=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-3654/paper24
|storemode=property
|title=Conflict Model of Radio Engineering Systems under the Threat of Electronic Warfare
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3654/paper24.pdf
|volume=Vol-3654
|authors=Volodymyr Astapenya,Yuliia Zhdanova,Svitlana Shevchenko,Svitlana Spasiteleva,Olena Kryvoruchko
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/cpits/AstapenyaZSSK24
}}
==Conflict Model of Radio Engineering Systems under the Threat of Electronic Warfare==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3654/paper24.pdf
Conflict Model of Radio Engineering Systems
under the Threat of Electronic Warfare
Volodymyr Astapenya1, Yuliia Zhdanova1, Svitlana Shevchenko1, Svitlana Spasiteleva1,
аnd Olena Kryvoruchko2
1 Borys Grinchenko Kyiv Metropolitan University, 18/2 Bulvarno-Kudriavska str., Kyiv, 04053, Ukraine
2 State University of Trade and Economics, 19 Kioto str., Kyiv, 02156, Ukraine
Abstract
The purpose of the article is to determine the necessary conditions for creating a conflict
model of radio technical systems that function in the information space under the threat of
radio Electronic Warfare (EW). The starting points of the theory of conflict about complex
technical systems are given. It is determined that the Information Conflict (IC) is a key
component of the conflict in the conditions of modern radio-electronic warfare. The
information conflict is considered a process of combating radio electronic systems at the stage
of obtaining information about the opponent and its transmission to consumers and radio
suppression systems, which oppose them. The composition and functions of the subsystems
included in the radio-electronic warfare system were analyzed: Radio Electronic
Reconnaissance (RER), Radio Electronic Suppression (RES), and Radio Electronic Protection
(REP). The list of modern systems that use radio waves to obtain and transmit information, as
well as other types of information support, assuming the action of EW means against them, is
considered. When creating a model of information conflict between similar systems and the EW
system, factors that need to be identified are the interferences of various origins and especially
intentional ones, the creation of which is one of the main tasks of EW. The main characteristics
of information systems that can be violated and should be defined in the conflict model are
interference resistance, interference protection, and secrecy. In a conflict, they are points of
contact and, together with the characteristics of EW tools, need to be adequately reflected in a
mathematical model. A list of conflicts between EW systems and other information systems is
provided. An example of estimating the range of radio communication, radio reconnaissance,
and navigation is given. The results of the research can be used as educational material for
students of the specialty 125 Cybersecurity and Information Protection.
Keywords 1
Conflict, information conflict, information security systems, cyber system, cyber conflict,
electronic warfare, radio-electronic reconnaissance, radio-electronic suppression, radio-
electronic protection.
1. Introduction capabilities, tendencies to self-organization, a
large volume of internal information and
Technical systems of various purposes, among memory (as the ability to store one’s experience
which large-scale technical systems play an and use it), and a certain freedom of behavior.
increasingly important role, have gained global The majority of such systems involve human
distribution and occupy a dominant place in the participation as a subject of management and
main areas of people’s lives. They form a decision-making. This means that we are talking
technosphere in which the dominant role is about ergatic systems [1–3] of a rather high level.
occupied by complex ergatic systems with wide Despite all their attractiveness, such systems are
CPITS-2024: Cybersecurity Providing in Information and Telecommunication Systems, February 28, 2024, Kyiv, Ukraine
EMAIL: v.astapenia@kubg.edu.ua (V. Astapenia); y.zhdanova@kubg.edu.ua (Y. Zhdanova); s.shevchenko@kubg.edu.ua (S. Shevchenko),
s.spasitielieva@kubg.edu.ua (S. Spasitielieva); ev_kryvoruchko@ukr.net (O. Kryvoruchko)
ORCID: 00000-0003-0124-216X (V. Astapenia); 0000-0002-9277-4972 (Y. Zhdanova); 0000-0002-9736-8623 (S. Shevchenko); 0000-
0003-4993-6355 (S. Spasitielieva); 0000-0002-7661-9227 (O. Kryvoruchko)
©️ 2024 Copyright for this paper by its authors.
