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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Tokenomics in Civic Blockchain: Implementing Community and SoulBound Tokens in a Game-Theoretical Framework for Collaborative Economies</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Irene Domenicale</string-name>
          <email>irene.domenicale@unicam.it</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Flavia Fredda</string-name>
          <email>flavia.fredda@unicam.it</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Claudio Schifanella</string-name>
          <email>claudio.schifanella@unito.it</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>University of Camerino, International School of Advanced Studies</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Piazza Cavour 19F, 62032 Camerino</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="IT">Italy</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>University of Turin</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Corso Svizzera 185, 10149 Torino</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="IT">Italy</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>This paper introduces a novel framework designed for the modelling and analysis of tokenomics within civic blockchain environments, aimed at enhancing collaborative economies. As digital platforms and blockchain technologies continue to disrupt traditional economic models, the need to understand and optimize the mechanisms of collaboration and value exchange within decentralized communities is becoming increasingly pressing. Our framework addresses this gap by integrating concepts from tokenomics, game theory, and community governance. Utilizing a game-theoretic approach, our framework establishes a solid foundation for understanding and guiding the complex interactions between participants, ensuring that the system remains balanced, sustainable, and aligned with the collective goals of the community. Central to our framework are two distinct types of tokens that govern the economic interactions within the community: a community token (CVT) and SoulBound tokens (SBT). CVT operates as a medium of exchange and a measure of value within the collaborative ecosystem, enabling and incentivizing participation and contribution. In contrast, SBT tokens serve a critical role in representing and verifying the membership and identity of participants within the community. These non-transferable tokens are pivotal in fostering a sense of belonging and trust among members, which are essential elements in the success of collaborative economies. By implementing this dual-token system, our framework provides a robust mechanism for governing decentralized local communities and facilitating collaborative economic activities.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;Blockchain</kwd>
        <kwd>ERC20</kwd>
        <kwd>ERC721</kwd>
        <kwd>SoulBound Tokens</kwd>
        <kwd>Local Communities</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        Distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) have raised new questions about the relationship between
the domains of computer science, games, and economics [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] in the study of interactions between
participants in a network and the mutual benefits gained from such interactions. Of particular interest
is the fact that DLTs have enabled processes of tokenization to emerge. Tokenization can be described
as the conversion of value into a digital form or, more precisely, the establishment of a self-regulating
(token) economic system governed by rules programmed by the token designer [2]. Tokenomics is a
discipline that refers to the study and design of self-sustaining economic systems optimised through
token incentives [3]. In this context, the tokens are intended to incentivise a particular behaviour within
the network with the aim of aligning the interests of participants towards a common goal without
involving intermediaries.
      </p>
      <p>Another topic related to DLTs has emerged recently: the application of blockchain technology for
social good. Of particular interest to our research is the category of civic blockchain. By civic blockchain,
we mean a particular field of application of this technology, within the broader field of blockchain for
social good, which is characterised by the co-production of public services to meet societal needs [4, 5].
More specifically, civic applications refer to the design and creation of systems that support processes
of civic participation and alternative processes of value circulation within communities and local
economies. Core elements of civic applications of blockchain are the co-design and accessibility of this
technology at a local community level [6].</p>
      <p>The intersection of blockchain technology with community engagement presents an innovative
approach to fostering participation, decision-making, and trust within local ecosystems. This paper
introduces the Community Value Token (CVT), an ERC20 token, tailored to enhance community
engagement through a unique integration with SoulBound Tokens (SBTs).</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Our contribution and motivation</title>
      <p>The concept of civic blockchain is relatively recent, and, to the best of our knowledge, there is still
no systematisation available of the literature relating to its applications. While use cases show how
blockchain technology is also being used in the field of social good to implement community tokens, there
are no unambiguous or systematised references related to models for the design and implementation
of collaborative-economy-oriented tokenization processes in the context of local communities. Our
research aims to investigate this gap and the contribution we intend to propose consists of three main
elements.</p>
      <p>The first element concerns the proposal of a framework that describes the context and objectives
of the system we intend to take into analysis. In this regard, we decided to consider the collaborative
economies as reference to describe the exchange system, (see Section 3), as it best represents the
dynamics of resource sharing from the nonprofit and mutualistic perspective that we wish to consider.
Indeed, the exchanges envisaged by this model cannot be attributed to market, profit or financial logic.
