Model to formation data base of secondary parameters for assessing status of the state secret protection⋆ Yurii Dreis1,2,†, Oleksandr Korchenko2,3,†, Volodymyr Sokolov4,† and Pavlo Skladannyi4,∗,† 1 Mariupol State University, 6 Preobrazhenska str., 10008 Kyiv, Ukraine 2 State University of Information and Telecommunication Technology, 7 Solomyanska str., 03058 Kyiv, Ukraine 3 University of the National Education Commission, 2 Podchorążych ul., 30084 Krakow, Poland 4 Borys Grinchenko Kyiv Metropolitan University, 18/2 Bulvarno-Kudriavska str., 04053 Kyiv, Ukraine Abstract Protection of classified information, especially state secrets, is an important task in the field of national and information security of the state. To minimize possible damage to the national security of Ukraine from violations in the field of state secret protection and to reduce the negative international rating and other serious consequences at the state level, the task of creating specialized databases, developing and improving existing methods and models that implement relevant assessments is urgent. That is why the theoretical- multiple presentation of the parameters of the “Report on the State of Protection of State Secrets” in tuple models allows solving the actual scientific and practical task of formalizing the process of assessing the negative consequences of leaking a state secret, its disclosure or loss of Material Carriers of Secret Information (MCSI), violation of the secrecy regime and state of ensuring the protection of country’s secrets in general. Previously, a tuple model of primary and internal parameters was developed, and now, as its completion, a model of secondary parameters and its hierarchical structure has already been proposed, due to the integrated theoretic-multiple representation of sets characterizing information: the implementation or ordering (scientific and/or scientific and technical support) of secret research, development, design and other scientific works, manufacture of secret products, regime premises, objects of information activity, international cooperation, etc., allows to determine sets of input and output parameters for the formation of special databases and formalization of the process of damage assessment caused to national security by violations of state secret protection mechanisms. In the future, to implement the above-mentioned process, it is necessary to develop a method of assessing the state of protection of the country’s secrets both separately for the subject of regime-secret activity (reporting entity) and for the organization (institution) to which the reporting entities are directly subordinated. Keywords limited access information protection, state secrets protection, parameter model1 1. Introduction protection of SS and by the requirements of the law [4], the appropriate forms of reports on the status of SS protection From 2014 to the present, the number of security breaches (hereinafter—Report) and instructions on the procedure for as a result of treason and/or sabotage, in terms of loss, their execution and submission [5] were approved and disclosure, or transfer of information including information updated. with limited access, especially State Secrets (SS), is increased The report was supplemented with dynamically significantly both in the world [1, 2], as well as in Ukraine changing sets of identifying and evaluation parameters for [3]. This process became more active after the occupation of determining the state of the provision of SSP, presented in certain territories of Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk separate sections of this report. The specified update makes regions, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea). As a result, certain corrections and additions to the already developed to strengthen national security in the sphere of State Secret model for assessing the consequences of the leaks of state Protection (SSP), the NSDC decisions “On additional secrets from cyber attacks on the critical information measures to strengthen the national security of Ukraine” infrastructure of the country [6]. There is also a need for and “On the state of overcoming negative consequences further improvement of methods and models for evaluating caused by the loss of material carriers of