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    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Modeling of Individual Naturalistic Decision Making in a Cognitive Architecture</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Maximilian Plitt</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Nele Russwinkel</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Universität zu Lübeck, IFIS Institut für Informationssysteme</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Ratzeburger Allee 160, 23562 Lübeck</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="DE">Germany</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>In the dynamic environment of train stations, managing passenger flow to prevent overcrowding and ensure safety is challenging, particularly with an increased passenger volume and less predictability of travel routes introduced by the 49-euro ticket. The aim of the overall research project is to allow for an effective passenger flow and an optimal distribution of individuals first in a simulation of a train station, later on in a real-world train station. Therefore, the passengers or agents are addressed through transparent and individualized messages. To achieve this overall goal, this work focuses on the modeling of the reactions to these messages. Human behavior in such settings is complex, driven by personal goals and influenced by intuitive and analytical decision-making processes. The Naturalistic Decision-Making (NDM) framework, which highlights the role of experience and intuition in decision-making under real-world constraints, forms the basis of our approach. To model these behaviors, we employ cognitive modeling, specifically the ACT-R (Adaptive Control of ThoughtRational) architecture, which simulates human cognitive processes and predicts behavior in dynamic situations. Our modelling approach integrates both intuitive and analytical decision-making processes, accommodating environmental changes and feedback. We represent individual personas with static and dynamic attributes, allowing for varied responses to information in a realistic manner. This cognitive model aims to predict passenger behavior in response to messages and guide their actions within the station. The paper outlines the technical implementation of the ACT-R model, detailing the representation of the station environment, individual goals, and decision criteria. By simulating human behavior, we can generate valuable data to inform decision-making processes without relying solely on empirical testing, ultimately contributing to safer and more efficient passenger flow management.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;Cognitive Modelling</kwd>
        <kwd>Intuitive Decision Making</kwd>
        <kwd>Naturalistic Decision Making</kwd>
        <kwd>ACT-R</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>1. Introduction1</p>
      <p>Unpredictable upcoming crowds are a problem at
larger train stations, not just because of security
reasons. It is often not known how many people are
in the station at the same time. The 49-euro ticket,
allowing for free travel with regional trains without
the need to book the journey in advance, increases
this effect. Due to the dynamic nature of stations,
there are often situations where localized crowds
form or individual sections are overcrowded, even
though there is sufficient space in the rest of the
station.</p>
      <p>The overall objective of the whole projects to
develop a methodology for the efficient
10th Workshop on Formal and Cognitive Reasoning (FCR-2024) at
the 47th German Conference on Artificial Intelligence (KI-2024,
September 23 - 27), Würzburg, Germany
m.plitt@uni-luebeck.de (M. Plitt);nele.russwinkel@uni-luebeck.de
(N. Russwinkel)
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2606-9690 (N. Russwinkel)
© 2024 Copyright for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under
Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
administration of passenger traffic within a train
station in order to circumvent the formation of local
crowds. Therefore, a multi-agent simulation of a train
station is administered in the overall project with the
objective to ensure an optimal distribution of
individuals within the station, while simultaneously
addressing their specific needs. It is of particular
importance to ensure that individual needs are not
overlooked or disregarded by persuading people to
act against their will. Therefore it is essential to align
the overarching goal with people's individual goals as
much as possible by addressing their personal
preferences. To this end, it is crucial to provide
transparent and easily accessible information. This
can be achieved by sending individualized messages
to guide the actions of passengers at the station.</p>
      <p>However, human behavior is inherently complex.
Individuals act in accordance with their personal
objectives and possess their own unique preferences.
In the context of a train station, where the majority of
individuals are pursuing a fixed goal, such as taking a
specific train at a designated time or reaching a
particular destination, it can be assumed that their
actions are often driven by self-interest and the
pursuit of their own goals, with the common good
not being a primary consideration. The reality of a
train station is also a dynamic situation in which a
large number of different individuals act and
spontaneous events, such as a train breakdown,
constantly alter the overall situation.</p>
      <p>
        The field of psychology has identified two distinct
modes of thinking: intuitive and analytic. Intuition is
a subconscious process that draws upon patterns
from knowledge, experience, and emotion, allowing
the brain to rapidly filter decision-making options
based on past experiences. This intuitive process is
influenced by emotional responses
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5 ref9">(Thomson et al.,
2015, Hall, 2002)</xref>
        . The theory of predictive
processing posits that the brain is engaged in a
continuous process of comparison between incoming
information and stored knowledge, with the
objective of reducing prediction errors. In the event
of a discrepancy, the brain modifies its mental
models to enhance the decision-making processes.