Specifically, the types of exchange considered are: access to products or services without the need to
own the underlying assets, reallocation of goods and exchange of intangible assets [7].</p>
      <p>Within a local community, these processes may manifest as the management of shared spaces,
redistribution of products from urban gardens, lending systems for everyday items (such as libraries of
things), and skill exchanges.</p>
      <p>In this context, the economic aspect of tokenization operates as a dynamic system that facilitates
exchange and interaction among its members. Therefore, a token can be described as a community
token, indicating a socio-economic unit of value used to facilitate interactions in terms of exchange and
distribution of rewards as provided by the incentive system.</p>
      <p>Indeed, this highlights the critical significance of modeling interactions among participants within
the collaborative economy: the second aspect of this proposal focuses on exploring game theory as
a tool for analyzing the strategic behaviors of the community members. Specifically, game theory
is applied to the token economy rather than the blockchain infrastructure itself. While blockchain
provides the foundational layer for secure and transparent transactions, the broader design
considerations of tokenized systems extends beyond the blockchain technology itself: it involves the design of
comprehensive frameworks that encompass tokenomics, governance structures and user incentives.
This study aims to address a research gap by providing models that facilitate the design of tokenized
systems tailored for collaborative economies within local community contexts.</p>
      <p>The third central element of the research is the implementation, through the development of
community tokens, incentive mechanisms and governance mechanisms. In this paper, we will address the
preliminary phase of the implementation, starting with a detailed description of the Community Token
and the SoulBound Token. The design choice to implement the community token brings us close to the
concept of local currency, and some examples of using blockchain in this way can be found in projects
such as Circles [8], Sarafu Network [9] and TrustLine [10]. While the integration of SoulBound Tokens
is a strategic decision aimed at supporting the integrity and functionality of the community ecosystem.</p>
      <p>This paper will first establish the framework within which our research will unfold. Subsequently,
we will proceed to address the following research questions:
RQ1 Can game theory serve as a tool to support collaborative practices and shape the framework of
a digital collaborative economy? This inquiry seeks to formalize strategic behaviors, considering the
dynamics and community context in which they occur.</p>
      <p>RQ2 Can community tokens be developed to foster participatory and collaborative dynamics? This
research question delves into the mechanisms and attributes through which a token can act as a
driver for non-profit and mutualistic principles, supporting collaborative economies and facilitating
resource-sharing systems.</p>
      <p>To illustrate the applicability of our proposed scenario, we introduce a use case that embodies all
the outlined principles, demonstrating a collaborative sharing economy scenario driven by non-profit
objectives.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Related Work</title>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>3.1. Collaborative economies</title>
        <p>The field of collaborative economies encompasses a wide variety of diferent economic models and
sectors and, for this reason, it is dificult to give an unique definition [ 11]. However, some elements
can serve to categorise these platforms, such as whether they are for profit or non-profit, whether the
interactions are business to consumer (b2c) or peer-to-peer (p2p), and whether the services ofered
can be regarded as professional or non-professional [11, 12]. The term collaborative economy is often
associated with terms such as sharing economy, gig economy, platform economy, to name a few [13].
Part of this phenomenon has resulted in the commodification of social relations and the proliferation of
extractive digital platforms [14]. We intend to distance ourselves from this type of outcome. Instead, for
our research, we consider those models of collaborative economies that are oriented towards non-profit
and peer-to-peer transactions. These models can be defined as new socioeconomic models [ 15]. They
allow the redistribution of resources according to the logic of mutuality, which refers to the possibility
of having access to resources without implying transfer of ownership [16, 17]. Blockchain technology
can play a crucial role in these processes, accelerating the spread of collaborative practices [17]. In
addition to ofering the ability to implement automated and secure transactions, it has the potential to
redefine exchange practices in a decentralised way [18].</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>3.2. Game Theory Applied to Blockchain Systems</title>
        <p>Game theory has been and continues to be used to address diferent kinds of problems concerning
blockchain. The general purpose of using game theory as an analytical tool is to analyze miners’
behaviors to predict and evaluate their participation in maintaining of the system. The main areas of
application identified in [19] and [20] are:
• security: selfish mining attacks and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
• mining management: individual mining (computational power allocation, fork chain selection
and block size setting) and pool mining (pool selection and reward allocation).
