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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Blockchain-based DNS: Current Solutions and Challenges to Adoption</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>George Giamouridis</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>BooJoong Kang</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Leonardo Aniello</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>School of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton</institution>
          ,
          <country country="UK">UK</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>The Domain Name System (DNS) is a fundamental component responsible for the translation of domain names into IP addresses. Traditional DNS relies on centralised authorities for domain registration and resolution, raising concerns about censorship, security, and trust. In response to these challenges, blockchain-based DNS (BDNS) solutions have emerged, promising decentralisation, security, and resilience. This paper reviews existing works on BDNS and their potential to transform the domain name landscape. Each BDNS solution is analysed in terms of its objectives, operational mechanisms, supported Top Level Domains (TLD) and limitations. The state of the art of BDNS is discussed to identify the key challenges hindering its widespread adoption, ranging from technical dificulties (scalability, performance, integration with existing infrastructure) to security concerns, and to governance and regulatory considerations.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;Blockchain</kwd>
        <kwd>Blockchain DNS</kwd>
        <kwd>Domain Name System</kwd>
        <kwd>Decentralisation</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>The DNS is a hierarchical, distributed database that enables the resolution of domain names to
IP addresses on the Internet. It is implemented through a hierarchy of multiple servers, also
known as Name Servers, that work together to resolve domain names.</p>
      <p>The traditional DNS architecture sufers from numerous problems. One notable issue is the
vulnerability to several cyberattacks, including distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks
as well as other attacks such as cache poisoning attacks that can potentially lead to integrity
concerns. These vulnerabilities arise primarily due to the centralised nature of the traditional
DNS, where a single point of failure can compromise the entire system. Additionally, the
traditional DNS lacks transparency and accountability. Indeed, the decision-making processes
regarding domain registrations, updates, and resolutions often occur within the closed circles of
domain registrars, leaving end-users with limited visibility into how these decisions are made.
These weaknesses highlight the urgent need for innovative solutions to strengthen the security,
resilience, and trustworthiness of the DNS ecosystem.</p>
      <p>
        In response to these vulnerabilities, several approaches have been proposed. One such solution
involves implementing security extensions such as Domain Name System Security Extensions
(DNSSEC) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] to authenticate DNS responses and prevent data tampering. While DNSSEC
strengthens the integrity of DNS data, its adoption remains limited due to complexity and
compatibility issues. Another solution relies on the deployment of Content Delivery Networks
(CDNs) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ] and Anycast routing [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ] to help mitigate the impact of DDoS attacks by distributing
DNS queries across multiple servers. However, these solutions primarily focus on addressing
specific attack vectors and do not fundamentally address the centralised nature of traditional
DNS. Moreover, they often entail increased operational complexity and costs [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ], which limits
their widespread adoption. As such, while these solutions ofer additional improvements to DNS
security, they fall short of providing a comprehensive and decentralised approach to address
the broader spectrum of DNS security.
      </p>
      <p>Blockchain-based DNS (BDNS) introduces blockchain technology to address the limitations of
the traditional DNS architecture. Blockchain is a decentralised and immutable ledger that records
transactions across a network of nodes securely and transparently. By applying blockchain
principles to DNS, BDNS eliminates the reliance on centralised authorities, thus mitigating the
risk of single points of failure and enhancing the system’s resilience against cyberattacks.
Moreover, BDNS provides a tamper-proof record of domain ownership and associated DNS records,
strengthening transparency and accountability in the domain registration process. Through the
use of smart contracts and cryptographic techniques, BDNS enables automated and trustless
domain management. Furthermore, BDNS ofers the potential to address concerns related to
censorship and domain ownership conflicts (e.g trademark disputes or expired domains) by
providing a decentralised and censorship-resistant infrastructure.</p>
      <p>The integration of blockchain technology into the DNS protocol represents a significant
advancement in functionality and security. Several alternatives to BDNS have been proposed to
date. One novel contribution of this paper is to provide a comprehensive overview of currently
active and notable BDNS solutions, explaining their primary objectives, functionalities, and
limitations. Additionally, this paper contributes with a unique discussion of the BDNS landscape
and the primary factors limiting its potential for widespread adoption.</p>
      <p>The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the basics of DNS and
blockchain. Existing academic works that review the state of the art of BDNS are discussed in
Section 3. An extensive analysis of existing BDNS solutions is presented in Section 4. Section 5
identifies the main challenges to the adoption of BDNS. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Background</title>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>2.1. The Domain Name System (DNS)</title>
        <p>DNS serves as a fundamental component of the Internet infrastructure, translating
humanreadable domain names into IP addresses, enabling users to access websites and services
consistently. Introduced by Paul Mockapetris in 1983, DNS has played a crucial role in simplifying the
user experience by replacing numerical IP addresses with easily memorable domain names. DNS
operates on a hierarchical and centralised model, where a set of authoritative servers (name
servers) manage domain name records for specific zones. DNS data (DNS records) is stored in
local databases but is available worldwide. DNS is an application layer protocol that allows
computers, hosts, routers, and name servers to communicate and resolve names (translate names
into IP addresses). DNS-lookup is a basic function of the protocol, performed by any machine
or service, and results from remote name servers are temporarily stored in local memory to
improve performance.</p>
        <p>
          DNS Structure. Figure 1 highlights the hierarchical structure of DNS [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
          ], representing the
various levels of domain names within its architecture. At the top of the DNS hierarchy, there is
the root domain, represented by a dot ("."). Below the root domain, there are top-level domains
(TLDS), such as generic TLDs (.com, .org) and country-code TLDs (.us, .uk). Further down the
hierarchy, there are second-level domains (SLDs) and subdomains provide additional specificity
to individual addresses. DNS records, including essential types like A (address), AAAA (IPv6
address), MX (mail exchange), and CNAME (canonical name) [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
          ], store information associated
with domain names. Authoritative name servers, distributed across the internet, play a crucial
role in storing and managing these DNS records for specific domains or zones. Resolver servers,
operated by internet service providers or end-users, interact with authoritative servers to
retrieve the necessary DNS information, thereby facilitating the seamless resolution of domain
names to their corresponding IP addresses.
