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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>Chakrian V. “Improvement of EIGRP Protocol Routing Algorithm with the
Consideration of Information Security Risk Parameters”. Scholars Journal of Engineering and
Technology (2015)</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.30837/978-966-659-378-1</article-id>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Intelligent Methods of Secure Routing in Software- Defined Networks</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Olga Cherednichenko</string-name>
          <email>olga.cherednichenko@univ-lyon2.fr</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Nataliia Sharonova</string-name>
          <email>nvsharonova@ukr.net</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Ganna Pliekhova</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Nadiia Babkova</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Kharkiv National Automobile and Highway University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>25, Yaroslava Mudrogo Str., Kharkiv, 61002</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>National Technical University «Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute»</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>2, Kyrpychova str., Kharkiv, 61002</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff2">
          <label>2</label>
          <institution>Univ Lyon</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Univ_Lyon 2, UR ERIC - 5 avenue Mendès France, 69676 Bron Cedex</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="FR">France</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2018</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>3</volume>
      <fpage>707</fpage>
      <lpage>714</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>The object of research is the process of ensuring network security in Software-Defined Networks by routing means. The subject of research is secure routing methods in Software-Defined Networks. The work aims to research and improve existing methods of secure routing in Software-Defined Networks. Research methods are analytical modeling, simulation, formalization, and comparison. The work analyzes the standards, security, and vulnerabilities of Software-Defined Networks, as well as the CVSS standard for the quantitative calculation of network equipment's vulnerability level. Special attention is paid to analyzing the functionality of routing protocols as effective means of increasing network security in modern information and communication networks. The mathematical model of secure routing has been improved, considering the base score of the vulnerabilities' criticality. The technological problem was formulated as an optimization problem with a quadratic objective function when the optimal route was chosen according to the combined metric under the base score of the vulnerabilities' criticality and the bandwidth of the network links that make up this route.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;Software Defined Network</kwd>
        <kwd>network security</kwd>
        <kwd>vulnerability</kwd>
        <kwd>Common Vulnerability Scoring System</kwd>
        <kwd>secure outing</kwd>
        <kwd>modeling</kwd>
        <kwd>intellect methods1</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>An intelligent system is one of the types of automated information systems that are based on
knowledge. An intelligent system is a complex of software, linguistic, and logic-mathematical
tools for the implementation of the main task: providing support for human activity and
information search in an extended dialogue mode using natural language. The architecture of
modern intelligent systems is based on knowledge bases that are formed according to the subject
domain in which the intelligent system is used. The issue of researching intelligent software
systems and organizing knowledge bases becomes relevant, especially decision support systems
in various fields, including network security.</p>
      <p>
        Presently, the implementation of network architectures, such as Software-Defined
Networking (SDN), confronts emerging cybersecurity risks necessitating the formulation and
examination of innovative specialized approaches to fortify network security [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref2 ref3 ref4">1-4</xref>
        ]. Although SDN
architecture offers heightened flexibility and adaptability, it supplants conventional networks
while simultaneously raising the likelihood of various network intrusion attempts, thereby
engendering fresh security predicaments.
      </p>
      <p>The growing interest in SDN and wide deployment of various types of software-defined
networks allow for the identification of their vulnerabilities in process of combating</p>
      <p>0000-0002-9391-5220 (O. Cherednichenko); 0000-0002-8161-552X (N. Sharonova); 0000-0002-6912-6520
(G. Pliekhova); 0000-0002-2200-7794 (N. Babkova)
© 2024 Copyright for this paper by its authors.</p>
      <p>
        Use permitted under Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
cybersecurity threats [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4 ref5">4, 5</xref>
        ]. It is obvious that security issues are closely related to characteristics
of SDN networks themselves. In addition, security problems in SDN can be divided into three
levels: data plane, control plane, and application plane.
      </p>
      <p>At the same time, among the attack targets, there may be devices of different SDN levels.