Use permitted under Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
CEUR Workshop Proceedings (CEUR-WS.org)
CEUR
ceur-ws.org
Workshop ISSN 1613-0073
Proceedings
290
inevitably characterized by conflict and poor EW is a type of armed struggle in which
predictability of some consequences, which radio emissions (radio jamming) are used to
sometimes leads to instability and catastrophic influence the radio-electronic means of the
consequences [2–3]. For example, information enemy’s control, communication, and
exchange systems will not be able to ensure its intelligence systems to change the quality of
integrity, availability, and confidentiality, which the information circulating in them, to protect
can lead to severe consequences in a system one’s systems from similar influences, as well
where this information is needed for proper as a change in the conditions (properties of the
functioning. In a certain sense, the prevention of environment) of radio wave propagation.
such events is connected with the difficulties of Radio-electronic warfare (some authors
forming adequate models of the relevant [11] have long used the term radio-electronic
conflicts. Work on their creation is being carried or electronic war about it) is implemented by a
out [4–9] and needs to be continued. corresponding system, which consists of the
The conflict should be interpreted as a form of following main subsystems [10]:
interaction of complex systems. Then, within the • Radio-electronic reconnaissance (the
framework of the system approach, two options main types of which are radio
for describing this interaction (conflict) are reconnaissance and radio technical
possible: reconnaissance).
• A general description taking into account • Management and control of the process
the essential factors followed by the and results of EW conducting.
identification of the nature of the • Radio suppression by radiation of
interaction, conflicting components, interference.
causes, mechanisms of development, • Electromagnetic damage to equipment
and the result (such a model is complex, by powerful electromagnetic pulses.
multifaceted, but relatively reliable). • Electronic protection of own means.
• Proceeding assuming that the parties, Radio-electronic reconnaissance collects
causes and nature of the conflict are reconnaissance information based on the
known, identify the main factor(s) and reception and analysis of electromagnetic
build a model to calculate the factor’s radiation. Radio electronic reconnaissance
contribution and the outcome of the includes radio reconnaissance, the task of
conflict. which is to intercept signals from
communication channels and determine the
2. EW System Characteristics and content of messages, and radio technical
reconnaissance, which, based on the analysis
Potential Conflicts with Radio
of the parameters of the received signals of
Systems working radars, communication stations, radio
jamming stations, and other radio-electronic
One of the example of complex systems where means, determines the type of appropriate
there is a permanent conflict is the functioning of means, their operating frequency, spectrum
information systems of various purposes in the width, time parameters of signals,
conditions of a potential threat of conducting characteristic of antenna directionality,
Radio-Electronic Warfare (EW). Moreover, radio polarization of radiation, direction to the
communication and countermeasures to it source of the signal and its location (this is also
developed almost simultaneously. done by radio reconnaissance), parameters of
Thus, the first episode of EW in the radio the movement of the source and some other
range took place in 1904, when near Port characteristics of radio-electronic means.
Arthur, jamming was used against the radio Radio and radio technical reconnaissance
channel of the Japanese ship’s artillery fire can monitor electromagnetic emissions in the
adjusters [10]. In the future, by the creation range from 3 MHz to 30 GHz and above.
and development of other systems, where Based on the data received by radio-
electromagnetic (as well as acoustic) waves electronic reconnaissance, measures for radio-
are used, the development of EW was parallel. electronic suppression are implemented. Radio-
First of all, it is inherent in the military sphere, electronic suppression is a set of measures and
which left a certain mark on the terminology.
291
actions related to disruption (violation) of work • Ensuring electromagnetic compatibility
or reducing the effectiveness of the enemy’s use of radio-electronic means.
of radio-electronic systems and means by • Ensuring the stability of radio-electronic
affecting their receiving devices with radio- means in the presence of unintentional
electronic interference. It includes radio, radio interference.
engineering, optical-electronic, and • Protection of radio-electronic devices
hydroacoustic suppression. Radio electronic against intentional interference and
suppression is provided by creating active and ensuring their interference protection.
passive interference, using false targets, traps, • Protection of radio-electronic means
and other methods. from electromagnetic and ionizing
Electromagnetic damage to the equipment radiation (unintentional as well as
is carried out due to the formation and intentional so-called electromagnetic
emission of powerful electromagnetic pulses, weapons) to ensure the reliability of the
which disable the enemy’s electronic, functioning of radio-electronic means
communication, and power equipment. The and to avoid functional damage to the
damage effect is a consequence of the targeting elemental base.
of induction currents in electronic elements • Protection against the influence of false
especially in long conductors. (For the first signals and disinformation.
time such an effect was detected during Measures to ensure the secrecy of the
nuclear explosions in the atmosphere.) functioning of one’s information systems and
Generators based on magnetrons can be used components of the radio-electronic warfare
to create electromagnetic pulses. Such means system should also be included in the radio-
are in service with the United States and other electronic protection.
