Ranking-based Defeasible Reasoning for Restricted First-Order Conditionals Applied to Description Logics Alexander Hahn1 , Gabriele Kern-Isberner1 and Thomas Meyer2 1 Dept. of Computer Science, TU Dortmund University, Dortmund, Germany 2 University of Cape Town and CAIR, Cape Town, South Africa Abstract Nonmonotonic reasoning based on ordinal conditional functions (OCFs), often called ranking functions, and description logics are both well-established methodologies in knowledge representation and reasoning. However, nonmonotonic reasoning mainly focuses on propositional logic as a base logic, while description logics investigate fragments of first-order logic for efficient reasoning with terminological knowledge. In this paper, we investigate how OCFs can be employed to define inference relations induced from first-order conditional knowledge bases. The goal of this work is to present first steps towards an interpretation of defeasible subsumptions in description logics (DL) which is thoroughly based on conditionals and ranking functions. In the process, we adapt a recently proposed DL version of the KLM postulates, a popular framework for non-monotonic reasoning from propositional knowledge bases, for the use with conditional first-order logic. Moreover, we consider some additional recently proposed rationality postulates for a KLM approach based on (restricted) first-order logic. Concrete examples are provided for reasoning with strategic c-representations, a special type of ranking functions based on the underlying conditional structures of a knowledge base, yielding high-quality non-monotonic inferences without the need to specify external relations, e.g., expressing typicality among individuals. Keywords first-order logic, description logic, conditional reasoning, non-monotonic reasoning, ranking functions, c-representations 1. Introduction DL version of these postulates, lifting the KLM approach to defeasible description logics. Rules in the form of conditional statements โ€œIf A then (usu- The goal of this paper is to propose first steps towards ally) Bโ€ (sometimes equipped with a quantitative degree) an interpretation of defeasible subsumptions in description are basic to human reasoning and also to logics in Artificial logics (DL) which is thoroughly based on conditionals and Intelligence, and have been explored in the area of non- ranking functions. To this end, we lift the notion of inductive monotonic reasoning since the 80s of the past century. They inference operators defined in [7] to first-order conditional can be formalized as conditionals (๐ต|๐ด), allowing for a non- knowledge bases. Additionally, we adapt the KLM postu- classical, three-valued interpretation of conditional state- lates from [4], as well as additional rationality postulates for ments. Semantics for knowledge bases consisting of condi- the KLM approach from [3] and show that they are fulfilled tionals are provided by epistemic states, often equipped with by our approach. Moreover, we illustrate the application total preorders on possible worlds. Using total preorders of ranking-based first-order conditional semantics to a DL ensures a high quality of nonmonotonic reasoning in terms example well-known from the literature and compare it to of broadly accepted axioms. Ordinal conditional functions concept-wise multipreference (cwm ) semantics from [5]. [1, 2], often called ranking functions, can be considered an The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, implementation of such epistemic states that assign to each the basics on first-order conditionals and defeasible ๐’œโ„’๐’ž possible world ๐œ” an implausibility rank ๐œ…(๐œ”) such that the are summarized. In Section 3, we describe inductive infer- higher ๐œ…(๐œ”), the less plausible ๐œ” is, and with the normal- ence operators for first-order (conditional) knowledge bases. ization constraint that there are worlds that are maximally In Section 4, postulates from [4] and [8] are adapted and plausible. evaluated for the use with first-order conditional logic. In Similar to conditionals for propositional logic, statements Section 5, we compare the OCF-based semantics for first- of the form โ€œUsually, As are Bsโ€ encoded as defeasible con- order knowledge bases with cwm -semantics [5] for defeasi- cept inclusions ๐ด โŠ โˆผ ๐ต, also called defeasible subsumptions, ble ๐’œโ„’๐’ž knowledge bases. In Section 6, we conclude this are a natural extension for description logics (DLs) in or- paper with summarizing its main contributions and some der to introduce conditional reasoning. Recently, different pointers for future work. semantics for defeasible DL knowledge bases have been proposed [3, 4, 5]. In order to compare and contrast different approaches to 2. Preliminaries non-monotonic reasoning, as well as to provide unifying frameworks, postulates are necessary. A popular approach This section recalls some formal basics on conditional first- for non-monotonic reasoning, preferential models, is char- order logic and defeasible description logics. For a more acterized by the so-called KLM postulates [6]. However, thorough introduction to description logics, we recommend preferential models have been mostly considered for propo- [9]. sitional logics. Recently, Britz et al. [4] have proposed a 2.1. Conditionals in First-Order Logic 22nd International Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning, November 2-4, 2024, Hanoi, Vietnam In this section, we recall relevant parts of the first-order $ alexander.hahn@tu-dortmund.de (A. Hahn); conditional logic introduced in [10]. We start with syntac- gabriele.kern-isberner@tu-dortmund.de (G. Kern-Isberner); tical details. Let ฮฃ = โŸจ๐‘ƒฮฃ , ๐‘ˆฮฃ โŸฉ be a first-order signature tommie.meyer@uct.ac.za (T. Meyer)  0009-0008-6114-2594 (A. Hahn); 0000-0001-8689-5391 consisting of a finite set of predicates ๐‘ƒฮฃ and a finite set (G. Kern-Isberner); 0000-0003-2204-6969 (T. Meyer) of constant symbols ๐‘ˆฮฃ but without function symbols of ยฉ 2024 Copyright for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under Creative Commons License Attribu- tion 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). arity > 0. An atom is a predicate of arity ๐‘› together with a CEUR ceur-ws.org Workshop ISSN 1613-0073 Proceedings list of ๐‘› constants and/or variables. A literal is an atom or a Definition 1. An ordinal conditional function (OCF) ๐œ… on negated atom. Formulas are built on atoms using conjunc- โ„ฆฮฃ is a function ๐œ… : โ„ฆฮฃ โ†’ N โˆช {โˆž} with ๐œ…โˆ’1 (0) ฬธ= โˆ…. tion (โˆง), disjunction (โˆจ), negation (ยฌ), material implication (โ‡’), and quantification (โˆ€, โˆƒ). We abbreviate conjunctions We can now make use of the possible world semantics by juxtaposition and negations usually by overlining, e. g. to assign degrees of disbelief also to formulas and (non- ๐ด๐ต means ๐ด โˆง ๐ต and ๐ด means ยฌ๐ด. The symbol โŠค denotes quantified) conditionals. In the following, let ๐ด, ๐ต โˆˆ โ„’ฮฃ an arbitrary tautology, and โŠฅ denotes an arbitrary contra- denote closed formulas, and let ๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— ) โˆˆ โ„’ฮฃ denote โƒ— ), ๐ต(๐‘ฅ diction. A ground formula contains no variables. In a closed open formulas. formula, all variables (if they occur) are bound by quanti- Definition 2 (๐œ…-ranks of closed formulas [10]). Let ๐œ… be fiers, otherwise, the formula is open, and the variables that an OCF. The ๐œ…-ranks of closed formulas are defined (as in the occur outside of the range of quantifiers are called free. If a propositional case) via formula ๐ด contains free variables we also use the notation ๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— ) where โƒ—๐‘ฅ = (๐‘ฅ1 , . . . , ๐‘ฅ๐‘› ) contains all free variables in ๐œ…(๐ด) = min ๐œ…(๐œ”) and ๐œ…(๐ต | ๐ด) = ๐œ…(๐ด๐ต) โˆ’ ๐œ…(๐ด). ๐œ”|=๐ด ๐ด. If โƒ—๐‘ is a vector of the same length as โƒ—๐‘ฅ then ๐ด(๐‘ โƒ—) is meant to denote the instantiation of ๐ด with โƒ—. ๐‘ A formula โˆ€๐‘ฅ โƒ— ๐ด(๐‘ฅโƒ—) By convention, ๐œ…(โŠฅ) = โˆž, because ranks are supposed (โˆƒ๐‘ฅโƒ— ๐ด(๐‘ฅโƒ— )) is universal (existential) if ๐ด involves no further to reflect plausibility. quantification. Let โ„’ฮฃ be the first-order language that al- The ranks of first-order formulas are coherently based on lows no nested quantification, i.e., all quantified formulas the usage of OCFs for propositional formulas. These degrees are either universal or existential formulas. โ„’ฮฃ contains of beliefs are used to specify when a formula from (โ„’ฮฃ |โ„’ฮฃ ) both open and closed formulas. is accepted by a ranking function ๐œ… (where acceptance is โ„’ฮฃ is extended by a conditional operator โ€œ|โ€ to a condi- denoted by |=). We will first consider the acceptance of tional language (โ„’ฮฃ |โ„’ฮฃ ) containing first-order condition- closed (conditional) formulas. als (๐ต|๐ด) with ๐ด, ๐ต โˆˆ โ„’ฮฃ . We write (๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )) to โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ highlight free variables. Then we assume โƒ—๐‘ฅ to mention Definition 3 (Acceptance of closed formulas [10]). Let ๐œ… all free variables occurring in ๐ด or ๐ต where the positions be an OCF. The acceptance relation between ๐œ… and closed of the variables are suitably adapted. Note that ๐ด and ๐ต formulas from โ„’ฮฃ and (โ„’ฮฃ |โ„’ฮฃ ) is defined as follows: usually will have free variables in common but may also โ€ข ๐œ… |= ๐ด iff for all ๐œ” โˆˆ โ„ฆ with ๐œ…(๐œ”) = 0, it holds that mention free variables which do not occur in the respec- ๐œ” |= ๐ด. tive other formula. E.g., the