secret information damage to the national security of Ukraine in the event of in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine, in the area an SS leak [7–12], taking into account the use of a of the anti-terrorist operation in the Donetsk and Luhansk theoretical-multiple approach [13], and the development of regions” were taken. To improve reporting on the state of a method for assessing the state of ensuring the SSP of a CSDP-2024: Cyber Security and Data Protection, June 30, 2024, Lviv, 0000-0003-2699-1597 (Y. Dreis); 0000-0003-3376-0631 (O. Korchenko); Ukraine 0000-0002-9349-7946 (V. Sokolov); 0000-0002-7775-6039 (P. Skladannyi) ∗ Corresponding author. © 2024 Copyright for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under † These authors contributed equally. Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). dreisyuri@gmail.com (Y. Dreis); icaocentre@nau.edu.ua (O. Korchenko); v.sokolov@kubg.edu.ua (V. Sokolov); p.skladannyi@kubg.edu.ua (P. Skladannyi) CEUR Workshop ceur-ws.org ISSN 1613-0073 1 Proceedings reporting entity as a Subject of Regime-Secret Activity forming a database of parameters of the state of SSP (SRSA), (for example, a Critical Infrastructure Object (CIO), provision for creating a method of processing input data in the event of classified information leaks. To implement (identification, static and other sets) and formalizing the such a method, models for forming a database of a section process of assessing the state of SSP at CIS from the negative of the parameters (primary [14], internal [15]) for consequences of a SS leak or caused by the loss of MCSI or evaluating the state of provision of SSP for SRSA at CIO its disclosure. were developed. In this regard, the purpose of this work is to develop a model for the formation of a database of secondary 2. Formulation of the problem parameters, which, due to the theoretical multiple representations of parameters as identification, static, and To minimize the consequences of possible damage to the other sets of input data, allows to assess the state of provision national security of Ukraine from breaches in the field of of SSP for SRSA at OCI in the event of negative consequences SSP and to reduce the negative rating at the state level, it is (damages) caused by the leak of SS, its disclosure or loss of necessary to create databases, methods, and models that the MCCI, breach of the secrecy regime, etc. implement appropriate assessments. Therefore, the theoretical-multiple presentation of the parameters of the Report defined by its separate sections, which contain 3. Completion of model information about [5] the reporting entity, its subordination development and departmental affiliation; financing of SSP activities; We will use the set of all possible identifiers of IS personnel of the reporting entity having permission and (Information about the Subject) tuples, which can be used to access to SS; the number of material carriers of classified display information about SRSA and use it in the process of information; implementation and ordering (scientific and/or detecting and assessing the consequences in case of loss of scientific and technical support) of secret research, SS [19, 20]: development, design, and other scientific works, manufacturing of secret products; regime premises, objects of information activity; facts of losses of MCCI or disclosure 𝐈𝐒 = 𝐈𝐒 = {𝐈𝐒 , 𝐈𝐒 , … , 𝐈𝐒 }, (1) of information constituting a state secret, as well as classified information about foreign states, international where 𝐈𝐒 ⊆ 𝐈𝐒 (𝜑 = 1, 𝑧) is the identifier of the tuple organizations and international cooperation [16–18]. of parameters characterizing the φth SRSA. Therefore, the generalization and presentation of these For example, at 𝑧 = 4 (1) will have the form [15]: parameters by a tuple model is an urgent scientific goal, which allows solving the scientific and practical tasks of 𝐈𝐒 = 𝐈𝐒 = {𝐈𝐒 , 𝐈𝐒 , 𝐈𝐒 , 𝐈𝐒 } = 𝐈𝐒 , 𝐈𝐒 , 𝐈𝐒 , 𝐈𝐒 І , where 𝐈𝐒 = 𝐈𝐒 , 𝐈𝐒 = 𝐈𝐒 , 𝐈𝐒 = 𝐈𝐒 , 𝐈𝐒 = 𝐈𝐒 І For example, according to the Generalized Report and is respectively, the identifiers of the tuples of the SRSAs the Report [5] at 𝑘 = 9 the tuple (2) we define as: National Aviation University (NAU), Zhytomyr Military Institute named after S. P. Koroliov (ZMI), National 𝐈𝐒 = 〈𝐈𝐒 , 𝐈𝐒 , … , 𝐈𝐒 