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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Universal centralized secret data management for automated public cloud provisioning⋆</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Yevhenii Martseniuk</string-name>
          <email>yevhenii.v.martseniuk@lpnu.ua</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Andrii Partyka</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Oleh Harasymchuk</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Svitlana Shevchenko</string-name>
          <email>s.shevchenko@kubg.edu.ua</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Borys Grinchenko Kyiv Metropolitan University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>18/2 Bulvarno-Kudryavska str., 04053 Kyiv</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>CPITS-II 2024: Workshop on Cybersecurity Providing in Information and Telecommunication Systems II</institution>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff2">
          <label>2</label>
          <institution>Lviv Polytechnic National University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>12 Stepana Bandery str., 79013 Lviv</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <fpage>72</fpage>
      <lpage>81</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>In modern cloud environments, secret management plays a key role in ensuring the security of sensitive data, such as passwords, API keys, credentials, and other critical resources. This paper discusses the use of HashiCorp Vault as a universal platform for centralized secret management and automated provisioning of cloud resources. A comparison is also made with native secret management services, such as AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, and Google Cloud KMS, to determine their capabilities and limitations in providing security. The comparison shows that Vault offers more flexible and universal secret management thanks to advanced cryptographic methods and integration with automation platforms. The research demonstrates that Vault provides secure storage, dynamic creation, and automatic revocation of credentials, allowing access management based on security policies. The integration of HashiCorp Vault with automation platforms like Rundeck and Ansible enables the automation of cloud resource provisioning while maintaining information confidentiality and reducing the risk of human error. The use of dynamic creation methods for temporary credentials enhances security and compliance with standards, adhering to the principle of least privilege. The results highlight the importance of using HashiCorp Vault as a central platform for managing secrets and credentials, which improves the overall level of security and efficiency in cloud environments.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;HashiCorp Vault</kwd>
        <kwd>secrets</kwd>
        <kwd>automation</kwd>
        <kwd>data security</kwd>
        <kwd>dynamic credentials</kwd>
        <kwd>AWS</kwd>
        <kwd>authentication</kwd>
        <kwd>authorization</kwd>
        <kwd>cloud infrastructure</kwd>
        <kwd>centralized management 1</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>In the modern world of cloud computing, infrastructure is
becoming increasingly ephemeral (temporary) and elastic,
adapting to changing loads and needs. The dynamic nature
of IP addresses and the lack of a clear network perimeter
introduce new challenges in ensuring cybersecurity, as
traditional protection methods based on fixed network
boundaries become less effective. Consequently, modern
security systems are oriented towards the ‘Zero Trust’
principle, which assumes potential breaches within the
network, regardless of its boundaries [1, 2].</p>
      <p>
        The Zero Trust concept posits that no system or user
can be trusted by default; every access request must be
thoroughly verified, whether it originates from within the
organization’s internal network or externally [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]. This
approach requires more integrated security methods, where
access to systems and endpoints is controlled directly,
rather than relying on being within a privileged network.
This means that instead of using IP addresses as the sole unit
of access, each application or service is given a unique
identification, allowing it to work with the ephemeral and
elastic nature of cloud infrastructure [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ].
In the context of Zero Trust, effective secret management is
critically important for securing access to applications,
systems, and endpoints. Data must be properly protected
and not stored in plaintext, as this poses a significant risk of
unauthorized access [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ]. This necessitates centralized secret
management and the use of intermediary software for key
management and data encryption [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        A secret is considered any information that requires
strict access restrictions, such as API encryption keys,
passwords, certificates, or other credentials used for
authentication and authorization of access to resources [1].
In modern conditions, most web applications and various
services have already transitioned to a microservices
architecture or are actively undergoing this transition. This
is because microservices architecture enhances flexibility,
scalability, and independence in the development and
deployment of individual system components [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]. However,
instead of a single monolithic configuration file, there are
now numerous small configuration files (one or several per
microservice), which require secure storage of their
contents.
      </p>
      <p>
        Additionally, environment variables are often used for
configuring service parameters instead of traditional
configuration files. As a result, each service has its unique
0009-0009-2289-0968 (Y. Martseniuk);
0000-0003-3037-8373 (A. Partyka);
0000-0002-8742-8872 (O. Harasymchuk);
0000-0002-9736-8623 (S. Shevchenko)
© 2024 Copyright for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under
Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
settings for connecting to databases, external APIs, message
queues, caches, and other systems [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]. Moreover, other
parameters require secure storage, such as ‘salt’ (a modifier
used for password hashing) or keys for generating JWT tokens.