However, when our experience or knowledge is
limited, we are forced to rely on slow, logical, and
rational analytic thinking, which requires time for
testing, learning, and analysis (Wang &amp; Ruhe, 2007)
      </p>
      <p>
        This is consistent with the Naturalistic
DecisionMaking (NDM) framework, as described by
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">(Klein,
2008)</xref>
        . The NDM framework is concerned with the
decision-making processes of individuals operating
within real-world environments that are
characterized by a number of factors, including
uncertainty, dynamicity, the presence of competing
or ill-defined goals, time pressure, action and
feedback loops, and information sources of varying
reliability. The framework underscores the
significance of experience and intuition in
expeditious decision-making, in accordance with the
notion that intuition draws upon patterns derived
from past knowledge, experience, situation
awareness, and emotional responses to rapidly filter
choices. Although this approach differs from
traditional decision-making models that frequently
assume that decision-makers have sufficient time
and information to evaluate options in a systematic
manner, the NDM framework recognizes the
importance of these analytical processes. In
circumstances where intuition is inadequate due to
limited knowledge, uncertainty, or novel
circumstances, decisions may be made through
analytical, logical, and conscious processes. This
integration of intuitive and analytic processes within
NDM illustrates how mental models are continually
refined to minimize prediction errors, thereby
ensuring effective decision-making in dynamic
contexts. It demonstrates the interplay between
rapid, intuitive judgments and slower, analytic
reasoning in optimizing decision outcomes.
      </p>
      <p>The concept of dynamic decision-making
becomes pertinent when multiple decisions must be
made in a given situation. It is an ongoing process of
learning, dependent on experience and feedback.
Decisions are made in a sequential manner as
potential alternatives become apparent over time,
rather than all at once. This type of decision-making
considers not only singular aspects, such as
attentional influence, but also environmental factors
that provide feedback, necessitating adaptation to
new conditions. As Gonzalez (2017) notes, dynamic
decisions are motivated by goals and external events
and are influenced by previous choices and external
conditions. Feedback from the environment shapes
future choices and decision outcomes, making
dynamic decision-making highly experience-based
and dependent on immediate feedback.</p>
      <p>To guarantee the effective management of
passenger flows without having to depend on lengthy
test runs in which individuals are provided with
erroneous or unhelpful information, it is crucial to
simulate the reactions of individuals to the messages
in their entirety. It is essential that these decisions
are modeled in a realistic and transparent manner,
with the objective of ensuring that the
decisionmaking process is as close as possible to reality.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Why cognitive modelling?</title>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>The method of cognitive modeling forces precision of vague theories. For scientific theories to be precise, these verbal theories should be formally modeled (Dimov et al., 2013).</title>
        <p>
          Cognitive models provide an opportunity to
predict how various aspects or variables interact to
produce human behavior observed in empirical
studies. In real-life situations, this behavior is shaped
by multiple influences. Consequently, cognitive
models are a valuable tool for understanding the
interrelated cognitive processes that lead to
observed behavioral outcomes. By simulating
multiple ongoing cognitive processes, cognitive
models are capable of performing the same tasks as
human participants. This enables models to offer
insights into tasks that are too complex to be
analysed through controlled experiments
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">(Wolff and
Brechmann, 2015)</xref>
          .
        </p>
        <p>While cognitive architectures are not a definitive
solution for studying decision-making, they are a
valuable tool for exploring complex theories that
traditional experimental methods are unable to
address. In particular, the study of dynamic
decisionmaking is challenging due to its inherent cognitive
complexity and the limitations of introspection. By
manipulating symbolic elements and their activation
strengths, these models allow for the examination of
processes within the model and the formulation of
testable predictions about the cognitive mechanisms
of decision making. This, in turn, supports the goal of
modeling and understanding the processes
underlying human decision-making.</p>
        <p>
          In conclusion, cognitive modeling represents a
falsifiable methodology for the study of cognition. In
scientific practice, this signifies that exact hypotheses
are implemented in executable cognitive models,
with the principal objective of describing, predicting,
and prescribing human behavior. The aim is to
develop a generalizable cognitive model that can
predict human behavior in diverse situations
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">(Marewski and Link, 2014)</xref>
          .
        </p>
        <p>A model embedded in cognitive architectures has
the capacity to simulate a multitude of parallel
processes, effectively capturing complex
psychological phenomena and even making
predictions for tasks that are inherently complex.
However, the construction of these models
necessitates a systematic, step-by-step approach to
clearly identify and separate the various influencing
factors.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. The cognitive Architecture ACT-R</title>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>The cognitive architecture ACT-R (Adaptive</title>
        <p>
          Control of Thought—Rational) has been effectively
utilized to model various dynamic decision-making
tasks
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref3 ref8">(Anderson, 2007; Prezenski et al., 2017;
Gonzalez, 2014)</xref>
          . The following section provides a
technical overview of the main structures of ACT-R
that are relevant to our modelling approach.
