=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-3762/516
|storemode=property
|title=Regulating Generative AI towards the future
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3762/516.pdf
|volume=Vol-3762
|authors=Giovanna De Minico,Michela Tuozzo
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/ital-ia/MinicoT24
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==Regulating Generative AI towards the future==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3762/516.pdf
Regulating Generative AI towards the future1
Giovanna De Minico* - Michela Tuozzo*
University of Naples Federico II, via Marina 33, Naples, 80125, Italy
Abstract
This intervention is focused on two issues. The first one aims to consider the current regulatory
framework of Generative Artificial Intelligence systems, with specific attention to the obligations
of providers and deployers and system governance as dictated in the AI Act.
The second issue is dedicated to exploring points of intersection with other regulations
applicable to AI systems within the European digital ecosystem.
Keywords
Generative AI systems, AI Act, Governance
1. Introduction potential implications on a crucial issue: hate speech
and online misinformation.
Generative intelligence, a cutting-edge development
in the realm of artificial intelligence, has significantly 2. GPAIs’ classification
influenced the legislative trajectory of the European
Regulation on Artificial Intelligence -
2021/0106(COD). The critical characteristics of general-purpose AI
AI systems utilizing Large Language Models have (GPAI) models include their large size, opacity, and
the capacity to generate a wide range of outputs, potential to develop unexpected capabilities beyond
including texts, translations, images, sounds, videos, those intended by their creators. According to article
and more. The prospect of these systems 3 (63), a general-purpose AI model means an AI model
harmoniously integrating with other AI systems trained with a large amount of data using self-
amplifies their usefulness for users, both supervision at a scale that displays significant
professionals and non-professionals, as well as for generality and is capable of competently performing a
public and/or judicial authorities. The latter can wide range of distinct tasks regardless of the way the
leverage them for forecasting, adopting model is placed on the market and that can be
recommendations, or making informed decisions. integrated into a variety of downstream systems or
The unique characteristics of generative AI have applications.
raised questions about the applicability of the On December 6, 2022, the General Secretariat of
traditional risk management approach, which forms the Council classified GPAIs as high-risk systems. This
the foundation of European technological Regulation, classification enforces specific compliance obligations
and how to effectively categorize this new form of AI. (Articles 10-15), requires a risk impact assessment on
The proposed intervention aims to highlight the fundamental rights (Article 27), mandates auditing
status of generative AI under the AI Act and its prior to market entry (Article 43), and necessitates
governance. Consequently, critical reflections will be registration in the EU database, along with post-
elaborated upon regarding these elements and their market surveillance obligations.
1 The article reflects collective thoughts; however, the © 2024 Copyright for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under
Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
paragraphs can be attributed as follows: paragraphs 1, 2, 2.1, and
3 to Dr. Michela Tuozzo; paragraphs 2.2 and 4 to Prof. Giovanna
De Minico.
Ital-IA 2024: 4th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
organized by CINI, May 29-30, 2024, Naples, Italy
∗ Corresponding author.
giovanna.deminico@unina.it (G. De Minico);
michela.tuozzo@unina.it (M. Tuozzo);
CEUR
ceur-ws.org
Workshop ISSN 1613-0073
Proceedings
The high-risk classification of GPAIs has sparked In addition to those already stipulated for "standard"
two types of criticism: the failure to adhere to a GPAIs, providers shall perform model evaluation to
precautionary approach and the imposition of identify and mitigate systemic risk; assess and
obligations that are perceived as difficult to achieve. mitigate possible systemic risks at the Union level;
Through its amendments on June 14, 2023, these report without undue delay to the AI Office and, as
critical aspects led the European Parliament to appropriate, to national competent authorities,
develop an autonomous classification of GPAIs as relevant information about severe incidents and
foundation models. Article 28 ter outlined three possible corrective measures to address them; ensure
categories of obligations for the provider: risk an adequate level of cybersecurity protection.