DNS Governance DNS governance involves a multifaceted framework that defines the policies,
protocols, and management of the DNS. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN) plays a central role in managing the global coordination of the DNS. ICANN
manages the assignment of unique identifiers, such as domain names and IP addresses, ensuring
their coherent and organised distribution [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ]. Within the ICANN structure, various supporting
organisations and advisory committees contribute to policy development, addressing technical,
operational, and ethical aspects of DNS management. Additionally, the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA) is responsible for the allocation and assignment of various DNS
parameters and protocol identifiers. DNS governance is characterised by a multi-stakeholder
model, involving input from governments, industry stakeholders, technical experts, and the
broader Internet community. This collaborative approach aims to strike a balance between
maintaining the stability and security of the DNS while encouraging inclusivity and transparency
in decision-making processes.
        </p>
        <p>
          The DNS Protocol. DNS operates on a client-server model and employs a hierarchical and
distributed protocol to simplify the translation of domain names into IP addresses [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
          ]. When a
stub resolver (integrated into the end user’s device) requests a domain name in a web browser
or any other application, a DNS query is initiated. The process begins with the stub resolver
contacting a local DNS resolver as shown in Figure 2, typically provided by an Internet Service
Provider (ISP). If the resolver possesses the requested information in its cache, it returns the
corresponding IP address directly to the user’s device, expediting the resolution process.
        </p>
        <p>If the requested domain name is not found in the local cache or the cache entry has expired,
the resolver acts recursively. It queries root DNS servers to determine the authoritative DNS
server responsible for the TLD of the requested domain name (e.g., ".com", ".org"). After receiving
a response from the root DNS server specifying appropriate the TLD server, the resolver queries
the TLD server for information about the domain name’s authoritative name server. Once
the resolver receives a response from the TLD server with the IP address of the authoritative
DNS server, it queries the authoritative DNS server for the IP address of the domain name’s
authoritative name server.</p>
        <p>Once the authoritative name server provides the IP address, the recursive resolver caches
this information to optimise subsequent queries for the same domain. The IP address is then
relayed to the user’s device, enabling it to establish a connection with the desired web server.