• applications on top of the blockchain: cryptocurrency economic trading (for setting transaction
transparency and determining the cryptocurrency value), and energy trading.</p>
        <p>Liu et al. [19] also identify which game-theoretic approaches are most used to analyse
interactions within the blockchain network. They include non-cooperative, extensive-form, Stackelberg and
stochastic games.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-3">
        <title>3.3. Blockchain for Social Good</title>
        <p>Blockchain for Social Good is a broad field. Here, we focus our attention on applications for social
economies and civic participation [6], and we divide these into two categories: tools for community
empowerment, and tools for social economies and financial inclusion.</p>
        <p>The first category includes tools that allow members of a specific community to create from
scratch what they need for a particular purpose, from tokens to a decentralised autonomous
organisation (DAO) [21]. In this regard, we shall mention the community toolkit platforms of Waves [22],
Coinsence [23] and CommonsHood [24], which ofer innovative toolsets for the development and
operation of Web 3.0 applications. Also of relevance are platforms for creating community/complementary
currencies like Celo [25].</p>
        <p>The second category consists of non-customisable ready-made tools for free use in a community.
Community and complementary currencies include Sarafu [9], ImpactMarket [26], TrustLines [10], and
Circles UBI [8]. In addition to constituting an exchange system, these projects enable the creation of
microcredit systems to facilitate financial inclusion. Another set of applications are those that involve
purpose-driven tokens with the purposes being, for instance, caring for the environment or the common
good (Plastic Bank [27] and Empower [28]) and recognising civic participation (Colu [29]).</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Description of the framework</title>
      <p>In order to answer to the research questions, we establish a framework to better shape the setup we
address. We move inside a local community that we consider like in Definition 4.1.</p>
      <p>Definition 4.1. (Local Community) A local community is a finite set ℒ = {1, . . . ,  } where  is
its size and  for  ∈ {1, . . . ,  } are its members, locally confined in a geographical bounded area of
diameter ∆ .</p>
      <p>The local community is considered here as a closed self-sustained system, where members exchange
goods or services and perform transactions that serve as the building blocks of a cohesive and
collaborative community. Members can be people or associations (managed by groups of citizens according to
governance rules).</p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>4.1. The local community as a closed system</title>
        <p>In the context of our analysis, the local community operates as a closed system, distinguished by its
defined boundaries and specific criteria for participation and interaction within it. This system’s closure
is facilitated by the strategic issuance and management of Soul-Bound Tokens (SBTs), explained in
details in Section 7.1, which serve as both a mechanism for membership verification and a means to
cultivate and maintain the system’s integrity.</p>
        <p>The benefits of such a closed system are multifaceted. Primarily, it ensures a high degree of trust
and security among participants, as the entry and participation within the community are regulated
through the allocation of SBTs. This controlled environment allows for more targeted and eficient
resource distribution, as well as the alignment of goals and values among members, thereby enhancing
cooperative eforts and mutual support. Furthermore, the notion of closure in this context does not
equate to exclusivity or lack of inclusiveness. Instead, it establishes a framework wherein inclusion
is predicated on shared commitments and contributions to the community’s objectives, rather than
arbitrary or superficial criteria. This approach allows for a more purposeful and cohesive community
fabric, where members are united by common purpose and collective action.</p>
        <p>The use of SBTs is pivotal in fostering this closure, acting not just as a gatekeeper but also as a
facilitator of engagement and participation within the community. A closed system, built on the strategic
use of SBTs, promotes a secure, cooperative, and goal-oriented environment that values and rewards
meaningful participation and contribution.</p>
        <p>Another motivation to consider the local community as a closed system is that there are several
services and activities that tend to function more efectively within closed communities compared to
open ones, primarily due to the enhanced control, trust, and shared values that closed communities
can ofer. Closed communities can facilitate more eficient and equitable resource sharing (like tool
libraries, car-sharing, or communal spaces) since there’s a higher level of trust and accountability among
members.</p>
        <p>Initiatives that require collaboration and collective efort, such as community gardens, local energy
projects, or cooperative businesses, can benefit from the closed community model. The alignment of
interests and the ability to coordinate closely with a known group of participants can lead to more
successful and sustainable outcomes. Also, some financial activities that rely on trust and mutual benefit,
such as peer-to-peer lending, community-supported agriculture (CSAs) [30], or local currencies, often
operate more successfully within the framework of a closed community. The shared commitment to
the community’s economic well-being can lead to more responsible and community-oriented financial
behaviors.</p>
        <p>Closed communities, by fostering a high level of trust, shared values, and mutual accountability, create
an environment where these services and activities can flourish. This model leverages the strength of
close-knit connections to enhance participation, eficiency, and outcomes in various endeavors.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>4.2. The community local starter</title>
        <p>In the structure of the local community under discussion, a pivotal role is played by what is referred to
as a local starter. The local initiator of the community is typically an association formed by individuals
who share common values and are united by a unique social objective, serving as the foundation for the
community’s establishment and growth. This entity acts as the cornerstone for the community’s origin,
embarking on a mission to fortify the local economy and improve the well-being of its members through
innovative ideas or projects. The mechanism of action employed involves the minting and distribution
of SBTs. As it will be explain later in Section 7.1 these tokens serve as a testament to membership and
participation rights within the community. The starter association manages the distribution of SBT
tokens to individual users and other associative bodies, efectively creating a network of stakeholders
engaged in the community’s development and well-being.</p>
        <sec id="sec-4-2-1">
          <title>4.2.1. Benefits</title>
          <p>Governance and autonomy. The fact that an entire local community can be initiated by a small association
emphasizes self-organization, autonomy, and the power of collective action without centralized authority.
