=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-3608/paper8
|storemode=property
|title=Russian information-psychological special operations in Ukraine and peculiarities of system design for their countermeasures
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3608/paper8.pdf
|volume=Vol-3608
|authors=Oleksandr Markovets,Mykola Buchyn,Anastasiia Kovalchuk,Taras Basyuk
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/scia2/MarkovetsBKB23
}}
==Russian information-psychological special operations in Ukraine and peculiarities of system design for their countermeasures==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3608/paper8.pdf
Russian Information-psychological Special Operations in
Ukraine and Peculiarities of System Design for Their
Countermeasures
Oleksandr Markovets, Mykola Buchyn, Anastasiia Kovalchuk and Taras Basyuk
Lviv Polytechnic National University, Bandery Str. 12, 79013 Lviv, Ukraine
Abstract
The article includes the analysis of the peculiarities of the using information technologies by
Russian Federation in the context of conducting information-psychological special operations
in Ukraine at the present stage. Russian information-psychological operations’ in Ukraine
essence, peculiarities, aims, subjects, objects and distribution channels are disclosed. The
periodization of the transformation stages of Russian information-psychological operations
against Ukraine is disclosed. The role of modern media in spreading key messages in the
context of conducting information-psychological operations in Ukraine is shown. The design
of the system for analyzing posts in social media using an object-oriented approach was
carried out.
Keywords 1
Informational technologies, information-psychological operations, messengers, information
warfare, information security, cybersecurity, social media, manipulations, propaganda,
Russian Federation, Ukraine.
1. Introduction
The confrontation between states is an integral element of modern international system. Since the
emergence of the first political entities its leaders sought to find new effective methods of neutralizing
and subjugate opponents. The development of information technologies and increasing role of
information in society caused the advent of new techniques of information flows manipulating, which
allow changing the object’s of influence mind, values and even the model of behavior.
Information-psychological special operations (next – IPOs) were an important part of states’
foreign policy yet in the XX century. Over the time the role of IPOs as an instrument of achieving
governments’ hidden purpose has only been increasing. Information influence was mostly used in the
USA and the USSR. After the collapse the Soviet Union became an active subject of conducting
information-psychological operations. The state didn’t only become the successor of the USSR, but
also inherited and developed all the propaganda methods of waging information warfare against its
geopolitical opponents.
One of the vivid examples of waging hybrid warfare is Russian information warfare against
Ukraine, in the frames of which the government of the Russian Federation systematically exerts
influence on Ukrainian political leadership and population. In this context the research of the essence
and peculiarities of information-psychological operations conducted by Russia will allow to
understand the official Moscow’s key goals and objectives in Ukraine as well as highlight information
SCIA-2023: 2nd International Workshop on Social Communication and Information Activity in Digital Humanities, November 9, 2023,
Lviv, Ukraine
EMAIL: oleksandr.v.markovets@lpnu.ua (O. Markovets); mykola.a.buchyn@lpnu.ua (M. Buchyn); kv.anasta.ev@gmail.com (A.
Kovalchuk); Taras.M.Basyuk@lpnu.ua (T. Basyuk)
ORCID: 0000-0001-8737-5929 (O. Markovets); 0000-0001-9087-5123 (M. Buchyn); 0000-0002-8462-8705 (A. Kovalchuk); 0000-0003-
0813-0785 (T. Basyuk)
©️ 2023 Copyright for this paper by its authors.
Use permitted under Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
CEUR Workshop Proceedings (CEUR-WS.org)
CEUR
ceur-ws.org
Workshop ISSN 1613-0073
Proceedings
methods of its implementations for further development of techniques to counter Russian information
aggression.
The purpose of the study – is to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the problem of Russian
information and psychological special operations in Ukraine and the features of designing a system
for countering them.
Research hypothesis – the Russian Federation is currently actively using information and
psychological special operations against Ukraine, which pose a significant threat to national security
and require the design of a system to counter them.
The following methods were used during the research: logical: analysis, synthesis, induction,
deduction; general scientific: historical - to highlight the evolution of Russia's use of IPOs methods in
Ukraine; systemic - for consideration of IPOs as a complete system of forms and methods of
information influence; structural and functional - to clarify the structure of the IPOs and the
peculiarities of the impact of their individual elements: comparative - to compare the goals and means
of the IPOs of the Russian Federation in Ukraine from 2000 to today; modeling – for designing a
system to counteract Russia's use of IPOs against Ukraine; empirical: the method of document
analysis - to determine the regulatory and legal regulation of information influence in the Russian
Federation; qualitative and quantitative content analysis - to identify the key messages of Russian
propaganda and disinformation at the current stage.
The work includes an introduction, analysis of the source base, the main part, which includes 4
subsections and highlights the main results of the research, conclusions, a list of used literature.
2. Related Works
Despite the novelty, information-psychological special operations became the object of research
for many scientists, experts and specialists in the field of information technologies. Taking into
account the applied nature and the modernity of the described events, the source base of our research
includes both scientific publications and analytical materials or news, which reveal certain facts about
the use of information-psychological special operations by the Russian Federation.
Literature on the topic of the research can be divided into two groups. The first concerns the
disclosure of general concepts, related to information-psychological operations or related categories.
Thus group includes the researches of information-psychological special operations as one of the
modern instruments of geopolitical confrontation [1]; information-psychological struggle and its
peculiarities [2]; theoretical approaches to defining information-psychological special operations [3];
information-psychological influence, its exerting and methods of counteracting [4]; analysis and
implementation of information-psychological operations in the context of waging hybrid warfare [5];
information-psychological special operations as a challenge to states’ security and protection [6];
psychological operations, its techniques, tactics and procedures of realization [7], [8], [9], [10].
This group of sources should also include research on the specifics of information-psychological
special operations and mechanisms of countering informational and psychological influence. In this
context, it is worth mentioning the works devoted to the issue of information security in the frames of
waging a hybrid war and the role of journalism in it [11]; research on information resistance as a
mean of countering socio-psychological strategies of information warfare [12]; analysis of the
information war on a global scale and its cognitive effects [13]; research of the mechanisms of
countering fake information, which is the key to ensuring the information security of any state [14];
research of information as a modern geopolitical weapon [15]; analysis of behavior in social networks
and manipulation of public opinion [16], etc.
Considering the fact, that the information-psychological special operations are most widely and
effectively used to correct the results of the will of citizens during elections, a number of literary
sources refer to the analysis of the impact of information-psychological special operations on the
election process and democracy, and especially in the context of the security threats during the use of
electronic voting [17], [18].