identification and mitigation, testing and evaluation,
and documentation. 2.2. Governance2
However, it's important to note that the regulatory
model was significantly altered in the final version of The governance of the artificial intelligence
the adopted AI Act, a result of the compromise market is complex due to AI's diverse applications in
reached among the European institutions during the both public and private sectors across national and EU
trilogue phase. This change was influenced by levels. It is important to note that responsibility for
lobbying efforts (Bareis), underscoring the political actions like fundamental rights impact assessment
dynamics at play in the regulatory process. and conformity evaluation falls on the entrepreneur's
initiative, reflecting a confusing blend by the
Commission of individual centrality and a trend
2.1. Tiered approach toward system privatization.
The governance system could have taken three
forms: complete decentralisation, relying on national
The Regulation of generative intelligence became its
oversight systems like telecommunications, complete
category in the final version of the AI Act approved on
centralised supervision disregarding national
March 13, 2024. Within this category, generative AI is
variations, or a mixed system with tasks entrusted to
classified into three types: general-purpose AI model,
the Commission in a designated Directorate-General
general-purpose AI model with systemic risk, and
and to European agencies. The governance of the AI
open-source general-purpose AI model (articles 51 –
Act takes different forms depending on the level
55). As a result, we have different rules for different
considered and even the type of intelligence, as shown
GPAIs.
by the case of GPAIs. Examples of entirely European
In essence, Spanish Presidency of the EU Council
Independent Authorities, independent from National
has aimed to strike a balance between the Council's
Governments and the Commission, were established
hands-off approach and the Parliament's earlier
in 2010 with the European Banking Authority, the
stance of establishing uniform rules for all generative
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
AI systems.
Authority, and the European Securities and Markets
Specifically, providers of "standard" GPAIs, when
Authority.
generating synthetic audio, image, video, or text
While traditional AI systems have an intermediate
content, must ensure that the outputs of the AI system
governance form balancing decentralisation and
are marked in a machine-readable format and
centralisation, generative AI systems follow a fully
detectable as artificially generated or manipulated
centralised approach. This led to a complex
(Article 50, paragraph 2). In addition providers shall
governance structure: the original proposal involved
(Article 53): draw up and keep up-to-date the
three authorities (Commission, National Authorities,
technical documentation; comply with Union
and AI Board), but the final act expanded to at least 5
copyright law; make a sufficiently detailed summary
(including the Advisory Forum and Scientific Panel).
of the content used for training publicly available.
The entire AI system obediently follows a
Conversely, providers of open-source GPAIs must
government-centric approach. It is justified solely by
only comply with copyright rules and those regarding
the fact that AI will become the engine of public
the synthesis of content used for training.
policies that must firmly remain in the hands of the
The obligations for providers of GPAI with
current political majorities.
systemic risk are more extensive than for "standard".
2 This part is due to Professor Giovanna De Minico.
As for the Commission, it has the power to have superficial rule because it is unclear how to ensure
the final and definitive say on corrective measures functional independence without first guaranteeing
proposed by national supervisory authorities, organisational independence, known as genetic
confirming an approach centred on the community independence. Additionally, Article 70 does not
executive. specify which entities should respect this
As for the AI Board, it is ensured only functional independence. Previously, Article 59, par. 4, stated
independence; indeed, genetic independence from the that “members of each national supervisory authority,
Commission and Member States is not required. (…), shall neither seek nor take instructions from
Evidence of this is the freedom of each State to send anybody and shall refrain from any action
whomever they want and the presence of the incompatible with their duties”. Removing this part of
Commission on the Board. Consequently, even the rule suggests that independence is only aimed at
functional independence is at risk, as already those being regulated, not political representatives.
evidenced by the comparison between European This suggests that the AI Act has accepted a partial
Parliament amendments (Article 56) and the final text risk of capture because it only focuses on regulating
of Article 65. This rule states: "The Board shall be solid entities.
organised and operated to safeguard the objectivity The National Authority possesses regulatory
and impartiality of its activities". The original powers, allowing it to mandate actions such as
formulation of Article 56 stated: "The ‘European suspensions, corrective measures, or removing AI
Artificial Intelligence Office’ (…) shall be an systems from the market. Could personal ablation be
independent body of the Union. It shall have legal constructed as a complex administrative action with
personality" and the Office "act independently when unequal powers? To this question, we respond
carrying out its tasks or exercising its powers” (Article affirmatively because the National Authority has the
56 quater). Currently, in terms of its structure, the authority to propose the action, with the Commission
Office is integrated within the administrative having the final say. Therefore, two authorities – the
framework of the Directorate-General for National and the Community – intervene in the same
Communications Networks, Content and Technology decision but at different times and with different
(DG-CNECT) of the Commission. It does not have contributions: one proposes, and the other finalises
operational autonomy from DG-CNECT. Furthermore, the procedure. This procedural collaboration achieves
unlike national authorities, no dedicated coordination between authorities operating
infrastructures or technical, financial, or human simultaneously within the National Union network.