A local starter enables the community to establish its own governance structures, rules, and objectives
based on collective interests and values. This approach highlights the potential for self-organization,
emphasizes the strength of collective action, and underscores the capacity of individuals to manage their
afairs efectively without reliance on central authority. This means not only empowers communities
but also contributes to the broader discourse on decentralization, autonomy, and the transformative
potential of grassroots initiatives.</p>
          <p>Resilience. Community-led initiatives can be more agile and adaptable to changing circumstances or
needs. Without the bureaucratic constraints typical of standard institutions, communities can quickly
pivot strategies, experiment with innovative solutions, and implement changes more eficiently. A local
starter is inherently more aware of the specific needs, challenges, and aspirations of the community it
serves. This focus leads to the development of tailored programs and initiatives that directly address
the interests of community members, rather than the one-size-fits-all approaches often deployed by
larger institutions.</p>
          <p>Participation and sense of community. By organizing independently, community members can ensure
direct representation in decision-making processes. This participatory model strengthens the sense
of sharing within the community, as all members have the opportunity to voice their opinions, vote
on initiatives, and contribute to governance. These strengthened relationships are the foundation for
mutual support and collaboration [31].</p>
          <p>Empowerment of community members. Organizing independently encourages the eficient sharing
of resources and knowledge within the community. Members can pool assets, expertise, and labor to
achieve common goals, leading to a more sustainable and self-suficient community. The experience
of self-organization enhances the capacities of community members. Skills in leadership, negotiation,
project management, and democratic participation are developed and honed, equipping individuals for
active civic engagement and leadership roles. Freed from the constraints and risk-aversion typical of
larger institutions, communities can become hotbeds of innovation</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-4-2-2">
          <title>4.2.2. Potential drawbacks and solutions</title>
          <p>However, it is crucial for the starter association to operate transparently and inclusively to avoid
centralization of power and to mitigate potential issues like censorship. Implementing democratic
processes, where possible, for decision-making and the distribution of SBTs can help in making the
system more equitable and preventing misuse of power. Additionally, setting up checks and balances,
such as oversight committees or the possibility for community review and appeals, can further ensure
that the association’s actions are in the best interest of the community as a whole.</p>
          <p>In order to mitigate the problem of centralization of power within the community, it is possible to
implement a system where SBT holders have the authority to distribute SBTs to new members. This
approach encourages a more distributed governance model and has several advantages for fostering a
participatory community structure. Moreover, when members have a say in who receives SBTs, they
are likely to feel more invested in the community’s growth and governance. This increased sense
of ownership can lead to higher levels of engagement and participation in community activities and
decision-making. In order for this solution to be efective in mitigating centralization and ensuring a
healthy, thriving community, certain safeguards and guidelines should be established. These might
include criteria or guidelines for new members, transparency in the distribution process, and mechanisms
for dispute resolution or revocation of SBTs in cases of misconduct.</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-3">
        <title>4.3. Why is blockchain useful in this context</title>
        <p>Blockchain technology ofers several unique advantages as it addresses limitations found in current
currency systems and provides innovative solutions for secure, transparent, and decentralized transactions.</p>
        <p>Blockchain eliminates the need for a central authority or intermediary. It allows for spontaneous
activities to create and grow by themselves, always respecting the laws of the place, without the need for
bureaucratic central approvals. Its nature also breaks down barriers to access for unbanked populations.
Blockchain’s transparency reduces the risk of censorship, fraud, and downtime ensuring trust among
users.</p>
        <p>Moreover, tokens on the blockchain can be programmed with smart contracts, which automatically
execute transactions when predefined conditions are met. This allows for the creation of complex
economic and governance systems within communities that can run by themselves.</p>
        <p>Token technology also enables the creation of new economic models and community governance
models together with incentive structures that reward contributors directly without intermediaries.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Game Theory as Enabler of Cooperation</title>
      <p>As stated in Section 2, we regard game theory as an analytical tool to assess and facilitate interactions
among members within the exchange system.</p>
      <p>Game theory ofers a collection of mathematical tools designed to examine how rational
decisionmakers interact. In the traditional framework of game theory each decision-maker chooses a strategy
with the goal of maximizing their utility, taking into account the strategies chosen by others. Following
the definition given by [19] some key terms are outlined below:

• Player: Refers to a decision-maker within the game. In our case, players are the members {}=1
of the local community (See definition 4.1).