Thus, there is a significant number of entities that require
secure storage to prevent unauthorized access [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        This research aims to identify the optimal tool for
centralized secret management in cloud environments that
meets modern security requirements and ensures flexibility
and efficiency. The study includes an analysis of existing
native secret management services, such as AWS KMS,
Azure Key Vault, and Google Cloud KMS, to evaluate their
capabilities and limitations [1]. Additionally, the choice of
HashiCorp Vault as the best solution for secret management
is justified due to its ability to provide advanced
cryptographic methods, dynamic credential creation,
integration with various automation platforms, and support
for a universal approach to secret management in
heterogeneous cloud infrastructures [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ].
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Challenges and risks in public clouds and native services for their mitigation</title>
      <p>
        The rapid adoption of cloud computing has fundamentally
changed approaches to data storage and management. Due
to the high convenience, scalability, and flexibility offered
by public cloud services such as Amazon Web Services
(AWS), Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud Platform (GCP),
organizations are increasingly moving to cloud technologies
for deploying their operations and storing data. However,
these changes come with significant challenges related to
ensuring the security and privacy of information [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ].
Reliable secret storage solutions that include secure
management of keys, passwords, and other sensitive data
are critically important for protection against unauthorized
access and potential data breaches.
      </p>
      <p>
        By moving their data and applications to public cloud
infrastructures, organizations face some security challenges
inherent to cloud environments. Cloud environments, by
nature, involve storing data on remote servers managed by
third parties. This setup creates potential vulnerabilities, as
sensitive information, such as encryption keys, passwords,
and certificates, must be securely managed and protected
from unauthorized access [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ]. The lack of effective secret
management solutions significantly increases the risks of data
leaks, unauthorized access, and insider threats [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ].
Therefore, the implementation of advanced cryptographic
methods for protecting secrets in the cloud and ensuring data
security is especially important [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>2.1. Main security challenges and risks in public clouds</title>
        <p>Vulnerability to Unauthorized Access: The use
of cloud services requires storing keys, passwords,
and certificates in a secure environment. However,
cloud environments themselves can be targets of
attacks, making effective secret management
critically important to prevent unauthorized
access. Even if data is intercepted, advanced
cryptographic methods, such as encryption using
2.
3.
4.</p>
        <p>
          robust algorithms, ensure that without the
appropriate decryption keys, the data remains
inaccessible [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>Insider Threats: Insider threats pose a significant
risk to cloud environments. Employees or
contractors with access to sensitive data may
intentionally or unintentionally compromise
security. Threshold cryptography methods and
distributed key management help mitigate this
risk by ensuring that no individual has complete
access to the secret key, thus limiting the potential
for malicious use of the data.</p>
        <p>Ensuring Data Integrity and Confidentiality:
Data integrity and confidentiality are the most
important aspects of security in cloud
environments. Advanced encryption methods,
such as DNA-based encryption or hybrid
cryptography, provide robust mechanisms to
protect against tampering, and unauthorized
access and ensure that only authorized users can
decrypt the data.</p>
        <p>Scalability and Performance: Scalability is a key
advantage of cloud computing, but it also creates
security challenges. Decentralized encryption and
other scalable cryptographic solutions enable cloud
environments to handle large volumes of data
efficiently without compromising security. They
provide effective key management, prevent data
duplication, and enhance the overall performance of
systems.</p>
        <p>
          Regulatory Compliance and Building Trust:
Implementing reliable secret storage solutions
helps organizations not only protect their data but
also build trust with their clients and ensure
compliance with regulatory requirements, such as
GDPR and HIPAA. This is achieved by
demonstrating a commitment to data security and
using advanced protection methods [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
          ].
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Native services for secure secret management</title>
      <p>To address these issues, public cloud providers like AWS,
Azure, and GCP offer their own built-in secret management
services:</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>3.1. AWS key management service</title>
        <p>AWS Key Management Service (KMS) provides
centralized control over cryptographic keys used to protect
data stored within AWS infrastructure. This service is
closely integrated with other AWS cloud services, allowing
automatic encryption of data within those services and
managing access to the keys needed for decryption.
