from 2000, and not from 1991 (the period of the collapse of the USSR), in our opinion, can be explained by the fact that during the presidency of B. Yeltsin, the Russian political elite paid less attention to foreign policy interests due to the numerous internal political problems. However, with V. Putin coming to power in Russia in 2000, imperial foreign policy ambitions began to dominate. This led to the active use of IPOs. Therefore, the period from 1991 to 2000, in the context of the issues we are investigating, can be considered a preparatory stage for Russia’s future use of IPOs in general, and against Ukraine, in particular.
2000-2007 years can be characterized as the stage of conceptual understanding and strategic
planning of the Russian further actions. V. Putin set the goal of “restoring the former great power”.
Since the early XX century the Russian Federation has been introducing hard “vertical” power and
making long-term investments in controlled media and non-governmental organizations, which could
be used as the instruments of soft power. In 2000s a significant part of Ukrainian heads of media
holdings had close ties with the Russian Federation. For example, New Channel and STB were owned
by the Russian Alfa Group and Lukoil, and in 2006 the UA. Inter Media Group Limited company was
sold to the Russian billionaire A. Abramov. In 2000-2005 the director of the ICTV Channel’s
information service was Russian journalist D. Kiselyov, who was the host of political talk-show
“National Interest” at the same time. A significant part of the TV programs and films broadcast by
Ukrainian channels was created together with Russian media groups of even borrowed: for a certain
time the Inter Channel aired the new programs of the First Channel, and Ukrainian TET was filled
with the content of Russian STS. Print mass media wasn’t left out the attention of the Russian
Federation: such newspapers as “Kommersant”, “Arguments and Facts”, “Komsomolsk Truth” were
actively published in Ukraine [
During 2004-2007 years in the rhetoric of the Russian political elite, theses, saying that Ukraine and Russian are parts of the same Orthodox civilization appear. Numerous public organizations, including: Russian Movement of Ukraine, Russian Movement of the Crimes, Slavic Committee of Ukraine, Russian Community, Ukrainian branch of the Institute of CIS Countries as well we International Eurasian Movement (headed by A. Dugin) promoted such ideas. The aims of these organizations were to impose pro-Russian views, spread dissatisfaction with Ukrainian policies among Russian-speaking population, form a negative attitude of Ukrainians towards the integration into the EU and NATO, conduct public actions and create the Russian image as the guarantor of the protection of the Russian-speaking population, etc.
The ideas of historic, cultural and religious unity of Ukraine and Russia were supported by the
representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow
Patriarchate, “Black Hundred”, “United Fatherland”, the “Union of Orthodox Peoples”, etc. The
latter’s members actively spread the information, discrediting Ukraine in the Internet and participated
in mass protests [
The coverage of the event of the Orange Revolution of 2004-2005 by the Russian media deserves special attention. In October-December 2004, print and online publications accused the USA of financing actions on the Independence Square and “interfering in the country’s foreign affairs”. In addition, it was noted that the revolution was organized by Western supporters of V. Yushchenko and did not reflect the interest of Russian-speaking part of the population [30].
Until 2008-2009 it was possible to notice only some of the elements of Russian IPOs, which were mostly aimed at maintaining the citizens’ loyalty to the Russian Federation, and so-called “reflexive control” over the Ukrainian political elite, conducted by economic blackmailing (the RussianUkrainian gas conflicts can be considered a vivid example of it).
The intensification of Ukraine-EU interaction during the presidency of V. Yushchenko also contributed to the increase in tension between the parties. In 2008 the Russian media criticized Ukraine, claiming that “there is no basic order” there, and “the country’s acceptance into NATO and the EU will mean the destabilization of the entire West”. Russian mass media began to broadcast narratives about the destructiveness of European values and the threat of potential economic collapse in Ukraine after the signing of the Association Agreement, simultaneously raising the issue of the status of Russian language [25].