• Utility: A utility, whether it’s expressed as a payof, interest, or revenue, represents the expected
outcomes for the player. If we name  the set of all possible outcomes of the game played, the
utility is a function  :  →− R.
• Strategy: A player’s strategy encompasses a range of actions, choices, or decisions that they can
undertake to reach their outcome. Typically, a player’s utility is influenced not only by their own
strategy but also by the strategies adopted by other players. For this reason, the set of all the
possible strategies is the product of all the players’ ones,  = 1 × · · · ×  , and the stretegy
function goes from them to the outcomes set:  :  →− 
• Rationality: A player is deemed rational when their strategy is oriented towards self-interest,
aiming to maximize their payof.</p>
      <p>In this interdisciplinary field, this version of non-cooperative game theory [ 32] stands out for its
integration of traditional game theory with cognitive, economic, and social sciences, providing insight
into real-world decision-making processes. 1 Given the local community context, we propose adopting
the mentioned non-cooperative game theory as an analytical tool for designing the reward mechanism
of a use case such the one described in the following section. This approach addresses the epistemic
nature of coordination problems, considering players’ knowledge about each other’s states of mind
crucial for efective coordination. Within a specific community, players interpret established norms
and institutions collectively, fostering a shared understanding known as community-based salience
[33][34]. This is driven by community-based reasoning, where players perceive themselves as part
of the same community, anticipating uniform behavior patterns among members. This underscores
the relevance of the community’s value system, guiding individuals towards common expectations
and facilitating tacit agreement among players [35]. In our research, we prioritize shared values over
institutional afiliations, emphasizing collaboration and resource sharing within communities.</p>
      <p>This perspective is useful for designing tokenomics to align strategic behaviors with community
goals rather than self-interest. Unlike traditional game theory which equates payofs with utility, our
scenario draws a distinction between payofs and utility functions as a result to the inclusion of human
interactions in informal settings beyond mere rational strategies. This ensures that payofs remain
consistent across strategic behaviors, while utility functions are higher for individuals aligned with
shared goals of mutualistic sharing and logic. The proposal suggests a theoretical framework to ofer
1For a comprehensive and detailed exposition of the mentioned version of non-cooperative game theory, we refer to Larrouy,
Lauren. On coordination in non-cooperative game theory: Explaining how and why an equilibrium occurs and prevails. Springer
Nature, 2023. pp. 283-322.
guidance and analytical tools for designing a token economy tailored to the collaborative sharing
model. As such, the focus is on analyzing and providing a preliminary description of the requirements
necessary for system design, while the implementation of the system is planned as future work.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>6. Use Case</title>
      <sec id="sec-6-1">
        <title>6.1. Exchanges</title>
        <p>A possible use case could be a collaborative sharing economy scenario, aimed at enabling resource
sharing and based on nonprofit and mutualistic logics.</p>
        <p>Specifically, the types of exchange considered [ 7] are: access to products or services without the need to
own the underlying assets, reallocation of goods, and exchange of intangible assets. In a local community,
these processes can take the form of: management of shared spaces and commons, redistribution of
products from urban gardens, lending systems for everyday objects (libraries of things), and exchange
of skills. Sharing can occur in two ways: simple borrowing or renting. In the simple borrowing scenario,
users reserve and utilize objects or services without the need to lock tokens as collateral or make any
pre-payment. Renting takes place when an object is borrowed and, for the duration of the borrowing
period, a specified amount of tokens is locked to ensure a level of security for the renter. The tokens
are then transferred to the lender as a rental fee.