Therefore, according to the multilevel SDN architecture, security threats can be classified at the
levels of data transmission, management, and applications. In turn, the data plane consists of
switches and other network devices and is mainly responsible for data processing, forwarding,
dropping, as well as collecting statistics. The operation of the data plane is based on flow rules
provided by network controller. The main causes of security problems include the SDN
architecture itself, external malicious attacks, insufficient access control, and encryption
capabilities.</p>
      <p>
        Today a significant role in the complex of network security measures, including SDN networks,
is assigned to routing protocols that require systematic and coordinated interaction among
multiple network elements simultaneously – SDN switches and network controllers – during
formation (calculation) of paths and flow rules, along which the necessary level of security should
be ensured according to selected indicators or criteria. An analysis of vulnerabilities in SDN data
plane and functional capabilities of routing tools to counter potential attacks has demonstrated
the prospect of using intelligent secure routing based on basic vulnerability criticality metrics to
enhance the level of network security in SDN data plane. The analysis of CVSS standard for
quantitative vulnerability assessment of network equipment justified its use in development and
exploration of promising approaches to secure routing in the data plane of software-defined
networks [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Thus, this work is dedicated to a relevant scientific-applied problem related to analysis of
threats, attack targets, and improvement of potential solutions for enhancing level of network
security in the data plane of SDN networks through the use of intelligent routing methods. The
purpose of work is to research and improvement of existing methods of secure routing in
software-defined networks using intelligent support tools.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Related works</title>
      <p>A number of secure routing models have been developed and investigated, taking into account
basic vulnerability criticality metrics. An existing model has been refined, leading to formulation
of an optimization-based flow model for secure QoS routing (Figure 1). Numerical analysis has
demonstrated the effectiveness and adequacy of proposed refinement.</p>
      <p>
        Therefore, NFV consists of three main components [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]:
1. Virtualized Network Functions (VNF) are network functions implemented in software
that can be deployed within a network function virtualization infrastructure (NFVI).
2. NFVI – common hardware and software components where they are deployed VNF.
3. Management and Orchestration Environment for NFV (MANO) is an architectural
framework that includes functional blocks, data stores utilized by these blocks, and
interfaces through which functional blocks exchange information for the management
and orchestration of NFVI and VNF.
      </p>
      <p>
        Key requirements and definitions regarding the security of NFV, SDN, and cloud technologies.
To ensure the security of an object or system, there is a recognized need to provide five essential
security functions – CIAAA [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6 ref7 ref8">6-8</xref>
        ]:
• Confidentiality;
• Integrity;
• Availability;
• Authenticity;
• Accountability.
      </p>
      <p>
        So, confidentiality ensures the privacy and confidentiality of information about data or
individuals and prevents its disclosure to unauthorized users. Integrity ensures that information
and the expected operation of system will not be accidentally or intentionally altered by
unauthorized users. Availability guarantees that unauthorized users cannot access systems and
services. Authenticity ensures that users can be verified and trusted as who they claim to be, and
that incoming data comes from a reliable source. Accountability generates the requirement for
the actions of subject to be traced exclusively to that subject [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]. Each of these stages requires a
convenient interface based on intelligent data processing, especially when presented in textual
form.
      </p>
      <p>A system, organization or cyberspace consists of three key elements:
• real and virtual objects (entities);
• interconnection (communications) infrastructure;
• interaction between objects through infrastructure.</p>
      <p>
        Real and virtual entities encompass tangible objects and physical devices, such as people
(users of system), computers, sensors, mobile phones, electronic devices and virtual abstractions
of entities such as data/information, software and services. Infrastructure includes networks,
databases, information systems and repositories that connect and support objects in system
(space). Interaction, in turn, involves actions and interdependencies between objects in system
(cyberspace) through interconnected infrastructure and information related to communication,
policies, business and management [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Therefore, information or cybersecurity can be considered as systems, tools, processes,
practices, concepts and strategies to prevent and protect cyberspace from unauthorized
interaction by agents with elements of space to support and preserve the confidentiality,
integrity, availability and other properties of the space and its resources that require protection.</p>
      <p>
        Essentially, cybersecurity is related to identifying vulnerabilities in cyberspace, assessing the
risks associated with threats exploiting these vulnerabilities and providing security solutions.