〉, Academy of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU), Sumsk where, for example, subtuple 𝐈𝐒 is section 1 Investigator’s Isolator (SIІ). (“Information about SRSA, it is subordination and For the φth SRSA, the tuple of parameters that departmental affiliation”), and other components are characterizes it has the following form: indicated in Table 1. Let’s divide the components 𝐈𝐒𝝋 of Table 1 by types of 𝐈𝐒 = 〈𝐈𝐒 , 𝐈𝐒 , … , 𝐈𝐒 , … , 𝐈𝐒 〉, (2) parameters primary, internal, and secondary. The first where 𝐈𝐒 ⊆ 𝐈𝐒 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑘 ) is the component of the group of (primary) and the second group of (internal) tuple, which is a sub-tuple, maps the ith identifier to the φth parameters are discussed in detail in scientific papers SRSA parameter, and k is the maximum number of such [14, 15], and therefore we will describe the following third 𝝋 𝝋 parameters. Significantly, all members 𝐈𝐒 are characterized group of secondary parameters 𝐈𝐒𝟓 . . 𝐈𝐒𝟗 to complete the by order property. development of a model for the formation of a database of parameters for evaluating the state of provision of SSP. 2 Table 1 An example of the description of components 𝐈𝐒 Type of parameters 𝐈𝐒 Symbolic designation Description of 𝐈𝐒 Primary 𝐈𝐒 Section I Information about the reporting entity, its subordination, and departmental affiliation 56,067 𝐈𝐒 Section II Information about RSO, financing of activities for SSP Internal 𝐈𝐒 Section III Information on whether employees of the reporting entity have permission and access to state secrets 54,636 𝐈𝐒 Section IV Information on the number of material carriers of classified information (MCCI) Secondary 𝐈𝐒 Section V Information on the implementation (scientific and/or scientific and technical support) of secret research, development, design, and other scientific works, the manufacture of secret products 56,010 𝐈𝐒 Section V(A) Information regarding the orders (scientific and/or scientific and technical support) of secret research, development, design, and other scientific works, the manufacture of secret products 56,532 𝐈𝐒 Section VI Information about regime premises, objects of information activity 54,775 𝐈𝐒 Section VII Information about the facts of losses of the MCCI or the disclosure of information constituting a state secret, as well as information with limited access to foreign states or international organizations 50,066 𝐈𝐒 Section VIII Information about international cooperation Primary 𝐈𝐒 Section I Information about the reporting entity, its subordination, and departmental affiliation 53,709 𝐈𝐒 Section II Information about RSO, financing of activities for SSP The fifth component of the sub-tuple 𝐈𝐒 is Section 5 𝐈𝐒 = 〈𝐈𝐒 . , 𝐈𝐒 . , … , 𝐈𝐒 . , … , 𝐈𝐒 . 〉, (3) (“Information on the implementation (scientific and/or where 𝐈𝐒 . ⊆ 𝐈𝐒 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑦) is the component of subtuple that scientific and technical support) of secret research, displays the ith identifier of the parameters of the φth SRSA development, design, and other scientific works, the (organization), and 𝑦 is their quantity. manufacture of secret products”) is filled in by the SRSA For example, according to [5], 𝑦 = 10 (𝑖 = 1,10) the (institutions) that are contractors of works and products as formula (3) can be represented as follows: of the end of the reporting period by filling in the appropriate columns (parameters): 𝐈𝐒 = 〈𝐈𝐒 . , 𝐈𝐒 . , … , 𝐈𝐒 . 〉 = 〈𝐍 , 𝐒𝐒 , 𝐭𝐖 , 𝐒𝐖 , 𝐧𝐒𝐖 , 𝐩𝐒𝐖 , 𝐭𝐏 , 𝐒𝐏 , 𝐧𝐒𝐏 , 𝐩𝐒𝐏 〉, where 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐍 (Name) is the set “Actual and 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐭𝐏 is the set Total products (the sum of graphs conditional (if available) name of the reporting entity”; 16–21); 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐒𝐒 is the set Secrecy Classification; 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐒𝐏 is the set Including products under the state 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐭𝐖 is the set Total works (the sum of graphs defense order; 6–13); 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐒𝐏 is the set Number of secret products; 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐒𝐖 is the set Including works under the state 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐩𝐒𝐏 is the set Number of component parts of defense order; secret products. 