conditional (๐น ๐‘Ÿ๐‘–๐‘’๐‘›๐‘‘๐‘ (๐‘ฆ, ๐‘ฅ) โˆง โ€ข ๐œ… |= (๐ต | ๐ด) iff ๐œ…(๐ด๐ต) < ๐œ…(๐ด๐ต). ๐น ๐‘Ÿ๐‘–๐‘’๐‘›๐‘‘๐‘ (๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ง)|๐น ๐‘Ÿ๐‘–๐‘’๐‘›๐‘‘๐‘ (๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ)) (if ๐‘ฅ is a friend of ๐‘ฆ then usually ๐‘ฆ is also a friend of ๐‘ฅ and ๐‘ฅ has also a(nother) Acceptance of a sentence by a ranking function is the friend ๐‘ง) would be represented by (๐ต(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ, ๐‘ง)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ, ๐‘ง)) same as in the propositional case for ground sentences, and with ๐ต(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ, ๐‘ง) = ๐น ๐‘Ÿ๐‘–๐‘’๐‘›๐‘‘๐‘ (๐‘ฆ, ๐‘ฅ) โˆง ๐น ๐‘Ÿ๐‘–๐‘’๐‘›๐‘‘๐‘ (๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ง) and interprets the classical quantifiers in a straightforward way. ๐ด(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ, ๐‘ง) = ๐น ๐‘Ÿ๐‘–๐‘’๐‘›๐‘‘๐‘ (๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ). Note that conditionals cannot The treatment of acceptance of open formulas is more be nested, and that conditionals with tautological antecedent intricate, as such formulas will be used to express default are identified with the corresponding non-conditional state- statements, like in โ€œ๐ด is plausibleโ€, or in โ€œusually, if ๐ด holds, ment, i.e., (๐ด|โŠค) โ‰ก ๐ด. Nevertheless, we distinguish be- then ๐ต also holdsโ€. tween such plausible statements (๐ด|โŠค) โ‰ก ๐ด and strict Definition 4 (๐œ…-ranks of open formulas [10]). We define the facts. Let โ„’๐‘ฮฃ = โ„’ฮฃ โˆช (โ„’ฮฃ |โ„’ฮฃ ) be the language contain- ranks of open formulas and open conditionals by evaluating ing both first-order formulas and conditionals as specified most plausible instances: above. A first-order conditional knowledge base โ„› is a finite set ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )) = min ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž โƒ— )) of conditional formulas. A first-order knowledge base ๐’ฆโ„ฌ = ๐‘Žโˆˆโ„‹๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— โƒ—) โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ consists of a first-order conditional knowledge base ๐œ…(๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )) = min ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž โƒ— )) โˆ’ ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘Ž โƒ— )). โ„›, together with a set โ„ฑ of closed formulas from โ„’ฮฃ , called ๐‘Žโˆˆโ„‹(๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )) facts. The open formulas and conditionals in โ„› are meant Generalizing the notion of acceptance of a first-order for- to represent defeasible plausible beliefs. mula or conditional is straightforward for closed formulas Regarding semantics, we base our first-order conditional and conditionals. The basic idea here is that such (condi- semantics on the Herbrand semantics. A possible world tional) open statements hold if there are individuals called ๐œ” is a subset of the Herbrand base โ„‹ฮฃ , which contains all representatives that provide most convincing instances of ground atoms of the first-order signature ฮฃ. Possible worlds the respective conditional. can be concisely represented as complete conjunctions or minterms, i.e. conjunctions of literals where every atom Definition 5 (representative [10]). Let ๐‘Ÿ = (๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )) of โ„‹ฮฃ appears either in positive or in negated form. The be an open conditional. We call โƒ—๐‘Ž โˆˆ โ„‹๐‘Ÿ a weak representa- set of all possible worlds is denoted by โ„ฆฮฃ . For an open tive of ๐‘Ÿ iff both of the following conditions are satisfied: conditional ๐‘Ÿ = (๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅโƒ— )), the set โ„‹๐‘Ÿ denotes the set of all vectors from the Herbrand universe that appear in ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘Ž โƒ— )) = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )) (1) groundings of ๐‘Ÿ, i.e. ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘Ž โƒ— )) < ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘Ž โƒ— )) (2) โ„‹(๐ต(๐‘ฅโƒ—)|๐ด(๐‘ฅโƒ—)) = {๐‘Ž โƒ— โˆˆ ๐‘ˆฮฃ | |๐‘Ž โƒ— | = |๐‘ฅ โƒ— |}. The set of weak representatives of ๐‘Ÿ is denoted by wRep(๐‘Ÿ). Further, โƒ—๐‘Ž โˆˆ wRep(๐‘Ÿ) is a (strong) representative of ๐‘Ÿ iff Ordinal conditional functions [1], usually called rank- (๏ธ )๏ธ โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘ โƒ—) . (3) (๏ธ€ )๏ธ€ ing functions, can be defined just as in the propositional ๐œ… ๐ด(๐‘Ž โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘Ž โƒ— ) = min ๐œ… ๐ด(๐‘ โƒ— ๐‘โˆˆwRep(๐‘Ÿ) case. They associate degrees of (im)plausibility with possi- ble worlds. The set of strong representatives of ๐‘Ÿ is denoted by Rep(๐‘Ÿ). (Strong) Representatives of a conditional are character- ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)) and ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž)๐ต(๐‘Ž)) = โˆž = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)). ized by being most general (1) and least exceptional (3). And Moreover, we must have ๐œ… |= (๐ต(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)) and ๐œ… |= of course, their instantiation should be accepted by ๐œ… (2). (๐ต(๐‘)|๐ด(๐‘)). For the second closed conditional, this simply Note that Rep(๐‘Ÿ) ฬธ= โˆ… iff wRep(๐‘Ÿ) ฬธ= โˆ…. Now we can base means ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)) < ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)), which clearly holds. our definition of acceptance of open conditionals on the For the open conditional (๐ต(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)), we must apply Def- notion of representatives as follows. inition 6. In particular, we must consider representatives of this conditional. Since ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž)๐ต(๐‘Ž)) = 0 = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)), Definition 6 (acceptance of open conditionals [10]). Let ๐œ… we also have ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)) = 0 = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)) by be an OCF and ๐‘Ÿ = (๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅโƒ— )). Then ๐œ… |= ๐‘Ÿ iff Rep(๐‘Ÿ) ฬธ= Definition 4. Hence the more complicated option (B) of โˆ… and either of the two following conditions holds. Definition 6 applies, and we must also consider represen- (A) It holds that tatives of (๐ต(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)). Natural candidates of representa- tives for (๐ต(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)) resp. (๐ต(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)) would be ๐‘Ž resp. ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )) < ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )). (4) ๐‘, but let us go into more details here. For both, we have ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž)๐ต(๐‘Ž)) = โˆž = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)), so they are defi- (B) ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘ฅโƒ— )) = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )) and either โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘ฅ nitely weak representatives of the respective conditional. How- Rep((๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— ))) = โˆ…, or for all ๐‘Žโƒ—1 โˆˆ โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ ever, for strong representatives, their rank of falsification Rep((๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— ))), ๐‘Žโƒ—2 โˆˆ Rep((๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— ))) must also be minimal among all weak representatives, ac- it holds that cording to (3). For ๐‘Ž and ๐‘, this rank is maximal due to ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž)๐ต(๐‘Ž)) = โˆž = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)), and at least prima fa- ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Žโƒ—1 )๐ต(๐‘Žโƒ—1 )) < ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Žโƒ—2 )๐ต(๐‘Žโƒ—2 )). (5) cie, it is well imaginable that there are other constants ๐‘ โˆˆ ๐‘ˆฮฃ We also have to ensure that strict knowledge (facts) are with lower, i.e., finite falsification ranks. So, at this point we interpreted suitably by ranking functions. An OCF can stop our investigations here and will come back later to this enforce factual knowledge by setting the ranks of all worlds example when we can use more detailed information about which violate facts to infinity. the structure of ranking models of ๐’ฆโ„ฌ in the next section. Definition 7 (enforcement of facts). Let ๐œ… be an OCF and let Now we have set up the formal framework of our ranking- ๐ด โˆˆ โ„’ฮฃ be a closed formula. Then we define that ๐œ… enforces based approach that we need for reasoning from first-order the fact ๐ด, denoted by ๐œ… ||โˆ’ ๐ด, iff ๐œ…(๐ด) = โˆž. knowledge bases. Before dealing with inference from such knowledge bases in the next section, we briefly summarize Observe the difference between acceptance and enforce- the syntactic basics of a description logics with defeasible ment: while ๐œ… |= ๐ด is the same as ๐œ… |= (๐ด|โŠค) and subsumptions. only means that ๐ด has to hold in the ๐œ…-minimal worlds, ๐œ… ||โˆ’ ๐ด means that ๐ด holds in all feasible (i.e. finitely- ranked) worlds. Nevertheless, enforcement is downward- 2.2. Defeasible ๐’œโ„’๐’ž compatible to plausible acceptance, as the next proposition Let ๐‘๐ถ be a set of atomic concept names, ๐‘๐‘… be a set of shows. role names and ๐‘๐ผ be a set of individual names. The set of ๐’œโ„’๐’ž-concepts is defined by the rule Proposition 1. Let ๐œ… be an OCF and let ๐ด โˆˆ โ„’ฮฃ be a closed formula. ๐œ… ||โˆ’ ๐ด implies ๐œ… |= ๐ด. ๐ถ ::= ๐ด|โŠค|โŠฅ|ยฌ๐ถ|๐ถ โŠ“ ๐ถ|๐ถ โŠ” ๐ถ|โˆƒ๐‘Ÿ.