Another group of literary sources refer to the practice of information-psychological operations
conducted by the Russian Federation. On the one side, this group includes the literature, which
generally characterize the Russian Federation as the subject of information-psychological special
operations at the present [19], [20], [21]; reveals the anatomy of Russian disinformation [22];
examines Russian Internet policy as network authoritarianism and the mechanism of using
information as a geopolitical tool [23]; reveals Russia's information war against the West through the
Russian government's use of hacking, propaganda and election manipulation [24]. On the other side,
this group also consists of researches of peculiarities of conducting information-psychological special
operations against Ukraine. In particular, it goes about the general analysis of Russian information
campaigns against Ukraine [25]; research of the reasons of an aggressive behavior and the full-scale
invasion on the territory of Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022 [26]; disclosure of the features of
disinformation in the media space during the war in Ukraine, aimed at forming the opinion that the
culprit of Russia's invasion of Ukraine is the USA, NATO and Ukrainian society [27]; field studies of
disinformation during the Russian-Ukrainian war through the prism of the perception and opinion of
the Ukrainian population regarding the manipulation of information [28], etc.
The basis of the source base of the research are the works of Ukrainian and foreign researches,
analytical reports of NATO, field manuals of the Armed Forces of the USA, legislation of the Russian
Federation as well as publications of the online newspapers. At the same time, despite considerable
attention to the problem of the information and psychological influence of the Russian Federation in
foreign countries, the studying of the Russian IPO in Ukraine from the 2000s to now remains
fragmented, and therefore requires deeper and more careful analysis.
3. Results and Discussion
3.1. Concepts and types of information-psychological operations
Information- psychological special operations is one of the examples of selective and purposeful
use of information flows in order to influence the target audience. It should be mentioned, that in
foreign sources (mostly English-language) the separate forms and abbreviations of the concept are
used: «PSYOPS» - psychological operations and «IO» - information operations, as well as «IPO» -
information-psychological operation.
The evolution of the means of information and psychological influence as well as differences in its
exerting in different states caused the emergence of various approaches to definition of the concept
“information-psychological special operations”. The origin of the term is associated with the creation
of the propaganda division led by the military intelligence of the American Expeditionary Force in
1918, and its first used – with the surrender messages sent to the Japanese mainland in 1945. The term
remained generic for decades, despite the fact its components were actively used by the countries of
the world [7].
The official definition of “psychological operations” was firstly established in the field manual of
the Armed Forces of the USA in 1979. It was mentioned, that the psychological operation
encompasses political, military, economic and ideological actions, which are planned and conducted
with the aim of creating in neutral, friendly and hostile foreign groups emotions, attitudes or behavior,
favorable for the achievement of national goals [10].
One of the modern definitions, suggested by Ukrainian researchers V. Zhadko and Y.
Kharytonenko explains IPOs as the planned use of technologies and means of spreading information
for influencing the people’s mind in a broad sense; and as an instrument of influence, which is
practically used during combat operations with the aim to demoralize opponent – in narrow sense [4].
According to the statements of Russian scientists A. Manoilo, A. Petrenko, D. Frolov, V. Veprintsev
IPOs – the complex of measures to manipulate the information flows in order to achieve advantage
over the enemy. Ukrainian researcher H. Pocheptsov explains such operations as communicative
technologies, which change the behavior and the mind of people by influencing psychological state of
the target audience [3].
Table 1.
Main definitions and the goals of IPOs
Definition of IPOs Goal of the IPOs
Political, military, economic, ideological actions Creation of emotions, attitudes or behavior,
which is favorable for the achievement of
national goals
Planned use of technologies and means of Influencing the people’s mind
spreading information
Instrument of influence during combat Demoralization of the opponents
operations
Complex of measures of the information flows Achievement the advantage over the enemy
manipulations
Communicative technologies Change of the people’s behavior by influencing
the target audience’s psychological state
One more definition was suggested by NATO and the US Ministry of Defense. It separates the
concepts “psychological” (PSYOP) and “information” (IO) operations. ІО is explained as integral use
of information possibilities during combat operations in order to influence, obstruct, corrupt and usurp
decision-making of actual and potential adversaries with the simultaneous protection of the domestic
one. IO is first of all military activities in information space, which has exactly defined goals, and also
includes offensive and defensive measures aimed at influencing the opponents decisions and
manipulating information and information systems. Instead psychological operations are the pre-
planned activities, which involve the use of communication methods and the other resources on the
target audience to influence their attitude, behavior, perception and interpretation of the reality. It is
emphasized that PSO is build on a certain psychological theme (a prepared narrative or idea), and the
greater the sensitivity of the target audience to the topic or tool of PSYOP, the greater the probability
of success of the operation. In accordance to the mentioned above, PSYOPs are conducted in
peacetime, and IO – during military operations [6].
Table 2.
The difference between information and psychological operations
Criteria Information operations Psychological operations
The essence of the Integral use of information Pre-planned activity, which
concept technologies includes application of
communicative methods
Goal Influence, obstruction, Influence on the target
corrupting, usurping the decision- audience’s attitudes, behavior,
making with the simultaneous perception and interpretation of
protection of the domestic one. the reality.
Methods of the use Manipulation of information Preparation and spreading the
narratives and ideas
Context of application During military operations Peacetime
In our opinion, information-psychological special operations should be understood as the complex
of particular actions, which has relevant information spreading and interpretation, involves
manipulation, misrepresentation, and aims to shape the object’s certain emotional and psychological
state and reactions, needed by the subject.
It should be mentioned, the term IPOs is often used in the context together with the concept
“information warfare”, which unlike IPOs is more strategic in nature. Thus, it can be argued that
information warfare is a complex of information and psychological special operations.
Modern researchers distinguish offensive and defensive IPOs (although a significant part of such
operations is mixed). By the goals and orientation, the operations aimed at making the decisions
required by the customer, obtaining or demonstrating compromising material, disrupting the political
system and/or society, as well as destabilizing the opponent are also identified. Short-term (up to 2
weeks), medium-term (up to a month) and long-term (more than 4 weeks) are distinguished by the
criterion of duration [11].
In the Allied Doctrine on Psychological Operations, developed by NATO, the following categories
of IPOs are defined: strategic (planned operations to gain support and strengthen cooperation with
friendly and neutral audiences as well as weaken the capabilities and desire of enemy audiences to
carry out aggressive actions); crisis (operations, which are the part of the settlement of crisis situations
and are conducted to create a favorable atmosphere and desire for cooperation between the parties to
the conflict and the civilian population); military (as part of combat operations against a defined target
audience in order to defeat the enemy or eliminate his desire to continue aggression) [8].
Table 3.