resources are provided. In a summary overview, the governance of the AI
Regarding National Supervisory Authorities, it is Act reserves central political authority for the
permissible for the State to designate them within an Commission, whose verbum is communicated
affiliated entity such as the Government (as downstream to the National Authorities. Then, it
emphasised in the Privacy Commissioner's letter returns to the Commission itself, with an AI Board
dated March 25, 2024). intervening occasionally to address gaps in the
In Italy, the agencification approach is confirmed discourse.
by the legislative initiative on a delegated law In contrast to the system described above, the
regarding artificial intelligence approved by Council generative system governance is centralised between
of Ministers on April 23, 2024. In the draft, Article 18 the AI Office and the Commission.
designates the two Authorities: the Agency for Digital The Commission shall have exclusive powers to
Italy (AgID) and the National Cybersecurity Agency supervise general-purpose AI models and request
(ACN). In both cases, these government agencies measures and shall entrust the implementation of
achieve functional independence only with respect to these tasks to the AI Office, a European Agency of the
the regulated entities but not the representative Commission.
political body. The Government's choice seems clear: The AI Office plays a central role in developing a
to maintain control over "intelligent policies" in its Code of Practice and monitoring its application.
hands, rejecting the model of independent authorities. The Scientific Panel serves as a qualified advisory
In addition to functional independence, body to the AI Office.
organisational independence was expressly Unlike traditional AI models, governance for
requested in the Parliament's amendments (Article generative models is fully Eurocentric to the extent
59, par. 1, EP). that the Commission fulfils its administrative role and
Article 70 (AI Act adopted) only recognises possesses law enforcement powers. The
functional independence, which seems like a centralisation of governance is at its maximum.
While centralisation under the Commission is intervene. Civil society organisations, industry,
justified by the sector's sensitivity and the need for a academia, and other relevant stakeholders, such as
unified implementation approach, it raises concerns downstream providers and independent experts, may
about deviating from the independent European also support the process (Article 56).
authorities established in 2010. Co-regulation in the technology sector has shown
various reasons for fallibility, with the primary
concern being the risk of capture by regulated solid
3. Boundaries entities.
Lastly, there is an emphasis on the responsible
3.1. Disadvantages of the AI Act behaviour of providers but a need for proper division
of responsibility with 'downstream' users. It should
The qualification of so-called 'systemic risk' will be considered that the distribution of responsibilities
initially depend on the capability, either based on a along the value chain should involve multiple parties,
quantitative threshold of the cumulative amount of each with different responsibilities, particularly
compute used for its training measured in floating considering the user's role depending on whether
point operations (FLOPs set as 10^25) or based on a they use the output for professional purposes
decision of the Commission, ex officio or following a (Hacker, Engel, Mauer).
qualified alert from the scientific panel. It is presumed
that a model trained with large amounts of data and
advanced complexity has foreseeable adverse effects 3.2. Addressing Challenges Within and
on public health, safety, public security, fundamental Beyond the AI Act
rights, or the society as a whole that can be
propagated at scale across the value chain. Beyond the regulatory aspects addressed in the AI Act,
Upon closer examination, this definition of the proliferation of this new type of AI also presents
systemic risk consider the combination of the interpreters with the issue of the rapid pace of
probability of a harmful event occurring and the technological transformations. From a constitutional
severity of that harm, as well as the values and assets law perspective, it is essential to clarify the categories
of constitutional relevance. This appears consistent involved to assess whether the discipline outlined in
with the framework of the AI Act, which prohibits all the article respects fundamental liberties.
AI systems whose use is deemed unacceptable Consider that the prerogative of the most
because it contradicts Union values. However, there widespread GPAIs – such as chat GPT – is
needs to be coherence between the means, communication.
represented by numerical indicators such as FLOPs, We need to raise the following questions: Does
and the end, which is the protection of common generative AI produce ideas? Is it a new form of
constitutional values. These parameters «describe the media? Or a digital private communication?
foundational model but not its impact on society, Article 15 of the Constitution protects the
safety or fundamental rights» (Helberger et al.). limitation of the freedom of communication by the
Another criticism concerns the quantitative and guarantees of legal reservation and jurisdiction, but
qualitative reduction of provider obligations, even for with a significant difference compared to Article 21.