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐒𝐖 is the set Number of secret SRW, RDW, For example, to assign specific values to the next ten projects, and other scientific works; parameters of the fifth component 𝐈𝐒 ⊆ 𝐈𝐒 let us use SRSA 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐩𝐒𝐖 is the set Number of component parts of 𝐈𝐒 = 𝐈𝐒 [5, 14, 15, 19, 20]: secret SRW, RDW, project, and other scientific works; 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐍 = 𝑁 = 𝑁 ,𝑁 ,…,𝑁 , (4) where 𝑁 ⊆ 𝐍 (𝑖 = 1, ℎ ) is the ith valid name and names (for example, at 𝜑 = 1, 𝑦 = ℎ , ℎ = 1) then(4) conditional name of φth SRSA, and ℎ is the number of these acquires the form [14]: 𝐍 = 𝑁 = 𝑁 = {“NAU”}. 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐒𝐒 = 𝑆𝑆 = 𝑆𝑆 , 𝑆𝑆 , … , 𝑆𝑆 , (5) where 𝑆𝑆 ⊆ 𝐒𝐒 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑘 ) is ith identifier of the According to the Law of Ukraine “On State Secrets” [4] number of secrecy classifications, and 𝑘 is their quantity. and taking into account [5] the MCSI and the information constituting state secrets have such secrecy classifications 3 as: “secret” (S), “top secret” (ТS) and “of special importance” (SI), that’s why at 𝑦 = 𝑘 , 𝑘 = 3 the formula (5) has the form: 𝐒𝐒 = 𝑆𝑆 = 𝑆𝑆 , 𝑆𝑆 , 𝑆𝑆 = {“S”, “TS”, “SI”}. 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐭𝐖 = 𝑡𝑊 . = 𝑡𝑊 . , … , … , … , 𝑡𝑊 . , … , … , … , 𝑡𝑊 . , (6) where 𝑡𝑊 . ⊆ 𝐭𝐖 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑦 , 𝑗 = 1, 𝑦 ) is іth identifier specific secrecy classification (for example, at 𝜑 = 1 for of the number of total works (the sum of graphs 6–13), and 𝑦 = 2 (𝑖 = 1,2), 𝑦 = 1 (𝑗 = 1), then (6) will acquire the 𝑦 is their number according to 𝑦 , that is, according to a form: 𝐭𝐖 = 𝑡𝑊 . = 𝑡𝑊 . , 𝑡𝑊 . = {“30”}, {“15”} , therefore, works in total at the NAU by secrecy classification: “secret”—30, “top secret”—15: 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐒𝐖 = 𝑆𝑊 . = 𝑆𝑊 . , … , … , … , 𝑆𝑊 . , … , … , … , 𝑆𝑊 . , (7) where 𝑆𝑊 . = 𝐒𝐖 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑦 , 𝑗 = 1, 𝑦 ) is іth identifier classification of secrecy (for example, at 𝜑 = 1 for 𝑦 = of the number of works including the state defense order, 2 (𝑖 = 1,2), 𝑦 = 1 (𝑗 = 1), then (7) will acquire the form: and 𝑦 is their quantity for 𝑦 , that is, according to the actual 𝐒𝐖 = 𝑆𝑊 . = 𝑆𝑊 . , 𝑆𝑊 . = {“30”}, {“15”} , i.e. the NAU performs the works, including the state defense order, with the secrecy classification “secret”—30, “top secret”—15). 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐒𝐖 = 𝑛𝑆𝑊 . = 𝑛𝑆𝑊 . , … , … , … , 𝑛𝑆𝑊 . , … , … , … , 𝑛𝑆𝑊 . , (8) where 𝑛𝑆𝑊 . = 𝐧𝐒𝐖 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑦 , 𝑗 = 1, 𝑦 ) is jth according to the specific ith secrecy classification (for example, identifier of the number of secret SRW, RDW, design, and other taking into account [5], at 𝜑 = 1 for 𝑦 = 2 (𝑖 = 1,2), 𝑦 = scientific works, and 𝑦 is their number for each 𝑦 , that is, 4 (𝑗 = 1,4), then (8) will be as: 𝐧𝐒𝐖 = 𝑛𝑆𝑊 . = = 𝑛𝑆𝑊 . , 𝑛𝑆𝑊 . , 𝑛𝑆𝑊 . , 𝑛𝑆𝑊 . , 𝑛𝑆𝑊 . , 𝑛𝑆𝑊 . , 𝑛𝑆𝑊 . , 𝑛𝑆𝑊 . = = {“10”, “2”, “1”, “6”}, {“5”, “2”, “1”, “3”} , i.e. at the NAU the number of secret scientific research performed in the reporting period—1; the implementation of work (SRW), research and development work (RDW), which as of the end of the reporting period continues—6; design, and other scientific works with the secrecy 2) “top secret”: completed in the reporting period—5; classification: terminated in the reporting period—2; which were not 1) “secret”: completed in the reporting period—10; performed in the reporting period—2; the implementation of terminated in the reporting period—2; which were not which at the end of the reporting period continues—1). 