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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>Ital-IA</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Artificial Intelligence and Anti-Corruption</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Fabrizio Sbicca</string-name>
        </contrib>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2024</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>4</volume>
      <fpage>29</fpage>
      <lpage>30</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>The article presents recent developments undertaken by ANAC in the understanding of corruption and suggests possible avenues for further analysis of the phenomenon using machine learning techniques.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;corruption</kwd>
        <kwd>public procurement</kwd>
        <kwd>big data</kwd>
        <kwd>machine learning1</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>Although corruption represents one of the main
obstacles to economic, political, and social
development, it is a latent phenomenon and,
therefore, difficult to measure. Indeed, the corruptive
phenomenon can be compared to an iceberg of which
only the tip is visible, despite the submerged part
being much larger than it appears. The cases of
corruption that are learned about, for example,
through court rulings, constitute the visible part, but
they leave us ignorant regarding the size and
characteristics of the phenomenon that remains
largely hidden. Not surprisingly, there is an extreme
shortage of structured scientific data on the
corruptive phenomenon internationally that goes
beyond the measurement of the so-called
"perception" or of ad hoc studies, certainly very
interesting and rich in insights, but whose contents
and results are difficult to generalize.
2. ANAC’s experience in measuring
corruption</p>
      <p>A significant step forward in the understanding of
this phenomenon was made by the Italian
AntiCorruption Authority (ANAC), which in July 2022
presented to the public a section of its portal called
"Measure Corruption"
(https://www.anticorruzione.it/il-progetto). Seventy
indicators are made available to the community
capable of measuring the risk of corruption in the
territory
(https://www.anticorruzione.it/gliindicatori).</p>
      <p>These indicators can be considered as warning
bells signaling potentially anomalous situations. They
allow to have a picture of territorial contexts more or
less exposed to corruptive phenomena on which to
invest in terms of prevention and/or investigation.
They can also direct the attention of civil society and
increase civic participation. From this point of view,
this system of indicators could represent a useful
contribution to the country for the construction and
implementation of further and more targeted tools for
the prevention, monitoring, and control of corruption,
with the ultimate aim of better managing the future
use of public financial resources. The perspective
pursued in developing the website has been to
highlight the importance of strengthening collective
awareness on the serious social consequences
resulting from corruption. Prevention and repression
are in fact necessary but not sufficient, to fight the
phenomenon in a more profound way we need an
increase in social capital. For this reason, the
dashboards in the website are “easy”, behind them
© 2024 Copyright for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under
Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
there are complex data, algorithms and IT structures
but the result that ANAC tried to achieve is that they
would be understandable to everyone and
captivating, especially for young people, in order to
engage more easily in questions, reflections and
awareness.</p>
      <p>In particular, the so-called "context indicators"
provide an idea of the complex social and economic
context of the territory in which a risk of corruption is
more or less likely to manifest. This analysis indeed
took into consideration 18 indicators, collected in four
thematic domains (education, economy, crime, social
capital). Other 25 indicators were then added. These
indicators are useful for evaluating the conditions of
the territorial context (for a total of 43 simple
indicators), all related to the main hypotheses
identified in the literature regarding factors
associated with corruption. The analysis of the
external context, in fact, aims to identify the cultural,
economic, and social characteristics of the provincial
territory in which the administrations operate, which
can favor, or conversely hinder, the occurrence of
corruptive phenomena.</p>
      <p>Each thematic domain is summarized by a
composite index to simplify the reading of complexity
due to the many dimensions considered. The four
thematic composite indicators are in turn
synthesized, by combining them, into a further
"composite of composites" index that therefore
provides a highly informative synthetic measure on
some characteristics of the entire phenomenon. Thus,
the "context dashboard" makes available to the
community a total of 48 indicators, of which 5 are
composite.</p>
      <p>The risk indicators for corruption in the public
procurement, on the other hand, provide information
related to the purchases of administrations located in
the province to which they refer and are particularly
important both because of the unique weight of the
corruptive phenomenon in the public procurement
market and the institutional purposes of ANAC. The
source of the information is in fact the National
Database of Public Contracts (BDNCP), a great value
asset that, for the quantity and detail of the data
contained, relating to about 70 million contracts,
represents a unique experience at the European level.