        </p>
        <p>The ACT-R cognitive architecture aims to model
overall cognition by employing a modular approach,
whereby different modules interact to simulate
cognitive processes. These modules communicate via
interfaces referred to as "buffers." As a hybrid
architecture, ACT-R incorporates both symbolic and
subsymbolic mechanisms within its modules.</p>
        <p>Our model employs the declarative, imaginal,
goal, and procedural modules. Figure 2 shows an
overview of the whole ACT-R cognitive architecture.
The declarative module serves as ACT-R's long-term
memory, where all information units (chunks) are
stored and subsequently retrieved. The imaginal
module serves as ACT-R's working memory,
maintaining and modifying the current problem
state, which is an intermediate representation that is
crucial for task performance. The goal module
oversees the management of control states, which
are subgoals that are essential for the attainment of
the primary decision-making objective. The
procedural module plays a crucial role in ACT-R,
functioning as the interface for other processing
units by selecting production rules based on the
current state of the modules.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>The creation of a model in ACT-R necessitates the</title>
        <p>specification of its symbolic components, namely
production rules and chunks. In ACT-R, all data is
stored in chunks, which are the basic units of
information. A production rule, or production, is
composed of two parts: a condition and an action.
The selection of productions is conducted in a
sequential manner, with only a single production
being selected at any given time. A production is
selected when its condition part is matched with the
current state of the modules. Thereafter, the action
part modifies the chunks within the modules. In the
event that multiple productions satisfy the
conditions, a subsymbolic selection process is
employed to determine which production is selected.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Modelling in ACT-R</title>
      <p>The objective is to develop an ACT-R modeling
approach which still needs to be implemented in the
future. The model should be applied to real-world
decision-making situations and accordingly must be
construct a cognitive representation of the situation
of the train station in which it is required to cope
with uncertainty. This should include both intuitive
decision-making processes and analytical
decisionmaking processes. In order to cope with the necessity
of making multiple decisions, it is essential to
incorporate changes in the environment that occur
subsequent to previous decisions into the
decisionmaking process.</p>
      <p>The cognitive model should provide a
transparent representation of the underlying
cognitive processes associated with real-world
decision-making. To ensure the model's
generalizability across different experimental
settings and data sets, it is essential to maintain its
simplicity. Although the underlying cognitive
processes are complex, the model only makes
minimal and necessary assumptions. Therefore, the
provided, individual messages draw on a limited
selection of options, and similarly, the individuals'
personal goals are also restricted. The aim of the
decision process is to assess whether these two sets
of goals can be aligned in any way, which may result
in a decision either in favor of or against the message.
Consequently, this modeling approach should be
capable of predicting behavior in response to
different stimulus materials and be transferable to
other similar tasks, such as managing visitor flows in
airports.</p>
      <p>The following section presents a potential
implementation of the model. Initially, the primary
representations of the self and the situation are
outlined. These are represented as chunks in ACT-R.
Subsequently, the concept of the yet outstanding
decision-making process is described, reflecting the
underlying cognitive processes.</p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>4.1 Chunks in the Model</title>
        <p>The implemented chunks are illustrated in Figure
1. In order to process the data contained within the
messages, it is essential to incorporate a fundamental
understanding of the train station's operational
characteristics into the model. This includes data
regarding the distances between platforms, the
necessity of navigating stairs, and other pertinent
information. The extent to which this basic
knowledge can be accessed should vary depending
on the individual. This represents an opportunity to
incorporate a certain degree of uncertainty into the
model. In the event that the knowledge situation is
unclear, the model can utilize intuitive
decisionmaking mechanisms, given that a comprehensive
assessment of the situation is not feasible. The
implementation of the basic knowledge will be
stored in the declarative memory, from which it will
be retrieved.</p>
        <p>The chunk representing of the individual is
stored in the imaginal memory, due to its dynamic
components. It contains the persona information
defined by a series of attributes. On the one hand,
these are static attributes, such as the need to avoid
crowds, mobility, or knowledge about the train
station. Conversely, the persona should also be
characterized by dynamic attributes that evolve over
the course of the individual's stay and navigation
within the station. Frustration serves as an
illustrative example. The objective is to incorporate a
substantial number of personas into the model,
which are then represented by a series of individuals.
The initial stage of the process is to define the
various personas, which are characterized by a range
within static attribute values. For example, one might
consider a commuter or an older person. Given that
individuals within a given persona group exhibit a
range of attributes, it is necessary to randomly select
each individual from the specified range. This allows
for the generation of different individuals, who may
also exhibit distinct responses to a given message,
within the same persona group.</p>
        <p>The chunk representing the dynamic perceived
situation is also stored in the imaginal buffer,
functioning as an intermediate representation of the
surrounding passenger situation. As the model is
unable to perceive by itself, information from the
station simulation is integrated . The chunk relates to
the immediately perceived environment of the
individual and includes surrounding crowds and
whether the individual's potential path is blocked.