NATO countries. The radio-electronic struggle brought a
Management and control of the process and specific “coloring” to the content of the conflict of
results of EW management is a complex opposing radio-electronic means (radio-
organizational and technical process, which electronic systems), which acquired all the
involves monitoring the state of operation of characteristic features of a severe (antagonistic)
one’s radio-electronic means and their conflict. At the same time, an antagonistic conflict
protection against the enemy’s technical is understood as a specific form of interaction
means of intelligence, evaluating the results of between some parties opposing each other,
suppressing his means. It includes radio, pursuing directly opposite interests, when a
radiotechnical, photographic, and visual- change in the efficiency of one party (radio
optical control, as well as control of the engineering system, means, etc.) leads to the
effectiveness of information protection against same magnitude, but opposite in sign changes in
its leakage through technical channels during the effectiveness of the other (opposite) side.
the operation of means of information For many years, EW was limited to solving the
transmission and processing. In the course of tasks of radio suppression of separately allocated
the current control and based on its results, radio-electronic means in favor of disorganizing
management decisions are made in favor of the management of the forces and means of the
radio-electronic protection and optimization opposing side and ensuring the stability of the
of the EW system. management of its forces. Such a concept fully
Radio-electronic protection is an integral corresponded to the narrow specialization of
part of radio-electronic warfare aimed at radio equipment in the assumption of low
ensuring the stable operation of radio- interference resistance and conflict resistance in
electronic means under the influence of general. The simplest static model of the conflict
intentional radio interference by the enemy, (duel) of means and objects of radio suppression
electromagnetic radiation of weapons of at the energy (“signal”) level of its representation
functional damage, electromagnetic and sufficiently corresponds to the conditions of
ionizing radiation arising from the use of radio suppression of such radio-electronic
nuclear weapons, exposure to unintentional means. Such a model was based on the equations
radio interference. of anti-radio communication, anti-radiolocation,
The basis of electronic protection is a set of
organizational and technical measures aimed at:
292
and the well-known relations of the theory of increase in the conflict resistance of both the
potential jamming by V. A. Kotelnikov. specified integrated systems in general and the
It should be noted that, traditionally, all components of their separate specialized radio-
classic tasks of radio communication, radar electronic means.
location, and radio navigation when applying this In such conditions, the conflict as a form of
model are solved under the mandatory condition interaction of radio-electronic systems will be
of the presence of unintentional interference, at a process of conflict of interests of at least two
least of natural origin—against the background very complex multi-level goal-oriented
of interference (thermal noise, noise of the systems, which form an even more complex
atmosphere, space, and so on). conflict super-system (or meta-system) during
Thanks to the achievements in the field of interaction. At the same time, individual
element base, digital methods of signal elements (subsystems) of each of the opposing
processing, and information technologies, in systems are united by a single general goal of
recent years a qualitative leap in the the system as a whole and are not completely
development of radio-electronic means for “independent”, but complement and mutually
various purposes and a significant expansion of “help” each other. Therefore, the confrontation
their functional capabilities has been outlined. of the opposing parties in modern conditions
Such significant transformations are associated during the conduct of the ERB acquires all the
with two main factors. The first is the formation characteristic features of a complex coalition
(creation) of single integrated information and conflict.
control systems (structures) based on previously A somewhat conventional structure of one
separated individual types of radio-electronic of the variants of a complex antagonistic
means (radio communication, radar, radio conflict is presented in Fig. 1.