Main types of IPOs
Criteria Types of IPOs
Focus on the object Defensive
Offensive
Mixed
Goals and orientation Aimed at making the decisions needed by the
object
Aimed at obtaining or demonstrating
compromising material
Aimed at destabilization of the opponent
Duration Short-term (up to 2 weeks)
Medium-term (up to 1 month)
Long-term (more than 1 month)
Context and purpose Strategic
Crisis
Military
3.2. Goals, methods and forms of conducting information-psychological
special operations
According to the statements of V. Horbulin, the main goal of IPOs is the manipulation of the target
audience’s consciousness. And the tasks can be the following: changing or fixing in the people’s
consciousness particular views and ideas, misinforming and intimidating the population, as well as
weakening the existing beliefs, which form the basis of society. Another scientists V. Petryk
distinguishes such goals as: inducement to make decision beneficial to the initiator, obtaining
compromising material for its further use and destabilization of the social/political/economic order
[4].
Considering the fact, that IPOs are conducted in both peace- and wartime, the following
distribution of operation tasks can be made. In peacetime: destabilization of socio-political situation in
the country; demoralization of the civilian population and the military; creating and aggravating
contradiction between political forces, creating prerequisites for a social explosion. In wartime:
undermining the psychological and morale of the opponent’s army; creation and exacerbation of
contradictions between the military, society and political forces; supporting the opposition and
inciting it to confront the authorities [5].
Based on the analyzed approaches to defining IPOs, the following goals of the information-
psychological special operations can be distinguished (see Figure 1).
Change of the
basic
society’s
Spreading values
disinformatio Intimidation
n
Inducement
to make the Destabilizatio
particular n of the
decisions Main goals society
of IPOs
Ensuring
Demoralization victory in the
of society elections to
the right
politicians
Shaping the Shaping the
subject’s opponents’
positive negative
image external
image
Figure 1: The main goals of IPOs
The subjects of IPOs are the people and sources, which are directly engaged in exerting
information and psychological influence, in particular: political authorities and state special services,
media, non-governmental organizations, Internet-platform etc. [1].
The objects of IPOs (or the target audience) are the people or groups of people, whom the
specified influence is directed to. According to the US Field Statute “Psychological Operations,
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures”, published in 2003 there exist several types of the objects of
influence (see Table 4) [9].
Tаble 4.
Main objects of IPOs
Objects of IPOs Characteristics of the objects of IPOs
Primary groups Small social groups, families and companies
Secondary groups Political or governmental structures, organizations and
associations
Categories Large groups of people who share certain demographic
characteristics
Aggregates A group of people identified only by a common geographic area
Centers of gravity Individuals or small groups who may have significant power over
others
Key communicators Persons to whom members of the target audience address for the
information or its interpretation
The choice of the target audience varies depending on the type and purpose of the IPOs. In
general, the targets of IPOs are: military personnel (both authorities and soldiers), political leaders and
representatives of governmental structures, civilians, religious, ethnic and cultural groups, business
representatives, mass media, academic groups, public activists and non-governmental organizations.
The subjects of IPOs can influence both the audience in a foreign state and their own.
The effectiveness of IPOs mostly depends on the right choice of channels for the distribution of
the narratives needed for the subjects. Among the main channels of spreading information for the
IPOs are the following (see Figure 2) [5]:
Printed media
Distributed
Television printed
materials
Radio Social media
Main
channels
(ways)
of spreading
information in
IPOs
Programs and
special Online
applications platforms
Specially
trained Outdoor
communicator advertising
s
Figure 2: Main channels (ways) of spreading information in IPOs
Through these channels such methods of IPOs as disinformation, propaganda, psychological
pressure, spread of rumors, diversification of public opinion are applied [4]. Each of the mentioned
IPOs methods has its own characteristics and specific forms of practical application (see Table 5).
Table 5.
Methods of IPOs application
Methods of IPOs Peculiarities Forms of application
Disinformation Deliberate dissemination of false Tendentious distortion of facts;
information in order to hide the Disinformation “from the reverse” ;
truth or to influence public Terminological “mining”;
opinion to induce the object to “Grey” disinformation;
take certain actions. “Black” disinformation.
Propaganda Dissemination of ideas for their Simplification;
consolidation in public opinion, Silencing;
as well as the practical Displacement of fact.
application of these ideas in the
mass activities of people.
Diversification of Purposeful distraction of the Destabilization of the country or region;
public opinion political authorities’ attention of Intensification of opposition movements;
the state (by artificially drawing Publicity of scandalous court
attention to a certain range of proceedings;
problems), which prevent it from Introduction of sanctions, etc.
concentrating on solving urgent
and important issues for the
state and society.
Psychological Intimidation of the object and Dissemination of information about
pressure influence on his psyche forcing existing or false threats;
him to act accordingly to a Blackmailing
certain pattern of behavior. Committing acts of terrorism and mass
massacres;
Taking hostages, etc.;
Spread of rumors Dissemination of information Dissemination of information to
(mostly disinformation) among demoralize;
the masses though unofficial Dissemination of information to
channels to complicate the intimidate;
object’s activities. Dissemination of information to
disintegrate
IPOs are often conducted during elections and are used as one of the forms of foreign interference
in the election process. It can be explained by the important role, the elections play in the
development of a democratic society, being the main attribute, indicator and catalyst of democracy
[29]. On the other hand, the results of elections define the strategic direction of each state’s
development. Thus, external influence on the election process and its results allows the aggressor to
achieve its global goals by conducting IPOs. It is especially common in terms of using information-
communicative technologies and electronic voting in particular, which must be reliably protected
from foreign information influence [17], [18].
Fighting IPOs is an important issue for each state. However, the difficulty of сountering IPOs is in
the actual absence of the possibility of prosecuting the object of informational-psychological
operations as the characteristic features of information-psychological influence are its latency and the
absence of direct proves of aggression, with the simultaneous infliction of significant damage to the
target object without declaring was or terminating diplomatic relations. Another difficulty is an
identification of the primary sources of influence and determining the true intentions, means and
methods of the subjects’ actions [5].
Legal regulation of the information sphere as a mechanism for countering IPOs is also difficult.
This can be explained, in particular, by the low efficiency of such a mechanism. In addition, the high
level of legal regulation of the information sphere has a negative impact on the level of democracy
and freedom of speech, limiting, in this way, the possibilities for countering IPOs in democratic
countries.
The implementation of countermeasures against informational and psychological influence at the
state level can be carried out by the implementation of counteroperations aimed at the opponents or
the implementation by specially developed state security policy. The negative impact can be
neutralized by conducting information-explanatory campaigns for the population, using all available
channels of information dissemination; delivering truthful information to citizens and the international
community about the actions of country’s political leaders and its military structures; monitoring the
information space and immediate responding to the identified active and potential subjects of
influence; the unification of society around national values and the integration of citizens for the joint
fight against external threats; forming positive image of the state and its political authorities, etc. [4].
However, some of the most effective and universal mechanisms for counteracting informational
and psychological influence are a high level of consciousness and culture of citizens, a high level of
awareness and intelligence of individuals, in particular, their information literacy, a high level of
critical thinking. These make individuals significantly less vulnerable to IPSO, minimize the
effectiveness of informational and psychological influence
.