Domain Name Registration. Domain name registration involves the process through which
individuals or entities acquire the rights to use a specific domain name within the DNS. This
process is demonstrated in Figure 3 where registries, under the oversight of the IANA and
administered by ICANN, are responsible for managing TLDs such as ‘.com’ and ‘.net’. Their
primary function involves the maintenance of records about domain ownership, attributing
individual domains to respective registrants, whether they be individuals or organisations. This
hierarchical structure defines the distribution of responsibilities within the DNS, ensuring the
orderly management of Internet resources.</p>
        <p>Registrars, act as intermediaries between end-users (registrants) and registries, and are
responsible for performing transactions related to domain registrations. For instance, when a
registrar wants to sell a TLD to another end-user, it is required to inform the corresponding
registry (e.g. VeriSign for ‘.com’ domains). Subsequently, the registrar incurs a fee payable to
the registry, a cost that is typically embedded within the price charged to the end-user.</p>
        <p>
          The registration process often involves choosing the desired registration period which usually
ranges from 1 to 10 years [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
          ], agreeing to terms and conditions, and providing accurate contact
information for administrative, technical, and billing purposes. Domain registration is subject to
periodic renewal to maintain ownership rights. The hierarchical structure of DNS, including the
distinction between registrars and registries, ensures a distributed and organised approach to
managing the vast array of domain names on the Internet. This system enables users worldwide
to access websites and services eficiently through the DNS.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>2.2. Blockchain</title>
        <p>Blockchain technology refers to a decentralised, digital ledger that records transactions across a
network of computers. It operates as a global public ledger, in which participants (called nodes)
can determine the ownership of assets without the need for a central authority or intermediary
to validate transactions. The public ledger, which is replicated across all nodes in the network,
is trusted as the oficial record. The blockchain is constructed independently by all nodes in the
network, rather than a single entity. As a result, each node in the network can independently
validate the data communicated through the network and create a duplicate of the same public
ledger, ensuring a secure and transparent system.</p>
        <p>Transactions and Blocks. A transaction serves as the fundamental unit of data exchange
within the network, representing the transfer of value or information from one participant to
another, cryptographically signed by the sender for authentication. Once initiated, transactions
undergo validation and verification by network nodes before being grouped into blocks. Each
block contains a header with metadata uniquely identifying the block. Each block also maintains
a reference to its preceding block by including the hash value of the previous block in its header,
forming a sequential chain of blocks. This linkage ensures the integrity and immutability of the
transaction history, with any attempt to tamper with the data in a block requiring alteration of
subsequent blocks, thus providing a secure and transparent ledger of transactions within the
blockchain network.</p>
        <p>Distributed Ledger. The blockchain is a distributed ledger that uses a linked list of blocks
containing a chronological record of transactions. Each node within the blockchain network
maintains a copy of the data associated with the blockchain. The accumulation of blocks results
in the concept of a height, which refers to the distance from the genesis block, and the top block,
referring to the most recently added block in the chain.</p>
        <p>
          Consensus. Consensus is a method employed by the participants of a Blockchain network
to reach agreement on the current state of the public ledger, which maintains a record of all
transactions [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
          ]. The blockchain network attains reliability through the use of consensus
algorithms, which also establish trust among unidentified peers. Essentially, the consensus is a
protocol that ensures that each block added to the blockchain is valid, meaning that it represents
the singular version of reality that the network’s nodes have concurred upon.
Smart Contracts. A smart contract [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
          ] is a self-executing (actions are executed when
predeifned conditions are met) digital agreement programmed to automatically enforce the terms and
conditions of a contract once predefined conditions are met. Unlike traditional contracts that
necessitate intermediaries and manual enforcement mechanisms, smart contracts use blockchain
technology to ensure trustless, transparent, and tamper-proof transactions. By relying on
cryptographic principles and consensus algorithms, smart contracts ensure the integrity and
security of contractual obligations without the need for centralised oversight.
Crypto Wallets. A crypto wallet is a digital tool that allows users to securely store, send, and
receive digital currencies. Functioning similarly to a traditional wallet for physical cash, a crypto
wallet manages the private keys necessary for accessing and managing one’s cryptocurrency
holdings on a blockchain network. These wallets are usually applications installed on mobile
phones or physical devices specifically designed for cryptocurrency storage.
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Related Work</title>
      <p>
        A few attempts have been made in the literature to survey existing research on BDNS.
Weihong et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ] investigate the efectiveness of blockchain technology in addressing security
vulnerabilities in the traditional DNS. Through a review and analysis of two core BDNS systems,
namely Namecoin and Blockstack, the study evaluates their ability to provide decentralised,
secure, and user-friendly naming systems. This work focuses on these two BDNS solutions only
and does not discuss the limitations in the wider state of the art.
      </p>
      <p>
        The work by Bansal and Sethumadhavan [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ] examines the security issues within the DNS
and the solutions proposed to mitigate them. It seeks to identify threats within the DNS
ecosystem, particularly concerning government-operated root servers susceptible to censorship,
data tracking, privatisation, and commercialisation. This work also discusses some BDNS
projects, but it does not identify their limitations nor elaborate on BDNS adoption.
      </p>
      <p>
        In their work, Patsakis et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ] provide a background on existing BDNS alternatives
that covers a wide array of existing projects, including Dot-P2P, Handshake, ENS, Namecoin,
Blockstack, EmerDNS, Nebulis, and OpenNIC. These are analysed in terms of their architecture,
features, and potential applications. Besides this literature review, which also includes projects
that are no longer active, the focus of this work is primarily on the threats inherently associated
with decentralised DNS architectures and the possible countermeasures; it does not discuss the
limitations of each BDNS solution.
      </p>
      <p>Contrarily to the above-mentioned works, this paper systematically discusses goals,
operational mechanisms and limitations of the main active BDNS systems as well as relevant academic
works. Furthermore, it includes a unique analysis of the challenges to overcome to foster the
widespread adoption of BDNS.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Blockchain-based DNS Solutions</title>
      <p>The application of blockchain technology within the DNS has been recognised as one of the
proposed mechanisms for improving security within the DNS protocol and mitigating instances
of censorship. In this survey, we focus on exploring the landscape of BDNS and the advancements
made in this field. In conducting this research on blockchain DNS solutions, our criteria for
selecting existing works emphasised relevance, publication quality, impact and popularity.