navigation, etc.). The second is a significant
Information management system of side 1
Information Control and EW Executive
support communication subsystem subsystem
Reconnaissance subsystem subsystem
subsystem
Subsystem of
navigation
EW 2 time support
Subsystem of
EW 1 navigation
time support
Reconnaissance
subsystem Information Control and
EW Executive
support communication
subsystem subsystem
subsystem subsystem
information management system of side 2
Figure 1: The structure of one of the variants of a complex antagonistic conflict
Based on the above general provisions and conflict interaction (influence) of the EW
components of EW, it is possible to specify the system with other information systems,
293
depending on the specifics of their purpose, can be analyzed both separately and in
construction, and functioning. In the classical combination.
sense, EW is carried out about military, dual,
and special purpose systems. Although its 3. Operating Conditions and
potential application does not exclude systems
of another purpose. Indicators of Radio Systems,
Here is a list of such conflicts: Which Should Be Defined in the
Terrestrial radio communication—EW Conflict Model
system.
Satellite communication—EW system. Let’s try to dwell on important factors
Radio relay communication—EW system. (characteristics) that are relevant to most of the
Office Wi-Fi—EW system. listed conflicting systems and situations both
Radio communication based on distant between the means of information collection and
tropospheric propagation—the EW system. information transmission processes and in the
The ground radar complex (system)—the conditions of radio-electronic warfare. These
EW system. factors should appear in the formation and
The air-based radar complex (system)—the application of information conflict models.
EW system. Among them: are interference, sensitivity of
The ship’s radar complex (system)—the EW receivers, interference resistance, interference
system. protection, secrecy of the information system,
The space-based radar complex (system)— electromagnetic compatibility of information
the EW system. systems, and radio-electronic means. Let’s
Missile attack warning radar systems (in consider them in more detail.
the USA this system is called a nuclear missile
strike warning system, its purpose is to detect
3.1. Interference as Electromagnetic
warheads of strategic ballistic missiles)—EW
Radiation
system.
The ground complex (system) of radio
reconnaissance—the EW system. Interference as electromagnetic radiation of
The airborne complex (system) of radio various origins is inherent in the operating
reconnaissance—the EW system. conditions of radio-electronic means under
The space-based radio reconnaissance normal conditions especially when conducting
complex (system)—the EW system. EW. Their main characteristics:
The ground complex (system) of radio • The width of the interference spectrum
technical reconnaissance—the EW system. Δ𝑓𝑖 .
The aerial complex (system) of radio • The average (carrier) interference
technical reconnaissance—the EW system. frequency 𝑓𝑖 .
The complex (system) of space-based radio- • The average interference power 𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑖 .
technical reconnaissance—the EW system. • The maximum interference power
The complex (system) of reconnaissance in 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑖 .
the infrared range of space-based—the REB • Minimum interference power 𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑖 .
system. • Peak interference factor 𝐾peak 𝑖 =
The complex (system) of satellite radio 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑖 /𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑖 (or in dB 𝐾peak 𝑖 =
navigation is the EW system. 10𝑙𝑔(𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑖 /𝑃𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑖 ).
The complex (system) of radio technical • The dynamic range of interference is the
reconnaissance based on UAVs is the EW ratio of the maximum and minimum
system. instantaneous powers 𝐷 𝑖 = 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑖 /
The UAV-based radio reconnaissance 𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑖 (or in dB 𝐷 𝑖 = 10𝑙𝑔(𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑖 /
complex (system)—the EW system. 𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑖 ).
The complex (system) of radio-technical Depending on the location of the source of
intelligence and visual surveillance based on interference, internal and external interferences
UAVs—the EW system. are distinguished.
Each of these options has its specifics, but
also certain common features. Each of them
294
Internal interferences arise in the system itself intentional. They, in turn, include several
(noises of the input cascades of the receiver, subgroups. Depending on the range of
receiving antenna, signal channel lines and frequencies and conditions in which the
electrical signals entering the receiver through information system works, one or another type
internal circuits due to poor shielding or of interference prevails.
decoupling between cascades). The internal Unintentional include natural, inter-system
noise caused by the chaotic movement of (industrial and from third-party radio
charge carriers is fundamentally ineradicable, equipment), and intra-system.
although it can be minimized. Natural disturbances arise due to various
Thermal and shot noise are distinguished. electromagnetic processes occurring in the
Thermal noise is caused by the thermal troposphere, ionosphere, and outer space, as
movement of charge carriers. It is a Gaussian well as due to radiation from the earth’s surface.