๐ถ|โˆ€๐‘Ÿ.๐ถ , Proof. If ๐œ… ||โˆ’ ๐ด, then ๐œ” |= ๐ด for all ๐œ” โˆˆ โ„ฆ such that where ๐ด โˆˆ ๐‘๐ถ and ๐‘Ÿ โˆˆ ๐‘๐‘… . ๐œ…(๐œ”) < โˆž. This implies particularly that ๐œ” |= ๐ด for all An ๐’œโ„’๐’ž-interpretation is a tuple ๐ผ = โŸจโˆ†โ„ , ยทโ„ โŸฉ, where ๐œ” โˆˆ โ„ฆ such that ๐œ…(๐œ”) = 0, i.e., ๐œ… |= ๐ด. โˆ† is a domain and ยทโ„ is an interpretation function which โ„ With the necessary notation for the treatment of both un- maps ๐ด โˆˆ ๐‘๐ถ , ๐‘Ÿ โˆˆ ๐‘๐‘… , ๐‘Ž โˆˆ ๐‘๐ผ to ๐ดโ„ โІ โˆ†โ„ , ๐‘Ÿโ„ โІ certain and factual knowledge in place, we are now ready to โˆ†โ„ ร— โˆ†โ„ , ๐‘Žโ„ โˆˆ โˆ†โ„ , respectively. For complex concepts: define the conditions for whether an OCF can be considered โŠคโ„ = โˆ†โ„ a model of a first-order knowledge base. โŠฅโ„ = โˆ… Definition 8 ((ranking) model of a first-order KB [10]). Let ๐œ… be an OCF and let ๐’ฆโ„ฌ = โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ be a first-order knowledge ยฌ๐ถ โ„ = โˆ†โ„ โˆ– ๐ถ โ„ base. We say that ๐œ… is a (ranking) model of ๐’ฆโ„ฌ if both of the (๐ถ โŠ“ ๐ท)โ„ = ๐ถ โ„ โˆฉ ๐ทโ„ following conditions hold. (๐ถ โŠ” ๐ท)โ„ = ๐ถ โ„ โˆช ๐ทโ„ โ€ข ๐œ… ||โˆ’ ๐ด for every fact ๐ด โˆˆ โ„ฑ. (โˆƒ๐‘Ÿ.๐ถ)โ„ = {๐‘ฅ โˆˆ โˆ†โ„ | โˆƒ๐‘ฆ.(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โˆˆ ๐‘Ÿโ„ โˆง ๐‘ฆ โˆˆ ๐ถ โ„ } โ€ข ๐œ… |= ๐‘Ÿ for every rule ๐‘Ÿ โˆˆ โ„›. (โˆ€๐‘Ÿ.๐ถ)โ„ = {๐‘ฅ โˆˆ โˆ†โ„ | โˆ€๐‘ฆ.(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โˆˆ ๐‘Ÿโ„ โ‡’ ๐‘ฆ โˆˆ ๐ถ โ„ } We illustrate first-order knowledge bases and their rank- ing models in the following example. Classical (strict) subsumptions ๐ถ โŠ‘ ๐ท (where ๐ถ, ๐ท are Example 1. We consider a signature ฮฃ = โŸจ๐‘ƒฮฃ , ๐‘ˆฮฃ โŸฉ con- concepts) hold in an interpretation ๐ผ (short: ๐ผ |= ๐ถ โŠ‘ ๐ท) sisting of two unary predicates ๐‘ƒฮฃ = {๐ด, ๐ต} and at least iff ๐ถ โ„ โІ ๐ทโ„ . Assertions of the form ๐ถ(๐‘Ž) or ๐‘Ÿ(๐‘Ž, ๐‘) (where two constants {๐‘Ž, ๐‘} โІ ๐‘ˆฮฃ . Let the knowledge base ๐’ฆโ„ฌ = ๐ถ is a concept, ๐‘Ÿ is a role and ๐‘Ž, ๐‘ are individuals) hold if โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ be specified by โ„ฑ = {๐ด(๐‘Ž)๐ต(๐‘Ž), ๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)} and ๐‘Ž โˆˆ ๐ถ โ„ or (๐‘Ž, ๐‘) โˆˆ ๐‘Ÿโ„ , respectively. โ„› = {(๐ต(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)), (๐ต(๐‘)|๐ด(๐‘))}. Any model ๐œ… of ๐’ฆโ„ฌ Beyond classical logics and similar to first-order condi- must assign rank โˆž to all ๐œ” ฬธ|= โ„ฑ, i.e., can have finite ranks tionals, defeasible subsumptions ๐ถ โŠโˆผ ๐ท encode information only for worlds ๐œ” satisfying ๐œ” |= ๐ด(๐‘Ž)๐ต(๐‘Ž)๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘). This of the form โ€œUsually, instances of ๐ถ are instances of ๐ทโ€ or implies, also by Proposition 1, that ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž)๐ต(๐‘Ž)) = 0 = โ€œTypical ๐ถs are ๐ทsโ€. A defeasible (๐’œโ„’๐’ž) knowledge base ๐’ฆโ„ฌ = โŸจ๐’ฏ , ๐’Ÿ, ๐’œโŸฉ 3.2. Inductive FO-Inference Based on consists of a TBox ๐’ฏ (containing strict subsumptions), a c-Representations DBox ๐’Ÿ (containing defeasible subsumptions) and an ABox ๐’œ (containing assertions). c-Representations, originally defined for the propositional A popular approach to provide semantics for defeasible setting [11, 12], are a special kind of ranking models which subsumptions (e.g. used in [4, 5]) is to introduce some order- assign ranks to possible worlds in a regular way by adhering ing over the domain elements โˆ†โ„ and require the minimal to the conditional structures of knowledge bases. A (simpli- instances of ๐ถ (with respect to said ordering) to be instances fied) version of c-representations for first-order conditinal of ๐ท in order for ๐ถ โŠ knowledge bases was proposed in [10]. โˆผ ๐ท to hold. In this paper, we understand defeasible subsumptions as Definition 9 (c-Representation [10]). Let ๐’ฆโ„ฌ = โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ open conditionals and interpret them via ranking functions. with โ„› = {(๐ต1 (๐‘ฅ โƒ— 1 )|๐ด1 (๐‘ฅ โƒ— 1 )), . . . , (๐ต๐‘› (๐‘ฅโƒ— ๐‘› )|๐ด๐‘› (๐‘ฅ โƒ— ๐‘› ))} be a first-order knowledge base. An OCF ๐œ… is a c-representation 3. Reasoning from First-Order of ๐’ฆโ„ฌ if ๐œ…(๐œ”) = โˆž for all ๐œ” ฬธ|= โ„ฑ and ๐œ… |= ๐‘Ÿ for every ๐‘Ÿ โˆˆ โ„›, and for all ๐œ” |= โ„ฑ, ๐œ…(๐œ”) is of the form Knowledge Bases โˆ‘๏ธ ๐œ…(๐œ”) = ๐œ…0 + ๐‘“๐‘– (๐œ”)๐œ‚๐‘– , (7) In this section, we consider inference relations induced by 1โ‰ค๐‘–โ‰ค๐‘› first-order (FO) knowledge bases, similar to the ones con- sidered for the propositional case in [7]. where ๐‘“๐‘– (๐œ”) = #{๐‘Ž ๐‘Ÿ๐‘– โƒ— ๐‘– โˆˆ โ„‹ | ๐‘Ÿ๐‘– = (๐ต๐‘– (๐‘ฅ โƒ— ๐‘– ) | ๐ด๐‘– (๐‘ฅ โƒ— ๐‘– )) โˆˆ โ„›, ๐œ” |= ๐ด๐‘– (๐‘Ž โƒ— ๐‘– )๐ต๐‘– (๐‘Ž โƒ— ๐‘– )} is the number of possible grounding 3.1. Inductive FO-Inference Relations vectors that appear in falsifications of ๐‘Ÿ๐‘– in ๐œ”, and ๐œ…0 , ๐œ‚๐‘– โˆˆ N with ๐œ‚๐‘– โ‰ฅ 0 are suitably chosen to ensure that ๐œ… is an OCF Let ๐’ฆโ„ฌ = โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ be a first-order knowledge base. We and ๐œ… |= โ„›. are interested in defeasible inferences that we can draw from ๐’ฆโ„ฌ, i.e., we consider (nonmonotonic) inferences of The value ๐œ…0 is a normalizing factor for ensuring that the form ๐’ฆโ„ฌ |โˆผ ๐œ™ with ๐œ™ โˆˆ โ„’๐‘ฮฃ being a first-order formula min๐œ”โˆˆฮฉ ๐œ…(๐œ”) = 0, and the values ๐œ‚๐‘– are called impact fac- or conditional. More precisely, we study inductive inference tors. Observe that the value of ๐œ‚๐‘– does not depend on the relations |โˆผโІ โ„’๐‘ฮฃ ร— โ„’๐‘ฮฃ similar to the ones presented in [7]. specific world ๐œ” under consideration, but on the other condi- Two fundamental postulates for such inference relations pre- tionals in โ„›, and can be determined via a set of inequalities supposed in [7] are that formulas from the knowledge base between the different ๐œ‚๐‘– . Therefore, c-representations exist can be inferred (this is called Direct Inference (DI)), and that iff this system of inequalities is solvable. This allows for without conditionals in the knowledge base, conditionals deriving sufficient conditions for the satisfiability of knowl- can be inferred only trivially (Trivial Vacuity (TV)). edge bases in terms of solutions of inequalities. However, in the first-order case, this system of inequalities is much more (DI) ๐œ™ โˆˆ โ„ฑ โˆช โ„› implies โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ |โˆผ ๐œ™. complex than in the propositional case because conditionals can be both verified and falsified by different constants in (TV) โŸจโ„ฑ, โˆ…โŸฉ |โˆผ (๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅโƒ— )) only if there is a constant the same world, and due to the interactions between facts vector โƒ—๐‘Ž such that โ„ฑ |= ๐ด(๐‘Ž โƒ— ) โ‡’ ๐ต(๐‘Žโƒ— ). and conditionals. Therefore, it is hardly possible to give a Note that (DI) is a bit basic concerning the treatments of generic representation of these inequalities for first-order facts. Actually, we would expect facts from โ„ฑ to be enforced. knowledge bases. We illustrate c-representations by contin- We will see that our approach can guarantee this. uing our Example 1. One natural way to construct an inductive inference re- Example 2 (Example 1 contโ€™d). We consider the knowledge lation is to choose a model ๐œ… for each knowledge base and base ๐’ฆโ„ฌ = โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ with โ„ฑ = {๐ด(๐‘Ž)๐ต(๐‘Ž), ๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)} and consider the inferences induced by ๐œ… via โ„› = {๐‘Ÿ1 = (๐ต(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)), ๐‘Ÿ2 = (๐ต(๐‘)|๐ด(๐‘))} from Exam- โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ |โ‰ˆ๐œ… ๐œ™ iff ๐œ… |= ๐œ™, (6) A c-representation ๐œ… of ๐’ฆโ„ฌ has the form ๐œ…(๐œ”) = ple 1. โˆ‘๏ธ€ ๐œ…0 + 1โ‰ค๐‘–โ‰ค2 ๐‘“๐‘– (๐œ”)๐œ‚๐‘– for ๐œ” |= ๐ด(๐‘Ž)๐ต(๐‘Ž)๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘), where ๐œ™ โˆˆ โ„’๐‘ฮฃ , and โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ |โ‰ˆ๐œ… ๐œ™ means that ๐œ™ can be and ๐œ…(๐œ”) = โˆž for ๐œ” ฬธ|= ๐ด(๐‘Ž)๐ต(๐‘Ž)๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘). Since inferred from โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ via its ranking model ๐œ…. ๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘) โˆˆ โ„ฑ , conditional ๐‘Ÿ2 cannot be falsified by finitely- However in general, it is not easy to decide on the ex- ranked worlds, so the impact factor ๐œ‚2 is ineffective, and we istence of models of a first-order knowledge base, i.e., on just have the satisfiability of such knowledge bases in our ranking- ๐œ…(๐œ”) = ๐œ…0 + ๐‘“1 (๐œ”)๐œ‚1 (8) based semantics, as we saw in Example 1. In particular, for ๐œ” |= ๐ด(๐‘Ž)๐ต(๐‘Ž)๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘). For any such ๐œ”, ๐œ…(๐œ”) โ‰ฅ knowledge given by facts in โ„ฑ may interact with plausi- ๐œ…0 + ๐œ‚1 because of the falsification of ๐‘Ÿ1 by ๐‘, and if no ble beliefs specified by conditionals in โ„›. For example, if other constant falsifies ๐‘Ÿ1 , we obtain ๐œ…(๐œ”) = ๐œ…0 + ๐œ‚1 as the โ„ฑ |= โˆ€๐‘ฅ โƒ— ) โ‡’ ๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— .๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— ), the conditional (๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )) โˆˆ โ„› โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ minimum rank which must be 0. This yields ๐œ…0 = โˆ’๐œ‚1 . cannot be accepted by a ranking function ๐œ…. In this case, The impact factor ๐œ‚1 โ‰ฅ 0 has to be chosen in such a the ๐’ฆโ„ฌ = โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ would be not satisfiable. way that ๐‘Ÿ1 is accepted by ๐œ…. As for any model of ๐’ฆโ„ฌ, In the next subsection, we recall a class of ranking models it holds that 0 = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)) = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž)๐ต(๐‘Ž)) < of first-order knowledge bases that allow for more trans- ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž)๐ต(๐‘Ž)) = โˆž and 0 = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)) = parent investigations into the satisfiability of first-order ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)) < ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)) = โˆž, so ๐‘Ž โˆˆ wRep(๐‘Ÿ1 ) knowledge bases and usually provide a basis for quite well- and ๐‘ โˆˆ wRep((๐ต(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ))), and Definition 6 (B) applies. behaved inductive inference. Consider any constant ๐‘ ฬธโˆˆ {๐‘Ž, ๐‘}. Since ๐œ” |= ๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘) can be chosen in such a way that ๐œ” |= ๐ด(๐‘‘) for any fur- ther constant ๐‘‘ ฬธโˆˆ {๐‘Ž, ๐‘, ๐‘}, we obtain ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)) = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž)๐ต(๐‘Ž)๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)) = 0 = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)), Proof. Any c-representation ๐œ… of โŸจโ„ฑ, โˆ…โŸฉ has the form (7) and analogously, ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)) = ๐œ‚1 . for ๐œ” |= โ„ฑ and satisfies ๐œ…(๐œ”) = โˆž for ๐œ” ฬธ|= โ„ฑ. Since Consider the case ๐œ‚1 = 0. Then we would have there are no conditionals in the rule base, we simply have ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)) = 0 = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)), so ๐‘ ฬธโˆˆ wRep(๐‘Ÿ1 ) and ๐œ…(๐œ”) = ๐œ…0 for ๐œ” |= โ„ฑ, hence the normalization constant ๐‘ ฬธโˆˆ wRep((๐ต(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ))). Hence wRep(๐‘Ÿ1 ) = {๐‘Ž} and must satisfy ๐œ…0 = 0. If ๐œ… |= (๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )) holds, there โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ wRep((๐ต(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ))) = {๐‘}, and therefore Rep(๐‘Ÿ1 ) = {๐‘Ž} must be weak representative for (๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )), hence there โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ and Rep((๐ต(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ))) = {๐‘}. So finally, we have to check must be a constant vector โƒ—๐‘Ž such that ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘Ž โƒ— )) < the last condition (5) from Definition 6 (B) for ๐‘Ž and ๐‘, and ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Žโƒ— )๐ต(๐‘Žโƒ— )). This is possible only if ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘Žโƒ— )) = 0 find that ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž)๐ต(๐‘Ž)) = โˆž = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)), hence (5) is and ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘Ž โƒ— )) = โˆž, since ๐œ… has only these two ranks. violated. Therefore, ๐œ‚1 = 0 cannot ensure the acceptance of This implies ๐œ…(๐œ”) = โˆž for all ๐œ” |= ๐ด(๐‘Ž โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘Žโƒ— ), i.e., for ๐‘Ÿ1 . all ๐œ” |= ๐ด(๐‘Ž โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘Ž โƒ— ), ๐œ” ฬธ|= โ„ฑ. Via contraposition, โ„ฑ |= On the other hand, for any (finite) ๐œ‚1 > 0 and for any ยฌ(๐ด(๐‘Ž โƒ— )) โ‰ก ๐ด(๐‘Ž โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘Ž โƒ— ) โ‡’ ๐ต(๐‘Žโƒ— ). This was to be shown. constant ๐‘ ฬธโˆˆ {๐‘Ž, ๐‘}, we then calculate ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)) = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)) = 0 < ๐œ‚1 = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)). Hence each such ๐‘ is a weak representative satisfying ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)) = 3.3. c-Representations for Defeasible ๐’œโ„’๐’ž ๐œ‚1 < โˆž = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž)๐ต(๐‘Ž)). So in this case, ๐‘Ž cannot be a strong representative of ๐‘Ÿ1 , and we obtain Rep(๐‘Ÿ1 ) = The basic idea of our approach is to understand defeasi- ๐‘ˆฮฃ โˆ– {๐‘Ž, ๐‘}. Obviously, any ๐‘ โˆˆ ๐‘ˆฮฃ โˆ– {๐‘} cannot be a ble subsumptions as open first-order conditionals. This (weak) representative of (๐ต(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)), and therefore we have allows for considering defeasible ๐’œโ„’๐’ž knowledge bases wRep((๐ต(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ))) = Rep((๐ต(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ))) = {๐‘}. Fi- as first-order (conditional) knowledge bases and make use nally, since for any ๐‘ โˆˆ Rep(๐‘Ÿ1 ), ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)) = ๐œ‚1 < of ranking functions to provide semantics for defeasible โˆž = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘)๐ต(๐‘)), also (5) can be satisfied. Therefore, any ๐’œโ„’๐’ž knowledge bases. Even more, we are then able to finite ๐œ‚1 > 0 in (8) yields a c-representation of ๐’ฆโ„ฌ. reason inductively from defeasible ๐’œโ„’๐’ž knowledge bases via c-representations. We will investigate both the general Nevertheless, if c-representations of a first-order knowl- ranking-based semantics of defeasible ๐’œโ„’๐’ž reasoning and edge base exist at all, then there are usually infinitely many its more sophisticated version based on c-representations of them. E.g., in Example 2 above, infinitely many ๐œ‚1 > 0 in the following to show the potential of this semantics for define infinitely many c-representations. Therefore, some description logics. Since this paper only takes first steps in kind of selection procedure is needed in order to formal- this direction, we want to focus on main techniques of our ize which c-representations an inductive inference operator approach to not burden the general line of thought with should choose. too many technical details. Therefore, the following three prerequisites apply for the rest of this paper: Definition 10 (selection strategy ๐œŽ). A selection strategy (for c-representations) is a function ๐œŽ assigning to each first- 1. Both components โ„ฑ and โ„› of first-order conditional order conditional knowledge base ๐’ฆโ„ฌ = โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ an impact knowledge bases do not mention any constant. For vector โƒ—๐œ‚ โˆˆ N|โ„›| defeasible ๐’œโ„’๐’ž knowledge bases, this means that ๐œŽ : ๐’ฆโ„ฌ โ†ฆโ†’ โƒ—๐œ‚ the ABox is empty. such that the OCF obtained by using โƒ—๐œ‚ as impacts in Defini- 2. The ranking-based semantics for open first-order tion 9 is a c-representation of โ„›. conditionals is restricted to option (A) of Definition 6, i.e., in the following, ๐œ… |= ๐‘Ÿ = (๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )) iff โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ With the help of selection strategies, we are now able to Rep(๐‘Ÿ) ฬธ= โˆ… and define inductive inference operators specifically for infer- ences obtained from c-representations of a given knowledge ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )) < ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )). โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘ฅ base. 3. Moreover, we also presuppose that there are c-rep Definition 11 (C๐œŽ ). An inductive inference operator for โ€œenoughโ€ constants available in ๐‘ˆฮฃ to ensure that c-representations with selection strategy ๐œŽ is a function for every conditional there is some constant vector that can serve as a strong representative, and that Cc-rep ๐œŽ : ๐’ฆโ„ฌ โ†ฆโ†’ ๐œ…๐œŽ(๐’ฆโ„ฌ) non-acceptance of conditionals is not due to |๐‘ˆฮฃ | being too small. E.g., one may assume that for every where ๐œŽ is a selection strategy for c -representations. As before, conditional ๐‘Ÿ = (๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅโƒ— )) there exists a special a corresponding inductive inference relation can be obtained constant vector โƒ—๐‘Ž๐‘Ÿ with โƒ—๐‘Ž๐‘Ÿ โˆˆ โ„‹๐‘Ÿ the components of via Equation (6). which do not occur anywhere else in the knowledge It can easily be checked that the postulates (DI) and base. (TV) are satisfied by all inference relations induced from The first prerequisite is not uncommon for description logics c-representations. (DI) is ensured by the fact that each c- and is an intuitive justification for the second prerequisite. representation is a model of the knowledge base, and (TV) Although the ranking-based conditional semantics for first- is immediate from Equation (7), as the following lemma order knowledge bases from Section 2.1 is able very well shows. to deal with information about individuals and even allows for having a defeasible ABox, as Examples 1 and 2 illustrate, Lemma 1. Let โŸจโ„ฑ, โˆ…โŸฉ be a first-order knowledge base, let these examples also show how intricate investigations can ๐œ… be a c-representation of โŸจโ„ฑ, โˆ…โŸฉ. Then for any conditional be when option (B) of Definition 6 must be applied. This (๐ต(๐‘ฅโƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅโƒ— )), ๐œ… |= (๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )) only if there is a constant option is typically relevant only in cases where knowledge vector โƒ—๐‘Ž such that โ„ฑ |= ๐ด(๐‘Ž โƒ— ) โ‡’ ๐ต(๐‘Ž โƒ— ). or beliefs about individuals are present. Since we focus on generic (conditional) beliefs in this paper, i.e., our knowledge bases consist of quantified first-order sentences and open (CMโˆƒ ) If โˆƒ๐‘Ÿ.