6.2. Roles
In the case considered there are two kind of roles, that are both Players following the game-theory
point of view of Section 5.</p>
        <p>Organizations: namely local non-profit associations or social institutions, they are expected to lend
but not borrow items or services. They have multiple financial roles. They can mint new CVTs to
inject into the economy or burn existing CVTs to contract the monetary supply, thereby managing the
community’s liquidity and value stability. Otherwise, they can decide not to manage tokens and simply
use the tokens in circulation at that moment. Additionally, they can hold a reserve of CVTs garnered
through crowdfunding eforts, which can be used to finance community projects or to incentivise
participation by distributing token rewards to community members.</p>
        <p>Participants: upon joining the community, participants receive a SoulBound token granting them
access to community participation and related activities. Within this framework, participants can make
resources available, borrow or rent resources, and receive rewards corresponding to their actions. In our
scenario, interactions between participants are governed by modified game theory rules, as explained
in the next section. The modifications are related principally to the addition of other behaviors beyond
those that are purely rational in order to better represent real-life community dynamics where people
are more likely to reciprocate trust.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-6-2">
        <title>6.3. Strategic Behaviors</title>
        <p>
          In our scenario, participant interactions are regulated by game theory principles, as discussed in Section
5. Behaviors shape the set of the possible strategies  members can undertake into the community.
This perspective involves the addition of other behaviors beyond those that are purely rational in
order to better represent real-life community dynamics where trust and reciprocity are prevalent. To
operationalize this approach, we introduce behavioral groups, drawing inspiration from the framework
developed by J. Poncela-Casasnovas et al. [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          ]. These groups include virtuous, rational, malicious, and
random individuals. Virtuous individuals prioritize the welfare of others. Rational individuals follow
classic game theory behavior, seeking the most advantageous outcomes, among all the possible ones
represented by the set , for themselves. Malicious individuals aim to disrupt the system, regardless
of personal benefit. Random individuals act unpredictably, often changing their stance. The distinct
outcomes associated with each behavioral group are caught through corresponding utility functions
 . In particular, when the output of the function  establishes that the exchange is worthwhile, the
exchange occurs. This perspective influences the design of a token economy suitable for this type of
context applications. Specifically, our approach assumes that the majority of participants belong to the
virtuous group, shaping incentive mechanisms and rewards based on the utility function associated
with virtuous behavior. These principles come under the concept of community-based reasoning. The
community-based reasoning allows to frame the scope of interactions to the values and objectives
shared by the community, limiting the games players engage in with each other and greatly facilitating
coordination eforts.
6.4. Token
This scenario involves two tokens: the CVT and the SoulBound token. Further details regarding these
tokens will be provided in 7.1. The system operates on an inflationary model and adopts a
demanddriven issuance approach, providing flexibility to adjust to changes in demand and supply. The system
is built on incentive mechanisms. These incentives are distributed via token exchanges serving as either
rewards for positive behavior or a representation of value. All transactions in this system are conducted
using the same CVT type, this is classified as a work token designed to reward users for particular
actions or behaviors that support the system’s goals.
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>7. Community Value Token (CVT)</title>
      <p>This section delineates the conceptual underpinnings of the Community Value Token (CVT), the nature
and utility of SoulBound Tokens (SBTs), and the rationale behind their integration to create a cohesive
and secure community ecosystem. By intertwining the technical robustness of ERC20 tokens with
the personalized, non-transferable nature of SBTs, we create a model that can be adapted for various
community-driven initiatives seeking to benefit from blockchain’s transparency and security.</p>
      <p>At its core, the CVT is designed as a digital asset to facilitate and reward participation within a local
community. Unlike traditional cryptocurrencies or tokens that focus on financial transactions, CVT’s
primary aim is to serve as a medium of engagement, empowerment, and recognition within a specific
community setting. CVTs can be used to access community events, participate in decision-making
processes, and receive incentives for contributions to the community. The versatility of the CVT stems
from its ability to encapsulate both the tangible and intangible values that community members bring
to the collective ecosystem.</p>
      <sec id="sec-7-1">
        <title>7.1. SoulBound Tokens</title>
        <p>In 2022 P. Ohlhaver, E. G. Weyl et al. define the concept of Decentralized Society whose principal
element are SoulBound tokens (SBTs) [36]. SoulBound tokens represent a novel class of digital assets
characterized by their non-transferability and their role as attestations of identity, afiliation, or
accomplishment. SBTs are designed to be permanently associated with an individual’s digital identity. In
the context of the CVT ecosystem, SBTs are used to attest to an individual’s membership in the local
community. These tokens serve as digital credentials, verifying a member’s eligibility to participate in
community activities, access specific benefits, and engage in governance processes.</p>
        <p>The integration of SoulBound tokens with the Community Value Token framework is a strategic
decision aimed at enhancing the integrity, inclusivity, and functionality of community engagement.
This integration addresses the following key objectives.</p>
        <p>SBTs provide a secure and immutable method for verifying the identity and membership status
of community members. This verification process is crucial for ensuring that only eligible members
participate in certain community activities, thereby fostering a trust-based environment. By issuing an
SBT to members, we create a verifiable and tamper-proof record of their involvement and contributions.