random process with zero mean and power Accordingly, there are atmospheric
spectral density in the radio frequency range: (tropospheric) interferences, cosmic
𝑁0 (𝑓) = 𝑘𝐵 𝑇 𝑜 = 𝑁0 (V/ interferences (present in frequency ranges
(1)
Hz), above 30 MHz)—and cosmic noises from
where 𝑘𝐵 = 1,38 × 10−23 (J/K) is the interstellar gases, the Sun, and radio stars of
Boltzmann constant, 𝑇 𝑜 is the absolute Jupiter. Obstacles from the earth’s surface; it, like
temperature of the noise source (in Kelvin), 𝑓 is any heated body, emits electromagnetic waves
the frequency. (the power of these noises at the receiver input is
Thermal noise can be interpreted as White determined by the orientation and shape of the
Gaussian Noise (WGN) with a constant one- antenna’s directional pattern, as well as the
sided power spectral density: temperature and characteristics of the surface).
𝑁0 = 𝑘𝐵 𝑇 𝑜 (2) According to their statistical characteristics, they
and the Gaussian probability density distribution are similar to thermal noise.
of instantaneous amplitude values n: Intersystem interference (industrial and
𝑛2 from third-party radio equipment). They are
1 −
𝑤(𝑛) = 𝑒 2𝜎𝑛2 , (3) created by various radio stations (station
𝜎𝑛 √2𝜋 interference), industrial installations, medical
where 𝜎𝑛 is root mean square noise amplitude. equipment, electric motors, etc.
The graph of this distribution at different Industrial interference is created by various
rms amplitudes is shown in Fig. 2. electrical equipment of industrial enterprises,
𝜎1 transport, power transmission lines, and other
𝜎1 < 𝜎2 < 𝜎3
electrical installations. More often, they are
sequences of pulses with a constant or variable
𝜎2
follow-up period. Spread in the atmosphere
𝜎3 and along cable lines. The level of industrial
interference depends on the location of the
𝑛
receiver of industrial facilities and the power of
0
electrical equipment.
Figure 2: Distribution (3) graph at different Interference from third-party radio
rms amplitudes equipment (station interference) is one of the
most common types of external interference.
The WGN autocorrelation function is the The saturation of radio means (radio
inverse Fourier transform of its power spectral communication, radar, radio navigation, etc.) is
density and is an δ-function. constantly growing. Therefore, the loading of
In real systems, the frequency bandwidth is radio bands is such that very often interference
limited, and the power of the noise passing to from third-party radio equipment exceeds
the receiver input: other types of interference. Station
𝑃𝑛 = 𝑁0 ∙ Δ𝑓rec path, (4) interference is due to various reasons. Their
where Δ𝑓rec path is receiving path bandwidth. minimization is related to compliance with the
External interference. This is a fairly wide provisions of electromagnetic compatibility of
range of obstacles of various origins. There are radio-electronic devices.
two groups among them: unintentional and
295
A simplified physical model of the average frequencies of the interference and the
formation of station interference at high signal: Δ𝑓𝑖 >> Δ𝑓𝑆 .
channel loading can be presented in the form Narrowband interference has a spectrum
of a series-connected white noise generator width that is significantly smaller than the signal
and a filter with a frequency response that spectrum width, provided that the interference
varies over time according to a random law. spectrum falls into the signal frequency band:
The spectral density of interference power Δ𝑓𝑖 < Δ𝑓𝑆 .
𝑁(𝑓, 𝑡) as a random process (often non- Aiming interference has a spectrum width
stationary) can be sufficiently fully that coincides with the signal spectrum width,
characterized by the probability density provided that the average (carrier) frequencies
𝑤𝑓,𝑡 (𝑛) and the correlation functions of the interference and the signal coincide: Δ𝑓𝑖 =
(preferably normalized) of fluctuations in the Δ𝑓𝑆 .
time and frequency domains 𝑟𝑛 (𝜏) and 𝑟𝑛 (𝑓). The latter interferences are the most effective
The parameters of the correlation functions because all the power of the interfering
are the time correlation interval and the transmitter is concentrated in the band of the
frequency correlation interval. receiver that is being suppressed. But for this,
If the number of station interferences falling you need to monitor the operating frequency of
into the signal band is limited, then the mixture the receiver and estimate or predict (by
𝑥(𝑡) entering the receiver input is represented observing the signals of the system to be
as the sum of the useful signal 𝑆(𝑡) and a suppressed using electronic reconnaissance).