Information-
explanatory
campaigns
Formation of the Conducting
security strategy counter-
operation
Mechanisms of
counteraction to
IPOs
Public exposure Monitoring of
of the evidence information
of IPOs space
Formation of Formation of the
national values state’s positive
image
Figure 3: Mechanisms of counteraction to IPOs
3.3. The peculiarities of Russian information-psychological special
operations in Ukraine
After the collapse of the USSR, despite the factual end of the confrontation between the Soviet
Union and the USA, the competition in information sphere was increasing. At the times of B.
Yeltsyn’s presidency several strategic documents were published, in which it was mentioned, that
information and psychological operations became an integral element of the national security strategy.
The new era of understanding the advantages of waging “information wars” started with the
coming to power in Russia of V. Putin in early 2000s. In the following years, a number of strategic
security documents, which highlighted the presence of information threats to Russia from other states,
seeking to dominate in the global information space in influence the government and the population
was noted. These documents also declared the need for countering the other states’ use of
technologies to achieve aggressive military and political goals as well as the key role of information
activities in Russian security strategy.
The main reason for Russia's active use of IPOs at the current stage lies in the geopolitical interests
and imperial ambitions of the current Russian political elite. The effort to be one of the poles of
influence and to increase its dominance on the planet is realized, including, due to the spread of
informational and psychological influence both on its own audience and on the population of other
countries of the world.
Since the restoration of Ukrainian independence, the country has also been informationally
influenced by the Russian Federation. Having studied the peculiarities of Russian IPOs in Ukraine
(including conducting content-analysis of Russian media), we consider it appropriate to define 4 main
periods: 2000-2007; 2008-2013; 2014-2021; from 2022 – till now.
The beginning of the mentioned periodization from 2000, and not from 1991 (the period of the
collapse of the USSR), in our opinion, can be explained by the fact that during the presidency of B.
Yeltsin, the Russian political elite paid less attention to foreign policy interests due to the numerous
internal political problems. However, with V. Putin coming to power in Russia in 2000, imperial
foreign policy ambitions began to dominate. This led to the active use of IPOs. Therefore, the period
from 1991 to 2000, in the context of the issues we are investigating, can be considered a preparatory
stage for Russia’s future use of IPOs in general, and against Ukraine, in particular.
2000-2007 years can be characterized as the stage of conceptual understanding and strategic
planning of the Russian further actions. V. Putin set the goal of “restoring the former great power”.
Since the early XX century the Russian Federation has been introducing hard “vertical” power and
making long-term investments in controlled media and non-governmental organizations, which could
be used as the instruments of soft power. In 2000s a significant part of Ukrainian heads of media
holdings had close ties with the Russian Federation. For example, New Channel and STB were owned
by the Russian Alfa Group and Lukoil, and in 2006 the UA. Inter Media Group Limited company was
sold to the Russian billionaire A. Abramov. In 2000-2005 the director of the ICTV Channel’s
information service was Russian journalist D. Kiselyov, who was the host of political talk-show
“National Interest” at the same time. A significant part of the TV programs and films broadcast by
Ukrainian channels was created together with Russian media groups of even borrowed: for a certain
time the Inter Channel aired the new programs of the First Channel, and Ukrainian TET was filled
with the content of Russian STS. Print mass media wasn’t left out the attention of the Russian
Federation: such newspapers as “Kommersant”, “Arguments and Facts”, “Komsomolsk Truth” were
actively published in Ukraine [2].
During 2004-2007 years in the rhetoric of the Russian political elite, theses, saying that Ukraine
and Russian are parts of the same Orthodox civilization appear. Numerous public organizations,
including: Russian Movement of Ukraine, Russian Movement of the Crimes, Slavic Committee of
Ukraine, Russian Community, Ukrainian branch of the Institute of CIS Countries as well we
International Eurasian Movement (headed by A. Dugin) promoted such ideas. The aims of these
organizations were to impose pro-Russian views, spread dissatisfaction with Ukrainian policies
among Russian-speaking population, form a negative attitude of Ukrainians towards the integration
into the EU and NATO, conduct public actions and create the Russian image as the guarantor of the
protection of the Russian-speaking population, etc.
The ideas of historic, cultural and religious unity of Ukraine and Russia were supported by the
representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow
Patriarchate, “Black Hundred”, “United Fatherland”, the “Union of Orthodox Peoples”, etc. The
latter’s members actively spread the information, discrediting Ukraine in the Internet and participated
in mass protests [2].
The coverage of the event of the Orange Revolution of 2004-2005 by the Russian media deserves
special attention. In October-December 2004, print and online publications accused the USA of
financing actions on the Independence Square and “interfering in the country’s foreign affairs”. In
addition, it was noted that the revolution was organized by Western supporters of V. Yushchenko and
did not reflect the interest of Russian-speaking part of the population [30].
Until 2008-2009 it was possible to notice only some of the elements of Russian IPOs, which were
mostly aimed at maintaining the citizens’ loyalty to the Russian Federation, and so-called “reflexive
control” over the Ukrainian political elite, conducted by economic blackmailing (the Russian-
Ukrainian gas conflicts can be considered a vivid example of it).
The intensification of Ukraine-EU interaction during the presidency of V. Yushchenko also
contributed to the increase in tension between the parties. In 2008 the Russian media criticized
Ukraine, claiming that “there is no basic order” there, and “the country’s acceptance into NATO and
the EU will mean the destabilization of the entire West”. Russian mass media began to broadcast
narratives about the destructiveness of European values and the threat of potential economic collapse
in Ukraine after the signing of the Association Agreement, simultaneously raising the issue of the
status of Russian language [25].
Similar thesis actively circulated in the Ukrainian information space during the presidency term of
V. Yanukoych in 2010-2013. In the articles of Russian edition “Arguments and Facts in Ukraine”
there were phrases that “the integration of Ukraine into the EU will have serious negative impact on
the relations between Ukraine and Russia”, “Kyiv’s desire to “sit on two chairs” is vile”, “after
signing the Agreement, Ukraine will lose the right to vote and decide what laws to adopt, what tariffs
to set and how to interact with other unions – everything will be decided by the European
Commission”, “Russian-speaking population will not only suffer from great economic problems, but
also will become a victim of assimilation – a large piece is being separated from our common
civilizational space”, “in case of Ukraine’s accession to the EU, the Customs Union will take
protective measure, which will increase the deficit of Kyiv’s balance of payments to 15-16 billion
dollars. In 6 months, the state will become a bankrupt”. In 2012-2013 so-called “Internet-trolls” were
added to the list of means of Russian information influence, acting to create a positive coverage of
Russian government’s activities and suppress the opposition and discredit Western countries [19].