We prioritised works directly addressing BDNS solutions, published in reputable academic
journals or conference proceedings, and demonstrating innovative approaches or significant
contributions to the field. Furthermore, we emphasised including works that are currently active
within the research community, alongside those that have gained widespread recognition and
citation. Through this approach, we aimed to present a comprehensive overview of both active
and influential research in the field of blockchain DNS, providing a clear understanding of the
current state and future directions. In this section, we present these approaches, highlighting
their key characteristics, identifying limitations, as well as areas of research that remain to be
explored. We extensively analyse each solution separately, and in Table 1 we summarise the
main features of the discussed BDNS approaches.</p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>4.1. Namecoin</title>
        <p>
          Namecoin [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
          ] (launched in 2011) is one of the pioneering BDNS projects. Its primary objective
is to decentralise domain registration and create a secure and censorship-resistant system.
Namecoin extends the traditional DNS to provide users with increased privacy and control
over their domain names. By using a blockchain network, Namecoin seeks to eliminate central
points of control, making it resistant to censorship and domain seizures.
        </p>
        <p>
          Mechanism. Namecoin based on the Bitcoin codebase [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
          ], functions as a unique
cryptocurrency with a primary focus on providing a decentralised DNS. Operating independently,
Namecoin manages the .bit TLD within its blockchain. The blockchain stores key-value pairs where
keys represent domain names, and values include various data like IP addresses and public keys.
Users interact with the system through specialised software called wallet such as Namecoin
Core 1 or Electrum-NMC 2, enabling them to register domains, update DNS records, and
transfer ownership. These operations involve creating transactions on the Namecoin blockchain,
        </p>
        <sec id="sec-4-1-1">
          <title>1https://www.namecoin.org/download/</title>
          <p>2https://www.namecoin.org/docs/electrum-nmc/
ensuring censorship resistance and tamper-proof domain records.</p>
          <p>
            Challenges. Namecoin was the first BDNS to ofer security and decentralisation. However,
its primary limitation stems from inadequate support and adoption, leading to insuficient
computing power. This makes Namecoin more vulnerable to 51% attacks compared to other
analogous systems [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
            ]. Also, Namecoin’s low fees do not discourage domain squatters, making
it easy for people to hoard names without much cost. Unlike systems incorporating auctions
or algorithmic pricing to align name costs with their market value, Namecoin lacks such
mechanisms. This absence increases the risk of domain squatting, undermining the equitable
distribution and efective utilisation of domain names within the Namecoin ecosystem [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
            ].
          </p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>4.2. Blockstack</title>
        <p>
          Blockstack [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
          ], is a blockchain network that includes a decentralised DNS called Blockstack
Name System (BNS). The primary objective of Blockstack is to create a user-centric internet
where individuals have greater control over their digital identities and data. Specifically,
Blockstack aims to decentralise domain registration, providing users with ownership and control over
their domain names. By utilising blockchain technology, Blockstack aims to enhance security,
privacy, and user autonomy, enabling a more transparent and equitable internet ecosystem.
Mechanism. Blockstack DNS operates on the Bitcoin blockchain. Unlike traditional DNS,
Blockstack DNS supports custom TLDs like .id, .podcast and .helloworld created by users within
its independent blockchain. Information such as domain registrations, ownership details, and
decentralised identity data is securely stored in the blockchain. Users interact with Blockstack
DNS through the Blockstack Browser 3, a user-friendly application deployed across various
platforms. This browser simplifies domain registration, DNS record updates, and ownership
transfers through blockchain transactions. DNS lookups for Blockstack DNS domains are
executed through the Blockstack Browser or compatible software, querying the blockchain to
retrieve decentralised identity and associated data for a specific domain.
        </p>
        <p>Challenges. Scalability is a fundamental concern to many blockchain solutions, and as
Blockstack’s user base and transaction volume increase, maintaining eficiency and speed on its
blockchain may become a formidable challenge. Blockstack DNS operates on the Bitcoin
blockchain, which has limitations in terms of transaction throughput and block size. As the
number of domain registrations and updates increases, the blockchain may become congested,
leading to delays in processing DNS transactions and higher transaction fees. Additionally, the
reliance on a public blockchain like Bitcoin could pose scalability challenges as the network
grows, potentially impacting the performance and responsiveness of the Blockstack DNS system.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-3">
        <title>4.3. Ethereum Name Service (ENS)</title>
        <p>
          Ethereum Name Service (ENS) [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">19</xref>
          ] is a decentralised DNS built on the Ethereum blockchain
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">20</xref>
          ]. Its primary objective is to simplify and enhance the user experience in interacting with
blockchain addresses. ENS allows users to register and manage domain names ending in .eth in
a decentralised manner. The primary goal is to replace complex and hard to remember crypto
addresses with human-readable names, making the broader adoption of blockchain technology
easier and faster. ENS aims to provide users with a secure, user-friendly, and decentralised
naming infrastructure on the Ethereum network.