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐩𝐒𝐖 = 𝑝𝑆𝑊 . = (9) = 𝑝𝑆𝑊 . , … , … , … , 𝑝𝑆𝑊 . , … , … , … , 𝑝𝑆𝑊 . , 4 where 𝑝𝑆𝑊 . = 𝐩𝐒𝐖 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑦 , 𝑗 = 1, 𝑦 ) is jth identifier secrecy classification (for example, considering [5], at 𝜑 = 1 of the number of components of secret SRW, RDW, design, and for 𝑦 = 2 (𝑖 = 1,2), 𝑦 = 4 (𝑗 = 1,4), then (9) will be as other scientific works with the secrecy classification, аnd 𝑦 is follows: their number for each 𝑦 , that is, according to the specific ith 𝐩𝐒𝐖 = 𝑝𝑆𝑊 . = = 𝑝𝑆𝑊 . , 𝑝𝑆𝑊 . , 𝑝𝑆𝑊 . , 𝑝𝑆𝑊 . , 𝑝𝑆𝑊 . , 𝑝𝑆𝑊 . , 𝑝𝑆𝑊 . , 𝑝𝑆𝑊 . = = {“5”, “2”, “1”, “3”}, {“2”, “1”, “1”, “1”} , i.e. at the NAU, components of secret SRW, RDW, design, 2) “top secret”: completed in the reporting period—2; and other scientific works with the secrecy classification: terminated in the reporting period—1; which were not 1) “secret”: completed in the reporting period—5; performed in the reporting period—1; the implementation of terminated in the reporting period—2; which was not which continues as of the end of the reporting period—1. performed in the reporting period—2; the execution of which continues as of the end of the reporting period—1; 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐭𝐏 = 𝑡𝑃 . = 𝑡𝑃 . , … , … , … , 𝑡𝑃 . , … , … , … , 𝑡𝑃 . , (10) where 𝑡𝑃 . = 𝐭𝐏 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑦 , 𝑗 = 1, 𝑦 ) is jth identifier of specific secrecy classification) at 𝜑 = 1 for 𝑦 = 2 (𝑖 = the total number of products (the sum of graphs 16–21), and 1,2), 𝑦 = 1 (𝑗 = 1), then (10) acquires the form: y7 is their number (for example, taking into account the 𝐭𝐏 = 𝑡𝑃 . = 𝑡𝑃 . , 𝑡𝑃 . = {“10”}, {“5”} . Therefore, at the NAU products in total with the secrecy classification “secret”—10, “top secret”—5. 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐒𝐏 = 𝑆𝑃 . = 𝑆𝑃 . , … , … , … , 𝑆𝑃 . , … , … , … , 𝑆𝑃 . , (11) where 𝑆𝑃 . = 𝐒𝐏 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑦 , 𝑗 = 1, 𝑦 ) is іth identifier specific secrecy classification (for example, at 𝜑 = 1 for of the number of products, including the state defense order, 𝑦 = 2 (𝑖 = 1,2), 𝑦 = 1 (𝑗 = 1), then (11) will have the and 𝑦 is their number for 𝑦 , that is, according to the form: 𝐒𝐏 = 𝑆𝑃 . = 𝑆𝑃 . , 𝑆𝑃 . = {“10”}, {“5”} . Therefore, at the NAU the number of products, including products by state defense ordering with secrecy classification: “secret”—10, “top secret”—5). 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐒𝐏 = 𝑛𝑆𝑃 . = 𝑛𝑆𝑃 . , … , … , … , 𝑛𝑆𝑃 . , … , … , … , 𝑛𝑆𝑃 . , (12) where 𝑛𝑆𝑃 . = 𝐧𝐒𝐏 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑦 , 𝑗 = 1, 𝑦 ) is jth identifier each 𝑦 , that is, according to the specific ith secrecy of the number of secret products, аnd 𝑦 is their number for classification (for example considering [10], at 𝜑 = 1 for 𝑦 = 2 (𝑖 = 1,2), 𝑦 = 3 (𝑗 = 1,3) then (12) will be as follows: 𝐧𝐒𝐏 = 𝑛𝑆𝑃 . = = 𝑛𝑆𝑃 . , 𝑛𝑆𝑃 . , 𝑛𝑆𝑃 . , , 𝑛𝑆𝑃 . , 𝑛𝑆𝑃 . , 𝑛𝑆𝑃 . = {“4”, “1”, “1”}, {“1”, “1”, “1”} , i.e. at the NAU, the number of secret products with the 1) “secret”: manufactured in the reporting period—4; secrecy classification: which were not produced in the reporting period—1; the 5 production of which continues as of the end of the reporting production of which continues as of the end of the reporting period—1; period—1. 2) “top secret”: produced in the reporting period—1; which were not produced in the reporting period—1; the 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐩𝐒𝐏 = 𝑝𝑆𝑃 . = 𝑝𝑆𝑃 . , … , … , … , 𝑝𝑆𝑃 . , … , … , … , 𝑝𝑆𝑃 . , (13) where 𝑝𝑆𝑃 . = 𝐩𝐒𝐏 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑦 , 𝑗 = 1, 𝑦 ) is jth specific ith secrecy classification (for example, considering identifier of the number of components of secret products, [5], at 𝜑 = 1 for 𝑦 = 2 (𝑖 = 1,2), 𝑦 = 3 (𝑗 = 1,3), then and 𝑦 is their number for each 𝑦 , that is, according to the (13) will be as follows: 𝐩𝐒𝐏 = 𝑝𝑆𝑃 . = = 𝑝𝑆𝑃 . , 𝑝𝑆𝑃 . , 𝑝𝑆𝑃 . , 𝑝𝑆𝑃 . , 𝑝𝑆𝑃 . , 𝑝𝑆𝑃 . = {“2”, “1”, “1”}, {“1”, “0”, “1”} , i.e. at the NAU the number of components of secret of works and products as of the end of the reporting period products with secrecy classification: by filling in the corresponding columns (parameters). 