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|id=Vol-3645/facete2
|storemode=property
|title= Emerging technology calls for a systemic view on military capability
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3645/facete2.pdf
|volume=Vol-3645
|authors=Kent Andersson,Jan Lundberg,Janis Stirna
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/ifip8-1/AnderssonLS23
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== Emerging technology calls for a systemic view on military capability==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3645/facete2.pdf
Emerging technology calls for a systemic view on military
capability
Kent Andersson1, Jan Lundberg1,2 and Janis Stirna2
1
Swedish Defence University, Drottning Kristinas väg 37, 114 28 Stockholm, Sweden
2
Department of Computer and Systems Sciences, Stockholm University, Borgarfjordsgatan 12, 164 55 Kista, Sweden
Abstract
Many nations are developing their military towards so-called Multi-Domain Operations with artificial
intelligence (AI) as a pivotal component, despite identified challenges. Modern-day military operations
underscore the need for updated battle management and cross-domain communication, central to the
principles of Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). AI's potential is obvious, and while
autonomous platforms revolutionize warfare, they introduce complexities in command and control (C2),
which is also reflected in capability development. This study identifies suitable concepts for systemic
analysis of military capability and is the starting point in forming a framework for C2 capability development
in the context depicted. A number of concepts are identified; Combat Power, Fighting Power, Joint functions,
Warfighting functions, Elements of combat power, Warfighting Capability, DOTMLPF(I), TEPIDOIL,
Fundamental inputs to capability, Defence lines of Development, and Military Power. The study also
highlights their systemic character and guides the reader briefly in matching issues with suitable concepts.
Keywords
Capability, defence, socio-technical system 1
1. Introduction
Numerous nations are currently advancing their military capability towards mastering Multi-Domain
Operations. Conducting military operations across multiple military domains, like air, sea, ground
and cyber domains, is extremely complex and highlights the need for an updated approach to battle
management and its associated command-and-control (C2) framework. The design of such a C2
framework enables commanders to synchronize and coordinate operations against a vast number of
moving enemy targets in all domains. Accomplishing such operations with speed and acceptable risk
for losses or collateral damage is currently challenging, due to outdated command and control-
systems. In this context, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is an emerging technology with great potential -
while also presenting substantial challenges and associated risks [1]. The development of autonomous
weapon systems, supported by AI, pose new challenges to executing command and control. Research
emphasizes that there are major risks with commanders not fully understanding the actions of AI-
empowered systems [2]. We believe that benefiting from the potential in emerging technology, while
shaping military capabilities that are acceptable to society from ethical, cultural, and legal
perspectives, calls for a holistic approach to C2 development. Forming a suitable understanding of the
concept of military capability is an important first step.
Though capability is central to assessments and decision-making in the defence and security sector
the understanding of the term seems to differ a lot, thus hampering fruitful communication between
Companion Proceedings of the 16th IFIP WG 8.1 Working Conference on the Practice of Enterprise Modeling and the 13th
Enterprise Design and Engineering Working Conference, November 28 – December 1, 2023, Vienna, Austria
Kent.Andersson@fhs.se (K. Andersson); jan.lundberg@dsv.su.se (J.Lundberg); js@dsv.su.se (J.Stirna)
0000-0001-6104-5788 (K. Andersson); 0009-0008-0485-6005 (J.Lundberg); 0000-0002-3669-832X (J. Stirna)
© 2023 Copyright for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
CEUR
ceur-ws.org
Workshop ISSN 1613-0073
Proceedings
scholars or professionals. Lindbom et al. made a thorough review of definitions in scientific literature
related to risk management [3]. They found that the word capability is frequently used but rarely
defined. Still, they managed to list thirteen definitions related to their area of research. They
concluded that there are definitions that seem to equate capability with resources. Other definitions
focus on the ability to solve a task or to obtain an objective. In the area of information systems,
capability has been included in many enterprise architecture frameworks. The common purpose of
the use of the concept of capability in that domain is modeling organization’s ability to achieve an
intension, sometimes combined with capacity and situational specifics. C.f. [4] for more details on the
use of capability in those frameworks.
But, how does technology relate to military concepts of capability? When making assessments or
decisions on what to do about a military threat we recognize that technology is an important aspect.