Integration with AWS CloudTrail enables auditing of key
operations, providing detailed information about who used
specific keys, on which resources, and when.</p>
        <p>
          AWS KMS also simplifies the process for developers to
add encryption or digital signing capabilities to their
software, either directly or through the use of AWS SDK,
which supports AWS Encryption SDK as the key provider
for encrypting and decrypting data locally in applications.
The service allows the effective management of the lifecycle
and permissions of keys, including the ability to create new
keys at any time and manage their permissions separately
from the rights to use them [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
          ]. Users can choose between
keys generated in AWS KMS or other options, such as
importing keys from their key management infrastructure,
using keys stored in an AWS CloudHSM cluster, or keys
from an external key manager outside of AWS. AWS KMS
also supports the automatic rotation of root keys once a year
without the need to re-encrypt previously encrypted data,
ensuring their long-term security. The service retains old
versions of keys, making them available for decrypting
previously encrypted data. Key management is performed
through the AWS console, AWS SDK, or AWS Command
Line Interface (CLI).
        </p>
        <p>Security and Compliance: AWS KMS is designed so
that even AWS employees do not have access to your
plaintext keys. This is achieved through the use of
Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) that are validated
against the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)
140-2 of the U.S. National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST). The FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module
Validation Program ensures that HSMs provide robust
protection for the confidentiality and integrity of keys.</p>
        <p>
          The HSMs used in AWS KMS serve as the cryptographic
root of trust and create a secure hardware environment for
performing all cryptographic operations within KMS. All
key material for KMS keys is generated in AWS KMS HSMs,
and all operations requiring access to plaintext keys are
strictly performed within the HSMs, in compliance with
FIPS 140-2 Level 3 security requirements [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>Updates to the HSM firmware in AWS KMS are controlled
by multi-party access management and are reviewed by
independent expert groups at Amazon. All firmware changes
are sent to an accredited NIST laboratory for verification of
compliance with FIPS 140-2 Level 3 security standards. Your
plaintext keys are never written to disk and are only used in
the volatile memory of the HSM for the duration required to
perform the requested cryptographic operation. This applies
to cases where keys are created on user request, imported into
the service, or created in an AWS CloudHSM cluster using a
dedicated key storage function.</p>
        <p>Regulatory Compliance and Key Geographical
Control: AWS KMS allows users to choose whether to
create keys restricted to a single region or keys that can be
used across multiple regions. This is crucial for meeting
regulatory requirements regarding the storage and
processing of data within specific geographical boundaries.
Keys created for a single region are never transferred
outside of that region, ensuring data control within the
defined jurisdiction.</p>
        <p>
          The benefits of AWS KMS include flexibility in
choosing encryption methods, integration with other AWS
services, a high level of security through the use of certified
HSMs, and the ability to comply with various regulatory
standards, such as GDPR or HIPAA. This makes AWS KMS
a powerful tool for ensuring data security and privacy in
cloud environments [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
          ].

        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>3.2. Azure key vault: A native service for secure secrets management</title>
        <p>
          Azure Key Vault is a cloud service from Microsoft
designed for the secure storage of secrets and access
management. Secrets are considered data that require strict
access control, such as API keys, passwords, and
cryptographic keys. Azure Key Vault supports two types of
containers: general vaults and managed Hardware Security
Module (HSM) pools. Vaults are used for storing software
keys, secrets, and certificates with support for Hardware
Security Modules (HSMs), while HSM pools are exclusively
designed for storing keys protected by HSM hardware [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>To ensure secure data transmission between Azure Key
Vault and clients, the service uses the Transport Layer
Security (TLS) protocol. TLS ensures reliable authentication,
message confidentiality, data integrity, and detection of
unauthorized alterations, interceptions, or message
forgeries. Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) further secures
connections between clients and Microsoft’s cloud services
by using unique keys, including 2048-bit RSA encryption
keys. This configuration significantly complicates the
interception and access to data during its transmission.</p>
        <p>Access to Azure Key Vault is managed through two
interaction planes: the management plane and the data
plane.</p>
        <p>Management Plane: This plane is used for
administering Key Vault, including creating and
deleting key vaults, retrieving their properties, and
configuring access policies.</p>
        <p>Data Plane: This plane is intended for working
with the data stored in the vaults. It allows adding,
deleting, and modifying keys, secrets, and
certificates.</p>
        <p>Authentication in both planes is handled using the
Microsoft Entra ID. The management plane employs
Azure Role-Based Access Control (Azure RBAC), while the
data plane uses Key Vault access policies alongside Azure
RBAC to manage operations within the vault.</p>
        <p>
          Access to either plane of Azure Key Vault requires
proper authentication and authorization of all calling
entities (users or applications). The authentication process
identifies the requesting party, while authorization
determines the permissible operations for that entity. Azure
Key Vault uses Microsoft Entra ID to authenticate any
security principal that needs access to Azure resources [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
          ].