1) “secret”: manufactured in the reporting period—2; Subtuple 𝐈𝐒 should be 𝐈𝐒 ⊆ 𝐈𝐒 in case SRSA which were not manufactured in the reporting period—1; (institution) is the customer and not the contractor of works the manufacture of which as of the end of the reporting and products. period continues—1; Then filling in the parameters of the subtuple 𝐈𝐒 is 2) “top secret”: manufactured in the reporting period— identical to the parameters of the subtuple 𝐈𝐒 as 𝐈𝐒 = 𝐈𝐒 1; which were not manufactured in the reporting period—0; or otherwise 𝐈𝐒 ∉ 𝐈𝐒 and there is only the presence of the manufacture of which continued at the end of the reporting period—1. subtuple 𝐈𝐒 according to formula (3), that is, SRSA The sixth component of the subtuple 𝐈𝐒 is Section (institution) is the contractor, not the customer of works and V (a) (“Information about ordering (scientific and/or products. scientific and technical support) of secret scientific The Seventh Component of the Subtitle 𝐈𝐒 is research, research and development, design and other Section VI (“Information about Premises, Objects of scientific works, production of secret products”) is Information Activity”) is completed by the SRSA completed by the SRSA (institutions) that are the customers (institution) as of the end of the reporting period by filling in the corresponding columns (parameters): 𝐈𝐒 = 〈𝐈𝐒 . , 𝐈𝐒 . , … , 𝐈𝐒 . , … , 𝐈𝐒 . 〉, (14) where 𝐈𝐒 . ⊆ 𝐈𝐒 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑟 ) is the component of the For example,, according to [10], at 𝑟 = 5 (𝑖 = 1,5) the subtuple that displays ith identifier of the parameters of φth equation (14) can be represented as follows: SRSA (institution), and 𝑟 is their number. 𝐈𝐒 = 〈𝐈𝐒 . , 𝐈𝐒 . , … , 𝐈𝐒 . 〉 = 〈𝐍 , 𝐒𝐒 , 𝐧𝐑𝐑 , 𝐧𝐂𝐎 , 𝐧𝐂𝐒 〉, where 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐍 (Name) is the set “Actual and 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐂𝐒 is the set Number of certified information conditional (if available) name of the reporting entity”. and telecommunication systems suitable for the circulation of 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐒𝐒 is the set “Secrecy classification” (or classified information. “the highest secrecy classification”). For example, to assign specific values to the following 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐑𝐑 is the set “Number of regime rooms”. five parameters of the seventh component 𝐈𝐒 ⊆ 𝐈𝐒 let us 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐂𝐎 is the set Number of certified objects of use SRSA 𝐈𝐒 = 𝐈𝐒 [5, 14, 15, 19, 20]: information activity, suitable for the circulation of linguistic 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐍 , secret information. at 𝜑 = 1, 𝑟 = ℎ , ℎ = 1 that is according to formula (4) [14, 15]: 𝐍 = 𝑁 = 𝑁 = {“NAU”}. 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐒𝐒 , at 𝜑 = 1, 𝑟 = 𝑘 , 𝑘 = 3 that is according to formula (5): 𝐒𝐒 = 𝑆𝑆 = 𝑆𝑆 , 𝑆𝑆 , 𝑆𝑆 = {“S”, “TS”, “SI”}. 6 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐑𝐑 = 𝑛𝑅𝑅 . = 𝑛𝑅𝑅 . , … , … , … , 𝑛𝑅𝑅 . , … , … , … , 𝑛𝑅𝑅 . , (15) where 𝑛𝑅𝑅 . = 𝐧𝐑𝐑 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑟 , 𝑗 = 1, 𝑟 ) is jth classification (for example, taking into account [10], at 𝜑 = identifier of the number of regime premises, and 𝑟 is their 1 for 𝑟 = 2 (𝑖 = 1,2), 𝑟 = 2 (𝑗 = 1,2) then (15) will be as number for each 𝑟 , that is, according to a specific ith secrecy follows: 𝐧𝐑𝐑 = 𝑛𝑅𝑅 . = 𝑛𝑅𝑅 . , 𝑛𝑅𝑅 . , 𝑛𝑅𝑅 . , 𝑛𝑅𝑅 . = {“1”, “2”}, {“1”, “1”} , i.e. at the NAU, the number of regime premises with the 2) “top secret”: designated for storage of MCCI during secrecy classification: non-working hours—1; other regime premises—1. 1) “secret”: intended for the storage of MCCI during non-working hours—1; other regime premises—2; 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐂𝐎 = 𝑛𝐶𝑂 . = 𝑛𝐶𝑂 . , … , … , … , 𝑛𝐶𝑂 . , … , … , … , 𝑛𝐶𝑂 . , (16) where 𝑛𝐶𝑂 . = 𝐧𝐂𝐎 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑟 , 𝑗 = 1, 𝑟 ) is іth information, and 𝑟 is their number for 𝑟 , that is, according identifier of the number of certified objects of information to a specific ith secrecy classification (for example, taking activity, suitable for the circulation of linguistic secret into account at 𝜑 = 1 for 𝑟 = 2 (𝑖 = 1,2), 𝑟 = 1 (𝑗 = 1) then (16) will acquire the form: 𝐧𝐂𝐎 = 𝑛𝐶𝑂 . = 𝑛𝐶𝑂 . , 𝑛𝐶𝑂 . = {“1”}, {“1”} , i.e. at the NAU the number of certified objects of secret information by secrecy classification: “secret”—1, information activity suitable for the circulation of linguistic “top secret”—1. 