How does scientific gatekeeping in the patent examination system afect disruptive innovation? Although the patent system was established to safeguard innovation, previous research implies that disruptive innovation faces stronger challenges in gaining recognition. To open the black box of scientific gatekeeping, we analyze the dataset of the US Patent and Trademark Ofice between 2004 and 2018. Findings show that disruptive innovation is detrimental to patent approval, whereas examiner workload and work experience can enhance it. Moreover, examiner workload mitigates the negative impact of disruptive innovation on patent approval, while examiner work experience can amplify the impact of examiner workload on patent approval. This study contributes to the science of science by unveiling the seemingly contradictory gatekeeping logic of patent examiners. The implications help design a more innovation- friendly incentive mechanism for scientific gatekeeping.
gatekeeping within the patent examination system promote or suppress disruptive innovation? Despite the patent examination system intended to safe- We draw our research on the theories of scientific guard innovation, it may pose formidable hurdles for gatekeeping, analyzing 4.5 million patents (2006–2013) disruptive innovations striving for acknowledgment. De- of United States Patent and Trademark Ofice’s (USPTO) signed by the government to protect innovative tech- dataset, and build a citation network according to the nologies [1], an important task for patent examiners is dataset with network analysis methods. We define disto identify innovative patent applications based on prior ruption innovation as a leap or break with the traditional submissions [1]. Serving as impartial third parties, patent knowledge structure [5], and quantify disruptive innoexaminers are expected to ofer comparatively objective vation by the CD index five years after the publication assessments of the quality of patents. However, disrup- year of each patent[7]. To explore the bias in the patent tive innovation faces many challenges in terms of its approval process, we focus on two key characteristics of scientific impact and acceptance. Kuhn posits that in- patent examiners, namely workload and work experience. novation is a form of anomaly, and truly understanding Then, we use mixed efect models and propensity score such groundbreaking works, which challenge established weighting (PSW) to construct regression models and test paradigms, often demands a substantial amount of time the hypotheses. [2]. Prior research shows that disruptive innovation is We claim that disruptive innovation has a negative imrisky and hard to pay of [3, 4, 5]. Noh and Lee, in their pact on the patent approval, and examiner workload can analysis of patents within the telecommunications field, reduce the impact of disruptive innovation on the patent suggest that disruptive innovations often struggle to cap- approval. Examiner workload and Examiner work experiture the attention of examiners due to their significant ence both have a positive impact on the patent approval, deviation from existing technologies[6]. Thus, we for- and examiner work experience can amplify the efect of mulate the key puzzlement of this study: does scientific examiner workload on the patent approval. Additionally, granted patents means more patent citations, which helps knowledge flow and technology spillover. This study contributes to the science of science by unveiling the seemingly contradictory gatekeeping logic of patent examiners towards disruptive innovations.
Disruptive innovation indicates a leap or a break with the traditional knowledge structure [5], which is quite essential in the progress of science. However, normal science tends to explain existing problems and expand based on traditional knowledge rather than breaking out of the existing knowledge framework for innovation (Kuhn, 1962). The same thing happens with patents even patents are used to protect innovation by the government.
A patent that introduces a groundbreaking and disruptive innovative idea may struggle to attract attention because it is significantly diferent from existing technologies [6].
Moreover, some patents with a high degree of disruptive innovation may be accompanied by technical boundary spanning [6], which requires the examiner to do more back-and-forth work with the patent ofice, increasing the dificulty of examination and adversely afecting the granting result [8]. Therefore, we propose the hypothesis as follows:
H1: Disruptive innovation has a negative efect on patent approval. 2.2. Patent Examiner and Patent Approval disruptive innovation. Additionally, patents featuring disruptive innovation often involve interdisciplinary aspects, which might not entirely conform to the anticipated knowledge framework. This implies that reviewing patents involving disruptive innovation is relatively less challenging for these experienced examiners. Moreover, rejecting disruptive patents requires finding specific reasons, such as a significant gap from the current technology [6], which needs more time to do this kind of work.
However, the time constraints caused by workload make it relatively challenging for examiners to achieve this.
Therefore, we propose the hypothesis as follows:
H3: Examiner work Experience (a) and examiner workload (b) can reduce the negative impact of disruptive innovation on patent approval.
The accumulation of work experience enables examiners to gradually form personalized work routines, which diminishes their susceptibility to workload. Accumulated work experience enables patent examiners to conduct examinations with greater eficacy and eficiency, empowering them to better manage time constraints[19].
On the contrary, less experienced examiners are more prone to relying heavily on prior patents in their patent examination process [15], which amplifies the positive efect of workload on grant approval. In all, examiners’ work experience mitigates the impact of their workload on patent approval. Thus, we propose the hypothesis as follows:
H4: Examiner work experience can mitigate the positive efect of examiner workload on patent approval.
With the increasing workload, patent examiners are required to review a greater number of patent applications within a fixed timeframe, which afects the patent granted and patent quality. Rejecting a patent takes more time than accepting one [9, 10]. If examiners do not have suf- 3. Method ifcient time to thoroughly review all relevant prior art for each application to find if they meet the novelty, then 3.1. Data granting patents to applications that should have been rejected is more likely to occur [11, 12]. Moreover, the ex- We use the USPTO Patent dataset to obtain the basic inperience of examiners inevitably varies significantly at a formation about patents (2004-2018). In order to calculate specific point in time or concerning a particular group of the work experience of examiners and CD5 accurately, patents, influencing the quality and outcome of patents we analyze 200 thousand patents from 2006 to 2013 after granted [13]. The increase in the examiner’s work expe- data merging and cleaning. rience will make them inclined to grant a patent. Mann suggests that an increase in work experience may insti- 3.2. Measures gate a "burnout" efect, and result in an escalated work- 3.2.1. Dependent variables load, which links to a higher rate of patents granted [14].