The new era of Russian IPOs started in the beginning of 2014. Taking advantage of the moment of
internal tension in the country, Russian incited the population of the Crimea to revolt against the
“Kyiv regime” and lobbied for its interests in the governmental structures of the autonomous republic.
Since mid-January 2014, with the support of the Russian community of Crimea and the political party
“Russian Unity” self-defense units were formed on the territory of the peninsula as a force of popular
resistance. These units were financed by Russian political structures and supposed to oppose the
“banderians” and advocate the creation of Ruthenia in case of a coup d'état. On February 20, 2014 the
operation to seize Crimea by the “little green men” began and was actually completed by March 1st.
On the same day the self-proclaimed Head of the Council of Ministers of Crimea S. Aksyonov
appealed to the President of the Russian Federation with a request to contribute to the establishment
of “peace and tranquility”, and the Parliament of Russia adopted a decision on sending troops to the
territory of Ukraine. According to the version of Russian media, the seizure of administrative
buildings was carried out by “groups of people without identification marks” and the protests took
place between the “supporters” and the “opponents” of the new government in Ukraine. What is more
important, the latter demanded the extension of the powers of the autonomous republic and the repeal
of the law introducing the Ukrainian language as the only state language on its territory [21].
In the frames of its informational operation Russian also limited the access of the Crimean
population to Ukrainian media: on March 6, 5th Channel, 1+1, Crima-24 were disconnected. Instead
of them Russia broadcast Russia-1. On March 9, all the Ukrainian television stations were switched
off. The President of the Russian Federation argued the feasibility of holding referendum and the
subsequent accession of Crimea to Russia in the following way: “Crimea has the same right to leave
Ukraine as Ukraine had – to leave the USSR”, “the Ukrainian authorities violate the rights of people
who speak Russian and Crimean Tatar”, “there is no legitimate executive power in Ukraine as the
current government is controlled by nationalists, Russophobes and anti-Semites” [31].
The next period of Russian IPOs followed the beginning of hostilities in the east of Ukraine. The
scenario of the events was similar to the one used before in Crimea: Russia created and financed the
organizations and people’s militias, which opposed the current Ukrainian government. The absence of
identification marks, both in Crimea and in the east of Ukraine, gave Russia the opportunity to defend
the thesis, that the hostilities are internal civil conflict in Ukraine. The Russian government spread
propaganda accusing Ukrainian forces of shelling peaceful cities in Donbas. Therefore, Russian
disinformation channels increased their influence first of all among the population of Lughansk and
Donetsks People’s Republics and it continued to accuse the Ukrainian government in aggression. The
information campaigns of the Russian Federation were also used against the representatives of the
Armed Forces of Ukraine. The soldiers and military authorities received text messages, which
encouraged them to surrender, saying Ukrainian government does not need them.
At the same time Russian sought to legitimize its actions in front of international community and
domestic audience. Thus, the annexation of Crimea and the proclamation of the so-called Lughansk
and Donetsks People’s Republics was positioned by the Russian government as “the right to self-
determination of peoples”. The President and the Russian representatives in international
organizations appealed to the provisions of the UN Charter and the Kosovo case, responding to
accusation with the thesis, that Western states apply double standards [25].
In addition to militaries, international community and the population of the occupied territories,
Russian continued to put pressure on the residents of the rest of Ukrainian territory by launching a
cyber war. Since November 2013 (in addition to the active operations of the “bot farms”) Russian
hackers have systematically carried out attacks on state institutions, enterprises, energy companies,
and even ordinary websites and TV channels to obtain state information, destabilize the work of
structures and exert psychological influence on the population [30].
On January 12, 2022 the Russian Federation made a number of demands to NATO. One of them
concerned the Alliance’s refusal of expansion and, in particular, the provision of guarantees that
Ukraine would not become a member of the organization. NATO’s refusal prompted the Russian
Federation to aggressive rhetoric. The state accused the bloc in threatening its national security [31].
In the media, Russia-NATO relations were described in the following way: “The relations between
Moscow and the Alliance are at critically low level on the background of terrorist threats, the
unfolding of arms race and the complete degradation of the security architecture in Europe… NATO’s
repeated disregard of Russian side’s initiatives regarding de-escalation creates the preconditions for
the emergence of conflicts and undermines the basics of security”. On February 21, V. Putin
recognized the independence of the Lughansk and Donetsk Republics, and in the morning of February
24, 2022 he announced the beginning of a special military operation in Ukraine. The “Special military
operation” was justified by the need to protect the residents of the Lughansk and Donetsk Republics
from the “genocide by the Kyiv regime” and its goals were defined as “demilitarization” and
“denazification” of Ukraine [26].
Table 6.
Historical peculiarities of Russian IPOs in Ukraine
Criteria 2000-2007 2008-2013 2014-2021 2022 – till now
IPOs’ goal Make Ukraine Increase the Seizure of power and Discredit the image of
remain in Russian economic and recognition of the DPR Ukrainian government,
sphere of political influence on and LPR as demoralize the society
influence. Ukraine by its autonomous republics and the military to end
integration into the within Ukraine. the war on the terms of
Customs Union. Russia.
IPOs’ Influence on Maintaining Forcing Ukraine to Discrediting the image
tasks Ukrainian influence on political recognize the L/DPR of Ukrainian
authorities to elite; and the annexation of authorities;
strengthen Convincing people, Crimea; Demoralization of
cooperation with that joining the Discrediting Ukrainian Ukrainian military and
Russia; Customs Union is authorities; civilians;
Convictions of more positive than Aggravation of Legitimization of
citizens in the integration with the contradictions in Russian actions in
historical and EU; society and Ukraine;
cultural unity of Discrediting destabilization of the
Ukraine and Euromaidan political situation;
Russia. participants; . Encouraging regions
neighboring the
Russian Federation to
become autonomous;
Target Ukrainian political Ukrainian political Ukrainian political Ukrainian political
audience authorities and authorities and authorities and authorities and
population; population; population; population;
Public activists Public activists and Residents of L/DPR and Ukrainian military
and cultural cultural actors; Crimea; personnel;
actors; Ukrainian military Residents of the
personnel; occupied territories;
International International
community; community;
Subjects Russian Russian authorities; Russian authorities; Russian authorities;
and authorities; Cultural and religious Cultural and religious Cultural and religious
channels Cultural and organizations; organizations; organizations;
of religious Pro-Russian Pro-Russian structures Media (print media,
influence organizations; structures in Ukraine; in Ukraine; television, radio,
Pro-Russian Law enforcement Media (print media, Internet);
structures in structures of television, radio, Special Internet “trolls”
Ukraine; Ukraine; Internet); and “bots”;
Media (print Media (print media, Special Internet “trolls” Russian special military
media, television, television, radio, and “bots”; division;
radio, Internet); Internet); Russian special military Representatives of
Russian cultural Special Internet division; foreign countries loyal
heritage; “trolls” and “bots”. Representatives of to Russia.
foreign countries loyal Saboteurs;
to Russia.