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐂𝐒 = 𝑛𝐶𝑆 . = 𝑛𝐶𝑆 . , … , … , … , 𝑛𝐶𝑆 . , … , … , … , 𝑛𝐶𝑆 . , (17) where 𝑛𝐶𝑆 . = 𝐧𝐂𝐒 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑟 , 𝑗 = 1, 𝑟 ) is jth is, by a specific ith secrecy classification (for example, taking identifier of the number of certified information and into account [5], at 𝜑 = 1 for 𝑟 = 2 (𝑖 = 1,2), 𝑟 = 4 (𝑗 = telecommunication systems, suitable for circulation of 1,4) then (17) will be as follows: secret information, and 𝑟 is their number for each 𝑟 , that 𝐧𝐂𝐒 = 𝑛𝐶𝑆 . = = 𝑛𝐶𝑆 . , 𝑛𝐶𝑆 . , 𝑛𝐶𝑆 . , 𝑛𝐶𝑆 . , 𝑛𝐶𝑆 . , 𝑛𝐶𝑆 . , 𝑛𝐶𝑆 . , 𝑛𝐶𝑆 . = = {“1”, “2”, “1”, “1”}, {“0”, “0”, “1”, “1”} , i. e. at the NAU the number of certified information, telecommunication systems—1; number of long-distance/local telecommunication, and information-telecommunication government communication subscriber installations—1. systems, suitable for the circulation of secret information The eighth component of the subtuple 𝐈𝐒 is with the secrecy classification: Section VII (“Information on the facts of the losses of 1) “secret”: local computing networks—1; PCs (including MCCI or the disclosure of state secrets, as well as local computing networks)—2; other information, information with restricted access of foreign states or telecommunication, information-telecommunication international organizations”) is completed by the SRSA systems—1; the number of subscriber installations of long- (institutions) as of the end of the reporting period by filling distance/city government communications—1; in the relevant graphs (parameters): 2) “top secret”: local computing networks—0; PC (including local computing networks)—0; other information and 𝐈𝐒 = 〈𝐈𝐒 . , 𝐈𝐒 . , … , 𝐈𝐒 . , … , 𝐈𝐒 . 〉, (18) where 𝐈𝐒 . ⊆ 𝐈𝐒 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑤) is the component of the For example, respectively [5], 𝑤 = 4 (𝑖 = 1,5) formula subtuple that displays ith identifier of parameters of φth SRSA (18) can be represented as follows: (institution), and w is their quantity. 7 𝐈𝐒 = 〈𝐈𝐒 . , 𝐈𝐒 . , 𝐈𝐒 . , 𝐈𝐒 . 〉 = 〈𝐍 , 𝐧𝐃 , 𝐧𝐋 , 𝐧𝐃𝐋 〉, where 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐍 (Name) is the set Actual and For example, to assign specific values to the next four conditional (if available) name of the reporting entity. parameters of the eighth component 𝐈𝐒 ⊆ 𝐈𝐒 let us use 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐃 is the set Number of facts of disclosure of SRSA 𝐈𝐒 = 𝐈𝐒 [5, 14, 15, 19, 20]: information constituting a state secret. 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐍 , 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐋 is the set Number of facts of loss of MCCI. at 𝜑 = 1, 𝑤 = ℎ , ℎ = 1 that is according to formula 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐃𝐋 is the set Number of facts of disclosure of (4) [14, 15]: information with limited access to foreign states or international organizations and Losses of its MCCI. 𝐍 = 𝑁 = 𝑁 = {“NAU”}. 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐃 = 𝑛𝐷 = 𝑛𝐷 , 𝑛𝐷 , … , 𝑛𝐷 , (19) where 𝑛𝐷 ⊆ 𝐧𝐃 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑤 ) is ith identifier of the number of facts of disclosure of information constituting a state 𝐧𝐃 = 𝑛𝐷 = 𝑛𝐷 = {“0”}, secret, and 𝑤 is their quantity (for example, at 𝜑 = 1, 𝑤 = i.e. at the NAU the number of facts of disclosure of 1 (𝑖 == 1) then (19) will be as follows: information constituting a state secret—0. 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐋 = 𝑛𝐿 = 𝑛𝐿 , 𝑛𝐿 , … , 𝑛𝐿 , (20) where 𝑛𝐿 ⊆ 𝐧𝐋 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑤 ) is ith identifier of the number of facts of losses of MCSI, 𝑤 is their quantity (for 𝐧𝐋 = 𝑛𝐿 = 𝑛𝐿 = {“1”}. example, at 𝜑 = 1, 𝑤 = 1 (𝑖 = 1) then (20) will be as That is the number of losses of MCSI—1. follows: 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐃𝐋 = 𝑛𝐷𝐿 = 𝑛𝐷𝐿 , 𝑛𝐷𝐿 , … , 𝑛𝐷𝐿 , (21) where 𝑛𝐷𝐿 ⊆ 𝐧𝐃𝐋 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑤 ) is ith identifier of the RDW, design, and other scientific works with the following number of facts of disclosure of information with limited secrecy classifications: access of foreign states or international organizations and 1) “secret”: completed in the reporting period—5; losses of its MCSI, and 𝑤 is their quantity (for example, at terminated in the reporting period—2; which was not 𝜑 = 1, 𝑤 = 1 (𝑖 = 1) then (21) will be as follows: performed in the reporting period—2; the execution of which continues as of the end of the reporting period—1. 