        </p>
        <p>Mechanism. ENS operates on the Ethereum blockchain to provide a decentralised domain
registration and management system. Managing the .eth TLD, ENS is not compatible with
traditional DNS. Critical data such as domain registrations, and ownership details are securely
stored on the Ethereum blockchain. To interact with ENS, users deploy Ethereum wallet
software, like MetaMask 4, which integrates seamlessly with ENS features. Users can perform
various actions such as registering, updating DNS records, transferring domain ownership, and
conducting DNS lookups via their Ethereum wallets. This method ensures a decentralized and
secure approach to managing Ethereum-based domain names. It’s worth noting that while
some operations like ENS lookups may suggest a transactional process with associated costs,
they actually function as read operations and do not require any transactions or fees.
Challenges. A significant challenge for ENS is the gas fees during network congestion that
can potentially impact the system’s operations, particularly for users attempting to register,
update, or transfer domain names. During periods of high network congestion on the Ethereum
blockchain, gas fees can increase dramatically as users compete to have their transactions
processed by miners. This can make ENS operations prohibitively expensive for users, especially
for those with limited resources or smaller transactions. Additionally, the unpredictability of
gas fees during network congestion can introduce uncertainty for users, making it challenging
to plan and budget for ENS transactions efectively. This uncertainty may result in delays or
hesitancy in executing critical actions, such as renewing domain registrations or updating DNS
records, which could disrupt the normal operation of decentralised applications (dApps) and
services relying on ENS.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-4">
        <title>4.4. Handshake</title>
        <p>Handshake 5 is a decentralised, permissionless naming protocol with a core objective of
revolutionising the traditional DNS. Its primary goal is to create an alternative to existing Certificate
Authorities and naming systems by establishing a decentralised and censorship-resistant DNS
infrastructure. Handshake seeks to democratise domain ownership, providing users with
increased control over their digital identities and mitigating issues related to centralised control
and censorship in the current DNS landscape.</p>
        <p>Mechanism. Handshake naming protocol has its own dedicated blockchain, distinct from
traditional DNS. Introducing various custom TLDs such as .hs, Handshake operates independently of
traditional DNS, allowing users to create and manage domains on its blockchain. The blockchain
stores ownership details, utilising a decentralised and secure system for tamper-resistant records.
Interactions with Handshake occur through specialised wallet software like Namebase 6,
enabling users to participate in blind auctions using HNS tokens for domain registration. DNS
record updates, domain ownership transfers, and DNS lookups are executed through
trans</p>
        <sec id="sec-4-4-1">
          <title>4https://metamask.io/</title>
          <p>5https://hsd-dev.org/files/handshake.txt
6https://www.namebase.io/
actions on the Handshake blockchain, providing a decentralised and secure environment for
managing and trading Handshake domain names.</p>
          <p>Challenges. The main challenge of the Handshake DNS lies in achieving interoperability with
the traditional DNS infrastructure. While Handshake ofers a decentralised naming system,
integrating it seamlessly with existing DNS servers and resolvers poses complexities. One
key challenge is ensuring compatibility between Handshake’s decentralised model and the
hierarchical structure of the traditional DNS. This involves developing protocols and standards
that allow Handshake names to be resolved by conventional DNS servers and browsers without
compromising security or performance.</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-5">
        <title>4.5. Unstoppable Domains</title>
        <p>
          Unstoppable Domains [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21">21</xref>
          ] is a project with the primary objective of using blockchain technology
to provide users with censorship-resistant and truly decentralised domain names. The project
aims to replace traditional domain extensions with blockchain-based extensions, allowing users
to have full control and ownership of their domain names without the risk of censorship or
domain seizures. Unstoppable Domains seeks to allow individuals to use their domain names
to receive cryptocurrency payments, host decentralised websites, and manage their digital
identities in a secure and privacy-focused manner.
        </p>
        <p>
          Mechanism. Unstoppable Domains operates on various blockchain networks, including
Ethereum and Zilliqa 7. Managing unique blockchain-based TLDs like .crypto and .zil,
Unstoppable Domains operates independently from traditional DNS. Vital domain information,
including ownership records, is stored on the Ethereum blockchain, ensuring immutability and
resistance to censorship. Users interact with Unstoppable Domains through compatible wallets
like MetaMask, while DNS lookups for these domains are made through decentralised resolution
protocols. These protocols involve querying the Ethereum blockchain or other smart contracts
that contain the domain name records. The registration process involves a one-time fee and
submitting a transaction on the Ethereum blockchain to associate the chosen domain with the
user’s Ethereum address, providing a secure and transparent domain ownership experience.