limited number of additive interferences with The total power of the interference perceived
known or unknown statistical characteristics: by the receiver is convenient to estimate in the
𝑀𝑖 frequency plane, knowing the power spectral
𝑥(𝑡) = 𝑠(𝑡) + 𝑛(𝑡) + ∑ 𝛾𝑘 (𝑡), (5) densities of each of the interferences at the
𝑘=1
location of the receiver. In the general case, with a
where 𝑀𝑘 is the number of sources of rectangular amplitude-frequency characteristic of
interference, 𝛾𝑘 (𝑡) is the external interference, the receiving path:
the frequency spectrum of which falls into the 𝑃Σ 𝑟𝑒𝑐
𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥
bandwidth of the receiver, 𝑛(𝑡) is the WGN. 𝑀𝑘
Intentional interference is a more important (6)
= 𝐾𝑛 ∙ ∫ [∑ 𝑁𝑘 (𝑓)] 𝑑𝑓
process in the implementation of EW. Therefore, 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑘=1
their characteristics need to be carefully where 𝐾𝑛 is a receiver noise ratio (>1), 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the
considered when creating a conflict model. minimum bandwidth frequency of the receiving
Deliberate disturbances are created with the path, 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum bandwidth frequency
help of special devices—troublemakers to of the receiving path, 𝑁𝑘 (𝑓) is the power spectral
disrupt the operation of the information system. density of the ith interference, 𝑀𝑘 is the number
From the point of view of the nature of the of interferences.
influence on the functioning of the system When the spectral densities of interference
against which the interference acts, they are powers in the reception band are uniform, the
divided into noise-like and imitative. formula is simplified:
Noise-like ones are designed to worsen 𝑀𝑘
signal reception conditions by creating an 𝑃Σ𝑟𝑒𝑐 = 𝐾Ш ∙ Δ𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑐 ∑ 𝑁𝑘 (𝑓) (7)
increased interference background at the
𝑘=1
receiver input. According to the method of where Δ𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑐 is the bandwidth of the receiving
formation, they are divided into direct noise path.
(direct noise process) and harmonic processes In all cases, the jamming side (carrying out
modulated by noise. According to the radio-electronic suppression) aims for the
relationship with the parameters of the useful total power of the frequency components of
signal, which they counteract, these types of the interference within the receiver’s
interference are divided into blocking, bandwidth to exceed the signal power. That is,
narrowband, and targeting. the ratio of the signal power to the power of the
Blocking interference has a spectrum width interference(s) was as small as possible one—
that is significantly greater than the signal 𝑃S /𝑃Σ𝑟𝑒𝑐 << 1. In this case, the purpose of EW
spectrum width at approximately the same
296
will be achieved if the system against which 3.3. Interference Resistance
suppression is carried out is not equipped with
sufficient means of protection against Interference resistance—is the ability of the
interference. system to perform its functions in the presence
In addition to continuous ones, there are of disturbances with quality indicators not
interferences in the form of pulse sequences, as lower than the established ones. This means
a rule, with a chaotic structure in terms of the the presence of not only the noise background
follow-up period, duration, and shape of mentioned above but also a certain level of
pulses. As a rule, these are obstacles of artificial interference from another origin.
origin. They can be unintentional or Interference resistance depends on
intentional. modulation, reception method, coding
Simulating deliberate interference is methods, etc. Quantitatively, the interference
intended to misinform. By structure and immunity of discrete message transmission
parameters, they repeat the signal, so they are systems can be characterized by the
perceived as a useful signal, but carry false probability of error 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑟 at a given ratio of
information. average signal power and interference at the
The above-mentioned interferences (noise- input of the system receiver.
like and imitative) are also used to protect
information systems by setting such 3.4. Interference Protection
interferences to systems and means of
information interception. That is, there will be
Interference protection is the ability of the
a counter-conflict with the use of EW methods.
system to counteract the harmful effects of
interference and to perform its functions with
3.2. Sensitivity of Receivers quality indicators not lower than those
specified under the conditions of interference.