๐ด โŠ โˆผ ๐ถ and โˆƒ๐‘Ÿ.๐ด โˆผ โˆ€๐‘Ÿ.๐ต, then โˆƒ๐‘Ÿ.(๐ดโŠ“๐ต) โˆผ โŠ โŠ conditionals representing defeasible subsumptions, we use ๐ถ. only option (A) of Definition 6 in this paper. In fact, condition (4) is enough to ensure the acceptance (CMโˆ€ ) If โˆ€๐‘Ÿ.๐ด โŠ โˆผ ๐ถ and โˆ€๐‘Ÿ.๐ด โˆผ โˆ€๐‘Ÿ.๐ต, then โˆ€๐‘Ÿ.(๐ดโŠ“๐ต) โˆผ โŠ โŠ of a conditional, as the following proposition shows. ๐ถ. (RMโˆƒ ) If โˆƒ๐‘Ÿ.๐ด โŠ โˆผ ๐ถ and โˆƒ๐‘Ÿ.๐ด โˆผ โˆ€๐‘Ÿ.ยฌ๐ต, then โˆƒ๐‘Ÿ.(๐ด โŠ“ โŠ โงธ๏ธ€ Proposition 2. Let ๐œ… be an OCF and let (๐ต(๐‘ฅโƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )) be an open conditional. If ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )) < ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )) holds, ๐ต) โŠโˆผ ๐ถ. then ๐œ… |= (๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )). (RMโˆ€ ) If โˆ€๐‘Ÿ.๐ด โŠ โˆผ ๐ถ and โˆ€๐‘Ÿ.๐ด โˆผ โˆ€๐‘Ÿ.ยฌ๐ต, then โˆ€๐‘Ÿ.(๐ด โŠ“ โŠ โงธ๏ธ€ ๐ต) โŠโˆผ ๐ถ. Proof. We have to show that (4) ensures that the con- ditional has strong representatives. Let โƒ—๐‘Ž be such that We now present a version of the KLM-style postulates ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )) = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘Ž โƒ— )). Since ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )) < using first-order conditionals. Since concepts and roles in ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )) โ‰ค ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘Ž โƒ— )), we have ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘Ž โƒ— )) < description logics are unary and binary predicates, respec- ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘Ž โƒ— )). Therefore, โƒ—๐‘Ž is at least a weak representative tively, we use single variables ๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ instead of vectors โƒ—๐‘ฅ here of (๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )), which means that Rep((๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— ))) ฬธ= โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ in order to simplify notation. However, none of the proofs โˆ…. Because (A) holds by definition, it follows that ๐œ… |= in this paper rely on the arity of the predicates. Moreover, (๐ต(๐‘ฅโƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )). in compliance with the prerequisites stated in the previous section, we can assume that there is at least one constant To motivate prerequisite (3), consider Example 2 again. If symbol, i.e. ๐‘ˆฮฃ ฬธ= โˆ…. ๐‘ˆฮฃ would consist only of the constants ๐‘Ž and ๐‘, conditional ๐‘Ÿ1 could not be accepted for the only reason that neither ๐‘Ž (Ref) ๐œ… |= (๐ด(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)). nor ๐‘ can be a strong representative for ๐‘Ÿ1 (please see the argumentation for case ๐œ‚1 = 0 in the example). At least a (LLE) If ๐œ… ||โˆ’ โˆ€๐‘ฅ.[๐ด(๐‘ฅ) โ‡” ๐ต(๐‘ฅ)] and ๐œ… |= (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)), third constant ๐‘ ฬธโˆˆ {๐‘Ž, ๐‘} is needed to ensure the acceptance then ๐œ… |= (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)|๐ต(๐‘ฅ)). of ๐‘Ÿ1 . (RW) If ๐œ… ||โˆ’ โˆ€๐‘ฅ.[๐ต(๐‘ฅ) โ‡’ ๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)] and ๐œ… |= (๐ต(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)), However, even under all three prerequisites from above, then ๐œ… |= (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)). it is hard to make general statements about the consistency of a first-order knowledge base, or the system of inequalities (And) If ๐œ… |= (๐ต(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)), (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)), then ๐œ… |= that impact factors in c-representations have to solve. The (๐ต(๐‘ฅ) โˆง ๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)). papers [13, 14] present a sufficient condition for the consis- tency of a first-order knowledge base by lifting the concept (Or) If ๐œ… |= (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)), (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)|๐ต(๐‘ฅ)), then ๐œ… |= of a tolerance partition (on which the propositional system (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ) โˆจ ๐ต(๐‘ฅ)). Z [15] is based) to the first-order case. However, it is still an (CM) If ๐œ… |= (๐ต(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)), (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)), then ๐œ… |= open question under which conditions c-representations for (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ) โˆง ๐ต(๐‘ฅ)). a first-order knowledge base exist. Our conjecture here is that they exist if the knowledge base is consistent, i.e., if it (RM) If ๐œ… |= (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)) and ๐œ… ฬธ|= (๐ต(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)), then has a ranking model at all, just as in the propositional case. ๐œ… |= (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ) โˆง ๐ต(๐‘ฅ)). We leave further investigations into this research question for future work and focus on the quality of inductive rea- The translation of the quantified postulates using first-order soning based on c-representations for defeasible description conditionals is given below. logics in the following. (CMโˆƒ ) If ๐œ… |= (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ) | โˆƒ๐‘ฆ.[๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โˆง ๐ด(๐‘ฆ)]) and ๐œ… |= (โˆ€๐‘ฆ.[๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โ‡’ ๐ต(๐‘ฆ)] | โˆƒ๐‘ฆ.[๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โˆง ๐ด(๐‘ฆ)]), then 4. KLM-style Postulates and Beyond ๐œ… |= (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)|โˆƒ๐‘ฆ.๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โˆง ๐ด(๐‘ฆ) โˆง ๐ต(๐‘ฆ)). In [4], the well-known KLM postulates for non-monotonic (CMโˆ€ ) If ๐œ… |= (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ) | โˆ€๐‘ฆ.[๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โ‡’ ๐ด(๐‘ฆ)]) and ๐œ… |= reasoning were translated for use with defeasible description (โˆ€๐‘ฆ.[๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โ‡’ ๐ต(๐‘ฆ)] | โˆ€๐‘ฆ.[๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โ‡’ ๐ด(๐‘ฆ)]), logics, and also the postulate of rational monotonicity was then ๐œ… |= (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ) | โˆ€๐‘ฆ.[๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โ‡’ (๐ด(๐‘ฆ) โˆง ๐ต(๐‘ฆ))]). considered. Let ๐ด, ๐ต, ๐ถ be concepts. (RMโˆƒ ) If ๐œ… |= (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ) | โˆƒ๐‘ฆ.[๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โˆง ๐ด(๐‘ฆ)]) and ๐œ… ฬธ|= (Ref) ๐ด โŠ (โˆ€๐‘ฆ.[๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โ‡’ ๐ต(๐‘ฆ)] | โˆƒ๐‘ฆ.[๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โˆง ๐ด(๐‘ฆ)]), then โˆผ ๐ด. ๐œ… |= (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ) | โˆƒ๐‘ฆ.[๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โˆง ๐ด(๐‘ฆ) โˆง ๐ต(๐‘ฆ)]). (LLE) If ๐ด โ‰ก ๐ต and ๐ด โŠ โˆผ ๐ถ, then ๐ต โˆผ ๐ถ. โŠ (RMโˆ€ ) If ๐œ… |= (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ) | โˆ€๐‘ฆ.[๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โ‡’ ๐ด(๐‘ฆ)]) and ๐œ… ฬธ|= (RW) If ๐ด โŠ โˆผ ๐ต and ๐ต โŠ‘ ๐ถ, then ๐ด โˆผ ๐ถ. โŠ (โˆ€๐‘ฆ.[๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โ‡’ ๐ต(๐‘ฆ)] | โˆ€๐‘ฆ.[๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โ‡’ ๐ด(๐‘ฆ)]), then ๐œ… |= (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ) | โˆ€๐‘ฆ.[๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โ‡’ (๐ด(๐‘ฆ) โˆง ๐ต(๐‘ฆ))]). (And) If ๐ด โŠ โˆผ ๐ต and ๐ด โˆผ ๐ถ, then ๐ด โˆผ (๐ต โŠ“ ๐ถ). โŠ โŠ Proposition 3. All of the postulates given above hold for โˆผ ๐ถ and ๐ต โˆผ ๐ถ, then (๐ด โŠ” ๐ต) โˆผ ๐ถ. (Or) If ๐ด โŠ โŠ โŠ every OCF ๐œ…. (CM) If ๐ด โŠ โˆผ ๐ต and ๐ด โˆผ ๐ถ, then (๐ด โŠ“ ๐ต) โˆผ ๐ถ. โŠ โŠ Proof. In the following proofs for the individual postulates, (RM) If ๐ด โŠ we implicitly use Proposition 2 and prove the acceptance โˆผ ๐ถ and ๐ด โˆผ ยฌ๐ต, then (๐ด โŠ“ ๐ต) โˆผ ๐ถ. โŠ โŠ โงธ๏ธ€ of desired conditionals by proving that their verification is Moreover, in [4], quantified versions of (CM) and (RM) more plausible than their falsification. which are adapted to the specific form of DL concepts have (Ref): This postulate is straightforward as ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)) < been presented. ๐œ…(โŠฅ) by definition. (LLE): Let ๐ด(๐‘ฅ) be equivalent to ๐ต(๐‘ฅ) for all ๐‘ฅ in all Postulate (CLA) claims that each ranking model of a con- feasible possible worlds, and let ๐œ… |= (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)). Be- ditional knowledge base respects all classical consequences cause of the equivalence of ๐ด(๐‘ฅ) and ๐ต(๐‘ฅ), we have of the facts. Postulate (SUB) reveals a compatibility between ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž)๐ถ(๐‘Ž)) = ๐œ…(๐ต(๐‘Ž)๐ถ(๐‘Ž)) and ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘Ž)๐ถ(๐‘Ž)) = a conditional and its counterpart as material implication. ๐œ…(๐ต(๐‘Ž)๐ถ(๐‘Ž)) for every ๐‘Ž. Therefore, if ๐‘Ž is a represen- But note that this counterpart is only plausible. tative of (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)), it has to be a representative of The next proposition shows that both these postulates (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)|๐ต(๐‘ฅ)) as well. Hence, if condition (A) or (B) from are also satisfied by our approach. Definition 6 holds for (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ)), the respective condi- tion has to hold for (๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)|๐ต(๐‘ฅ)), too. Proposition 4. Let ๐œ… be an OCF. If ๐œ… is a model of โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ (RW): We have ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)) < ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)) and then ๐œ… ||โˆ’ ๐›ผ for all ๐›ผ โˆˆ โ„’ฮฃ with โ„ฑ |= ๐›ผ. If ๐œ… is a model of the fact โˆ€๐‘ฅ.