However, it is evident that technology alone will not be enough. The integration of technology
requires a framework encompassing doctrines, strategies, leadership structures, methodologies, and
other elements. Having a systems approach, we can view a problem situation as a socio-technical
system, including a potential military opponent with personnel equipped, trained, and organized to
enforce the will of their leadership on us. Correspondingly, we can view our own military force as a
respondent system made up of our own interacting social and technical components. See Lawson [5]
for details on the systems model presented. Having this view, decisions can be made in relation to the
anticipated effect of the entire respondent system if engaging the situation system – and risks of
serious sub-optimizations are reduced. This is equivalent to making decisions based on how these are
anticipated to affect the overall ability to solve a military task. Hence, if having a socio- technical
systems view on matters in the military domain it is wise to start with a definition of military
capability associated with the overall ability to solve a task or to achieve a goal. Such definitions will
also be in harmony with lexical definitions like “the quality or state of being capable” [6], or “the ability
or qualities necessary to do something” [7]. A few useful definitions are discussed below.
Assume we can agree assessments of a military force is ultimately about assessing its capability in
some situation. The next step is then to analyze the problem at hand. This might involve questions
like: if we choose this course of action how will that affect capability? Or, if we develop and acquire
this equipment how will that affect capability? Or, if we organize in this way how will that affect
capability? Depending on the nature of the question, the analysis will require a relevant concept of
what elements constitutes capability and a valid theory for how the elements relate. Having a socio-
technical view on capability means acknowledging that capability constitutes both social and technical
components. From this view follows that, to properly understand capability, we must involve
researchers and perspectives from both social science and from engineering disciplines, such as
information system engineering. Though, any lack of understanding for others’ viewpoints risk
hampering a fruitful dialogue which leads to poorly designed systems and solutions to capabilities.
This study forms the starting point of our journey towards a socio-technical systems framework
for developing military command and control capability. Next section, Section 2, describes our
method. Section 3 presents our review of concepts identified in the military domain and Section 4
presents a concluding discussion.
2. Method
The aim of this study, as described above, is to find concepts suitable for socio-technical systems
analysis of military capability. The research approach is non-systematic literature review in the
military domain based on the experience of the authors. Two of the authors of this study are active
officers, together representing more than forty years of experience in developing C2 capability,
gained from various positions in the Swedish Armed Forces. One is also a senior lecturer at the
Swedish Defence University with more than ten years of experience in teaching military capability
development to first and second cycle students.
First, concepts related to assessments of capability were identified. Then these were reviewed
through the systems lens described in the introduction. The result is an assessment of each concept's
usefulness to analysis of military problems.
3. Review of concepts related to military capability
3.1. Definitions of capability in military context
In the 2013 issue of Textbook in military-technology, volume 9: theory and methods, the authors make
a slight modification of the lexical definitions and define capability as “to be able to do something
successfully” [8]. They explain that in military contexts the term is often used with attributes relating
the capability to missions at different levels of conflict, like having the capability to stop a military
invasion, to do surveillance of own territory, or to perform ceremonial tasks. With this description it
follows that a military actor is expected to incorporate many different capabilities. Some of them are
in continuous use while others might never be tested. Whether a military actor can do something
successfully or not also implies that it depends on the circumstances of the operation in question, and
on potential adversaries.
The authors of the Subject Description of Systems Science for Defence and Security [9] instead refers
the term to “a potential in a society, organization, group or individual to achieve a specific goal given
the right resources”. They also state that characteristic to capabilities in military units is that they are
shaped under requirements from “uncertainty and large potential risks, both for society and for the
individuals charged with protecting it” [9]. Thus, this definition highlights that capability is something
abstract, an inherent potential in people, and that it exists in organizations on different levels. The
referred text also justifies speaking of military capabilities, to distinguish them from others.
NATO defines capability as “the ability to create an effect through employment of an integrated
set of aspects categorized as Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership development,
Personnel, Facilities, and Interoperability” [10], referred to as DOTMLPFI. NAF (NATO Architecture
Framework) defines capability as “the ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and
conditions” and highlights the use of scenarios, to describe a context, and a holistic engineering
approach [11]. Each definition is easily associated with a systemic view on capability and is also very
specific about its constituent elements.
Common to these definitions of the capability concept is that they associate capability with doing
something or achieving an objective. This is similar to how capability is treated in enterprise
architecture frameworks. The current view on capabilities also suggests separating one capability
from another. We can say that a given resource contributes to a specific capability but not to another,
or we can say that we lack a specific capability. There are many other definitions. See for example
Henshaw et al. [12] or Lindbom et al. [3]. In addition, there are concepts easily associated with military
capability, and sometimes used synonymously. Combat power is one example.