𝐧𝐃𝐋 = 𝑛𝐷𝐿 = 𝑛𝐷𝐿 = {“0”}, 2) “top secret”: completed in the reporting period—2; terminated in the reporting period—1; which were not i.e., at the NAU, the number of facts of disclosure of performed in the reporting period—1; the implementation of information with limited access to foreign states or which continues as of the end of the reporting period—1. international organizations and losses of its MNI—1. “Information about regime premises, objects of The ninth component of subtuple 𝐈𝐒 is Section VІ, information activity” is completed by the SRSA i.e. the NAU carried out work on components of secret SRW, (institution) as of the end of the reporting period by filling in the corresponding columns (parameters): 𝐈𝐒 = 〈𝐈𝐒 . , 𝐈𝐒 . , … , 𝐈𝐒 . , … , 𝐈𝐒 . 〉, (22) where 𝐈𝐒 . ⊆ 𝐈𝐒 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑒) is the component of For example, accordingly [5], 𝑒 = 5 (𝑖 = 1,5) the formula subtuple that displays ith identifier of parameters of φth SRSA (22) can be represented as follows: (organizations), and 𝑒 is their quantity. 𝐈𝐒 = 〈𝐈𝐒 . , 𝐈𝐒 . , … , 𝐈𝐒 . 〉 = 〈𝐍 , 𝐧𝐑𝐃 , 𝐧𝐃𝐑 , 𝐧𝐅𝐀 , 𝐧𝐅𝐓 〉, where 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐍 (Name) is the set “Actual and 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐑𝐃 is the set Number of premises visited by conditional (if available) name of the reporting entity”. delegations of foreign states and international organizations, as well as by foreigners and stateless persons. 8 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐃𝐑 is the set Number of Delegations of foreign For example, to assign specific values to the next five countries and international organizations received. parameters of the ninth component 𝐈𝐒 ⊆ 𝐈𝐒 let us use 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐅𝐀 is the set Number of Foreign Advisers who SRSA 𝐈𝐒 = 𝐈𝐒 [5, 14, 15, 19, 20]: are at the SRSA. 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐍 , 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐅𝐓 is the set Number of foreign business trips. at 𝜑 = 1, 𝑒 = ℎ , ℎ = 1 that is according to the formula (4) [14, 15]: 𝐍 = 𝑁 = 𝑁 = {“NAU”}. 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐑𝐃 = 𝑛𝑅𝐷 = 𝑛𝑅𝐷 , 𝑛𝑅𝐷 , … , 𝑛𝑅𝐷 , (23) where 𝑛𝑅𝐷 ⊆ 𝐧𝐑𝐃 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑒 ) is ith identifier of the 𝐧𝐑𝐃 = ⋃ 𝑛𝑅𝐷 = 𝑛𝑅𝐷 = {“5”}, number of premises visited by delegations of foreign states and i.e. at the NAU, the number of premises visited by delegations international organizations, as well as by foreigners and of foreign states and international organizations, as well as by stateless persons, and 𝑒 is their quantity (for example, at 𝜑 = foreigners and stateless persons is 5. 1, 𝑒 = 1 (𝑖 = 1) then (23) will be as: 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐃𝐑 = 𝑛𝐷𝑅 = 𝑛𝐷𝑅 , 𝑛𝐷𝑅 , … , 𝑛𝐷𝑅 , (24) where 𝑛𝐷𝑅 ⊆ 𝐧𝐃𝐑 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑒 ) is ith identifier of the number of delegations of foreign states and international 𝐧𝐃𝐑 = 𝑛𝐷𝑅 = 𝑛𝐷𝑅 = {“8”}, organizations received, and 𝑒 is their quantity (for i.e. the number of delegations of foreign states and example, at 𝜑 = 1, 𝑒 = 1 (𝑖 = 1) then (24) will be as: international organizations received at the NAU is 8. 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐅𝐀 = 𝑛𝐹𝐴 = 𝑛𝐹𝐴 , 𝑛𝐹𝐴 , … , 𝑛𝐹𝐴 , (25) where 𝑛𝐹𝐴 ⊆ 𝐧𝐅𝐀 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑒 ) is ith identifier of the number of foreign advisers which are on the SRSA, and 𝑒 is 𝐧𝐅𝐀 = 𝑛𝐹𝐴 = 𝑛𝐹𝐴 = {“0”}, their quantity (for example, at 𝜑 = 1, 𝑒 = 1 (𝑖 = 1) then that is at the NAU the number of foreign advisers which are (25) will be as follows: on the SRSA is 0. 𝐈𝐒 . = 𝐧𝐅𝐓 = 𝑛𝐹𝑇 = 𝑛𝐹𝑇 , 𝑛𝐹𝑇 , … , 𝑛𝐹𝑇 , (26) where 𝑛𝐹𝑇 ⊆ 𝐧𝐅𝐓 (𝑖 = 1, 𝑒 ) is ith identifier of the i.e. at the NAU the number of foreign trips is 12. number of foreign trips, and 𝑒 is their quantity (for The general hierarchical structure of the developed example, at 𝜑 = 1, 𝑒 = 1 (𝑖 = 1) then (26) will be as model (taking into account the above examples) is presented follows: in Fig. 1. 𝐧𝐅𝐓 = 𝑛𝐹𝑇 = 𝑛𝐹𝑇 = {“12”}, 9 Figure 1: Hierarchical structure of the tuple model of secondary parameter database formation 4. Conclusions [3] The National Council Will Check Several Channels Due to the Disclosure of State Secrets (2022). 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