Methods Political and Political and Political blackmail; Threats of using
economic economic blackmail; Activities of non- nuclear weapons;
blackmail; Activities of non- governmental Psychological pressure
Activities of non- governmental organizations; on military personnel
governmental organizations; Propaganda and and civilians;
organizations; Propaganda in the disinformation in Intimidation;
Propaganda in the media (including media; Propaganda and
media; social media); Suppression of groups disinformation in
Impact through Suppression of disloyal to the Russian media;
soft power. groups disloyal to the Federation; Provocations;
Russian Federation; False flag operations: Activities of agents on
Aggravation of Provocations; influence and internet
contradictions in Activities of agents of trolls;
Ukrainian society influence and internet Propaganda and
regarding the vector trolls; disinformation on
of foreign policy Cyber attacks; international
Psychological pressure platforms;
on military personnel Cyber-attacks;
and civilians; Persecution of pro-
Propaganda and Ukrainian activists;
disinformation on Diversions.
international
platforms;
Key Russia and EU policies and The annexation of Ukraine is an aggressor
messages Ukraine are values are immoral; Crimea is completely country, that posed
brotherly nations Ukrainian economy legal and complies with threat to Russia;
with a common will not withstand the norms of Ukraine must be de-
history and European international law; Nazified and
culture; integration; ATO is nothing but a demilitarized;
Ukraine is the Joining the Customs civil war in Ukraine; Russia is fighting
“younger brother” Union is a guarantee Ukraine is waging a war against NATO;
of Russia; of stability and against the civilian Ukrainian political
Ukraine and development; population of the authorities are
Russia are united Euromaidan is L/DPR; exacerbating the
by strong organized by Nazis Ukrainian political conflict and do not
economic and Bandera people; authorities are corrupt want to sit down at the
connections; and ineffective; negotiating table.
Economic collapse
awaits Ukraine
without the
support of Russia.
The strategy of Russian IPOs in Ukraine (including the ones, which were used after the February
24, 2022) was based on 4 main information technologies (so-called “4 Ds”): demoralization,
discreditation, destabilization, disinformation [20]. Demoralization of the army was achieved by
conducting cyber-attacks on the information networks of the Armed Forces, state structures, and
Ukrainian mass media. Through damaged communication channels Russian propaganda broadcast
“classic” messages, discrediting the image of the Ukrainian authorities as well as encouraging military
to lay down the arms and surrender. The influence on the civilian population of Ukraine was carried
out by the use of manipulative techniques in the mass media, in particular, through social media, in
which the Internet trolls and bots actively continued their activities. The new tasks of the latter were
discrediting the Ukrainian government and its ability to counter aggression, positioning the power of
the Russian Federation and inciting internal conflicts in the country. One more element of the
demoralization of Ukrainian civilians was the direct use of psychological pressure, which prompted
them to consider the possibility of ending the war at any cost. The examples of the pressure are
dropping bombs on the theater in Mariupol and the Kramatorsk railway station, the actions of the
occupying forces in the captured territories, shelling the colony in Olenivka and residential buildings
in the cities, causing damage to critical infrastructure, etc.
Among the information technologies, used by Russian in its IPOs in Ukraine, the following should
be highlighted [20].
Table 7.
Key information technologies of Russian IPOs in Ukraine after the full-scale invasion according to the
result of content analysis of main channels of distribution of IPOS.
Information The essence of information The examples of application of the
technologies of technologies information technologies
IPOs
Substitution of Replacing general terms with a hostilities in the East of Ukraine = civil
concepts negative meaning with those that are war;
perceived positively or neutrally. foreigners fighting in Ukraine =
mercenaries.
Mirroring Accusing the enemy of what they are Description of the crimes of the
accused of. Russians in Buch as a production.
“Pass it on” Creating a message that evokes a The intentions of the Russian
strong emotion and calls for its Federation regarding mass shelling.
distribution.
Appealing to Quoting famous people to support Report of the French TV channel TF1.
authority arguments.
Intimidation Dissemination of information in order The announcement that Ukraine
to create negative and panicky plans to create a squad of
moods among the population. "punishers" who will kill citizens loyal
to the Russian Federation.
Stereotyping The formation of a certain stereotype Creating an image of Ukrainian
in public consciousness servicemen as "militants" and "neo-
Nazis".
The primacy effect Priority distribution of the version Russia is at war with NATO.
that will reach a large audience and
have a better chance of dominating
public opinion.
Rationalization Denying one's guilt and striving to The Russian Federation started a war
prove one's right with logical in Ukraine because of a threat from
arguments NATO.
The methods of Russian IPOs after the beginning of the full-scale invasion have remained
unchanged since 2014: disinformation, cyber-attacks, provocations, activities of agents of influence,
spreading rumors, psychological pressure, etc.
Social media and communication platforms became an important tool for spreading IPOs by
Russia. In this context, the authors conducted a content analysis of several pro-Russian Telegram
channels regarding the level and characteristics of the spread of IPOs in Ukraine after the beginning
of the full-scale invasion. The content analysis was carried out during the first half of 2023.
Table 8.
Peculiarities of the spread of IPSO in Russia in Telegram channels according to the results of content
analysis of pro-Russian Telegram channels.
Channel’s Украина.ру AГС_Z_Донб UKR LEAKS Open Легитимны
name асса Ukraine| й
Открытая
Украина
Characteristics News channel The open Telegram There is no There is no
of the Russia channel for channel of the information information
Today media messages about Investigation
group project. “life of the Center of V.
people of Prozorov
L/DPR during
war”
Number of 252 432 206 186 128 518 189 590 903 944
followers
Date of June 11, 2017 July11, 2019 April 20, 2019 April 11, 2019 December 20,
creation 2018
Disinformation + + + + +
Mostly “grey” Mostly “grey”
Propaganda + + + + +
Psychological negligible + negligible + +
pressure
Substitution of + + + + +
concepts
Mirroring + + + + +
“Pass it on” - + - - -
Stereotyping + + + + +
Rationalization + + + + +
3.4. Designing a system for analyzing posts in social media
The conducted analysis shows, that the number of users of social media and Telegram channels is
about 5 billion today, and this number continues to grow. These statistics clearly show that virtual
platforms for communication of interaction are very popular and have a huge audience. This means
that extremely large volumes of public information are created in such places, which can and should
be monitored. Carrying out such processed manually is extremely difficult. For this, you need to hire
whole departments that would select the necessary messages, so this process is very expensive and
inefficient. In this case, it is proposed to create a system of analysis of posts in social media for
effective monitoring of possible illegal actions.