Similar thesis actively circulated in the Ukrainian information space during the presidency term of V. Yanukoych in 2010-2013. In the articles of Russian edition “Arguments and Facts in Ukraine” there were phrases that “the integration of Ukraine into the EU will have serious negative impact on the relations between Ukraine and Russia”, “Kyiv’s desire to “sit on two chairs” is vile”, “after signing the Agreement, Ukraine will lose the right to vote and decide what laws to adopt, what tariffs to set and how to interact with other unions – everything will be decided by the European Commission”, “Russian-speaking population will not only suffer from great economic problems, but also will become a victim of assimilation – a large piece is being separated from our common civilizational space”, “in case of Ukraine’s accession to the EU, the Customs Union will take protective measure, which will increase the deficit of Kyiv’s balance of payments to 15-16 billion dollars. In 6 months, the state will become a bankrupt”. In 2012-2013 so-called “Internet-trolls” were added to the list of means of Russian information influence, acting to create a positive coverage of Russian government’s activities and suppress the opposition and discredit Western countries [19].
The new era of Russian IPOs started in the beginning of 2014. Taking advantage of the moment of internal tension in the country, Russian incited the population of the Crimea to revolt against the “Kyiv regime” and lobbied for its interests in the governmental structures of the autonomous republic. Since mid-January 2014, with the support of the Russian community of Crimea and the political party “Russian Unity” self-defense units were formed on the territory of the peninsula as a force of popular resistance. These units were financed by Russian political structures and supposed to oppose the “banderians” and advocate the creation of Ruthenia in case of a coup d'état. On February 20, 2014 the operation to seize Crimea by the “little green men” began and was actually completed by March 1st. On the same day the self-proclaimed Head of the Council of Ministers of Crimea S. Aksyonov appealed to the President of the Russian Federation with a request to contribute to the establishment of “peace and tranquility”, and the Parliament of Russia adopted a decision on sending troops to the territory of Ukraine. According to the version of Russian media, the seizure of administrative buildings was carried out by “groups of people without identification marks” and the protests took place between the “supporters” and the “opponents” of the new government in Ukraine. What is more important, the latter demanded the extension of the powers of the autonomous republic and the repeal of the law introducing the Ukrainian language as the only state language on its territory [21].
In the frames of its informational operation Russian also limited the access of the Crimean population to Ukrainian media: on March 6, 5th Channel, 1+1, Crima-24 were disconnected. Instead of them Russia broadcast Russia-1. On March 9, all the Ukrainian television stations were switched off. The President of the Russian Federation argued the feasibility of holding referendum and the subsequent accession of Crimea to Russia in the following way: “Crimea has the same right to leave Ukraine as Ukraine had – to leave the USSR”, “the Ukrainian authorities violate the rights of people who speak Russian and Crimean Tatar”, “there is no legitimate executive power in Ukraine as the current government is controlled by nationalists, Russophobes and anti-Semites” [31].
The next period of Russian IPOs followed the beginning of hostilities in the east of Ukraine. The scenario of the events was similar to the one used before in Crimea: Russia created and financed the organizations and people’s militias, which opposed the current Ukrainian government. The absence of identification marks, both in Crimea and in the east of Ukraine, gave Russia the opportunity to defend the thesis, that the hostilities are internal civil conflict in Ukraine. The Russian government spread propaganda accusing Ukrainian forces of shelling peaceful cities in Donbas. Therefore, Russian disinformation channels increased their influence first of all among the population of Lughansk and Donetsks People’s Republics and it continued to accuse the Ukrainian government in aggression. The information campaigns of the Russian Federation were also used against the representatives of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The soldiers and military authorities received text messages, which encouraged them to surrender, saying Ukrainian government does not need them.
At the same time Russian sought to legitimize its actions in front of international community and domestic audience. Thus, the annexation of Crimea and the proclamation of the so-called Lughansk and Donetsks People’s Republics was positioned by the Russian government as “the right to selfdetermination of peoples”. The President and the Russian representatives in international organizations appealed to the provisions of the UN Charter and the Kosovo case, responding to accusation with the thesis, that Western states apply double standards [25].
In addition to militaries, international community and the population of the occupied territories, Russian continued to put pressure on the residents of the rest of Ukrainian territory by launching a cyber war. Since November 2013 (in addition to the active operations of the “bot farms”) Russian hackers have systematically carried out attacks on state institutions, enterprises, energy companies, and even ordinary websites and TV channels to obtain state information, destabilize the work of structures and exert psychological influence on the population [30].