GPAIs with systemic risk. It is surprising to note that The limits expressed (good conduct) and unexpressed
for such models, the activity of demonstrating (protection of personality rights such as reputation
compliance before placing the AI system into the and privacy) would not apply to communications as
market or service is not accompanied by guarantees they do to Article 21. Furthermore, protecting
of a prior conformity assessment for the provider and freedom and correspondence from undue
a fundamental rights impact assessment for the interference would extend to the recipient and the
deployer. Compliance can be demonstrated by relying sender (in our case, OpenAI, Google, and others).
on codes of practice within the meaning of Article 56 The constitutional coverage of Article 21 would
until a harmonised standard is published. imply extending the guarantees of the press medium
The AI Office, in collaboration with the Board, to chat GPT as well: the prohibition of censorship, the
encourages the drafting of the Code. They aim to possibility of adopting inhibitory acts with the
ensure that the Codes of Practice comprehensively guarantees of legal reservation and jurisdiction, and
address the obligations in Articles 53 and 55. finally, the possibility of limiting its contents.
However, all providers of general-purpose AI models
and relevant national competent authorities will
Finally, similarly to the issue of advertising The criterion for identifying GPAIs at systemic risk
information, it could be argued that informational relates to computational capacity: “when the
content has an economic purpose. Therefore, it would cumulative amount of computation used for its
be more appropriate to adopt the limits of Article 41. training measured in floating point operations is
Thus, it cannot be carried out in contrast to social greater than 10(^25)” (Article 51 AI Act). Unlike for
utility or in a way that harms health, the environment, the DSA in this case, the number of clients is
security, freedom, or human dignity. Upon closer disregarded because the taxable entity is
examination, the protection here is also twofold: identified because of the capacity to input data and
towards the end-user citizen and other commercial occupy the data world.
operators. The second difference is an objective one that
Providing a definitive answer to the question of concerns the service. Platforms render an
constitutional coverage requires further examination. intermediary service: they connect those who
It is essential to consider the communicative context generate information with those who receive
and the communicating subject: We are within the information, and this encounter between supply and
protective sphere of Article 15 when the intention is demand happens on the platform. So, the platform
to maintain the secrecy of the content of virtual does not put its hand on the information; it hosts it,
correspondence, the recipients are specific and rationalizes it, organizes it, and categorizes it, but
immutable, and the means are suitable for achieving someone else is generating the idea. Generative AI, on
secrecy. It is precisely this last requirement that leans the other hand, does precisely what the platform does
towards the category of Article 21. not do; that is, it occupies that space vacated by the
When considering the fine line with Article 41, we platform because the AI is not a host; it is the author
must examine the purpose of freedom of expression. of an idea of its own can argue about whether Chat-
If it serves an economic aim, such as profiling, then the GPT creates the idea out of thin air, or whether the
broader protection of Article 21 may not apply. idea is generated by fishing around the network, how
(Ruffolo). it articulates it, and so on but it is still something that
involves creative energy. Even though Chat-GPT,
unlike the human mind, does not create from anything
4. Next steps: Implementing the but from a background, it still realizes a vital, active,
innovative contribution that is not there in the
Regulatory Framework in the
platform.
Digital Ecosystem3 So I have come to say that there is a subjective and
Upon closer examination, we found that adopting objective difference, and because of this difference, to
the AI Act only addresses some of the issues raised by be strict, the discipline of DSA cannot be applied.
generative AI systems. 2) If we combine all the regulations, they would
It could be a reason for adding the general still fall under the guidelines of the AI Act, which has
discipline of the AI Act with some particular deliberately exempted GPAI. GPAI was only included
disciplines, such as Digital Services Act – Regulation in the final negotiations as a last resort, with less strict
2022/2065 – and Digital Market Act – Regulation rules compared to other forms of intelligence.
2022/1925, which follow a community goal: to create Essentially, GPAI has been shielded from excessive
a single digital ecosystem. regulation. Those advocating for additional rules are
This cumulation operation cannot happen going against the original purpose. Since EU laws are
automatically, but it should be conducted with some meant to be interpreted beyond just the words, this
questions showing us how to integrate the disciplines. combination of regulations would contradict the
1) Is there a difference in the passive legitimates intentio legis of the AI Act, burdening GPAI with
of the two disciplines? By passive legitimates, we regulations it was meant to avoid. While we might
mean the recipients of the rules of the Digital Service regret not imposing more regulations, it is worth
Act and the AI Act. The former are the platforms that acknowledging that GPAI has been protected as
are identified in the discipline because of a quantity: intended.