3.2. Combat power
“The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against
the opponent at a given time.” [13]
Power is frequently used in our context of interest. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary
there are several lexical meanings. Two of them are interesting in this text. First, the “ability to act or
produce an effect” and, second,” the possession of control, authority, or influence over others” [6]
The quote above is how NATO and the US Department of the Army defines the concept called
Combat power. Note that the concept seems to be associated with the means to fight available to a
specific military formation, of any size. Furthermore, it is related to the formation’s ability to destroy
or disrupt an opponent – not to perform any specific military task.
This concept might primarily be useful in political or strategic power discussions, perhaps for
comparisons of combat power between two opponents, e.g., if it is greater or lesser, or for discussing
whether a resource of interest contributes or not. From a systemic viewpoint on capability, the utility
of this concept seems limited. Though, there are other concepts with similar labels that do contribute,
like Fighting power.
3.3. Fighting power
“The ability of any actor to use, or threaten to use, force to achieve a desired outcome is dependent on their
will to act, their understanding and their capability to act decisively. Together these determine an actor's
effectiveness – their fighting power – and represent respectively its three interrelated components: morale,
conceptual and physical. No component is more important than any other; for instance, it does not matter
how advanced the platforms, weapons, and sensors if the people operating them lack legitimacy, morality,
motivation, doctrine and training, or adequate leadership. Likewise, the three components are not
independent; each overlap with, and rely on, the others.” [14]
So far, the presented concepts can only be used for accounting or managing a portfolio of
capabilities. They say very little about how various phenomena affects military capability. However,
in many Western doctrines, the ability to fight has for a long time been captured using a concept
labelled the Fighting power of a military actor. The quote above is from the British doctrine. The Fighting
power as defined there comprises three interdependent components: the conceptual component, (the
thought process), the morale component (the ability to get people to fight); and the physical
component (the means to fight). Hence, what the actor wants to do is a product of the conceptual
component. The manpower and equipment required to do it constitute the physical component, and
the resolve to do it is a product of the morale component.
Having a systems’ view on capability it is especially interesting to note that Fighting power is viewed
as the effect of three interacting and interdependent components, thus, it can be regarded a system’s
effect. The concept is, for example, applicable in the study of cases where the morale component seems
to compensate for an adversary’s superior physical forces, or, in the study of cases where an innovation
in physical forces does not seem to have the foreseen effect on the battlefield, perhaps due to
underdeveloped doctrine.
3.4. Joint functions, warfighting functions or the elements of combat power
“Joint functions — Related capabilities and activities placed into seven basic groups of command and
control, information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment to help
joint force commanders synchronize, integrate, and direct joint operations.” [15]
“To execute combined arms operations, commanders conceptualize capabilities,” and “[when achieved,
it] is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or
formation can apply at a given time.” [13]
Another systemic conceptual framework is used by military actors in the design of their forces. Its
main purpose is to facilitate the planning, or study, of dynamics in the application of capabilities in
military operations. It is called Joint functions on joint level in the US and in NATO, or Warfighting
functions, or Elements of combat power, on component level. There is a difference in the exact number
or clustering of functions or elements, but the use of the concept is similar. It is described in the NATO
allied joint operations doctrine: “The joint functions are a framework that provides the commander
and staff a means to visualize the activities of the force and to ensure all aspects of the operation are
addressed. They are a point of reference, as well as a description of the capabilities of the force. Several
subordinate tasks and related capabilities help define each of the joint functions and some of them could
apply to more than one function. In any joint operation, the commander joint task force (JTF) may
choose from a wide variety of joint and service specific capabilities and combine them in various ways
to perform joint functions and accomplish the mission” [16]. For example, an artillery battalion with
the capability to deliver indirect fire might in some phase of the operation support a mechanized
battalion and in some phase of the operation produce fires to neutralize the target – thereby
contributing to the task force’s collective functions maneuver and fires respectively. The NATO allied
joint operations doctrine also points out that “forces and assets are not characterized by the functions
for which the commander is employing them. A single force or asset can perform multiple functions
simultaneously or sequentially while executing a single task” [16]. How the subordinate capabilities are
applied to contribute to the joint functions is determined in the operations plan.