Security vulnerability is a weak point in a system (component / product / system / cyberspace)
that can allow an attacker to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity
or accountability of that system. Threats and risks are closely related but not equivalent. A threat
is any entity, action or state that leads to harm, loss, damage, and / or deterioration of existing
conditions. The risk associated with a threat is a characteristic that encompasses three
components [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]:
• impact or significance of threat incident;
• probability or potential of a threat incident in future;
• potential losses (damages) due to a threat incident.
      </p>
      <p>
        The risk assessment associated with a threat contributes to the development of new security
solutions and formulation of requirements for these solutions [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6 ref7 ref8">6-8</xref>
        ].
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Security issues NFV</title>
      <p>
        As network components are virtualized, NFV networks include a level of abstraction that is
absent in traditional networks. Securing this complex and dynamic environment, covering both
virtual and physical resources, management elements, protocols, as well as the boundaries
between virtual and physical networks, is a challenging task for several reasons according to CSA
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]. Among the main security issues are hypervisor dependencies: hypervisors are available from
multiple vendors. They must address security vulnerabilities in controlled software.
Understanding the underlying architecture, deploying appropriate encryption types and applying
patches diligently are critical for hypervisor security. Another identified issue is elastic network
boundaries: in NFV, network fabric performs numerous functions. The physical and virtual
boundaries are blurred or absent in NFV architecture, complicating the design of security
systems. Dynamic workloads present another challenge: while NFV offers flexibility and dynamic
capabilities, traditional security models are static and cannot adapt when network topology
changes according to requirements. Adding NFV services provides elastic, transparent networks,
as fabric intelligently routes packets based on configurable criteria. Traditional security
management elements are deployed logically and physically. In NFV, there is often a lack of a
socalled security service insertion point that has not yet been placed on hypervisors. Stateful /
stateless verification: Security operations over the past decade have been based on the
assumption that stateful verification is more advanced than stateless. However, NFV can add
complexity when security control mechanisms cannot handle asymmetric flows created by
multiple duplicating network paths and devices. Another problem is scalability of available
resources: deep inspection technologies, such as next-generation firewalls and TLS protocol
decryption, require resources and do not always scale without offloading capability. ETSI security
expert group, focusing on software architecture security, identified potential security
vulnerabilities in NFV and determined whether they are new issues or existing problems in
various forms and manifestations.
      </p>
      <p>
        Security issues in SDN can be divided based on three levels: data plane, control plane, and
application plane [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6 ref7 ref8">6-8</xref>
        ]. The data plane may suffer from various security threats, such as malicious
OpenFlow switches, flow rule injection, "flooding" attacks (e.g., flooding the switch's flow table),
forged or fake traffic flows, credential management and malicious hosts. The application plane
inherits security issues such as unauthorized or unauthenticated programs, fraudulent role
addition, lack of authentication methods and so on. The control plane faces several security issues
related to centralized SDN controller, communication interfaces, policy enforcement, flow rule
modification for packet modification, "flooding" communication between the controller and
switch, security issues in SDN at system level (related to lack of audit accountability mechanisms),
and lack of trust between the SDN controller and third-party applications. As control plane in SDN
architecture acts as heart of this virtual network infrastructure, security vulnerabilities at this
level can cause a failure in the entire virtual network architecture.
      </p>
      <p>So, security threats related to SDN infrastructure are classified based on affected level
(interface) as follows:
1. Application layer.
2. Management layer.
3. Data layer.
4. Application management interface.</p>
      <p>5. Management interface.</p>
      <p>From perspective of intelligence third and fourth levels draw maximum attention as
knowledge bases can be created by shaping this knowledge from system text messages.</p>
      <p>At the current stage of SDN architecture development, both domestic and foreign researchers
believe that typical security problems in software-defined networks primarily manifest in aspects
such as malicious software, controller vulnerabilities, legitimacy and consistency of flow rules,
standardization problem of northbound interface and security in communication process using
southbound interface, etc. Within the scope of this work, typical security problems and attack
objects within the data plane – network devices controlled by SDN controller – are analyzed. The
results of analysis are presented in Table 1. Clearly, devices at various network levels can be
objects of attack and according to well-defined multilevel architecture of SDN, security threats
can be classified at different levels. This work is dedicated to analysis of threats, attack objects
and potential solutions to enhance level of network security in data plane of SDN networks
through routing means.</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>Security Issue</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>Authorized Authentication</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-3">
        <title>Legitimacy of Flow Rules</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-4">
        <title>Consistency of Flow Rules</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-5">
        <title>DoS/DDoS Attacks</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-6">
        <title>Attack Target</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-7">
        <title>Network Equipment</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-8">
        <title>Flow Rules</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-9">
        <title>Flow Rules</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-10">
        <title>Flow Tables</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-11">
        <title>Attack</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-12">
        <title>Channels through third-party Data Privacy</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-13">
        <title>Cause</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-14">
        <title>Access Control</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-15">
        <title>Access Control</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-16">
        <title>SDN Architecture</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-17">
        <title>SDN Architecture, Malicious</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-18">
        <title>Attack</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-19">
        <title>Malicious Attack</title>
        <p>The basic group of metrics represents internal vulnerability characteristics that remain
constant over time and across users. It consists of three sets of indicators:</p>
        <p>Exploitability: These indicators reflect ease and technical means by which a vulnerability is
exploited. Indicators include:
• Attack vector, indicating how remote an attacker can be from vulnerable component.
• Attack complexity, conveying the level of complexity required by attacker to exploit
vulnerability after identifying target component. Complexity is assessed as high if attacker
cannot carry out attack at will but must exert effort for preparation or execution.
• Required privileges characterize access needed by attacker to exploit vulnerability.
Values include "none" (privileged access is not required), "low" (basic user privileges) and
"high" (administrator rights).
• User interaction indicates whether another user, apart from attacker, needs to participate
for a successful attack.</p>
        <p>Impact: These indicators indicate degree of impact on core security goals – confidentiality,
integrity and availability. In each case, assessment reflects the worst result if more than one
component is affected. For each of three goals, similar impact values are introduced: "high"
(complete loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability), "low" (certain losses) and "none" (no
impact).</p>
        <p>Scope: This indicator is part of the basic metrics group, although it is somewhat independent
of the rest of group. It relates to ability of a vulnerability in one software component to affect
resources beyond its capabilities or privileges. An example is a vulnerability in a virtual machine
allowing an attacker to delete files in the host operating system.</p>
        <p>Usually, basic and temporal metrics are determined by vulnerability bulletin analysts, security
software providers or vendors since they have better information about vulnerability
characteristics than users. However, environment-related metrics are determined by users as
they are best suited to assess the potential impact of a vulnerability in their own environment.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Analysis of SDN architecture vulnerabilities</title>
      <p>Despite the numerous security challenges in cloud computing, Cloud Security Alliance has
identified twelve critical security threats related to nature of shared on-demand cloud computing
that have the greatest impact on corporate business:
1. Data Breach. A data breach is an incident during which confidential, protected or
private information is disclosed, viewed, stolen or used by an unauthorized person.
2. Weak management of identity data, credentials and access. Data breaches and
activation of attacks can occur due to lack of scalable identity data access management
systems, non-use of multi-factor authentication, weak password usage and absence of
automated cryptographic key, password and certificate rotation.
3. Unprotected Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). Provisioning, management,
orchestration and monitoring are performed using a set of user interfaces or
application programming interfaces. These interfaces must be developed with proper
control to protect against both accidental and malicious attempts to bypass security
policies.
4. System and Application Vulnerabilities. System vulnerabilities are errors in programs
that can be exploited to infiltrate a computer system for data theft, system control or
service disruption.
5. Stolen account credentials. This is a serious threat and cloud users should be aware of
and guard against methods such as phishing, fraud and software vulnerabilities to
prevent account data theft.
6. Malicious insiders. A current or former employee, contractor or other business partner
with authorized access to an organization's network, systems or data, who
intentionally abuses this access in a way that negatively impacts the CIAAA of the
organization's information system, poses a malicious insider threat.
7. Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). APTs are a parasitic form of cyber-attacks that
infiltrate systems to establish themselves in the computing infrastructure of target
companies, from which they steal data and intellectual property.
8. Data Loss. Data stored in the cloud may be lost not only due to malicious attacks.</p>
      <p>Accidental deletion by a cloud service provider or a physical disaster, such as fire or
earthquake, can result in permanent data loss for the client.
9. Inadequate due diligence. An organization rushing to adopt cloud technologies and
selecting cloud service providers without conducting proper due diligence exposes
itself to numerous commercial, financial, technical, legal, and compliance risks.
10. Abuse and malicious use of cloud services. Poorly protected deployments of cloud
services, free trial versions of cloud services, and fraudulent registration of accounts
using payment fraud expose cloud computing models such as IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS to
malicious attacks. Attackers may use cloud computing resources of users,
organizations, or other cloud providers.
11. Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks. Denial-of-service attacks aim to interfere with users'
access to their data or programs, forcing the target cloud service to consume an
excessive amount of limited system resources, making service unable to respond to
legitimate users.
12. Technology sharing issues. Cloud service providers deliver their services by sharing
infrastructure, platforms, or applications. Infrastructure supporting the deployment of
cloud services may not have been designed to provide robust isolation features for
multi-tenant architectures (IaaS), redeployable platforms (PaaS), or multi-client
applications (SaaS). This can lead to shared technological vulnerabilities that could
potentially be exploited across all delivery models.</p>
      <p>With the growing interest in Software-Defined Networking and widespread deployment of
Software-Defined Networks, their vulnerabilities in combating cybersecurity threats are
gradually becoming apparent. Security questions are closely related to characteristics of SDN.
According to research the following aspects make Software-Defined Networks vulnerable to
attacks. Within the SDN architecture, separate levels are implemented for control plane and data
plane, unlike traditional networks where these planes operate in a single device. The control
plane formulates flow rules, while the data plane is responsible only for forwarding data packets
according to flow rules.</p>
      <p>For example, the lexicon used in such systems, which is fundamental for creating knowledge
bases in intelligent systems, is provided in Table . This stage is necessary for forming a system of
features to create logical equations.</p>
      <p>The specified indicators are basic metrics [10, 12] characterizing the overall complexity of
implementing an attack using a particular vulnerability on the node of the network.</p>
      <p>Representation and interpretation of knowledge play a crucial role in various fields of
computer science. Different methods of discrete mathematics are used for formalizing
information about objects and processes in knowledge bases. In cases where information about
objects and processes is represented by discrete informational features and has a complex logical
structure, various methods and models of discrete mathematics, including logical equations with
Boolean variables, are used for its formal representation.</p>
      <p>Logical classification methods typically involve the formulation and solution of logical
equations with variables that take values of 1 and 0 depending on whether the object has a certain
property or not. Solving such equations allows either identifying the object based on available
sets of attribute variable values or determining the unknown properties of the object [15].</p>
      <p>Logical classification methods for object categorization are applied to solving practical
problems in various fields: biology, physics, meteorology, information security, etc. Their features
can be revealed during the stage of constructing a mathematical model, taking into account
specificities of data. Typically, propositional logic is used for this purpose. We propose an
approach based on finite predicate algebra and method of comparison. The general form of such
problems is built on basis of predicate equations.</p>
      <p>Let the feature variables  1,  2 , … ,   denote certain properties of objects, for example, the
metrics values for calculating basic vulnerability metrics of network elements (Table ). Each
variable takes values from its domain. Unlike Boolean variables, predicate variables can take
values from different domains.</p>
      <p>Let discrete variables  1,  2 , … ,   be features, by set of which we can determine possible
values of property variables. Properties and features can be related to each other in the form of
complex logical dependencies, which can be represented as predicate equations:
 ( 1,  2 , … ,   ;  1,  2 , … ,   ) = 1, (1)
where P is a finite predicate.</p>
      <p>Classifying the considered object means determining, based on this predicate equation and
experimental data about the features  1,  2 , … ,   which properties (values of features