The manner in which this situation is interpreted by
the individual is also represented here. This is once
more dependent on the attributes of the persona. In a
further slot, the influence of a previous decision on
the overall situation is evaluated.</p>
        <p>The message chunk is also stored in the imaginal
buffer. The message slots include the target and the
reason for the message. Additionally, the message
may contain incentives to achieve this target. To keep
the model simple, both the goals and the reasons for
the message are based on a limited set of
alternatives. For example, this could involve
temporarily switching to another track or moving to
the waiting area due to a forecasted overcrowding at
the current location.</p>
        <p>The personal goal of the individual is stored in
the declarative memory, as are the sub-goals
associated with it. Additionally, the interpretation of
the goal presented by the message is represented.
Several slots are provided to represent the various
decision criteria.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>4.2 Decision Process</title>
        <p>The modeling of the decision-making process
should be capable of representing both intuitive and
analytical decision-making methods. It is important
to note that the model's decisions are limited to
choosing either for or against the content of the
message. This manifests in a change of the personal
goal, a description of the reason for the decision, and
potentially a change in movement speed. First, the
extent to which the individual goal can be aligned
with the goal of the message should be modeled.
Factors such as the necessity of detours, the presence
of additional stairs, and the potential for avoiding
crowds are of significant consequence in this regard.
It is equally important to consider the personal
attributes of the individual, such as their mobility,
knowledge of the station, and level of frustration. In
order to facilitate computational processing of the
entire process, the slots of the decision criteria are
calculated. In order to achieve this, the individual
components of the different chunks are offset against
each other in order to collect evidence for or against
the decision in these decision criteria. To illustrate,
the temporal feasibility decision criterion is
employed, wherein the persona attributes of mobility
and knowledge about the station are contrasted with
the distance to the individual's intended destination
and the surrounding crowd from the perceived
situation chunk, as well as the distance to the
destination of the message from the message chunk.
In cases where central decision criteria can be
evaluated with relative ease, such as when a course
of action is deemed to be "hardly feasible in terms of
time," clear and rapid decisions should be made that
can be considered intuitive. The attributes of
frustration and knowledge about the station also
exert a significant influence on intuitive
decisionmaking, and are designed to affect the extent to
which decisions are rational. There are often
situations in which no clear decision can be made. In
the event that the model is unable to resolve the
circumstances in an intuitive manner due to
uncertainty or the presence of partially overlapping
objectives, it would be beneficial to implement a
mechanism for evidence accumulation. This entails
the calculation of additional decision criteria, from
which a trade-off is derived that ultimately informs
an analytical decision. The outcome of preceding
decisions should be integrated into the intuitive
decision-making process and serve as a valuable
source of information for evidence accumulation.</p>
        <p>The decision process thus constitutes a reaction
to the message at the conclusion of the
decisionmaking process. Based on the decision chunk, the
feedback provided to the simulation contains a
greater degree of information than a purely binary
decision. The feedback from the model should
provide the message predictor with an opportunity
to learn more effectively. To include the reaction to
single messages in the simulation, they could be
implemented as a distribution of reactions within a
group of individuals. If an agent appears in the
simulation, it will react to certain messages
according to the distribution. By implementing the
individual decisions in the learning of the predictor,
these can also be incorporated into the simulation in
a further step.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Outlook</title>
      <p>The modelling approach is of significant
importance as it plays a crucial role in solving the
passenger traffic problem in the whole multi-agent
simulation. All decisions of the single individuals will
form part of the training phase of the message
predictor with the objective to improve to
production of adequate messages. These messages
should achieve the overall goal but are still likely to
be followed by the individuals. With modeling the
reactions, the generation of a substantial amount of
data pertaining to human reactions in a time-efficient
manner is enabled, thus avoiding the potential stress
and inconvenience associated with direct
observation of test participants. The models'
decisions contain a greater quantity of information
than that which can be derived from purely observed
behavior. The subsequent phase of the process
requires the involvement of human subjects to
substantiate the potentially transparent and
plausible predictions of the model. To this end, an
experiment should be conducted to ascertain how
individual groups of people respond to messages,
thereby enabling the model's predictions to be
refined. Subsequently, the validated model may be
transferred to other decision-making processes. The
simulation of human behavior in real-world settings
will become increasingly crucial in the future,
underscoring the need for further research in the
domain of cognitive modelling with the aim to more
realistic simulations.</p>
    </sec>
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