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-3">
        <title>3.3. Security principles and authentication mechanisms</title>
        <p>A security principal in Azure is an entity that represents a
user, group, service, or application that requires access to
resources. Each security principal in Azure is assigned a
unique object identifier. Types of security principals include:
User Security Principal: Represents an individual
user with a profile in Microsoft Entra ID.</p>
        <p>Group Security Principal: Represents a group of
users created in Microsoft Entra ID. Any roles or






permissions assigned to the group automatically
apply to all its members.</p>
        <p>Service Principal: Used to identify an application
or service (a piece of code), rather than a user or
group. The object identifier for a service principal
is called a client ID and serves a similar function to
a username. The client’s secret or certificate for a
service principal acts as the password.</p>
        <p>
          Many Azure services support the assignment of a
Managed Identity, which provides automatic management
of the client ID and certificate. This is the most secure and
recommended method of authentication in Azure, as it
reduces the risks associated with manual credential
management [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">19</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>Azure Key Vault is a key security component in the
Microsoft Azure ecosystem, providing reliable management
and storage of secrets. Its functionality enables
organizations to control access to critical data using
advanced authentication, authorization, and encryption
technologies that meet the highest security standards.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-4">
        <title>3.4. Google cloud key management service</title>
        <p>
          Google Cloud KMS (Key Management Service) is a cloud
service for centralized encryption key management provided
within the Google Cloud ecosystem. It allows businesses to
create, use, and manage cryptographic keys, as well as securely
perform cryptographic operations for other Google cloud
services. The primary purpose of Google Cloud KMS is to
enable organizations to control the process of data encryption
and key management within the cloud infrastructure [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">20</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>By default, all data stored in Google Cloud is
automatically encrypted. Using Google Cloud KMS, users
gain greater control over how their data is encrypted at rest
and how encryption keys are managed. This service
provides a high level of security and scalability, meeting the
needs of various industries and types of software. Google
Cloud KMS allows you to create and use keys for encrypting
data in cloud services and applications, ensuring their
protection both during storage and transmission.</p>
        <p>The Google Cloud KMS platform offers centralized
management of cryptographic keys for both direct use and
integration with other cloud resources and applications. It
supports various key sources for encryption:</p>
        <sec id="sec-3-4-1">
          <title>Cloud KMS Software Keys: Allow flexible data</title>
          <p>encryption using manageable symmetric or
asymmetric keys.</p>
          <p>Cloud Hardware Security Modules (HSMs):
Used for secure storage and processing keys in
environments with high security requirements.
Customer-Managed Encryption Keys
(CMEK): Provide the option to select and use keys
generated by Cloud KMS for other Google Cloud
services.</p>
          <p>Cloud External Key Manager (EKM): Allows
the use of external keys that are stored outside of
Google Cloud.</p>
          <p>
            Customer-Supplied Encryption Keys (CSEK):
Customers can use their encryption keys,
maintaining full control over these keys [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21">21</xref>
            ].
          </p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-5">
        <title>3.5. Data protection in Google Cloud</title>
        <p>Google Cloud automatically encrypts all data using an
internal mechanism called Keystore. This is a key
management service that automatically generates and
manages keys without user intervention. Keystore supports
a primary key for encrypting new data encryption keys, as
well as a limited number of older key versions to maintain
compatibility and allow decryption of existing data. Users
do not have direct control over these keys or access to their
usage logs.</p>
        <p>
          Data from multiple clients may be encrypted with the
same default key. This process relies on cryptographic
modules validated for compliance with FIPS 140-2 Level 1,
ensuring a high level of data protection [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">22</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>Google Cloud KMS provides a comprehensive set of
tools for managing encryption keys in the cloud
environment, allowing organizations to protect data
according to modern security requirements. The use of
different types of keys, integration with other cloud
services, and support for encryption standards enable
clients to flexibly adapt the level of protection to their needs
and to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.</p>
        <p>
          Considering the aforementioned risks, it can be
concluded that secret management platforms such as AWS
Key Management Service (KMS), Azure Key Vault, and
Google Cloud Key Management Service (KMS) are key
tools for overcoming modern security challenges in cloud
environments. They provide integrated, scalable, and
reliable solutions for managing cryptographic keys and
other sensitive data, helping organizations minimize the
risks associated with storing secrets in the cloud [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref23">23</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>However, even with these tools, organizations remain
vulnerable to the risks mentioned above:
1.</p>
        <sec id="sec-3-5-1">
          <title>Vulnerability to Unauthorized Access: All</title>
          <p>three platforms store critical keys and secrets in
the cloud, which potentially exposes them to
unauthorized access, including data breaches or
cyber-attacks. AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, and
Google Cloud KMS implement appropriate
security measures, such as using Hardware
Security Modules (HSMs) and advanced
encryption methods, but the risk persists,
especially if authentication and access
management processes are not properly
configured.</p>
          <p>Internal Threats: Insider threats, such as
unauthorized actions by employees or contractors,
pose a significant risk to any cloud infrastructure.