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: Patent Approval. Patent Approval is a dummy variable
H2: Examiner workload (a) and examiner work expe- that refers to the status of the given patent whether be rience (b) has a positive efect on patent approval. granted or not. This variable takes the value 1 if the
As the experience and workload of an examiner in- patent is granted and 0 if it is rejected. creases, they are more inclined to grant patents [15], which may consequently result in a relatively higher ap- 3.2.2. Independent variables proval rate for patents involving disruptive innovation.
If an experienced examiner conducts the review, their rel- Disruptive Innovation. Following the tradition of prior atively reduced focus on existing technology [15] might research [17, 18], we calculate the D-score of disruption lead to a more lenient assessment of patents involving for each patent as follows: the higher the disruptive potential of a patent, the greater = − , (1) the dificulty in obtaining a grant. Therefore, H1 is well + + supported. where is the number of subsequent papers that cites According to the results of Model 2-4 in Table 2, both the focal paper, is the number of subsequent papers examiner work experience and examiner workload have that cite both the focal paper and its references, and is a positive impact on the patent granted. In other words, the number of subsequent papers that only cites the focal the shorter the tenure of examiners and the greater their paper’s references. However, the measure of disruption workload, the likelihood of patents being accepted tends D tends to be underestimated in the first few years (Lin et to increase. Therefore, H2(a) and H2(b) are well supal., 2022). Therefore, we calculate disruptive innovation ported. based on citations of the focal paper over a 5-year time As Model 5 shows in Table 2, firstly, the moderation window (CD5). Because the distribution of disruption is efect of Examiner Work Experience is not significant. also highly skewed, we use the CD5 percentile (M = 0.59, Thus H3(a) is rejected. Secondly, Examiner Workload has SD = 0.35) to measure the disruptive innovation of the a moderate efect on the relationship between Disruptive patent. Innovation and Patent Approval, reducing the negative
Examiner Workload. Examiner workload refers to impact of Disruptive Innovation on the Patent Approval how much of the burden of other patents is assigned to (as shown in Figure 1). Furthermore, the result of simple the examiner when they evaluate the focal patent. We slope analysis reveals that when the values of workload weighted patents in the period between the filing date are at -1 SD, Mean, and +1 SD, their slopes are -0.40 (t = of the focus patent and the date of grant or rejection to -23.78, p < 0.001), -0.22 (t = -23.78, p < 0.001), and -0.04 (t = make the calculation more accurate based on the work -23.78, p = 0.16), respectively. It means that for examiners of Funk and Owen-Smith [17]. with more work, the probability of rejecting a disruptive
Examiner Work Experience. Examiner work expe- patent is relatively smaller. Therefore, H3(b) is supported. rience is the number of years the examiner has worked Thirdly, Examiner Work Experience moderates the efect for USPTO. We exclude the examiner appearing in the of Examiner Workload on Patent Granted. The result ifrst 2 years of the dataset to calculate more accurately of simple slope analysis reveals that when the values of (M = 3.09, SD = 1.82). workload are at -1 SD, Mean, and +1 SD, their slopes are 0.86 (t = 71.48, p < 0.001), 1.03 (t = 105.06, p < 0.001), and 1.20 (t = 82.84, p < 0.001), respectively. When the 4. Findings examiner workload is less than approximately 4.5, higher examiner work experience is associated with a lower probability of patent approval at the same workload level.
Therefore, H4 is only partially supported.
tionship between Disruptive Innovation, Patent Granted, and Patent Examiners. To begin, we report the correlation matrix of the key variables in Table 1.
We make use of mixed efect model to test research 5. Conclusion hypotheses 1-4 (see Table 2), which is related to the relationship between disruptive innovation, examiner In summary, this study aims to elucidate the relationwork experience, examiner workload, and patent granted. ship between disruptive innovation, patent examiners, As Table 2 shows, the results indicate a negative impact and granted patents, investigating factors influencing of disruptive innovation on the patent granted, that is, patent approval including disruptive innovation, examprovide additional evidence from the gatekeeping perspective that disruptive innovation faces dificulties in gaining acceptance in the scientific field [2]. Second, we explore the bias of examiners from the aspects of workload and work experience, thereby shedding light on the black box of the gatekeeping process by contrasting granted and rejected patents. Third, the mechanisms by which innovation is either fostered or hindered during the gatekeeping process help better understand and enhance the existing patent examination system’s ability to safeguard innovation.
We acknowledge the limitations of this study, which provide some insights and directions for future research.
First, we lack examination opinion data that detail the reasons for patent rejections. If specific examination opinions are available, it would enable exploration of more precise gatekeeping mechanisms. Second, when measuring the impact of a patent, we have only considered patent citations and have overlooked the influence of academic papers. Third, demographic factors of patent examiners e.g., gender and age) which could influence their decision-making processes and potential biases, are not included in the analysis. iner workload, and experience, while also exploring the impact of granted patents on citations. This study has significant theoretical and policy implications. First, we
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