On January 12, 2022 the Russian Federation made a number of demands to NATO. One of them concerned the Alliance’s refusal of expansion and, in particular, the provision of guarantees that Ukraine would not become a member of the organization. NATO’s refusal prompted the Russian Federation to aggressive rhetoric. The state accused the bloc in threatening its national security [31]. In the media, Russia-NATO relations were described in the following way: “The relations between Moscow and the Alliance are at critically low level on the background of terrorist threats, the unfolding of arms race and the complete degradation of the security architecture in Europe… NATO’s repeated disregard of Russian side’s initiatives regarding de-escalation creates the preconditions for the emergence of conflicts and undermines the basics of security”. On February 21, V. Putin recognized the independence of the Lughansk and Donetsk Republics, and in the morning of February 24, 2022 he announced the beginning of a special military operation in Ukraine. The “Special military operation” was justified by the need to protect the residents of the Lughansk and Donetsk Republics from the “genocide by the Kyiv regime” and its goals were defined as “demilitarization” and “denazification” of Ukraine [26].
Russian authorities; Cultural and
religious organizations;
Pro-Russian structures in
Ukraine;
Media (print media, television, radio, Internet); Russian cultural
heritage; Political and economic blackmail; Activities of nongovernmental organizations; Propaganda in the
media; Impact through soft power.
Russian authorities; Cultural and religious organizations;
Pro-Russian structures in Ukraine;
Law enforcement structures of
Ukraine; Media (print media, television, radio,
Internet);
Special Internet “trolls” and “bots”.
Political and economic blackmail;
Activities of nongovernmental organizations; Propaganda in the media (including social media);
Suppression of groups disloyal to the Russian Federation;
Aggravation of contradictions in
Ukrainian society regarding the vector
of foreign policy Russia and
Ukraine are brotherly nations with a common history and
culture;
Ukraine is the “younger brother” of Russia;
EU policies and values are immoral; Ukrainian economy will not withstand
European integration; Joining the Customs Union is a guarantee of stability and
Ukrainian military
personnel; International community; Russian authorities; Cultural and religious
organizations; Pro-Russian structures
in Ukraine; Media (print media, television, radio,
Internet); Special Internet “trolls”
and “bots”; Russian special military
division;
Representatives of foreign countries loyal
to Russia.
Political blackmail; Activities of nongovernmental organizations; Propaganda and disinformation in
media; Suppression of groups disloyal to the Russian
Federation; False flag operations:
Provocations; Activities of agents of influence and internet
trolls;
Cyber attacks; Psychological pressure on military personnel
and civilians; Propaganda and disinformation on international
platforms;
The annexation of
Crimea is completely legal and complies with
the norms of international law; ATO is nothing but a civil war in Ukraine; Ukraine is waging a war against the civilian
Residents of the occupied territories;
International community; Russian authorities; Cultural and religious
organizations; Media (print media, television, radio,
Internet); Special Internet “trolls”
and “bots”; Russian special military
division;
Representatives of foreign countries loyal to Russia.
Saboteurs; Threats of using nuclear weapons; Psychological pressure on military personnel and civilians;
Intimidation; Propaganda and disinformation in
media;
Provocations; Activities of agents on influence and internet
trolls; Propaganda and disinformation on international
platforms;
Cyber-attacks; Persecution of proUkrainian activists;
Diversions.
Ukraine is an aggressor country, that posed
threat to Russia; Ukraine must be de
Nazified and demilitarized; Russia is fighting
against NATO; Ukrainian political
Ukraine and Russia are united by strong economic connections; Economic collapse awaits Ukraine
without the support of Russia.
development;
Euromaidan is organized by Nazis and Bandera people; population of the
L/DPR;
Ukrainian political authorities are corrupt and ineffective; authorities are exacerbating the conflict and do not want to sit down at the negotiating table.