All three platforms use various methods to
mitigate these risks: AWS KMS supports threshold
cryptography to distribute access to keys, Azure
Key Vault implements role-based access control
(Azure RBAC), and Google Cloud KMS uses
centralized management and auditing capabilities
to prevent unauthorized access.</p>
          <p>Ensuring Data Integrity and Confidentiality:
Cloud data storage requires continuous assurance
of data integrity and confidentiality. While AWS
KMS, Azure Key Vault, and Google Cloud KMS use
advanced encryption methods and access control</p>
          <p>mechanisms, storing data on remote servers
creates a risk of data tampering or unauthorized
modification.</p>
          <p>Scalability and Performance: The scalability of
cloud environments also presents certain security
challenges. The use of decentralized encryption
solutions, as in the case of Google Cloud KMS, can
efficiently handle large volumes of data but may
require additional resources to maintain security.
Azure Key Vault and AWS KMS offer scaling
solutions, but the risk of reduced performance
when processing large amounts of data should be
considered.</p>
          <p>
            Compliance and Building Trust: Implementing
reliable secret storage solutions is also associated
with the risk of non-compliance with regulatory
requirements, such as GDPR or HIPAA, which can
lead to fines and reputational damage. All three
platforms offer tools to ensure compliance with
standards, but their effective use requires
organizations to carefully configure security
policies and maintain constant monitoring [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref24">24</xref>
            ].
          </p>
          <p>Thus, AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, and Google
Cloud KMS offer effective tools for secret management and
data protection in cloud environments but require proper
configuration and continuous monitoring to minimize
security risks. Implementing these solutions allows
organizations to reduce the risk of data breaches, prevent
unauthorized access, ensure data integrity and
confidentiality, and comply with regulatory requirements.
However, the success of these measures depends on the
level of integration with existing cloud services and the
specific needs of the business.</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Universal secret management platform</title>
      <p>
        In modern cloud environments, the need for effective and
reliable secret management is becoming increasingly
important. Advanced cryptographic solutions, such as
stateof-the-art algorithms, threshold cryptography, hybrid
automated security systems, server-based decentralized
encryption, DNA-based encryption, and hybrid
cryptography, provide robust mechanisms for protecting
secrets in the cloud. However, to achieve effectiveness, it is
essential to have a universal secret management platform
capable of integrating these solutions and providing
flexible, scalable, and centralized management of keys and
other sensitive data [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref25">25</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        HashiCorp Vault is an example of such a secret
management and encryption system based on identity. Vault
provides encryption services that ensure secure access to
secrets using authentication and authorization methods to
verify and restrict access. This tool allows the protection,
storage, and management of secrets and other sensitive data
through various interfaces, such as a UI, CLI, or HTTP API. A
secret is any information that requires strict access control,
such as tokens, API keys, passwords, encryption keys, or
certificates. Vault provides a unified interface for managing
any secrets, offering strict access control and detailed audit
logging [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref26">26</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>This is particularly important in cases where API keys for
external services or credentials for interacting in
serviceoriented architectures are used extensively and across various
environments, complicating the understanding of who has
access to which secrets (Fig. 1).</p>
      <p>1.
2.
3.