Means of radio-electronic intelligence as part Interference protection can be provided by
of EW systems and means against which radio- active and passive methods.
electronic suppression is carried out function Active methods consist of counteracting the
in the presence of unintentional interference functioning of the source of interference. If the
(internal noise of radio-electronic devices, source creates interference unintentionally,
atmospheric and space noise, industrial organizational and technical measures are
interference, intersystem interference, etc.). taken to turn off the source or eliminate defects
Their presence and intensity at the input of the in its operation that led to the unauthorized
corresponding receiving devices depends on creation of interference. If the source creates a
the selected range of electromagnetic waves, deliberate disturbance, then decisive measures
the time of day and season, the width of the are taken to destruction using destruction (for
interference spectrum, the location of the example, in military conflicts).
devices, the characteristics of the antennas, etc. Passive methods consist of the application of
The level of these interferences determines the additional methods and devices of signal
sensitivity of receivers—𝑃 𝑟𝑒𝑐 𝑚𝑖𝑛 means of formation and processing, which are used
radio-electronic reconnaissance, means of when the interference situation worsens:
communication, radars, and radio navigation • Switching to another operating frequency,
receivers. It is impractical to have the 𝑃 𝑟𝑒𝑐 𝑚𝑖𝑛 where the level of interference is lower.
value less than the total power of the most • Switching to a signal with a more
characteristic unintentional interference at the interference-resistant type of modulation;
receiver input (noise background), which increase in radiation power.
should exceed the power of the expected useful • A decrease in the technical speed of
signal. As a rule, the situation is non-stationary transmission (which is equivalent to an
and creates a “micro-conflict” between the increase in the duration of the signal,
receiving component of the system and the which means its power).
interference background. • Moving to fault-tolerant code with higher
error detection or correction capabilities.
297
• Rejection of frequency components of different frequencies and through different
interference (if its spectrum is narrower channels, etc.
than the signal spectrum) using Measures to ensure energy and structural
appropriate filters. secrecy contribute to the increase of
• Application of methods of narrowing the Interference protection of the information
directional diagrams of transmitting system because they will deprive the opposing
and/or receiving antennas [12–15], when party of information about the parameters of
the direction of arrival of the interference the signal, thereby reducing its ability to create
and the useful signal are different, it is intentional interference with the appropriate
possible to change the orientation and/or parameters.
shape of the directional characteristic of Information secrecy is such secrecy in
the receiving antenna in such a way that it which the adversary can perceive the IS signal,
reduces the intensity of the interference at distinguish it from other signals, determine its
the input of the receiving device under the structure, and identify the symbols of the
condition of a slight decrease in the level of message, but cannot determine the content of
the useful signal. the message, that is, information; such secrecy
• Readjusting the polarization of the is achieved by cryptographic methods.
receiving and transmitting antenna [16– The presence and high level of interference
17] (if there is a difference in the resistance, interference protection, and secrecy
polarization of the useful signal and the are components of the conflict resistance of a tool
interference). or system. Therefore, the task of radio-electronic
In modern systems, the listed methods are reconnaissance consists of overcoming secrecy,
mostly implemented in adaptive mode. and radio-electronic suppression consists of
reducing Interference resistance and
3.5. Secrecy of an Information System Interference protection both by creating
additional interference and by other methods.
The secrecy of the information system is the
ability to perform its functions in such a way 3.6. Electromagnetic Compatibility of
that the opposing party does not have the Information Systems and Radio-
opportunity to obtain information about the Electronic Means
operation of the system, its characteristics, and
the information circulating in it. Three main Electromagnetic compatibility of information
levels of secrecy are considered: energetic, systems and radio-electronic means their
structural, and informational. ability to function together in real operating
Energetic secrecy (also called absolute) is conditions with specified quality indicators
the kind of secrecy in which the opposing party without creating unacceptable interference
is unable to detect the very fact of the system’s with each other.