In order to effectively design software, it is necessary to design it using an object-oriented
approach and deep neutral networks [32]. Therefore, we will start specifying that functioning by
constructing a diagram of use cases [33]. This diagram is used to represent a system as a set of actors
that interact with each other through use cases. The diagram of options for using the designed system
is presented in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Diagram of use option
Since the system is planned to be developed using an object-oriented paradigm, the next step is to
create a class diagram. Figure 5 shows the class diagram of the designed system.
Figure 5: Class diagram
As we can see in Figure 5, the system consists of the following main classes:
• Posts – an entity class that stores post data;
• User – an entity class that stores information about the user;
• DBContext – a class needed to create and work with a database based on the Entity
Framework;
• UserRepository – a class designed to provide methods for basic operations with the user table
in the database;
• PostsRepository - a class that is designed to provide methods for basic operations with the
table of posts in the database;
• UnitOfWork – the main task of this class is to ensure the display of changes in the database in
the form of a transaction;
• PostsWorker – responsible for working with posts from social media and their further
presentation in the form of an ontology [34];
• FileWorker – required for reading, saving and parsing data;
• WebAPIController – provides web controllers that process client http requests;
• SocialMedia – needed to organize access to social media.
In order to understand the features of the display of objects involved in the system and the order of
message transmission between them, a sequence diagram was developed. For the designed system, the
sequence diagram is shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Sequence diagram
As you can see from Figure 6, we have four main objects that interact, in particular:
• User – a person who uses the system.
• System is a software tool that implements the basic business logic.
• DataBase – a place where all data necessary for functioning is stored.
• SocialMedia - is not an internal object of the system, but the system interacts with it as it
sends a request to receive the necessary posts.
The next stage in the design process is the creation of the system architecture. In general, the
following options can be chosen:
• Monolithic application - all processes take place on the user's device. The advantage of this
approach is a smaller number of requests, so the disadvantage is that all calculations take place on
the user's device, which leads to an additional load on the client side. This can lead to undesirable
delays related to the performance of the platform.
• Client-server application - the system is divided into two main components - this is the server
side, where all business logic and data storage is implemented; the server itself can be represented
by several machines that will share the load among themselves; the client side is an application
that is installed on the user's device and provides him with an interface for interacting with the
system. This approach requires a greater number of requests. But it also has significant advantages,
which are the possibility of easy scaling, since all calculations and requests are processed by a
separate physical component. If necessary, their number and as the result performance can be
increased. The specified architecture also allows reducing the load on the user's personal device.
which will only visualize the received data from the server.
In view of the conducted analysis, it was decided to use the client-server method of building the
system architecture, which will give it flexibility, scalability and reduce the load on the client side. An
example of such an architecture is presented in Figure 7.
Figure 7: An example of the applied client-server architecture [35].
The next stage of the research will be the construction of a system for analyzing posts in social
media using modern software tools.
4. Conclusions
The development of information technologies and increasing of role of information contributed to
the emergence of ways for states to use information flows in order to achieve certain political goals.
Therefore, IPOs have become an important tool for influencing the domestic and foreign audiences. In
Ukrainian studies the concept “IPOs” is defined as a planned use of technologies and means of
information dissemination and as a tool of influence on society. Western terminology separates
informational and psychological operations, which are carried out during military operations and
peacetime, respectively.
The purpose of IPOs is to manipulate the consciousness of the target object in order to change its
beliefs, impose a certain model of behavior or make a decision beneficial to the object. Subjects in
such operations are any people and sources, that directly exert influence (e. g. political authorities,
mass media, non-governmental organizations, special services, etc.). Instead, the object is those at
who this influence is aimed (e. g. military or political authorities, civilian population, religious or
ethnic groups, mass media, public activities, etc.). Disinformation, propaganda, diversification of
public opinion, psychological pressure, rumors, etc., are among the methods of influence.
Russia’s intensive use of information and psychological influence practices began in the 2000s.
Since then, the Russian Federation has enshrined the need to conduct information campaigns abroad
in the legislature, explaining it by a threat from Western countries and the need for protection of the
Russian information space in the states of the post-Soviet space. Modern Russian information and
psychological operations are directed both inside the state and at the audience of foreign countries.
Russian citizens are forced to be loyal to the authorities, limiting their access to foreign sources of
information at the legislative level, suppressing any manifestations of opposition and broadcasting
propaganda through mass media. Instead, foreign audience is exposed through a wide range of “active
measure” that include disinformation, sabotage, underground and intelligence activities, etc.
Russian IPOs in Ukraine are a vivid example of Russian information technologies in the post-
Soviet space, which, according to the statements of Russian authorities, should remain Moscow’s
sphere of influence. Prior to the intensification of the state’s cooperation with the EU and NATO, the
Russian government mainly used soft power, emphasizing the unity of historical and cultural heritage.
In 2008, after the invasion of Georgia, the Russian government intensively worked to increase its
influence over the Ukrainian community and prevent its European integration, broadcasting
propaganda about the "economic consequences of joining the Union." The Revolution of Dignity and
the destabilization of the political situation in the country were used by Russia to carry out a number
of foreign flag operations, the annexation of Crimea and the declaration of L/DPR. The beginning of
the anti-terrorist operation and the continuation of Ukraine's course to join the EU was characterized
by the use of new methods of pressure on the country, in particular cyber-attacks, psychological
pressure on the military and the civilian population, and disinformation through the media and
diplomacy. After the start of the full-scale invasion, the IPSO focused on disinformation and
demoralization of Ukrainian society, pushing it to end the war on Moscow's terms.
5. References
[1] Ya. Derkachenko, Information-psychological operations as a modern tool of geopolitics
[Informatsiino-psykholohichni operatsii yak suchasnyi instrument heopolityky], GOAL, 2016.
URL: https://goal-int.org/informacijno-psixologichni-operacii-yak-suchasnij-instrument-
geopolitiki/. [in Ukrainian]
[2] V. M. Petryk, V. V. Bed, M. M. Prysiazhniuk, Information and psychological confrontation
[Informatsiino-psykholohichne protyborstvo], 2nd ed., PAT «VIPOL», Kyiv. [in Ukrainian]
[3] Yu. Tverdokhlib, Theoretical approach to the research of information and psychological
operations [Teoretychni pidkhody do doslidzhennia informatsiino-psykholohichnykh operatsii],
Epistemological studies in Philosophy, Social and Political Sciences, 2(2) (2019) 122–131. URL:
https://visnukpfs.dp.ua/index.php/PFS/article/view/983/1404. [in Ukrainian]
[4] A. O. Umanets, Information-psychological influence: concepts, peculiarities of implementation
and countermeasures [Informatsiino-psykholohichni vplyvy: poniattia, osoblyvosti realizatsii ta
sposoby protydii], TNU Vernadskoho 33(2) (2022) 106–112. URL:
http://psych.vernadskyjournals.in.ua/journal/3_2022/18.pdf. [in Ukrainian]
[5] I. Yu. Yuzova, Analysis of organization and conducting information-psychological operations
during hybrid warfare [Analiz orhanizatsii ta vedennia informatsiino-psykholohichnykh operatsii
pry vedenni hibrydnoi viiny], KhNU im. I. Kozheduba 2 (64) (2020) 40–44. [in Ukrainian]
[6] P. Vejvodova, Information and Psychological Operations as a Challenge to a Security and
Defence, Vojenske rozhledy 3 (2019) 83–96.