The availability of this database allows for the
computation of corruption risk indicators with an
extreme degree of territorial, sectoral, and temporal
detail.</p>
      <p>Based on an increasingly important and
substantial body of scientific studies, ANAC has
identified 17 indicators that, in various ways, identify
aspects highlighting potential corruptive phenomena
in the context of public procurement, thus signaling
the risk of corruption in every Italian province.</p>
      <p>
        An example of corruption risk indicators in public
procurement is the use of discretionary procedures
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ] or tenders with very few bidders [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ], but also
delays and cost overruns [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ]. The literature identifies
that low competition in tenders associated with more
discretion is typically a signal of corruption risk [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ].
Other examples of contract-level red flags for
corruption can be found in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref11 ref12">10, 11, 12</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>The portal allows for the calculation of synthesis
indicators according to different risk thresholds,
obtained by condensing the information coming from
all or part of the 17 indicators. For each of the selected
indicators, in fact, it is possible to highlight the
provinces whose value exceeds a given percentage of
the provinces with a less risky value. The threshold
value can be freely chosen from the 75th to the 99th
percentile.</p>
      <p>Finally, five indicators were calculated at the level
of single administration, in this case, the 745 Italian
municipalities with a population equal to or greater
than 15,000 inhabitants. These indicators were
calculated based on the statistical analysis of the
relationships between variables potentially related to
corruption and episodes that occurred at the level of
single administration.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>3. Artificial Intelligence</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Corruption and</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Anti</title>
      <p>What are the potential future developments and
opportunities opened by technological innovation
that is evolving with unprecedented speed,
particularly regarding artificial intelligence? First, an
opportunity arises from the increasing availability of
information in large public databases of various kinds
which, if properly used, allow for the extraction of
potentially very useful indicators. The joint use of
separate databases is very advantageous, based on the
principle that the value of data tends to grow more
than proportionally with the combination of different
sources. In the Italian case, though, several databases
are often owned by distinct public administrations.
Their joint use is hindered by several factors,
including concerns about privacy protection. The
need to overcome such impediments is particularly
urgent today, with the spread of tools and techniques
for analyzing so-called "big data," which the Italian
public administration generates in increasing
measure. They can unleash their potential to support
a public debate that is anchored in the evidence of
facts and can help policymakers to take more
informed decisions.</p>
      <p>
        Another important aspect is certainly the
digitalization of the procurement lifecycle, an
important and difficult transformation process that is
occurring worldwide. In Italy, digitalization has been
expressively envisaged by the new Public Contract
Code. First of all, digitalization could in itself
constitute an effective measure for the prevention of
corruption as it is likely to bring a higher degree of
transparency, traceability, participation, control of
activities, potentially suitable to ensure compliance
with legality [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref13 ref18 ref2">1, 2, 13, 18</xref>
        ]. With the full
implementation of the digitalization of the contract
lifecycle, data should be "natively digital," which could
improve not only the quality and completeness of
information but also allow for the acquisition of
additional data not previously detected by the
mentioned BDNCP or acquired in a very deficient
manner. The informative bases held by ANAC could
therefore have in the future a role of great importance
and greater centrality also in the prevention and
combat of corruption and other phenomena (such as
fraud, collusion, conflict of interest) strongly
detrimental to the correct functioning of the market
and the effective and efficient allocation of resources
in the context of public procurement, including those
funded with EU funds. Recent experiences of full
digitalization of the public procurement process
analyzed in the literature can be found in Ukraine [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5 ref6">6,
5</xref>
        ] and Georgia[21].