operation and detect its signals against the The conditions of propagation of radio
background of existing disturbances; such waves, energy loss in the environment, loss of
stealth is achieved by using complex (noise- signal power in the equipment, the shape of the
like) signals, and in some cases also by creating characteristics of the directionality of the
an increased level of interference in the city antennas, and their polarization
where the receiving means of the opposing characteristics about the polarization of the
side are located. radio wave have a noticeable influence on the
Structural secrecy is the type of secrecy in operation of information systems and
which the adversary can perceive the electronic warfare systems. These factors
information system signal, but cannot affect such an important indicator of radio
distinguish it from other signals or determine systems as the operating range.
its structure and identify the symbols of the For example, the range of radio
message; this is achieved by various methods: communication, radio and radio technical
the emission of false signals, the transmission intelligence, and radio navigation in ideal
of separate component signals and messages at conditions (against the noise background and
the orientation of the antennas with the
298
maxima of the directional characteristics 𝑃intent.interf.input
towards each other): 𝑃trans.interf ∙ 𝐺trans.interf ∙ 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑐 ∙ 𝜆2 (11)
𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑛.𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 2 2
(4𝜋) ∙ 𝑅interf.
𝑃𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 ∙ 𝐺𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 ∙ 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑐 ∙ 𝜆2 (8) where: 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐.interf is the output power of the
=√ interference transmitter, 𝐺trans.interf is the
(4𝜋)2 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐 𝑚𝑖𝑛
maximum amplification factor of the
where 𝑃𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 is a transmitter output power, interference generator transmission antenna,
𝐺𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 is the maximum amplification factor of R interf is the distance to the interference
the transmitting antenna, 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑐 is the maximum generator.
amplification factor of the receiving antenna, λ Then the range of radio communication
is the wavelength, 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐 𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the sensitivity of (radio navigation, radio reconnaissance) will
the receiver, which is equal to the power of the become very small, and obtaining information
background noise spread above. may become impossible.
To ensure sufficient reception quality (and
ultimately the availability and integrity of
information), the signal at the receiver input 4. Conclusions
must exceed the noise level by a certain
number of ν times. Then the communication The so-called informational conflict is a key
equation (navigation, reconnaissance) will be: component of the conflict in the conditions of
𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑚.(nav.recon.) = the modern electronic security system. The
information conflict is understood as the
𝑃𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 ∙ 𝐺𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 ∙ 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑐 ∙ 𝜆2 (9)
=√ process of combating radio-electronic means
(4𝜋)2 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∙ 𝜈
(systems) at the stage of obtaining information
Losses of signal energy during the (data) about the opponent and its transmission
propagation of waves in the environment and in to consumers and means (systems) of radio
the equipment, which are taken into account by suppression, that oppose them. Today it can be
the appropriate Γprop and Γequip coefficients and considered that the outcome of the
the arbitrary orientation of the antennas (Fig. 3.) information conflict has a decisive influence on
lead to a decrease in range. the outcome of the conflict in EW systems as a
𝐹2 (𝜑) whole. Typical representatives of radio-
electronic means include the most common
𝜑2 and promising means of radio communication,
radio-electronic intelligence, and promising
types of air-space-based reconnaissance radar
stations, which are the most traditional objects
𝜑1 of radio suppression. At the same time, of
course, it is determined that the objects of
radio suppression themselves can be
𝐹1 (𝜑)
constituent elements of some higher
hierarchical level systems, which indicates a
Figure 3: 𝐹1,2 (𝜑) are directional diagrams in known “subordination” of the information
the horizontal plane of the object 1(2) conflict.
Then the range of radio communication (radio Conflicting mutual radio suppression of
navigation, radio reconnaissance): electronic warfare means with radio
𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑚.(nav.recon.)𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 (𝜃, 𝜑) = communication means and means of obtaining
information (radio-electronic reconnaissance,
𝑃𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 ∙ 𝐺𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 (𝜃, 𝜑) ∙ 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑐 (𝜃, 𝜑) ∙ 𝜆2 (10)
=√ radar location, radio navigation) is an
(4𝜋)2 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∙ 𝜈 ∙ Γprop ∙ Γequip
important component of information conflict.
In the conditions of suppression using EW, The specified factors, as well as the conditions
the power of intentional interferences PN from of the surrounding environment, should be
the input at the receiver input will significantly adequately taken into account in the complex
exceed 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐 𝑚𝑖𝑛 . model of the conflict of radio technical systems
of the information space in the conditions of
the action of EW systems against them.
299
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