4.</p>
      <p>Authentication — The process by which a client
provides information that allows Vault to
determine if the client is who it claims to be. After
successful authentication, a token is generated
that is associated with a specific policy.</p>
      <p>Verification — Vault verifies the client using
external trusted sources, such as GitHub, LDAP,
AppRole, etc., which provides an additional layer
of security.</p>
      <p>Authorization — The process of mapping the
client to a security policy defined in Vault. A policy
consists of a set of rules that determine which API
endpoints the client has access to with their token.
Policies provide a declarative way to grant or
restrict access to specific resources in the vault.</p>
      <p>
        Access — After successful authentication and
authorization, Vault grants the client access to
secrets, keys, and encryption capabilities based on
the policies associated with the client’s identifier.
The client can use the issued token to perform
future operations [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref27">27</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Thus, HashiCorp Vault demonstrates an example of a
universal secret management platform that integrates
modern cryptographic methods and provides a flexible and
scalable approach to data security. Such a platform allows the
centralized management of secrets and ensures compatibility
with various cloud environments and services, providing
robust access control and auditing capabilities. This makes it
a crucial tool for organizations looking to enhance their data
security and meet modern information protection
requirements.</p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>4.1. Challenges and risks associated with secret management and the vault’s role in addressing them</title>
        <p>Modern enterprises face numerous challenges and risks
related to secret management, such as credentials, API keys,
passwords, and other confidential data.</p>
        <p>Diversity and Lack of Centralized Control: Most
organizations have credentials scattered across their
environments: in plaintext within source code, configuration
files, or even in emails. This creates significant challenges in
tracking and controlling access, increasing the risk of
unauthorized data use. The dispersion of secrets complicates
understanding who has access to which resources and
reduces organizations’ ability to respond promptly to security
incidents.
Increased Risk of Malicious Attacks: Storing credentials
in plaintext or vulnerable formats increases the likelihood
of their compromise by both internal and external attackers.
In the event of a data breach or misuse of credentials, the
consequences can be catastrophic, including data loss,
leakage of confidential information, and significant
financial losses.</p>
        <p>
          Inability to Manage the Secret Lifecycle: Without a
specialized solution, organizations often struggle to
effectively manage the lifecycle of secrets, including
generation, storage, updating, and revocation of credentials.
This leads to the accumulation of outdated or compromised
data, increasing the organization’s vulnerability to attacks
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref28">28</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>HashiCorp Vault was designed to address these issues
by providing a universal secret management platform that
centralizes credentials, ensures their protection, and offers
effective management tools. The core features of Vault aim
to minimize risks associated with secret management as
follows:
</p>
        <p>Secure Secret Storage: Vault allows the storage
of any secret keys and values by encrypting them
before writing them to persistent storage. This
ensures that even if unauthorized access to the raw
storage occurs, the secrets remain protected as
they cannot be read without appropriate access
rights.</p>
        <p>Dynamic Secrets: Vault can generate secrets on
demand for specific systems, such as databases or
cloud services. For instance, if an application needs
access to an S3 bucket, Vault creates an AWS key
pair with valid permissions and automatically
revokes them after the lease period expires,
significantly reducing the risk of compromise.</p>
        <p>
          Data Encryption: Vault provides the capability to
encrypt and decrypt data without storing it,
allowing security teams to control encryption
parameters while developers can store encrypted
data in secure locations, such as SQL databases,
without the need to create their encryption
methods [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref29">29</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>
          Lease and Renewal of Secrets: All secrets in
Vault are associated with leases. After the lease
period expires, the secret is automatically revoked,
helping to avoid the storage of outdated or
insecure credentials. Clients have the option to
extend the lease using built-in APIs for renewal.
Revocation of Secrets: Vault has built-in support
for revoking secrets, allowing the immediate
invalidation of access to specific credentials or all
secrets associated with a particular user or data
type. This feature helps to quickly respond to
security incidents and prevents the further use of
compromised data [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref30">30</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>Thus, HashiCorp Vault effectively addresses the
challenges of dispersion, reduced management
transparency, and increased attack risk by providing
centralized secret management, robust encryption, dynamic
creation and revocation of credentials, and detailed audit
logs. This makes it an essential tool for enterprises looking
to enhance the security of their confidential data and protect
it from modern cyber threats.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>4.2. Using HashiCorp Vault for automating cloud environments</title>
        <p>
          In the context of automating cloud resource provisioning,
HashiCorp Vault serves as a centralized platform for secret
and credential management, ensuring a secure and efficient
environment setup. Vault acts as a secret management
cluster, critical for automation tasks carried out with
Rundeck — a platform that integrates secrets into its tasks,
primarily through Ansible instructions [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref31">31</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>
          Access to secrets in Vault is achieved through the
AppRole authentication method, which supports
machineto-machine authentication, providing secure access to
secrets. This method allows the creation of roles with
specific policies that regulate access to secrets. Each role is
associated with a RoleID and SecretID, used for
authentication, ensuring that only authorized services, such
as Rundeck, have access to the needed secrets (Fig. 2).