 1,  2 , … ,   ) this object has and which properties it does not correspond to [14, 15].</p>
      <p>Then, based on the a priori dependency (1) and experimental data on the features  1,  2 , … ,  
it is possible to determine to which class the given object belongs. As evident from the above
considerations, the values of features are grouped into a matrix.</p>
      <p>Suppose that as a result of the experiment, we obtained some data related to values of features
 1,  2 , … ,   describing the classified object, and compiled the following predicate equation
describing the relationships between them:</p>
      <p>(  1,  2 , … ,   ) = 1. (2)</p>
      <p>The task of object classification can be formalized as solving the following predicate equation
by finding the unknown predicate f:</p>
      <p>(  1,  2 , … ,   ) →  ( 1,  2 , … ,   ). (3)</p>
      <p>By solving this functional equation, one can determine the values of features  1,  2 , … ,   that
characterize objects  1,  2 , … ,   .</p>
      <p>In research related to logical inferences in knowledge bases, questions arise about the
tightness of relationships between the features of these objects, as well as questions about their
significance or insignificance [14, 15]. It has been proven that the formal relationship between
features is stronger the fewer sets of values of these variables satisfy the equation. In this case, if
any sets of values of these variables satisfy the original equation, it can be considered that there
is no connection between these variables.</p>
      <p>A comparative analysis of existing models of secure routing, a QoS routing model with a metric
analogous to the OSPF protocol, and an improved model of secure QoS routing taking into account
basic vulnerability criticality metrics has been conducted. The study proved the adequacy and
effectiveness of the proposed model, the feasibility of using intelligent methods for secure
routing.</p>
      <p>To solve the formulated optimization problem, a program was used, written in the Python
language, using Python IDLE, Python GEKKO Optimization Suite, and NumPy.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Conclusions and further research</title>
      <p>The article presents an important scientific and applied problem related to analysis of threats,
attack objects and improvement of potential solutions to enhance level of network security in
data plane of SDN networks using routing means with application of intelligent information
processing methods and interface creation.</p>
      <p>To achieve this goal standards for building software-defined networks were analyzed. It is
noted that SDN is a modern approach to designing, building and operating information and
communication networks by separating management and data forwarding planes. This
distribution provides networks with direct programmability and dynamism as well as
abstraction of functional capabilities from infrastructure layer. Network function virtualization
has become a standardized way of developing, implementing and managing network services.</p>
      <p>However, growing interest in SDN and their deployment has revealed their shortcomings in
combating cybersecurity threats. At the current stage of SDN architecture development, it has
been proven that typical security problems in software-configured networks primarily manifest
in aspects such as malicious software, controller vulnerability, legitimacy and consistency of flow
rules, standardization issues of northbound interface and communication security during the use
of southbound interface. Thus, main causes of security problems are SDN architecture itself,
external malicious attacks, insufficient access control and encryption means. Based on research
of typical security problems, it becomes apparent that centralized control and SDN
programmability features provide powerful and convenient channels for attackers.</p>
      <p>The analysis of vulnerabilities in SDN data plane and functional capabilities of routing means
to counter possible attacks showed the prospect of using secure routing tools based on basic
vulnerability criticality metrics to enhance the network security level of SDN data plane. In turn,
the analysis of CVSS standard for quantitative vulnerability assessment of network equipment
proved feasibility of its use in development and research of promising approaches to secure
routing in field of intelligent data processing in software-configured networks.</p>
      <p>The paper proposed improvements to existing secure routing model, taking into account basic
vulnerability criticality metrics. Thus, routing metrics were modified so that resulting model
would have properties of secure QoS routing. In improved model, the optimal route was selected
considering both basic vulnerability criticality metrics and bandwidth of communication
channels constituting this route. Additionally, model employed a quadratic optimality criterion
for balanced distribution of flows transmitted in data plane of a software-configured network into
substreams, taking into account chosen strategy of multi-path routing.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Acknowledgements</title>
      <p>The research study depicted in this paper is funded by the French National Research Agency
(ANR), project ANR-19-CE23-0005 BI4people (Business intelligence for the people)</p>
    </sec>
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