Since SBTs represent a permanent record of membership and contributions, they can encourage
longterm engagement and investment in the community. Knowing that their eforts and achievements will
be recognized indefinitely can motivate members to maintain an active, ongoing role in the community.
The non-transferable nature of SBTs enhances the security and trustworthiness of transactions within
the community.</p>
        <p>SBTs can foster a stronger sense of belonging and community by visibly tying members’ identities to
their contributions and participation. This can encourage a more vibrant, active community ecosystem
where members feel valued and integral to the community’s success.</p>
        <p>By using CVTs in tandem with SBTs, the system can efectively incentivize participation and
contribution to the community. CVTs can be awarded for active involvement, and because SBTs attest to
membership, the distribution of rewards can be targeted and meaningful, reinforcing positive behaviors
and contributions.</p>
        <p>The CVT and SBT framework facilitates a decentralized governance model, where community
members holding specific SBTs are empowered to vote on community matters, propose initiatives,
and participate in decision-making processes. This model promotes transparency, accountability, and
collective decision-making, aligning with the principles of decentralization inherent to blockchain
technology.</p>
        <p>SBTs can also facilitate synergies with other communities and ecosystems. Members with SBTs could
potentially access events, services, or benefits across diferent communities that recognize the value
and significance of these tokens, fostering a broader network of collaboration and mutual support.
7.2. CVT
Our Community Value Token (CVT) is based on the popular ERC20 standard, with a significant
modification: it incorporates checks for SBT ownership to control transactions. Before any CVT
transfer, the contract verifies that both the sender and receiver possess a valid SBT, confirming their
membership in the community. This mechanism aligns with our goal to strengthen community bonds
and ensure that benefits circulate within a verified network of members.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-2">
        <title>7.3. The exchange of CVTs inside the community</title>
        <p>The SBT tokens are instrumental in facilitating the exchange of CVT (Community Value Token), a
specialized token designed to operate as the community’s currency. This exchange mechanism is
exclusive; only holders of SBT tokens are granted the privilege to trade CVTs, thereby ensuring a closed
and secure economic environment that fosters mutual growth and support. The exclusivity of CVT
transactions underscores a crucial principle within the community - economic interactions are reserved
for those who contribute and share in the collective identity and aims of the community.</p>
        <p>However, this system also delineates a clear boundary: individuals or associations outside the SBT
framework find themselves unable to engage in the community’s economic exchanges. This policy
is not merely regulatory but serves a dual purpose of encouraging participation in the community’s
foundational activities and ensuring that the benefits of the community’s economic system are preserved
for its contributors. Importantly, the term ’individual users’ within this community does not solely
refer to distinct physical persons but encompasses the possibility for individuals to create and manage
multiple identities. This flexibility allows for a dynamic and versatile participation landscape, where the
multifaceted aspects of an individual’s contributions and engagements can be recognized and rewarded
in a nuanced manner.</p>
        <p>Thus, the model presented not only fosters a sense of belonging and mutual support among its
members but also erects a structured approach to community economic interaction. By requiring
membership and participation through the acquisition of SBTs for economic engagement, the community
efectively promotes a sustainable and self-reinforcing economic environment, aiming for long-term
prosperity and cohesion.</p>
        <p>This extended description provides a more comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms at play
within the community, emphasizing the importance of the starter association, the role of SBT tokens
in defining membership and participation, and the exclusive economic interactions enabled by such a
system.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-3">
        <title>7.4. Actual implementation</title>
        <p>This works focuses on the creation of two distinct types of tokens that can be deployed in any EVM
compatible blockchain: the Community Value Token (CVT) and the SoulBound Token (SBT). This
implementation underscores a pioneering approach towards embedding community engagement and
exclusivity within digital assets through smart contract functionalities.</p>
        <p>The CVT, derived from the ERC20 token standard, incorporates enhancements for permit capabilities.