Most secret functions in this architecture are based on the
HashiCorp Vault Key/Value (KV) v2 mechanism, which
provides advanced capabilities for storing and managing
data. KV v2 supports secret version history, allowing the
secure storage of multiple versions of a single secret and the
ability to revert to previous versions in case of accidental
deletion or unwanted changes. Additionally, this
mechanism includes metadata for each secret, aiding in
better management and lifecycle control of the stored data,
ensuring detailed access control, and audit logging
necessary for maintaining data integrity and confidentiality
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref32">32</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>In practice, when a task is launched on Rundeck, it uses
the provided RoleID and SecretID to authenticate with</p>
        <p>
          Vault and obtain the necessary secrets. These secrets are then
used in Ansible playbooks, which are part of the task,
ensuring secure automation of various operations without
exposing confidential information in task scripts. This setup
not only provides centralized and secure secret management
but also automates credential handling, reducing the risk of
human error and enhancing the efficiency of automation
workflows [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref33">33</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>
          In addition to static secrets, this system utilizes AWS
dynamic secret management in HashiCorp Vault,
allowing the automatic creation of temporary AWS
credentials (Fig. 3). This is particularly useful for tasks that
require modifications to the AWS cloud environment,
enhancing security and compliance. The AWS mechanism
in Vault is configured to generate credentials with a limited
lifespan based on predefined roles, which determines the
access level and permissions required to perform specific
automation tasks. This ensures that credentials can only
perform specific actions in AWS, minimizing the risk of
excessive permissions and improving security by adhering
to the principle of least privilege [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref34">34</xref>
          ].
When a task is initiated in Rundeck, it requests temporary
credentials from Vault. After authenticating the request using
AppRole, Vault issues these credentials, which are then used
by Ansible playbooks for secure interaction with AWS
services. Once the task is completed or the set time expires,
these credentials are automatically revoked, significantly
reducing the risk of unauthorized access and misuse of
resources. This dynamic credential management approach
eliminates the need for long-term AWS keys, simplifies the
credential rotation and auditing processes, and greatly
enhances security and efficiency in cloud environments [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref35">35</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>
          Thus, using HashiCorp Vault for automating cloud
resource management not only centralizes and secures
credentials but also significantly improves security by
automating authentication and access management
processes. This reduces the risk of human error and
enhances the effectiveness of automation tasks in cloud
environments [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref35">35</xref>
          ].
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Conclusions</title>
      <p>In today’s era of increasing cloud technology usage,
managing secrets and ensuring data security have become
critical tasks for organizations. Given the numerous
challenges, such as the fragmentation of credentials, rising
internal and external threats, the complexity of managing
the lifecycle of secrets, and the need to comply with
regulatory requirements, employing a universal secret
management platform is essential.</p>
      <p>The research indicates that HashiCorp Vault is an
effective solution for centralized secret management in
cloud environments. Vault provides secure storage,
encryption, dynamic creation, and automatic revocation of
credentials, offering policy-based access management.
Integration of Vault with automation platforms like
Rundeck and Ansible allows the automation of cloud
resource provisioning while maintaining information
confidentiality and reducing the risk of human error. The
use of dynamic creation of temporary credentials enhances
security and compliance, adhering to the principle of least
privilege.</p>
      <p>Comparing different secret management platforms,
such as AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, and Google Cloud
KMS highlights their importance in securing cloud
environments but also underscores the need for specialized
solutions that allow effective integration with existing cloud
infrastructures. Vault offers a universal approach,
combining advanced cryptographic methods, centralized
management, and dynamic credential management, making
it a crucial tool for protecting confidential information.</p>
      <p>Thus, using HashiCorp Vault as a universal secret
management platform is an optimal solution for
organizations seeking to enhance the security of their cloud
environments, ensure regulatory compliance, and automate
resource management. It not only minimizes risks
associated with unauthorized access and data misuse but
also significantly improves the efficiency of processes in
modern dynamic infrastructures.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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