Challenges. Similarly to ENS, the main challenge faced by Unstoppable Domains is the
potential volatility of gas fees on the Ethereum blockchain. During periods of high network
congestion or elevated gas prices, such as significant network activity, the cost of gas fees can
increase significantly. For instance, findings in [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">22</xref>
          ] saw that registering a new name through the
Unstoppable Domains service incurred approximately $80 in gas fees during a period of elevated
fees. In contrast, the actual cost of the name itself was $10. This challenge of unpredictable and
potentially high gas fees during network congestion can deter users from utilising Unstoppable
Domains and other Ethereum-based services, particularly for smaller transactions or users with
limited resources. It introduces uncertainty and unpredictability into the registration process,
making it challenging for users to budget efectively and plan for domain acquisitions.
4.6. B-DNS
B-DNS [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref23">23</xref>
          ] is a BDNS designed to address vulnerabilities present in the traditional DNS, such as
cache poisoning and DDoS attacks. By implementing a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus protocol
and an index of domains, B-DNS aims to overcome the limitations of current BDNS solutions,
particularly the computation-heavy PoW protocol and ineficient query mechanisms. The paper
compares the security of B-DNS and legacy DNS, assessing factors like attack success rate,
cost, and attack surface. Experimental results demonstrate that B-DNS significantly enhances
security, reducing the probability of successful attacks and increasing attack costs by orders of
magnitude compared to traditional DNS.
        </p>
        <p>Mechanism. B-DNS is designed with a four-layer architecture. At the Data Layer, DNS
records are stored as immutable transactions in the blockchain, utilising operation records
for registration, update, and revocation functionalities. Inspired by Bitcoin’s scripting system,
these records enable dynamic domain ownership changes and content updates. The Index
Layer ofers search speed by maintaining an index tree mapping domain names to IP addresses,
with bloom filters facilitating fast revocation checks. In the Consensus Layer, a PoS consensus
protocol ensures the consistency of DNS records, with block generators selected based on stake
proportional probabilities. Finally, the Network Layer is responsible for the communication
between B-DNS name servers, recursive resolvers, and end-users, enabling direct querying of
DNS records from the blockchain and ensuring compatibility with the traditional DNS systems.
Challenges. Mitigating DDoS attacks in B-DNS presents a notable challenge despite the
detection of fewer vulnerabilities compared to traditional DNS. In particular, the security
analysis that was performed saw that while in traditional DNS 24 vulnerabilities that can lead
to DDoS attacks were detected, in B-DNS only 12 vulnerabilities were detected. However, it is
essential to recognise that this improvement does not necessarily indicate that B-DNS efectively
prevents DDoS attacks. Instead, B-DNS architecture may render it more resilient to such attacks,
making it more challenging for attackers to exploit vulnerabilities and disrupt domain resolution
processes. Nonetheless, the potential for DDoS attacks to disrupt B-DNS operations remains a
concern, highlighting the need for continued research and development to increase the system’s
defenses against such threats.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-6">
        <title>4.7. Blockzone</title>
        <p>
          BlockZone [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref24">24</xref>
          ] is a BDNS storage aimed at addressing the centralisation issues of the traditional
DNS architecture and management. BlockZone uses blockchain by treating DNS name servers
as nodes within the network, each storing record information for the entire network. By using
a Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) consensus algorithm tailored for DNS, BlockZone
ensures consensus and data consistency while ofering advantages such as fast consensus
and low network trafic. BlockZone achieves significantly higher parsing and authentication
eficiency compared to DNSSEC, with the improved consensus algorithm exhibiting a substantial
increase in eficiency over PoW-based alternatives.
        </p>
        <p>Mechanism. BlockZone operates by using smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain to
manage DNS resource records, hierarchical relationships, and historical updates. Four types of
smart contracts - Consensus Contract (CC), Relationship Contract (RC), Ownership Contract
(OC), and History Record Contract (HC) - are utilised for this process. When adding a new node
(name server) to the system, registration involves submitting an application to the blockchain
network, undergoing confirmation by the consensus contract, and creating relationship contracts
if approved. Data updates are managed by synchronising resource records in the external
InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) 8 system and sending information to the service contract,
which records updated domain name information and generates historical contracts. Data
retrieval involves end users initiating query requests, trusted servers querying the blockchain’s
service contract, and verifying the integrity of retrieved information. A consensus algorithm,
a variant of PBFT, integrates communication and verification processes among participating
nodes, enhancing eficiency and reducing network overhead.</p>
        <p>Challenges. While BlockZone demonstrates notable improvements in parser throughput,
authentication eficiency, and distribution of query requests, several limitations exist within the
system. Firstly, the centralised structure of the root servers presents a potential single point of
failure risk, particularly evident when cache misses occur, leading to frequent query requests
directed to them. This centralised architecture contrasts with BlockZone’s non-central design
philosophy, potentially undermining the system’s reliability and resilience. Additionally, while
BlockZone utilises the PBFT consensus algorithm to ensure eficient transaction processing, the
rapid increase in blockchain length due to frequent updates poses a challenge in terms of storage
overhead. As the number of server nodes increases (for the needs of new domain storage),
so does the overall storage load on the blockchain. Thus, while BlockZone ofers significant
improvements in authentication eficiency, challenges persist in managing the storage overhead
and maintaining system reliability in the face of potential centralisation risks.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-7">
        <title>4.8. Other BDNS Proposals</title>
        <p>The reviewed BDNS solutions are among the most active and relevant research eforts to date in
the implementation of a BDNS. While alternative concepts have been proposed, the insuficient
maturity of their research currently limits us from gathering suficient information on them.