On the other side, the SoulBound Token, developed under the ERC721 standard for non-fungible tokens,
is characterized by its non-transferable nature post-minting. The contract stipulates that SBTs cannot
be transferred once issued, cementing them as a permanent, non-transferable attribute of the initial
recipient’s wallet.</p>
        <p>We extended the ERC20 design to introduce a unique prerequisite for transfers: individuals must
possess at least one SoulBound Token (SBT) to engage in CVT transactions. This condition enforces a
layer of community membership verification, as SBTs act as a gatekeeper, ensuring that only verified
members can transact with CVTs. Such a mechanism embeds a sense of community value and exclusivity
by linking the transferability of CVTs to the ownership of SBTs, fostering a controlled ecosystem where
token circulation is confined within a predefined community.</p>
        <p>The use of the SoulBound emphasizes the token’s role as a digital marker of community membership
or achievement, unchangeable and locked to the owner. For this first stage of implementation, minting
of SBTs is exclusively managed by the contract’s owner, permitting a regulated distribution method
that can align with specific membership criteria or qualifications, thus ensuring a controlled expansion
of the community. For further improvements the minting process is meant to be managed by all the
community members through a governance process.</p>
        <p>Moreover, the SoulBound Token contract overrides the _beforeTokenTransfer method of the
ERC721 standard to enforce its non-transferability, ensuring that any attempt to transfer an SBT, whether
from or to any address post-minting, is categorically prohibited. This strict enforcement guarantees the
token’s permanence as a badge of identity or afiliation within the community it represents.</p>
        <p>Inside the implementation of the SBT token, we have embedded the possibility of inserting a manifesto
of the community, that can encapsulate the values that define and shape its essence.</p>
        <p>The conjunction of CVT and SBT implementations builds a dual-token ecosystem that integrates
transferability with non-transferability and open participation with exclusivity. By coupling the wide
applicability and liquidity of ERC20 tokens with the fixed identity and membership representation of
ERC721 tokens, this approach unveils a multifaceted application of blockchain technology that fosters
a secure, community-centric economy.</p>
        <p>The code that implements the two contracts is available on this GitHub page [37].</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-7-4">
        <title>7.5. Interfacing with the community</title>
        <p>CVTs and SBTs are issued by a primary association that spontaneously forms within the local community.
This association is responsible for the initial distribution of SBTs to members, signifying their oficial
inclusion in the community. The issuance process involves a careful selection procedure to ensure
that new members align with the community’s values and objectives, since once a member receives an
SBT, they are considered eligible to participate in the community’s decision-making processes, access
specific benefits, and engage with the broader ecosystem of services and activities facilitated by the
CVT.</p>
        <p>In further stages of the implementation, every person owning an SBT has the right to participate
in decisions regarding the community and the CVT system itself. This inclusive model empowers
members to have a say in critical aspects of community governance, including but not limited to, the
acceptance of new members (counting other associations).</p>
        <p>The decision regarding which members or associations to accept into the community is a collective
one, made by existing SBT holders. Proposals for new members can be performed using their SBTs
for voting. This mechanism ensures that the community grows in a manner that is consistent with its
foundational values and objectives, fostering a cohesive and supportive environment.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>8. Conclusion and future works</title>
      <p>The objective of this proposal was to explore the utilization of blockchain and the token economy to
bolster a collaborative economy within a local community. Various theoretical frameworks from diverse
disciplines were considered to provide a comprehensive understanding of the requirements for designing
and implementing a tokenized system tailored to collaborative and community-driven dynamics. The
implementation of SBT allows supporting the game theory approach oriented to community-based
reasoning, as it defines community membership and the sharing of the value horizon and rules of
participation in the system, which are stated explicitly in the manifesto contained in the SBT and
accepted by participants when they enter the community. In this way, it allows defining a set of strategic
behaviors oriented to coordination and collaboration. This is relevant in order to proceed in the design
of the tokenized system, both in terms of the development of incentive and governance mechanisms
and the design of the creation and circulation of the tokens themselves in the exchange system.</p>
      <p>Therefore future works involve the development of an incentive system, based on the utility
functions identified through the proposed game theory approach and the implementation of a system of
governance that allows all the participants to decide on the minting and distribution of SBTs. Since
one of the aim of the present research is to develop increasingly accessible tools for empowerment and
ifnancial inclusion in local communities, the interface between community members and the CVT and
SBT systems is designed to be user-friendly and accessible, ensuring that all members, regardless of
their technical expertise, can engage with the system efectively. This interaction is facilitated through
web interfaces and digital wallets, which serve as the primary channels for members to manage their
tokens, participate in community decisions, and access community services.</p>
      <p>The web interface acts as a gateway for community members to interact with the CVT and SBT
ecosystem. Upon accessing the platform, users are prompted to connect their digital wallets, which are
essential for storing their tokens securely. These wallets not only hold CVTs, which can be used for
transactions within the community, but also store SBTs, which attest to their membership and eligibility
to participate in community activities. Decision-making processes are conducted through the web
interface, where SBT holders can vote on proposals, submit new initiatives, and engage in discussions
about the community’s future direction. The web interface ensures that these activities are conducted
transparently, with the results being recorded on the blockchain for immutability and accountability.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>9. Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>This research was funded by Ministero dell’Università e della Ricerca (MUR), issue D.M. 118/2023
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