      </p>
      <p>On the other hand, both Regulation (EU)
2021/241 of February 12 2021 establishing the
Recovery and Resilience Facility and Regulation (EU)
2021/1060 of 24 June 2021 laying down common
provisions for different European funds , provide that
Member States implement effective control
mechanisms on procurement based as much as
possible on methodologies and tools for collecting and
analyzing large volumes of information available in
computerized databases, emphasizing the centrality
of risk indicators as a fundamental tool for the
prevention and combat of serious irregularities in
such market, such as fraud, corruption, and conflicts
of interest. And “Notice on tools to fight collusion in
public procurement and on guidance on how to apply
the related exclusion ground” (2021/C 91/01 of 18
March 2021) , emphasizes, with specific reference to
collusion, the importance of indicators as a tool to
combat distortive phenomena of competition,
reaffirming the need for central authorities in
Member States to increasingly and effectively
collaborate in the analysis of procurement data,
developing methodologies and tools that are simple
and easy to apply to collect and analyze large volumes
of information available in computerized databases.</p>
      <p>
        The ever-greater availability of large data sets has
also increasingly shifted attention to the potential for
developing advanced algorithms, using big data
analytics and artificial intelligence in addition to
traditional statistical analyses [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ]. Machine learning
can help identifying further and more targeted red
flags that concerning both the individual transaction
and the purchasing activity of a certain administration
or the set of administrations in a certain territorial
area. For instance, [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ] studies a particular red flag for
corruption, which is the degree of political connection
of firms.
      </p>
      <p>
        In this regard, AI anti-corruption tools can be
defined as "data processing systems driven by tasks or
problems designed to, with a degree of autonomy,
identify, predict, summarize, and/or communicate
actions related to the misuse of position, information
and/or resources aimed at private gain at the expense
of the collective good" [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">19</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Thanks to the processing of large volumes of data
with the current processing speed, artificial
intelligence can indeed contribute to uncovering
patterns of corruption and identifying warning signs.
Research on the potential of such tools in the field of
corruption prevention and combat is still in its initial
phase [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ], and so far, there are not many concrete
examples of application to this theme, among these
are cited the case of Brazil (Anti-corruption tools
based on artificial intelligence to monitor public
spending, for example cartel practices); the Chinese
"Zero Trust" system to predict the risk that public
officials are involved in corrupt practices; the "SyRI"
algorithm used by the Dutch authorities to identify
fraud in the social security sector, however
dismantled in 2020 due to often discriminatory and
biased results; the Ukrainian "ProZorro" system to
detect violations from public procurement data and
prevent the misuse of public funds. Moreover, some
authors used data science techniques to construct
networks of firms bidding in the same auctions in the
Georgian public procurement market to find possible
networks of firms that collude to win public contracts
[21], other researchers use a neural network
approach to detect corruption in the Spanish
provinces [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ], or methods from network science to
analyze the corruption risk at the EU level [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">20</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>From this point of view, the indicators of the ANAC
portal need to be “valid” in order to be used in the
future in a targeted way and with a solid scientific
basis of reference also for preventive purposes. This
validation can be obtained thanks to techniques that
go beyond the deductive reasoning that led to their
identification in the first place. In this regard, any
further future developments exploring this line of
research, already practiced in the case of the
abovementioned municipal risk indicators already present
in the ANAC portal, could be based on a validation
methodology that is based on the distinction between:
a. "relevant events," which are summarized by the
risk indicators, for example, those related to public
procurement, calculated thanks to the BDNCP;
b. "phenomena of possible corruption," as indicated
by other types of sufficiently structured and
numerous data, among these: judicial convictions for
corruption crimes or, more generally, for crimes
against the PA; reports received by ANAC; news
articles related to episodes of corruption; dissolution
of municipal councils for mafia infiltration, etc.</p>
      <p>Validating the risk indicators (which summarize
the "relevant events") means evaluating their capacity
to "predict" the "phenomena of possible corruption".
Regarding this, the procedure that could be
experimented is based on two areas of statistical
techniques that can be used. On one hand, there are
the so-called traditional statistical models, both
parametric (such as, for example, regression models)
and non-parametric. On the other hand, there are
various types of machine learning techniques. In both
cases, the analysis is only carried out in a subset of the
available data, to then be able to consider the
predictive capacity of the estimated relationship
"outside the sample" (the part of the data not used).