“several average monthly active recipients of the Finally, let us ask what the purpose of DSA is. The
service in the Union equal to or higher than 45 DSA is for keeping the net clean of blatant
million” (Article 33, DSA). malfeasance, misleading, hate speech, fake news, and
3 This part is due to Professor Giovanna De Minico.
so on. Provided that the DSA is not intended to reasoning that hateful conduct is prohibited because
derogate from the general principle that the platform it is prohibited. Rather, tautology can conceal
is not the editor-in-chief of a newspaper, it is exempt dangerous liberticidal theses and easy slides toward
from a prior and general control obligation, but it does only permissible speech: state speech. Thus, the
put in place a punctual control obligation, thus not control of permissibility conceals insidious forms of
generalized, and not ex-ante but ex-post. This merit-based scrutiny of the manifestation of thought,
obligation of control signifies that the ultimate goal is opening the door to digital censorship on the Web.
to hold together a control that does not impose a This undergoes a radical change from a place
generalized vigilance to which no platform will ever unscathed by heteronomous interventions and free
want to submit, surrendering fundamental freedoms, from information intermediaries to a space
thus the right to say and have expressed those who supervised by private individuals who have the keys
then put news on the platforms. to open and close the information agora in their
Suppose we have a positive answer on positive hands. This risk cannot be avoided due the absence of
DSA’s purpose. In that case, it could be shifted to the the normative definition of falsehood, with the
Chat-GPT as well? Moreover, why not if this policy of paradoxical consequence of a caesura between the
cleaning up the network is so positive, even if some offline environment, where the dissemination of false
(De Minico d) see it as a form of censorship entrusted ideas does not constitute a crime unless it attacks
to the private entity? When the Commission other goods-interests other than the truth, and the
designates platforms as “providers of large online virtual one, where instead the idea if false ceases to be
platforms” (Articles 15 and 33 DSA), they become the the exercise of a right to become an illicit fact.
subjects of a timely and subsequent obligation to Therefore, I do believe that the DSA has
control the information stored and transmitted by aggravated the limit of lawfulness, making certain
their platform to ensure a transparent and secure conduct that is lawful offline unlawful when it sees the
digital environment. playing field changed.
The fulfilment of this selective cleanup duty-which The most severe thing about this blank
reconfirms the absence of a generalized duty of endorsement to platforms of the power to control the
control by object and, over time, according to the merit of others' ideas is the emergence of an unseen
philosophy of the e-Commerce Directive, now re- function assigned to private individuals, which in the
proposed in Art. 8 DSA, should equalize the real world does not even exist in terms of power
asymmetrical relationship between the platform referred to as a public authority. I prefer to trust in the
owner and the author of the hosted content, just as it beneficent virtues of the marketplace of ideas, which,
should put the author of the content and its recipient, in allowing the coexistence of the false with the true,
the end user of the information flow, on the same lets citizens distinguish between the two entities
level. because it believes in their ability to mature a
Without prejudice to my doubts about the responsible idea without being pre-addressed by
suitability of this asymmetrical measure to equiordize those who claim to know for them what objective
misaligned social partners, I would instead call truth is.
attention to a possible effect that could affect This failure of the D.S.A. to predetermine the
platforms. These, in order not to incur a liability concept of forgery degrades abstractness into
judgment due to the maintenance of illicit content concreteness and generality into particularity. The
online, will be inclined to delete rather than preserve law is resolved in the ordinal provision of the private
the ideas of others, based, moreover, on summary strongman, while the equality of citizens before the
evaluations pronounced inaudita altera parte. Adding law is attenuated in the concrete provision ad certam
to this is a further consideration: the lack of an personam.
abstract and general definition of the concept of false Adopting instead the point of view of those who
leaves platforms free to confuse false with politically consider it positive and desirable the extension of its
inappropriate news or news that does not conform to contents to the A.I. Act, then this operation cannot be
dominant thinking. No more complete is the carried out by making an automatic addition of
prohibition of hate speech, which lacks a prior disciplines but can be applied in interpretation.
typification of hate speech, even regarding the 3) Who does the interpretation? The Commission
necessary causal link between the saying and the has governance over the GPAIs and, therefore, could
activating effect toward the recipients of the impose on them obligations arising from the digital
prohibited conduct sought to be solicited. This service, not by automatic acquisition (Hacker, Engel,
normative gap in the DSA points back to tautological Mauer; Botero Arcila) but according to reasoning by
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