[๐ต(๐‘ฅ) โ‡’ ๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)]. Therefore, we have โŸจโˆ…, {(๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— ))}โŸฉ then ๐œ… |= (๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— ) โ‡’ ๐ต(๐‘ฅโƒ— )|โŠค). ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)) โ‰ค ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)) = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)) and Proof. Let ๐œ… be a model of โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ, let ๐›ผ โˆˆ โ„’ฮฃ with ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)) = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)) โ‰ฅ ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)). โ„ฑ |= ๐›ผ. Then ๐œ…(๐œ”) = โˆž for all ๐œ” ฬธ|= โ„ฑ and hence Hence, ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)) < ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)). also for all ๐œ” ฬธ|= ๐ด. Therefore, ๐œ… ||โˆ’ ๐›ผ. If ๐œ… is a (And): Because of ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)) < ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)) model of โŸจโˆ…, {(๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— ))}โŸฉ then ๐œ… |= (๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅโƒ— )), and ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)) < ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)), the minimal worlds i.e., ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )) < ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )). Since ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ—) โ‡’ ๐œ” in ๐œ… with ๐œ” |= ๐ด(๐‘Ž) for some ๐‘Ž have to sat- ๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )) = ๐œ…(ยฌ๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— ) โˆจ ๐ต(๐‘ฅโƒ— )) โ‰ค ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )), the state- โƒ— )๐ต(๐‘ฅ isfy both ๐ต(๐‘Ž) and ๐ถ(๐‘Ž) as well. Therefore, we ment follows. can conclude that ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)) = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)) = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)). It follows that ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)) < The next postulate deals with obviously irrelevant vari- min{๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ), ๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)} = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)(๐ต(๐‘ฅ) โˆจ ๐ถ(๐‘ฅ))). ables in an open conditional, i.e., variables that do not occur (Or): It holds that ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ) โˆจ ๐ต(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)) = in both the antecedent and the consequent of the conditional. min{๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)), ๐œ…(๐ต(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ))} < It adapts the postulate (IRR) from [8]. min{๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)), ๐œ…(๐ต(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ))} = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ) โˆจ ๐ต(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)). (IRR) Let โƒ—๐‘ฅ, โƒ—๐‘ฆ , โƒ—๐‘ง mention variables from pairwise dis- (CM): Because of ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)) < ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)) and joint sets. Then โŸจโˆ…, {(๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— , โƒ—๐‘ง ))}โŸฉ |โˆผ โƒ— , โƒ—๐‘ฆ )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)) < ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)), the minimal worlds ๐œ” (๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— , โƒ—๐‘)|๐ด(๐‘ฅโƒ— , โƒ—๐‘Ž)) for all proper groundings โƒ—๐‘Ž, โƒ—๐‘ of in ๐œ… with ๐œ” |= ๐ด(๐‘Ž) for some ๐‘Ž have to satisfy both โƒ—๐‘ง resp. โƒ—๐‘ฆ in ๐ด resp. ๐ต. ๐ต(๐‘Ž) and ๐ถ(๐‘Ž) as well. Therefore, we can conclude that ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)) = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)) = ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)). This postulate does not hold in general for our ranking It follows that ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)) < ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)) โ‰ค semantics but we can show that it holds for ranking models ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฅ)๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)). which are c-representations. (CMโˆƒ ): Let ๐œ” be a minimal world in ๐œ… such that ๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ ex- ist with ๐œ” |= ๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ)๐ด(๐‘ฆ). Since (A) holds, for every ๐œ” โ€ฒ Proposition 5. Let โƒ—๐‘ฅ, โƒ—๐‘ฆ , โƒ—๐‘ง mention variables from pairwise with ๐œ…(๐œ” โ€ฒ ) = ๐œ…(๐œ”) we have ๐œ” โ€ฒ |= โˆ€๐‘ฅ.โˆ€๐‘ฆ.[๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ)๐ด(๐‘ฆ) โ‡’ disjoint sets, and let ๐’ฆโ„ฌ = โŸจโˆ…, {(๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— , โƒ—๐‘ฆ )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— , โƒ—๐‘ง ))}โŸฉ. Let ๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)๐ต(๐‘ฆ)], and for every ๐œ” โ€ฒโ€ฒ with ๐œ…(๐œ” โ€ฒโ€ฒ ) < ๐œ…(๐œ”) ๐œ… = ๐œ…๐œŽ(๐’ฆโ„ฌ) be a strategic c-representation of ๐’ฆโ„ฌ. Then we have ๐œ” โ€ฒโ€ฒ |= โˆ€๐‘ฅ.โˆ€๐‘ฆ.๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โˆจ ๐ด(๐‘ฆ). Therefore, ๐œ… |= (๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— , โƒ—๐‘)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— , โƒ—๐‘Ž)) for all proper groundings โƒ—๐‘Ž, โƒ—๐‘ of โƒ—๐‘ง ๐œ…(๐œ”) = ๐œ…(๐ถ(๐‘ฅ) โˆง โˆƒ๐‘ฆ.[๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ)๐ด(๐‘ฆ)๐ต(๐‘ฆ)]) < ๐œ…(๐ถ(๐‘ฅ) โˆง resp. โƒ—๐‘ฆ in ๐ด resp. ๐ต. โˆƒ๐‘ฆ.[๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ)๐ด(๐‘ฆ)๐ต(๐‘ฆ)]). (CMโˆ€ ): Let ๐œ” be a minimal world in ๐œ… such that ๐‘ฅ ex- Proof. Let โƒ—๐‘ฅ, โƒ—๐‘ฆ , โƒ—๐‘ง mention variables from pairwise disjoint ists with ๐œ” |= โˆ€๐‘ฆ.๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โ‡’ ๐ด(๐‘ฆ). Since (A) holds, for sets, and let ๐’ฆโ„ฌ = โŸจโˆ…, {(๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— , โƒ—๐‘ง ))}โŸฉ. Each c- โƒ— , โƒ—๐‘ฆ )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ every ๐œ” โ€ฒ with ๐œ…(๐œ” โ€ฒ ) = ๐œ…(๐œ”) it holds for all ๐‘ฅ that ๐œ” โ€ฒ |= representation ๐œ… of ๐’ฆโ„ฌ has the form โˆ€๐‘ฆ.[๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โ‡’ ๐ด(๐‘ฆ)] implies ๐œ” โ€ฒ |= ๐ถ(๐‘ฅ)โˆงโˆ€๐‘ฆ.[๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โ‡’ ๐œ…(๐œ”) = ๐œ…0 + ๐‘“1 (๐œ”)๐œ‚1 , ๐ต(๐‘ฆ)]. And for every ๐œ” โ€ฒโ€ฒ with ๐œ…(๐œ” โ€ฒโ€ฒ ) < ๐œ…(๐œ”) we have ๐œ” โ€ฒโ€ฒ |= โˆ€๐‘ฅ.โˆƒ๐‘ฆ.๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ)๐ด(๐‘ฆ). Therefore, ๐œ…(๐œ”) = ๐œ…(๐ถ(๐‘ฅ) โˆง where ๐‘“1 (๐œ”) = #{(๐‘Ž โƒ— , โƒ—๐‘, โƒ—)|(๐‘Ž ๐‘ โƒ— , โƒ—๐‘, โƒ—) ๐‘ are proper groundings โˆ€๐‘ฆ.[๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โ‡’ ๐ด(๐‘ฆ)๐ต(๐‘ฆ)]) < ๐œ…(๐ถ(๐‘ฅ) โˆง โˆ€๐‘ฆ.[๐‘…(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โ‡’ of โƒ—๐‘ง , โƒ—๐‘ฆ , โƒ—๐‘ฅ in (๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— , โƒ—๐‘ฆ )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— , โƒ—๐‘ง ))} and ๐œ…0 , ๐œ‚1 โˆˆ N with ๐œ‚1 ๐ด(๐‘ฆ)๐ต(๐‘ฆ)]). suitably chosen to ensure that ๐œ… |= (๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— , โƒ—๐‘ง )). This โƒ— , โƒ—๐‘ฆ )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ For the case (A), (RM), (RMโˆƒ ), and (RMโˆ€ ) are implied by latter condition enforces that (CM), (CMโˆƒ ), and (CMโˆ€ ), respectively. In [8], the authors present an approach to defeasible rea- min ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ โƒ—, โƒ—๐‘) < min ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ โƒ—, โƒ—๐‘Ž)๐ต(๐‘ โƒ—, โƒ—๐‘). โƒ—, โƒ—๐‘Ž)๐ต(๐‘ โƒ— โƒ— ,๐‘ ๐‘Ž,๐‘ โƒ— โƒ— โƒ— ,๐‘ ๐‘Ž,๐‘ โƒ— soning for a restricted first-order logic which they evaluate according to postulates that are inspired by rational closure The left hand side here is 0 (all instantiations verifying the [16]. Beyond the KLM-postulates the satisfaction of which conditional), and the right hand side here is ๐œ‚1 (just one we proved above, they also propose further postulates. E.g., falsification of the conditional), so we obtain ๐œ‚1 > 0 from the postulate (INCL) in that paper corresponds to our (DI). In that. the following, we adapt and extend three of those properties Now, if we take any proper groundings โƒ—๐‘Ž, โƒ—๐‘ of โƒ—๐‘ง resp. โƒ—๐‘ฆ that deal with relations to classical logic and irrelevance to in ๐ด resp. ๐ต and check whether the framework here. First, we consider relations to classical logic resp. implication: min ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ โƒ— ๐‘ โƒ—, โƒ—๐‘ง )๐ต(๐‘ โƒ—, โƒ—๐‘ฆ ) < min ๐œ…(๐ด(๐‘ โƒ—, โƒ—๐‘ง )๐ต(๐‘ โƒ— ๐‘ โƒ—, โƒ—๐‘ฆ ), (CLA) Let ๐’ฆโ„ฌ = โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ be a first-order conditional we find again that the left hand side is 0 and the right hand knowledge base, and let ๐œ… be a model of ๐’ฆโ„ฌ. If side is ๐œ‚1 . Since ๐œ‚1 > 0 must hold, we conclude that ๐œ… |= โ„ฑ |= ๐›ผ โˆˆ โ„’ฮฃ , then ๐œ… ||โˆ’ ๐›ผ. (๐ต(๐‘ฅโƒ— , โƒ—๐‘)|๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— , โƒ—๐‘Ž)) for all proper groundings โƒ—๐‘Ž, โƒ—๐‘ of โƒ—๐‘ง resp. โƒ—๐‘ฆ (SUB) โŸจโˆ…, {(๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— ))}โŸฉ |โˆผ (๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )|๐ด(๐‘ฅ โƒ— ) โ‡’ ๐ต(๐‘ฅ โƒ— )|โŠค). in ๐ด resp. ๐ต. 5. Application of OCF-based A cwm -model โ„ณ satisfies a defeasible subsumption ๐ถ โŠโˆผ ๐ท iff the <โ„ณ -minimal instances of ๐ถ are instances of ๐ท: Reasoning to a DL Knowledge โ„ณ โ„ โ„ Base โˆผ ๐ท iff min(< , ๐ถ ) โІ ๐ท , โ„ณ |= ๐ถ โŠ The goal of this section is to provide an example for how where min(<, ๐‘†) = {๐‘  โˆˆ ๐‘† | โˆ„๐‘ โ€ฒ โˆˆ ๐‘† : ๐‘ โ€ฒ < ๐‘ } as usual. a DL knowledge base can be translated into a first-order Now we move towards defining ๐‘๐‘คm -entailment from knowledge base, so that OCF-based inductive reasoning can defeasible knowledge bases. Let ๐’ฎ๐’ฆโ„ฌ be the set that contains be applied. Further, we point out some commonalities and ๐ถ and ยฌ๐ถ for all concepts ๐ถ that occur in a knowledge base differences between the OCF-based semantics and the cwm - ๐’ฆโ„ฌ = โŸจ๐’ฏ , ๐’Ÿ, ๐’œโŸฉ. We say that {๐ท1 , . . . , ๐ท๐‘š } โІ ๐’ฎ๐’ฆโ„ฌ is semantics introduced by Giordano and Theseider Duprรฉ in consistent with ๐’ฆโ„ฌ if [5] which we consider first. ๐’ฏ ฬธ|= (๐ท1 โŠ“ ยท ยท ยท โŠ“ ๐ท๐‘š ) โŠ‘ โŠฅ , 5.1. Concept-Wise Multipreference i.e. if the intersection of ๐ท1 to ๐ท๐‘š does not have to be Semantics empty. In [5], a concept-wise multipreference (cwm ) semantics for Definition 14 (canonical interpretation [5]). A cwm -model ranked defeasible knowledge bases was presented, which โ„ณ = โŸจโˆ†โ„ , ยทโ„ , <โ„ณ โŸฉ is canonical for a knowledge base makes use of a typicality operator T on concepts used for ๐’ฆโ„ฌ = โŸจ๐’ฏ , ๐’Ÿ, ๐’œโŸฉ if โŸจโˆ†โ„ , ยทโ„ โŸฉ satisfies ๐’ฏ , and for any set of the construction of typicality inclusions of the form T(๐ถ) โŠ‘ concepts {๐ท1 , . . . , ๐ท๐‘š } โІ ๐’ฎ๐’ฆโ„ฌ consistent with ๐’ฆโ„ฌ, there ๐ท (where ๐ถ, ๐ท are concepts). We provide an equivalent exists ๐‘ฅ โˆˆ (๐ท1 โŠ“ ยท ยท ยท โŠ“ ๐ท๐‘š )โ„ . definition using the notation ๐ถ โŠ โˆผ ๐ท here. Note that our definition here is a simplified version of the one given in In other words, an interpretation is canonical if there is [5], because we only consider non-ranked knowledge bases at least one domain element ๐‘ฅ โˆˆ โˆ†โ„ in every intersection in this paper. of concepts that occur in ๐’ฆโ„ฌ. In order to define a preference relation over individuals, Definition 15 (T-compliant interpretation [5]). A cwm - the DBox ๐’Ÿ is partitioned based on the left-hand side of the model โ„ณ = โŸจโˆ†โ„ , ยทโ„ , <โ„ณ โŸฉ is T-compliant for a knowledge defeasible inclusions. Let ๐’ž = {๐ถ | (๐ถ โŠ โˆผ ๐ท) โˆˆ ๐’Ÿ}. For base ๐’ฆโ„ฌ = โŸจ๐’ฏ , ๐’Ÿ, ๐’œโŸฉ if โŸจโˆ†โ„ , ยทโ„ โŸฉ satisfies ๐’ฏ and for all ๐ถ โˆˆ each concept ๐ถ โˆˆ ๐’ž, let ๐’Ÿ๐ถ be the set that contains all de- ๐’ž with ๐ถ โ„ ฬธ= โˆ…, there exists ๐‘ฅ โˆˆ ๐ถ โ„ such that ๐’Ÿ๐ถ โ„ (๐‘ฅ) = ๐’Ÿ๐ถ . feasible inclusions (๐ถ โŠโˆผ ๐ท) โˆˆ ๐’Ÿ, and for an interpretation โ„ = โŸจโˆ†โ„ , ยทโ„ โŸฉ, let ๐’Ÿ๐ถ โ„ (๐‘ฅ) be the set of defeasible inclusions The definition above means that for all non-empty con- from ๐’Ÿ๐ถ which are not violated by ๐‘ฅ, i.e. cepts ๐ถ, there is at least one instance of ๐ถ which does not violate any defeasible subsumptions in with ๐ถ on the left- โ„ โ„ ๐’Ÿ๐ถ (๐‘ฅ) = {(๐ถ โŠ โˆผ ๐ท) โˆˆ ๐’Ÿ๐ถ | ๐‘ฅ โˆˆ (ยฌ๐ถ โŠ” ๐ท) }. hand side. Based on the amount of non-violated defeasible subsump- Definition 16 (cwm -entailment [5]). A defeasible subsump- tion ๐‘‘ = ๐ถ โŠโˆผ ๐ท is cw -entailed by a knowledge base ๐’ฆโ„ฌ m tions, for each concept ๐ถ โˆˆ ๐’ž a preference relation โ‰ค๐ถ is defined via (short: ๐’ฆโ„ฌ |โ‰ˆcwm ๐‘‘) if all canonical and T-compliant cwm - models of ๐’ฆโ„ฌ satisfy ๐‘‘. โ„ โ„ ๐‘ฅ โ‰ค๐ถ ๐‘ฆ iff |๐’Ÿ๐ถ (๐‘ฅ)| โ‰ฅ |๐’Ÿ๐ถ (๐‘ฆ)|. (9) It was proven in [5] that cwm -entailment fulfills the prop- Before we can define cwm -models, we need one more erties (Ref), (LLE), (And), (Or), and (CM). definition: If a concept ๐ถ is a (potentially) strict subset of another concept ๐ท, the subset ๐ถ can be viewed as more 5.2. Translation of a DL Knowledge Base specific then ๐ท. In order to allow for a comparison between the approach Definition 12 (specificity of concepts [5]). Given a defea- of [5] and the OCF-based semantics in the next part of this sible knowledge base ๐’ฆโ„ฌ = โŸจ๐’ฏ , ๐’Ÿ, ๐’œโŸฉ and two concepts section, we now give an example for how a defeasible knowl- ๐ถ, ๐ท โˆˆ ๐’ž, we call ๐ถ more specific than ๐ท (short: ๐ถ โ‰ป ๐ท) edge base can be transformed into a first-order knowledge iff ๐’ฏ |= ๐ถ โŠ‘ ๐ท and ๐’ฏ ฬธ|= ๐ท โŠ‘ ๐ถ. base. In cwm -models of defeasible knowledge bases, the prefer- Example 3. We consider the following example DL knowl- ence relations for the specific concepts defined in Equation 9 edge base, which is very similar to the running example pre- are combined into a global preference relation based on the sented in [5]. conceptsโ€™ specificity. ๐’ฏ = {Employee โŠ‘ Adult, PhdStudent โŠ‘ Student, Definition 13 (cwm -model [5]). A cwm -model of a defea- (โˆƒhas_funding.โŠค โŠ“ ยฌFunded) โŠ‘ โŠฅ}, sible knowledge base ๐’ฆโ„ฌ = โŸจ๐’ฏ , ๐’Ÿ, ๐’œโŸฉ is a tuple โ„ณ = โŸจโˆ†โ„ , ยทโ„ , <โ„ณ โŸฉ, where โˆ†โ„ ฬธ= โˆ…, โŸจโˆ†โ„ , ยทโ„ โŸฉ is an ๐’œโ„’๐’ž- ๐’ŸEmployee = { ๐‘‘1 : Employee โŠ โˆผ ยฌYoung, interpretation satisfying ๐’ฏ and ๐’œ, and <โ„ณ is an ordering ๐‘‘2 : Employee โŠ โˆผ โˆƒhas_boss.Employee }, over โˆ†โ„ such that ๐‘ฅ <โ„ณ ๐‘ฆ iff ๐’ŸStudent = { ๐‘‘3 : Student โŠ โˆผ โˆƒhas_classes.โŠค, 1. ๐‘ฅ <๐ถ ๐‘ฆ for some ๐ถ โˆˆ ๐’ž, and ๐‘‘4 : Student โŠ โˆผ Young, 2. for all ๐ถ โˆˆ ๐’ž: ๐‘ฅ โ‰ค๐ถ ๐‘ฆ, or there exists ๐ถ โ€ฒ such that ๐‘‘5 : Student โŠ โˆผ ยฌFunded }, ๐ถ โ€ฒ โ‰ป ๐ถ and ๐‘ฅ <๐ถ โ€ฒ ๐‘ฆ. ๐’ŸPhdStudent = { ๐‘‘6 : PhdStudent โŠ โˆผ โˆƒhas_funding.Money, ๐‘‘7 : PhdStudent โŠ โˆผ Bright }. As description logics are fragments of first-order logic, the In the following, we present an example which shows that knowledge base above can easily be translated into a first- the desirable properties of cwm -semantics w.r.t. inheritance order knowledge base. We start by translating the strict sub- of properties are fulfilled by the OCF-based semantics as sumptions in the TBox as facts. well. A full axiomatization of โ€œproper inheritance of proper- tiesโ€ is out of the scope of this paper, and will be addressed โ„ฑ = {โˆ€๐‘ฅ.[Employee(๐‘ฅ) โ‡’ Adult(๐‘ฅ)], in future work. โˆ€๐‘ฅ.[PhdStudent(๐‘ฅ) โ‡’ Student(๐‘ฅ)], Example 4. We consider again the knowledge base from โˆ€๐‘ฅ.[โˆƒ๐‘ฆ.has_funding(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โ‡’ Funded(๐‘ฅ)]} . Example 3. In [5], several possible queries and desirable re- The defeasible subsumptions can be translated as open con- sults are mentioned. Formulated as queries for the first-order ditionals. From now on, all predicates are shortened to their knowledge base defined above, they read as follows. initial letters. 1. โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ |โ‰ˆ๐œ… โˆƒ๐‘ฆ.hb(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) | ๐‘†(๐‘ฅ) โˆง ๐ธ(๐‘ฅ) ? (๏ธ€ )๏ธ€ โ„› = { ๐‘Ÿ1 : (ยฌ๐‘Œ (๐‘ฅ) | ๐ธ(๐‘ฅ)), ห“โ†’ should be(๏ธ€yes (inheritance) 2. โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ |โ‰ˆ๐œ… โˆƒ๐‘ฆ.hc(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) | ๐‘†(๐‘ฅ) โˆง ๐ธ(๐‘ฅ) ? )๏ธ€ ๐‘Ÿ2 : (โˆƒ๐‘ฆ.[hb(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โˆง ๐ธ(๐‘ฆ)] | ๐ธ(๐‘ฅ)), ห“โ†’ should be(๏ธ€yes )๏ธ€ (inheritance) ๐‘Ÿ3 : (โˆƒ๐‘ฆ.hc(๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) | ๐‘†(๐‘ฅ)), 3. โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ |โ‰ˆ๐œ… ยฌ๐น (๐‘ฅ) | ๐‘†(๐‘ฅ) โˆง ๐ธ(๐‘ฅ) ? ๐‘Ÿ4 : (๐‘Œ (๐‘ฅ) | ๐‘†(๐‘ฅ)), ห“โ†’ should be(๏ธ€yes )๏ธ€ (inheritance) ๐‘Ÿ5 : (ยฌ๐น (๐‘ฅ) | ๐‘†(๐‘ฅ)), 4. โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ |โ‰ˆ๐œ… ๐‘Œ (๐‘ฅ) | ๐‘†(๐‘ฅ) โˆง ๐ธ(๐‘ฅ) ? ๐‘Ÿ6 : (โˆƒ๐‘ฆ.[hf (๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ) โˆง ๐‘€ (๐‘ฆ)] | ๐‘ƒ (๐‘ฅ)), ห“โ†’ should be(๏ธ€no (conflict) 5. โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ |โ‰ˆ๐œ… ยฌ๐‘Œ (๐‘ฅ) | ๐‘†(๐‘ฅ) โˆง ๐ธ(๐‘ฅ) ? )๏ธ€ ๐‘Ÿ7 : (๐ต(๐‘ฅ) | ๐‘ƒ (๐‘ฅ)) } ห“โ†’ should be(๏ธ€no )๏ธ€ (conflict) We demonstrate below how the inequality for the acceptance 6. โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ |โ‰ˆ๐œ… ยฌ๐‘Œ (๐‘ฅ) | ๐‘†(๐‘ฅ) โˆง Italian(๐‘ฅ) ? of ๐‘Ÿ6 by a c-representation ๐œ… can be computed. In order to ห“โ†’ should be(๏ธ€no (irrelevance) 7. โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ |โ‰ˆ๐œ… ยฌ๐น (๐‘ฅ) | ๐‘ƒ (๐‘ฅ) ? )๏ธ€ keep formulas compact and readable, we indicate by a dot ฬ‡ (๐‘Ž)) that the literal may be either positive over a literal (e.g. ๐ด ห“โ†’ should be no (override) or negative (๐ด(๐‘Ž) or ยฌ๐ด(๐‘Ž)) and an underscore serves as a When the OCF ๐œ… used for answering the queries above is a wildcard that may be filled by all suitable constants ๐‘ โˆˆ ๐‘ˆฮฃ . (minimal) c-representation, all of the queries are answered For roles, i.e., binary predicates, the constants ๐‘๐‘Ž๐‘– are the ones correctly. As an example, we will compute the answer for used together with a constant ๐‘Ž in order to form a candidate query 7 below. The conditional mentioned in the query is for a strong representative for the rule ๐‘Ÿ๐‘– . accepted by ๐œ… iff ๐œ…(๐น (๐‘ฅ)๐‘ƒ (๐‘ฅ)) < ๐œ…(๐น (๐‘ฅ)๐‘ƒ (๐‘ฅ). Hence, we (4) need to compute these two ranks. ๐œ… |= ๐‘Ÿ6 โ‡” ๐œ…(๐‘ƒ (๐‘ฅ)hf (๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ)๐‘€ (๐‘ฆ)) < ๐œ…(๐‘ƒ (๐‘ฅ) โˆง โˆ€๐‘ฆ.hf (๐‘ฅ, ๐‘ฆ)๐‘€ (๐‘ฆ)) ๐œ…(๐‘ƒ (๐‘ฅ)๐น (๐‘ฅ)) = min ๐œ…(๐‘ƒ (๐‘Ž)๐น (๐‘Ž)) ๐‘Žโˆˆ๐‘ˆฮฃ โ‡” min ๐œ…(๐‘ƒ (๐‘Ž)hf (๐‘Ž, ๐‘๐‘Ž6 )๐‘€ (๐‘๐‘Ž6 )) (๏ธ€ ๐‘Žโˆˆ๐‘ˆฮฃ = min ๐œ… ๐‘ƒ (๐‘Ž)๐น (๐‘Ž)๐‘†(๐‘Ž)hf (๐‘Ž, _) ๐‘Žโˆˆ๐‘ˆฮฃ โ‹€๏ธ < min ๐œ…(๐‘ƒ (๐‘Ž) hf (๐‘Ž, ๐‘)๐‘€ (๐‘)) ๐ธ(๐‘Ž))hbฬ‡ (๐‘Ž, _)hc(๐‘Ž, ๐‘๐‘Ž3 )๐‘Œ (๐‘Ž) ๐‘Žโˆˆ๐‘ˆฮฃ ๐‘โˆˆ๐‘ˆฮฃ ฬ‡ (๐‘Ž)๐‘€ฬ‡ (๐‘Ž) )๏ธ€ (๏ธ ๐ต(๐‘Ž)๐ด โ‡” min ๐œ… ๐‘ƒ (๐‘Ž)hf (๐‘Ž, ๐‘๐‘Ž6 )๐‘€ (๐‘๐‘Ž6 ) = ๐œ‚6 ๐‘Žโˆˆ๐‘ˆฮฃ ๐นฬ‡ (๐‘Ž)๐‘†(๐‘Ž)๐ธ(๐‘Ž)hc(๐‘Ž, ๐‘๐‘Ž3 )๐‘Œ (๐‘Ž) ๐œ…(๐‘ƒ (๐‘ฅ)๐น (๐‘ฅ)) = min ๐œ…(๐‘ƒ (๐‘Ž)๐น (๐‘Ž)) ๐‘Žโˆˆ๐‘ˆฮฃ )๏ธ ฬ‡ (๐‘Ž)๐ต(๐‘Ž)๐‘€ ฬ‡ (๐‘Ž, _) ฬ‡ (๐‘Ž)hb min ๐œ… ๐‘ƒ (๐‘Ž)๐น (๐‘Ž)๐‘†(๐‘Ž)hf (๐‘Ž, ๐‘๐‘Ž6 ) (๏ธ€ ๐ด = ๐‘Žโˆˆ๐‘ˆฮฃ (๏ธ โ‹€๏ธ (๏ธ€ ๐‘€ (๐‘๐‘Ž6 )๐ธ(๐‘Ž))hbฬ‡ (๐‘Ž, _)hc(๐‘Ž, ๐‘๐‘Ž3 ) )๏ธ€ < min ๐œ… ๐‘ƒ (๐‘Ž) hf (๐‘Ž, ๐‘) โˆจ ๐‘€ (๐‘) ๐‘Žโˆˆ๐‘ˆฮฃ ฬ‡ (๐‘Ž)๐‘€ ฬ‡ (๐‘Ž) ๐‘โˆˆ๐‘ˆฮฃ )๏ธ€ ๐‘Œ (๐‘Ž)๐ต(๐‘Ž)๐ด ๐นฬ‡ (๐‘Ž)๐‘†(๐‘Ž)๐ธ(๐‘Ž)hc(๐‘Ž, ๐‘๐‘Ž3 )๐‘Œ (๐‘Ž) = ๐œ‚5 )๏ธ ๐ดฬ‡ (๐‘Ž)๐ต(๐‘Ž)๐‘€ ฬ‡ (๐‘Ž, _) ฬ‡ (๐‘Ž)hb The computation above shows that the conditional โ‡” ๐œ‚5 < ๐œ‚6 (๐น (๐‘ฅ)|๐‘ƒ (๐‘ฅ)) is accepted by ๐œ… if ๐œ‚6 < ๐œ‚5 . However, we know from Example 3 that ๐œ‚5 < ๐œ‚6 . Hence, the answer to the query The other inequalities can be computed in a similar way. The is no. resulting system of inequalities can be solved, i.e. the knowl- edge base โŸจโ„ฑ, โ„›โŸฉ is consistent for the OCF-based semantics The example above shows that the OCF-based semantics, as well. just like cwm -semantics, allows subclasses to appropriately inherit and override information specified for their respec- 5.3. Inheritance of Properties and tive superclass. Observe another interesting feature of c-representations Conflicting Information that comes to light in the example above: We did not have One particular advantage of the cwm -semantics is that it sup- to compute the ranks for all possible worlds or even just the ports sub-concepts to both inherit and override properties values of the ๐œ‚๐‘– , but could answer the query based on the defined for their parent-concepts, depending on whether underlying conditional structures of the knowledge base, there is a conflict of information. This is not the case for e.g. captured by the inequalities between the ๐œ‚๐‘– . Rational Closure [4], which suffers from the well-known There are some key differences between our approach and drowning problem. the semantics proposed for defeasible description logics in the literature. While most of these approaches are based on More advanced properties like syntax splitting [7] could an ordering over individuals and uses some notion of typical be considered for the first-order case as well. Our results individuals for specific concepts, our approach uses an order- concerning the property (IRR) dealing with splitting of vari- ing over possible worlds and makes use of representatives ables can be considered as first steps in this direction. for conditionals. Even if canonical models look very similar to orderings over possible worlds, only considering typi- cality between domain elements (even on a concept-level) References when constructing the global ordering < seems to be less [1] W. Spohn, Ordinal conditional functions: A dynamic restrictive than considering representatives for conditionals, theory of epistemic states, in: W. L. Harper, B. Skyrms as it allows knowledge bases to have models that would be (Eds.), Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and considered inconsistent under our semantics. However, this Statistics, Springer Netherlands, 1988, pp. 105โ€“134. breaks (DI), as the following example shows. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-2865-7_6. Example 5. Consider the following knowledge base. [2] W. Spohn, The Laws of Belief - Ranking Theory and Its Philosophical Applications, Oxford University Press, ๐’ฏ = {๐ด โŠ‘ ๐ต} Oxford, 2014. ๐’Ÿ๐ด = {๐ด โŠ โˆผ ยฌ๐ถ} [3] G. Casini, T. Meyer, K. Moodley, R. Nortjรฉ, Relevant ๐’Ÿ๐ต = {๐ต โŠ โŠ โˆผ ๐ด, ๐ต โˆผ ๐ถ} closure: A new form of defeasible reasoning for de- scription logics, in: E. Fermรฉ, J. Leite (Eds.), Log- A canonical and T-compliant model โ„ณ for this knowledge ics in Artificial Intelligence - 14th European Confer- base is given by the orderings below. The individuals are ence, JELIA 2014, Funchal, Madeira, Portugal, Septem- named after the concepts that they are interpreted in, with ber 24-26, 2014. Proceedings, volume 8761 of Lecture overlines indicating negation, i.e. for the individual ๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘ we Notes in Computer Science, Springer, 2014, pp. 92โ€“106. have ๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘ โˆˆ (ยฌ๐ด โŠ“ ยฌ๐ต โŠ“ ๐ถ)โ„ . doi:10.1007/978-3-319-11558-0_7. ๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘, ๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘, ๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘, ๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘, ๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘ <๐ด ๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘ [4] K. Britz, G. Casini, T. Meyer, K. Moodley, U. Sattler, I. Varzinczak, Principles of KLM-style defeasible de- ๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘, ๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘, ๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘ <๐ต ๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘, ๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘ <๐ต ๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘ scription logics, ACM Transactions on Computational ๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘, ๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘ <โ„ณ ๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘, ๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘ <โ„ณ ๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘ <โ„ณ ๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘ Logic 22 (2020) 1โ€“46. doi:10.1145/3420258. [5] L. Giordano, D. Theseider Duprรฉ, An ASP ap- We have min< (๐ต โ„ ) = {๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘, ๐‘Ž๐‘๐‘}, i.e. min< (๐ต โ„ ) โŠˆ ๐ดโ„ proach for reasoning in a concept-aware multipref- and min< (๐ต โ„ ) โŠˆ ๐ถ โ„ . Therefore, ๐’ฆโ„ฌ ฬธ|โ‰ˆcwm ๐ต โŠ โˆผ ๐ด and erential lightweight DL, Theory and Practice of ๐’ฆโ„ฌ ฬธ|โ‰ˆcwm ๐ต โŠ โˆผ ๐ถ. Logic Programming 20 (2020) 751โ€“766. doi:10.1017/ s1471068420000381. [6] S. Kraus, D. Lehmann, M. Magidor, Nonmonotonic 6. Conclusions reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics, Artificial Intelligence 44 (1990) 167โ€“207. doi:10.1016/ In this paper, we have presented an approach for first-order 0004-3702(90)90101-5. conditional logic from [10], and added a definition of in- [7] G. Kern-Isberner, C. Beierle, G. Brewka, Syntax split- ductive inference operators for first-order knowledge bases. ting = relevance + independence: New postulates for Moreover, we have shown that an inductive inference op- nonmonotonic reasoning from conditional belief bases, erator based on strategic c-representations fulfills the DL- in: Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Con- version of the KLM postulates defined in [4], as well as ference on Principles of Knowledge Representation additional postulates from [8]. Additionally, we have shown and Reasoning, KR-2020, International Joint Confer- how to apply our approach to defeasible DL knowledge ences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2020. bases, while pointing out some commonalities and differ- doi:10.24963/kr.2020/56. ences with cwm -semantics for defeasible description logics [8] G. Casini, T. Meyer, G. Paterson-Jones, I. Varzinczak, [5]. KLM-style defeasibility for restricted first-order logic, The work done in this paper lays the foundation for future in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer In- research on the capabilities of OCF-based semantics for ternational Publishing, 2022, pp. 81โ€“94. doi:10.1007/ first-order conditional knowledge bases and, in particular, 978-3-031-21541-4_6. for more in-depth comparisons between c-representation- [9] F. Baader, I. Horrocks, C. Lutz, U. Sattler, An Introduc- based inductive inference operators and different entailment tion to Description Logic, Cambridge University Press, relations proposed for defeasible DL knowledge bases like 2017. doi:10.1017/9781139025355. rational entailment [17, 4], relevant entailment [3], and cwm - [10] G. Kern-Isberner, M. Thimm, A ranking semantics for entailment [5]. There is some recent work on connections first-order conditionals, in: L. De Raedt, C. Bessiere, between defeasible DL semantics and OCF-based semantics D. Dubois, P. Doherty, P. Frasconi, F. Heintz, P. J. F. [18], albeit only using propositional conditional logic. Lucas (Eds.), ECAI 2012 - 20th European Conference Additionally, most work done so far on first-order condi- on Artificial Intelligence. Including Prestigious Appli- tional knowledge bases and defeasible DL knowledge bases cations of Artificial Intelligence (PAIS-2012) System focus on the general case where no facts or no ABox, respec- Demonstrations Track, Montpellier, France, August tively, are present. Our approach is basically also capable 27-31 , 2012, volume 242 of Frontiers in Artificial Intel- of dealing with information from an ABox, but for this, we ligence and Applications, IOS Press, 2012, pp. 456โ€“461. must also include option (B) from Definition 6 into our con- doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-098-7-456. siderations. We will work this out in future work. Moreover, [11] G. 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