This allows, among other things, to evaluate which
indicators, among the alternatives considered, have
the best predictive capacity. Finally, the potential of
this approach should be considered where the
programs used for the construction of the algorithms
were made available to the public in order to prevent
such measures from being perceived (or actually are)
as "black boxes". This is an important issue today, and
will gain even greater prominence in the future, as the
use of artificial intelligence techniques that can be
particularly opaque spreads.</p>
      <p>A first example of statistical validation has already
been carried out within the project on measuring
corruption and concerns the 5 risk indicators at the
municipal level mentioned earlier, which are in fact
significantly associated with the occurrence of
corruption episodes of a single administration. Unlike
the 48 context indicators and the 17 procurement
indicators, which were calculated at the aggregated
territorial level of the province, in this case, the unit of
analysis is indeed the single Municipality intended as
an entity.</p>
      <p>Based on the results achieved, it is possible to
identify various possible lines of development of
predictive indicators, using also machine learning
techniques. First, the development of a cluster
analysis on "infected" Municipalities (i.e.,
characterized by at least one episode of corruption in
the time period examined) with the aim of identifying
some subgroups of municipalities that present
recurring organizational, governance, and managerial
characteristics. The analyses conducted have indeed
allowed identifying among the medium-large Italian
Municipalities those in which episodes of corruption
occurred in the five-year period 2015-2019. It might
be interesting, within this group, to therefore conduct
a cluster analysis to be able to identify the "similarity"
between the Municipalities in which episodes of
corruption were detected, proceeding with a
classification of the same based on: 1) organizational
variables; 2) governance variables; 3) risk indicators
in public procurement; 4) accounting variables. The
development of this type of investigation could allow
identifying within the "infected" municipalities,
subgroups characterized by a high internal
homogeneity with respect to some features. This
could make it possible to identify some organizational,
governance, and managerial characteristics that are
recurrent among the Italian Municipalities
characterized by corruptive episodes.</p>
      <p>Another possible deepening could concern the
extension of the analysis to other sectors of public
administration (e.g., health units) in order to identify
potential corruptive risk indicators linked to
organizational, managerial, and accounting variables.
Indeed, it is known in the literature that Public
Administrations constitute a varied and
heterogeneous set of entities profoundly different in
terms of institutional, organizational, managerial,
accounting arrangements that operate in significantly
different normative and regulatory contexts. In other
words, the corruptive risk indicators could vary from
sector to sector of Public Administrations, due to the
specificities and differentiations that characterize
them.</p>
      <p>
        Finally, a further interesting development could
concern the use of the findings on corruption cases in
municipalities to support the development of
predictive techniques of corruption risk based on
artificial intelligence. Municipalities are one of the
areas of the PA where there is more need to
strengthen the analysis of context variables affecting
the corruptive risk. The magnitude of this risk is
presumably destined to grow with the use of EU funds
to finance the numerous projects approved in the
various territorial areas. In the most recent economic
literature, the analysis of the corruptive risk in Italian
municipalities has been conducted by some
researchers through the application of Artificial
Intelligence techniques, such as machine learning in
order also to build predictive models of corruption in
Italian municipalities, using as predictors a series of
socio-economic, demographic, geographic, and
biophysical variables, drawn from the sector
literature [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]. From this point of view, the analyses
conducted within the ANAC project have led to the
development of a database of corruptive events for
medium-large Italian Municipalities in the period
2015-2019, which has allowed to detect also
numerous organizational, governance, accounting,
and risk variables in public procurement. The
variables available in the Datasets prepared during
the project could therefore be used for the
construction of new algorithms that can learn from
this set of data for predictive purposes.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>4. References</title>
      <p>science perspective, International Journal of
Data Science and Analytics 12 (2021) 45–60.
[21] J. Wachs, J. Kertesz, A network approach to
cartel detection in public auction markets,
Scientific reports 9 No.1 (2021).</p>
    </sec>
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