Considering the current availability of materials and resources, we present a brief overview of
some of these additional concepts, with the expectation of further research in the future.</p>
        <p>
          EmerDNS 9 operates on the Emercoin blockchain [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref25">25</xref>
          ] to store domain name records. Users
can register domain names using the Emercoin cryptocurrency (EMC). The decentralised nature
of the Emercoin blockchain ensures that domain ownership records are transparent, secure, and
resistant to tampering or censorship. EmerDNS also incorporates Name-Value Storage (NVS)
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref26">26</xref>
          ], a feature within the Emercoin blockchain, to store additional information related to domain
names. However, EmerDNS competes with established domain registrars and traditional DNS
systems, making it challenging to convince service providers to adopt its vision.
        </p>
        <p>
          AuthLedger [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref27">27</xref>
          ] is a blockchain-based approach for domain name authentication that uses the
Ethereum blockchain to provide a decentralised alternative to traditional Certificate Authorities
(CAs). The primary objective of AuthLedger is to reduce reliance on CAs by implementing a
decentralised version of the CA system. However, it should be noted that AuthLedger is solely
        </p>
        <sec id="sec-4-7-1">
          <title>8https://ipfs.tech// 9https://emercoin.com/en/documentation/blockchain-services/emerdns/emerdns-introduction/</title>
          <p>BDNS Name</p>
          <p>Objectives</p>
          <p>Mechanisms</p>
          <p>Supported TLD</p>
          <p>Limitations
Namecoin
Handshake
Blockstack
ENS
Unstoppable
Domains
B-DNS
Blockzone</p>
          <p>Decentralised
domain registration,
censorship resistance</p>
          <p>Bitcoin blockchain, .bit
Blockchain-based
registration,
Decentralised
naming protocol,
alternative to Certificate
Authorities
Decentralised
internet, user control over
data
Simplify interaction
with Ethereum,
human-readable
smart contract
addresses
Censorship-resistant
domains,
usercontrolled</p>
          <p>Handshake
blockchain,
Blockchain-based
auction system
Bitcoin blockchain
.hs
.id .podcast
.helloworld
Ethereum blockchain</p>
          <p>.eth
Ethereum and Zilliqa
blockchains,</p>
          <p>.crypto .zil
Prevent cache poison- Agnostic blockchain,
ing and DDoS at- 4-layer architecture
tacks
Address central- Ethereum blockchain
isation issues of
traditional DNS
architecture and
management</p>
          <p>Agnostic
Agnostic</p>
          <p>Insuficient
computing power,
integration, scalability,
regulatory scrutiny
Usability,
integration, competition
with existing DNS,
regulatory scrutiny
Usability,
integration, scalability,
regulatory
considerations
Usability,
integration, name resolution
speed, regulatory
considerations
High gas fees,
integration, industry
acceptance, regulatory
considerations
Vulnerable to DDoS
attacks
Single point of
failure risk, storage
overhead
an authentication scheme, and does not allow for the purchase of individual domain names.</p>
          <p>
            DNSLedger [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref28">28</xref>
            ] is not a standalone blockchain, but rather an enhancement to existing BDNS
systems such as Namecoin and Blockstack. It is organised in a hierarchical multichain structure
in which domain name management and resolution are performed in a decentralised manner.
DNSLedger can also be applied in IoT devices to strengthen their security and enhance their
eficiency by ofering a robust distributed name management system.
          </p>
          <p>
            BlockONS [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref29">29</xref>
            ] is a permissioned blockchain built on the Hyperledger 10 blockchain. It aims
to address traditional security concerns related to DNS resolution, such as DNS cache poisoning
and is primarily used for Internet of Things devices.
          </p>
          <p>
            ConsortiumDNS [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref30">30</xref>
            ] is based on a three-layer architecture consisting of a consortium
blockchain, a consensus mechanism, and external storage. The primary goal of ConsortiumDNS
is to address the storage limitations of existing BDNS systems such as Namecoin and Blockstack
by implementing a three-layer architecture and external storage. The three-layer architecture
separates data records and domain name operation data, with domain name data stored in the
storage layer and domain name operation data stored in the underlying blockchain layer.