The strategy of Russian IPOs in Ukraine (including the ones, which were used after the February 24, 2022) was based on 4 main information technologies (so-called “4 Ds”): demoralization, discreditation, destabilization, disinformation [20]. Demoralization of the army was achieved by conducting cyber-attacks on the information networks of the Armed Forces, state structures, and Ukrainian mass media. Through damaged communication channels Russian propaganda broadcast “classic” messages, discrediting the image of the Ukrainian authorities as well as encouraging military to lay down the arms and surrender. The influence on the civilian population of Ukraine was carried out by the use of manipulative techniques in the mass media, in particular, through social media, in which the Internet trolls and bots actively continued their activities. The new tasks of the latter were discrediting the Ukrainian government and its ability to counter aggression, positioning the power of the Russian Federation and inciting internal conflicts in the country. One more element of the demoralization of Ukrainian civilians was the direct use of psychological pressure, which prompted them to consider the possibility of ending the war at any cost. The examples of the pressure are dropping bombs on the theater in Mariupol and the Kramatorsk railway station, the actions of the occupying forces in the captured territories, shelling the colony in Olenivka and residential buildings in the cities, causing damage to critical infrastructure, etc.
Among the information technologies, used by Russian in its IPOs in Ukraine, the following should be highlighted [20].
Replacing general terms with a negative meaning with those that are
perceived positively or neutrally.
Accusing the enemy of what they are
accused of.
Creating a message that evokes a strong emotion and calls for its
distribution.
Quoting famous people to support
arguments.
Dissemination of information in order to create negative and panicky moods among the population.
The formation of a certain stereotype in public consciousness hostilities in the East of Ukraine = civil
war; foreigners fighting in Ukraine =
mercenaries.
Description of the crimes of the Russians in Buch as a production.
The intentions of the Russian Federation regarding mass shelling.
Report of the French TV channel TF1.
The announcement that Ukraine
plans to create a squad of "punishers" who will kill citizens loyal
to the Russian Federation.
Creating an image of Ukrainian servicemen as "militants" and "neoThe primacy effect
Rationalization
Priority distribution of the version that will reach a large audience and have a better chance of dominating
public opinion.
Denying one's guilt and striving to prove one's right with logical arguments
Nazis".
Russia is at war with NATO.
The Russian Federation started a war in Ukraine because of a threat from
NATO.
The methods of Russian IPOs after the beginning of the full-scale invasion have remained unchanged since 2014: disinformation, cyber-attacks, provocations, activities of agents of influence, spreading rumors, psychological pressure, etc.
Social media and communication platforms became an important tool for spreading IPOs by Russia. In this context, the authors conducted a content analysis of several pro-Russian Telegram channels regarding the level and characteristics of the spread of IPOs in Ukraine after the beginning of the full-scale invasion. The content analysis was carried out during the first half of 2023.
The conducted analysis shows, that the number of users of social media and Telegram channels is about 5 billion today, and this number continues to grow. These statistics clearly show that virtual platforms for communication of interaction are very popular and have a huge audience. This means that extremely large volumes of public information are created in such places, which can and should be monitored. Carrying out such processed manually is extremely difficult. For this, you need to hire Open
Ukraine| Открытая Украина There is no information + + + + + + +
whole departments that would select the necessary messages, so this process is very expensive and inefficient. In this case, it is proposed to create a system of analysis of posts in social media for effective monitoring of possible illegal actions.
In order to effectively design software, it is necessary to design it using an object-oriented approach and deep neutral networks [32]. Therefore, we will start specifying that functioning by constructing a diagram of use cases [33]. This diagram is used to represent a system as a set of actors that interact with each other through use cases. The diagram of options for using the designed system is presented in Figure 4.
Since the system is planned to be developed using an object-oriented paradigm, the next step is to create a class diagram. Figure 5 shows the class diagram of the designed system.
As we can see in Figure 5, the system consists of the following main classes: • Posts – an entity class that stores post data; • User – an entity class that stores information about the user; • DBContext – a class needed to create and work with a database based on the Entity Framework; • UserRepository – a class designed to provide methods for basic operations with the user table in the database; • PostsRepository - a class that is designed to provide methods for basic operations with the table of posts in the database; • UnitOfWork – the main task of this class is to ensure the display of changes in the database in the form of a transaction; • PostsWorker – responsible for working with posts from social media and their further presentation in the form of an ontology [34]; • FileWorker – required for reading, saving and parsing data; • WebAPIController – provides web controllers that process client http requests; • SocialMedia – needed to organize access to social media.