The Swedish strategic doctrine uses the equivalent of six joint functions for the purpose described
above: intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, command and control, sustainment, and
protection [17]. In the handbook on management in the development of military units’ availability has
been added. The concept is used in the handbook to make sure that a military unit under development
is designed with all essential capabilities in mind. [18]
Another way to describe the concept is using a technique known as design logic. When designing
a military force, the joint functions/warfighting functions/elements-of-combat-power can be viewed
as the functions necessary to fulfil the system’s purpose. The subunits realizing the physical form of
the force support the functions necessary to solve the mission. Figure 1 shows the use of the design
logic pattern to illustrate the role of joint functions/warfighting functions/elements-of-combat-power
in the design of a military force. The pattern to the left is generic and the pattern to the right is specific
to the design (force generation in the planning of an operation) of a military force.
Figure 1: The use of the design logic pattern to illustrate the role of joint functions/warfighting
functions/elements-of-combat-power in the design of a military force.
The pattern is recursive and consequently we can use it to find a balanced design in any size of
military force – even in a single platform unit like for example a main battle tank (MBT). The design
logic pattern helps us to distinguish between a function and a capability. There is a difference, but
one that can be difficult to perceive at times. What is a capability and what is a function is a matter of
which mission designer or analyst has in focus. Note that when using the concept to improve a technical
system one has already decided on the general design, but it can be used to balance subsystems for
overall performance. In the MBT example the framework can be used to support a decision on
whether to rely on passive protection or whether to invest in active protection measures. The latter
must be weighed against increased signature within the protection function, and it might have
unwanted secondary effects on other functions, like possibly on movement and maneuver.
3.5. Capability-Based-Planning and Warfighting capability
At the end of the Cold war western states found themselves faced with great uncertainty to what end
their armed forces should be developed and trained. To many states there were no longer an evident
threat and a concept called Capability-Based Planning was born [19]. Using Capability-Based-
Planning, fighting power is viewed as a portfolio (a collection) of so-called Warfighting capabilities.
Figure 2: The Traceability model that the Swedish Armed Forces use for their version of capability-
based planning.
Each Warfighting capability refers to an objective, a task that needs to be accomplished in support
of the objective, or the task force necessary to conduct these tasks. They are seen as building blocks
possible to combine to form new warfighting capabilities on successively higher command levels. The
purpose is primarily to support military capabilities management in uncertainty [20]. One merit is
that a military actor can “provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of challenges while working
within an economic framework that necessitates choice” [21]. Another important result claimed by
proponents is that it shifts the generation of requirements away from a platform centric focus [20]. The
US portfolio called Universal Joint Task List is often used as a model for other states.
The Swedish Armed Forces started implementing Capability-Based-Planning, with a portfolio of
Warfighting capabilities, the so-called Traceability model (translation from Spårbarhetsmodellen in
Swedish), at the turn of the last decade [22]. A Warfighting capability was defined as “a specific
activity, for which resources have been acquired and trained, in order to achieve a desired effect that
varies depending on scenario and ambition” [23]. After 2015 the Swedish portfolio of warfighting
capabilities is no longer public. However, the ambition to uphold traceability between tasks and
capabilities on all command levels still applies. In a Swedish Armed Forces (SwAF) presentation [24]
to the Swedish National Financial Management Authority (ESV) the traceability model was illustrated
using the Vee-model [25]. See Figure 2. To the left in the Vee-model is shown how the task from the
government is recursively broken down into tasks at successively lower command levels, and on the
right side how the capabilities of the armed forces are successively integrated to correspond to these
tasks. The diagram has been adopted from an illustration of “Spårbarhetsmodellen” [24].
The model shows how a strategic task corresponds to Strategic capabilities, how joint tasks
corresponds to Joint capabilities, how tasks on component level corresponds to Tactical capabilities,
and lastly how all of these are integrated from the capabilities of the military units. The verification
of capabilities on each level is performed against predefined vignettes and scenarios involving a
potential adversary in focus.
The Capability-Based Planning and Warfighting capabilities concepts thus makes it possible to have
a system management view on the forces and capabilities of a military actor. A Lego metaphor easily
comes to mind. Having all kinds of pieces in your toy box sets you up to build a new and innovative
construct if the need suddenly arises. The tools and processes of Systems Engineering seems to apply.
3.6. The DOTMLPF construct and similar acronyms
In parallel to the Capability-Based-Planning initiative, many nations have found it useful to think of
and manage military capabilities as systems comprising similar abstract elements [21]. In the US the
system elements comprise; Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education,
Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) [26]. NATO adds an I for Interoperability [27]. The common aim is
to obtain a holistic view of capability development, thereby shifting attention away from the
traditional platform centric approaches and towards non-materiel aspects.