          </p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Challenges to BDNS Adoption</title>
      <p>
        The integration of blockchain into DNS is a notable attempt to reform the Internet infrastructure,
ofering decentralisation, and user empowerment. However, this transformative potential comes
with several challenges that must be carefully considered to realise the full benefits of BDNS
solutions. In this section, the multifaceted challenges to the adoption and implementation of
BDNS are explored. From scalability and performance concerns to regulatory and governance
hurdles, each challenge represents a promising research direction to explore further.
Scalability. One of the biggest challenges in BDNS is scalability. Traditional DNS systems
handle a vast number of queries daily, and scaling blockchain solutions to accommodate similar
or higher loads while maintaining performance is non-trivial. The consensus mechanisms
and distributed nature of blockchains often result in slower transaction processing times and
limited throughput, hindering their ability to handle DNS queries at scale. For example, in 2007,
The CryptoKitties craze clogged the Ethereum network, causing congestion and significantly
increasing transaction fees [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref31">31</xref>
        ]. This incident highlights the scalability limitations of blockchain
networks when faced with sudden spikes in transaction volume.
      </p>
      <p>
        Performance. Performance is closely related to scalability and is another significant challenge
for BDNS. The decentralised nature of blockchain networks introduces latency compared to
centralised DNS systems, potentially impacting user experience. Improving the performance of
blockchain networks through optimisations in consensus algorithms, network infrastructure,
and caching mechanisms is essential for wider adoption. Bitcoin’s blockchain is well known
for its slow transaction processing times and high fees during periods of network congestion
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref32">32</xref>
        ]. This poor performance has led to usability issues and deterred some users from utilising
Bitcoin for everyday transactions.
      </p>
      <p>
        Security. While blockchain technology ofers various security benefits, it also introduces
new security challenges for DNS systems. Smart contract vulnerabilities, consensus algorithm
weaknesses, and the potential for 51% attacks are among the security threats that BDNS systems
must mitigate. Ensuring the integrity of DNS data stored on the blockchain is crucial to prevent
unauthorised access or tampering. The decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) hack on
the Ethereum blockchain [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref33">33</xref>
        ] not only resulted in financial losses but also weakened trust in the
security of smart contracts and DApps built on blockchain platforms. This incident highlighted
the importance of robust security measures and thorough code audits in blockchain-based
systems.
      </p>
      <p>Governance and regulatory considerations. Regulatory challenges pose significant
barriers to the adoption of BDNS. The decentralised nature of blockchain networks complicates
regulatory compliance and governance, particularly concerning domain ownership, dispute
resolution, and legal liability. Establishing clear regulatory frameworks and standards for BDNS
systems is essential to address these challenges and foster trust among stakeholders. Conflicting
regulations and lack of clarity have created barriers to entry for startups and innovators in the
space.</p>
      <p>Usability and adoption. Usability is a critical challenge for BDNS adoption. User-friendly
graphical interfaces, integration with existing DNS infrastructure, and compatibility with
popular browsers and applications are essential to encourage widespread adoption. Moreover,
educating users and DNS administrators about the benefits and complexities of BDNS is
necessary to overcome scepticism and resistance to change. Some BDNS solutions sufer from
poor user experience and lack of adoption due to complex registration processes, unfamiliar
interfaces, and limited support from traditional DNS providers.</p>
      <p>Integration with existing infrastructure. Integrating BDNS with existing infrastructure
presents technical challenges such as ensuring compatibility with legacy systems and protocols.
Interoperability between BDNS solutions and traditional DNS infrastructure is essential for a
smooth transition and to minimise disruptions to existing services. Incompatibility issues
between BDNS solutions and traditional DNS infrastructure can lead to interoperability challenges
and disruptions in service. For example, DNS resolvers may struggle to resolve blockchain
domain names or may not support DNSSEC for blockchain domains, creating confusion and
inconvenience for users [34].</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>6. Conclusion</title>
      <p>The concept of BDNS seems a promising solution in the attempt of trying to make the Internet
more secure and resilient to censorship. The investigation into BDNS solutions reveals a wide
range of objectives, mechanisms, and limitations. However, the journey toward widespread
adoption of BDNS is not without challenges. Integration challenges with existing Internet
infrastructure, scalability concerns, and the need for regulatory landscapes further highlight the
complexity of implementing BDNS on a large scale. Additionally, usability remains a common
hurdle, as users who adopt traditional DNS may find the transition challenging. Addressing
these concerns will be crucial for the success of these transformative technologies.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>7. Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>This work was partially supported by the UK Research and Innovation (DTP Scholarship under
grant EP/T517859/1); and the Academic Centre of Excellence in Cyber Security Research
University of Southampton (EP/R007268/1).
[34] A. Herzberg, H. Shulman, Dnssec: Security and availability challenges, in: 2013 IEEE
Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS), IEEE, 2013, pp. 365–366.</p>
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