In order to understand the features of the display of objects involved in the system and the order of message transmission between them, a sequence diagram was developed. For the designed system, the sequence diagram is shown in Figure 6.
As you can see from Figure 6, we have four main objects that interact, in particular: • User – a person who uses the system. • System is a software tool that implements the basic business logic. • DataBase – a place where all data necessary for functioning is stored. • SocialMedia - is not an internal object of the system, but the system interacts with it as it sends a request to receive the necessary posts.
The next stage in the design process is the creation of the system architecture. In general, the following options can be chosen: • Monolithic application - all processes take place on the user's device. The advantage of this approach is a smaller number of requests, so the disadvantage is that all calculations take place on the user's device, which leads to an additional load on the client side. This can lead to undesirable delays related to the performance of the platform. • Client-server application - the system is divided into two main components - this is the server side, where all business logic and data storage is implemented; the server itself can be represented by several machines that will share the load among themselves; the client side is an application that is installed on the user's device and provides him with an interface for interacting with the system. This approach requires a greater number of requests. But it also has significant advantages, which are the possibility of easy scaling, since all calculations and requests are processed by a separate physical component. If necessary, their number and as the result performance can be increased. The specified architecture also allows reducing the load on the user's personal device. which will only visualize the received data from the server.
In view of the conducted analysis, it was decided to use the client-server method of building the system architecture, which will give it flexibility, scalability and reduce the load on the client side. An example of such an architecture is presented in Figure 7.
The next stage of the research will be the construction of a system for analyzing posts in social media using modern software tools.
The development of information technologies and increasing of role of information contributed to the emergence of ways for states to use information flows in order to achieve certain political goals. Therefore, IPOs have become an important tool for influencing the domestic and foreign audiences. In Ukrainian studies the concept “IPOs” is defined as a planned use of technologies and means of information dissemination and as a tool of influence on society. Western terminology separates informational and psychological operations, which are carried out during military operations and peacetime, respectively.
The purpose of IPOs is to manipulate the consciousness of the target object in order to change its beliefs, impose a certain model of behavior or make a decision beneficial to the object. Subjects in such operations are any people and sources, that directly exert influence (e. g. political authorities, mass media, non-governmental organizations, special services, etc.). Instead, the object is those at who this influence is aimed (e. g. military or political authorities, civilian population, religious or ethnic groups, mass media, public activities, etc.). Disinformation, propaganda, diversification of public opinion, psychological pressure, rumors, etc., are among the methods of influence.
Russia’s intensive use of information and psychological influence practices began in the 2000s. Since then, the Russian Federation has enshrined the need to conduct information campaigns abroad in the legislature, explaining it by a threat from Western countries and the need for protection of the Russian information space in the states of the post-Soviet space. Modern Russian information and psychological operations are directed both inside the state and at the audience of foreign countries. Russian citizens are forced to be loyal to the authorities, limiting their access to foreign sources of information at the legislative level, suppressing any manifestations of opposition and broadcasting propaganda through mass media. Instead, foreign audience is exposed through a wide range of “active measure” that include disinformation, sabotage, underground and intelligence activities, etc.
Russian IPOs in Ukraine are a vivid example of Russian information technologies in the postSoviet space, which, according to the statements of Russian authorities, should remain Moscow’s sphere of influence. Prior to the intensification of the state’s cooperation with the EU and NATO, the Russian government mainly used soft power, emphasizing the unity of historical and cultural heritage. In 2008, after the invasion of Georgia, the Russian government intensively worked to increase its influence over the Ukrainian community and prevent its European integration, broadcasting propaganda about the "economic consequences of joining the Union." The Revolution of Dignity and the destabilization of the political situation in the country were used by Russia to carry out a number of foreign flag operations, the annexation of Crimea and the declaration of L/DPR. The beginning of the anti-terrorist operation and the continuation of Ukraine's course to join the EU was characterized by the use of new methods of pressure on the country, in particular cyber-attacks, psychological pressure on the military and the civilian population, and disinformation through the media and diplomacy. After the start of the full-scale invasion, the IPSO focused on disinformation and demoralization of Ukrainian society, pushing it to end the war on Moscow's terms.
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