[7] An overview of psychological operations (PSYOP), Federal Research Division, Library of
Congress, Washington DC, 1989. URL: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA302389.pdf.
[8] AJP-3.10.1 (A) Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations. NATO/PfP Unclassified
publication, 2007. URL: https://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-PSYOPS.pdf.
[9] FM 3-05.301/MCRP 3-40.6A Psychological Operations, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.
Headquarters. Department of the Army, Washington DC, 2003. URL:
https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm3-05-301.pdf.
[10] FM 33-1 Psychological Operations. Headquarters. Department of the Army, Washington DC,
1979. URL: https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm33-1.pdf.
[11] V. Zhadko, O. Klymenko, P. Kulias, O. Markiv, Hybrid warfare and jourmalism. Issues of
information security [Hibrydna viina i zhurnalistyka. Problemy informatsiinoi bezpeky], Kyiv,
NPU im. M. P. Drahomanova, 2018. [in Ukrainian]
[12] A. Lebid, K. Vashyst, M. Nazarov, Information Resilience as a Means of Countering the Socio-
Psychological Strategies of Information Wars, International Journal of Media & Information
Literacy 7(1) (2022) 157-166.
[13] T. Clack, R. Johnson, The World Information War. Western Resilience, Campaigning, and
Cognitive Effects, Routledge, London, 2021. doi: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003046905.
[14] A. Svintsytskyi, O. Semeniuk, O. Ufimtseva, Y. Irkha, S. Suslin, Countering fake information as
a guarantee of state information security, Security Journal 36 (2023) 427–442.
[15] J. Olchowski, How to Weaponise Information, in Disinformation, Narratives and Memory
Politics in Russia and Belarus, Routledge, NY, 2022.
[16] L. Chen, J. Chen, C. Xia, Social network behavior and public opinion manipulation, Journal of
Information Security and Applications, 64 (2022). doi:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jisa.2021.103060.
[17] O. Markovets, M. Buchyn, Threats of the implementation of e-voting and methods of their
neutralization, CEUR Workshop Proceedings 3296 (2022) 29-39. URL: https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-
3296/paper3.pdf.
[18] M. Buchyn, A. Helesh, B. Shubyn, Information Security During Electronic Voting: Threats and
Mechanisms for Ensuring, in: 2021 IEEE 4th International Conference on Advanced Information
and Communication Technologies (AICT), Lviv, Ukraine, 2021, pp. 266-269. doi:
10.1109/AICT52120.2021.9628971.
[19] C. Paul, M. Matthews The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model', RAND
Corporation, 2016. URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html.
[20] PSYOPS Are Russia’s Way to Save On Conventional Weapons – DI. Instytut masovoi
informatsii, 2023. URL: https://imi.org.ua/en/news/psyops-are-russia-s-way-to-save-on-
conventional-weapons-di-i50384.
[21] Units of psychological operations of the Russian army [Pidrozdily psykholohichnykh operatsii
rosiiskoi armii], Military, 2020. URL: https://mil.in.ua/uk/articles/pidrozdily-psyhologichnyh-
operatsij-rosijskoyi-armiyi/. [in Ukrainian]
[22] G. Colom-Piella, The anatomy of Russian disinformation, Historia y Comunicación Social 25(2)
(2020). doi: https://doi.org/10.5209/hics.63373.
[23] N. Maréchal, Networked Authoritarianism and the Geopolitics of Information: Understanding
Russian Internet Policy, Media and Communication 5(1) (2017). doi:
https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v5i1.808.
[24] M. Wehner, Hacking, propaganda and electoral manipulation. Moscow’s information war on the
West, EUROZINE, 2017. URL: https://www.eurozine.com/hacking-propaganda-and-electoral-
manipulation-2/.
[25] Analysis of Russia’s Information Campaign Against Ukraine, The NATO StratCom Centre of
Excellence, 2015. URL:
https://stratcomcoe.org/cuploads/pfiles/russian_information_campaign_public_12012016fin.pdf.
[26] E. Lazareva, Why Putin started military operation against Ukraine, 2022. URL:
https://ura.news/articles/1036284030. [in Ukrainian]
[27] M. Musiał-Karg, A. Łukasik-Turecka, Disinformation in the media space during the war in
Ukraine. How did Kremlin’s fake news blame Ukraine, the USA and NATO for the invasion, in:
The War in Ukraine. (Dis)information – Perception – Attitudes, 2023, pp.13-38.
[28] L. Martín-Romo, M. Oliveros-Mediavilla, E. Vaquerizo-Domínguez, Perception and opinion of
the Ukrainian population regarding information manipulation: A field study on disinformation in
the Ukrainian war, Profesional de la informacion 32(4) (2023). URL:
https://revista.profesionaldelainformacion.com/index.php/EPI/article/view/87245/63445.
[29] M. Buchyn, Peculiarities and problems of measuring the level of democratic elections, Balkan
Social Science Review 21 (2023) 105–125. doi: 10.46763/BSSR2321105b.
[30] S. Ctetsenko, Russia and cyber attacks. Ukraine shared cyber defense experience with Czech
colleagues [Rosiia i kiberataky. Ukraina podilylasia dosvidom kiberzakhystu z cheskymy
kolehamy], Radio Svoboda, 2018. URL: https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/29656549.html. [in
Ukrainian]
[31] Russia formulated the response to the US and NATO regarding “security guarantees” [Rosiia
sformuliuvala vidpovid SShA i NATO shchodo “harantii bezpeky”], Ukrainska pravda, 2022.
URL: https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/02/14/7323955/. [in Ukrainian]
[32] O. Mediakov T.Basyuk, Specifics of Designing and Construction of the System for Deep Neural
Networks Generation, CEUR Workshop Proceedings 3171 (2022) 1282–1296. URL:
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3171/paper94.pdf.
[33] P. Mrzyglocki, UML Summarized: Key Concepts and Diagrams for Software Engineers,
Architects and Designers, Independently published, 2023.
[34] T. Basyuk, A.Vasyliuk, Approach to a subject area ontology visualization system creating,
CEUR Workshop Proceedings 2870 (2022) 528–540. URL: https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-
2870/paper39.pdf.
[35] J. Esterkin, Client-server architecture. URL: https://openclassrooms.com/en/courses/6397806-
design-your-software-architecture-using-industry-standard-patterns/6896156-client-server-
architecture.