To scholars interested in understanding the value of technology in military capability this is useful.
Regardless of the categorization of elements, we realize that any component in a system, like the
Materiel/Equipment element, can deliver no effect by itself but has dependencies to the other elements.
Thus, equipment must be operated by well-trained people, organized to support a fitting doctrine.
Consequently, when assessing the military utility [28] of a new technology we should relate it to the
predicted change in delivered military effect, which is indirectly a measure of the induced change in
military capability.
3.7. Military power, the modern system view
The modern system is a tightly interrelated complex of cover, concealment, dispersion, suppression, small-
unit independent maneuver, and combined arms at the tactical level, and depth, reserves, and differential
concentration at the operational level of war. Taken together, these techniques sharply reduce
vulnerability to even twenty-first century weapons and sensors. Where fully implemented, the modern
system damps the effects of technological change and insulates its users from the full lethality of their
opponents’ weapons. [29]
The concepts presented so far are ontological and give no real evidence as to how the components
of capability interact – especially if one is interested in the effects of technology change. That is why
Stephen Biddle’s Modern System theory is relevant. In his book Military Power [29] he views military
capability as the military dimension of power and claims it can be understood as a function of the
interaction between Force employment, military technology, and Preponderance. Force employment
comprises tactics, doctrine, skill, morale and leadership, and Preponderance can be understood as mass,
or force numbers. By using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods in case studies of past military
conflicts, Biddle finds that after World War I the outcome of military land battle is determined by Force
employment. His study shows that an actor having a modern system view (see the quote above) on
the application of its forces can exploit properties of military technology. But, he claims, these have
changed little after WWI. Consequently, when engaged with a high-tech adversary, the capability to
modify force utilization could suppress the impact of new technology.
On the other hand, in battle with a non-modern system army the effect of exploiting technology
changes is often great due to an increase in the adversary’s vulnerability. Increased superiority, Biddle
claims, only matters in battle between modern system armies [29]. Warfighting is also a two-way street
where an adversary undertaking similar activities, trying to degrade own forces capability. When
engaging an adversary with similar capabilities the force that processes the targeting5 process faster
holds the advantage [30].
Last, the Modern system theory applies to land battle. One can’t help to ask, are there similar
relationships between force employment, technology change and preponderance in the airspace and
maritime theatres?
4. Discussion
Capability is a core measure of what matters in the military domain. Therefore, military capability is
often at the heart of public or scholarly discussions. Unfortunately, in practice misunderstandings
occur. This is partly because there are many different interests in and views on the subject, but also
partly since there is many related and similar concepts brought into the discourse by representatives
of different professional and scientific disciplines. Some of the concepts commonly used in the
military domain have therefore been described to increase awareness of their nuances. See Table 1
for a compilation.
Table 1
Presents the list of concepts and their respective features.
Several of the concepts were evidently developed from a system thinking point of view, although
this is implicit in the respective definitions. Still, they differ in how useful they are for analysis or design
in different contexts. If the interest of analysis is in how requirements on weapon platforms have
evolved within the capability of Combat Air Support since 1940, then perhaps one should choose the
DOTPMLF(I) construct to study how the changes in operational context trace down to the interfaces
between Materiel (M) and Doctrine (D), between Materiel and Training (T) etc. If interest of analysis
is in finding an explanation as to why Ukrainian soldiers were sitting on top of their armored personnel
carriers (APC) instead of in them during the conflict with Russia-supported forces in 2014, then perhaps
we should choose the Fighting-Power concept to study the interaction between physical and morale
factors. A conclusion to draw is, if we always casually replace military capability with Warfighting
functions then the analysis will only be interesting less than half of the time.
Of course, the true capability of military force could only be fully assessed when the force engages
an adversary. Only then it is possible to know the opponent and his abilities and shortcomings. This
makes assessing military capability exceptionally challenging, and therefore it is best conducted with
a base of science combined with art. In the context of rapidly advancing technological progress and
its ongoing integration in society, we claim designers of military capability benefit from adopting a
holistic system perspective as they outline the specifications for various sub-systems, whether
technical or socio technical. No doubt, assessments of such capabilities require parallel use of several
of the capability concepts presented here. This implies that the current methods regarding capability
development should evolve to become more holistic, flexible, and comprehensive [31].
Acknowledgement
The paper is in part based on lecture notes available online.
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