Artifacts remain nebulous entities, notwithstanding their relevance to various domains such as engineering, art and archeology. In this paper we investigate the interconnection between artifacts and realizable entities, as illustrated by dispositions, functions, and roles within the framework of the upper ontology Basic Formal Ontology (BFO). More concretely, we propose the notions of canonical artifact (something that is intentionally produced for some purpose) and usefact (something that is intended to be used for some non-original purpose) which can correspond to various usages of the term “artifact”. We also characterized them in terms of intentional realizable entities and novel realizable entities: material canonical artifacts and material usefacts can be analyzed in terms of novel intentional realizable entities and a special kind of non-novel intentional realizable entities, respectively.
The world is replete with artifacts: technical artifacts (e.g. screwdrivers), artworks (e.g. paintings), social artifacts (e.g. the European
Shakespeare’s work Hamlet), to just name a few. These types of entities are usually contrasted with so-called “natural objects” such as molecules, stones, people, and planets. They are intimately connected with many kinds of entities such as intentions, agents, actions (physical and mental), capacities, functions, roles, and affordances. Artifacts are notoriously difficult to analyze because no clear consensus as of yet exists over how to capture systematically these multifacted ontological characteristics of artifacts.
In this paper we will investigate the relationship between artifacts and realizable entities.
Roughly, a realizable entity is a property that can be realized in associated processes of a specific
correlated type in which the bearer participates. For example, the fragility of a particular glass
can be analyzed as a realizable entity whose bearer is this glass and which can be realized in a
process of the glass breaking when the glass is pressed with sufficient force. A realizable entity
can go unrealized: this glass can be fragile, even if it never breaks or never undergoes any shock.
The notion of a realizable entity has been theoretically elaborated, notably in the upper
ontology Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) [
Our focus on artifacts vis-à-vis realizable entities is motivated by the fact that, whereas
artifacts are traditionally analyzed in terms of functions and intentions, an intention- and/or
function-centered approach to artifacts has been recently subject to critical philosophical
examination [
This paper is organized as follows. As a preliminary, Section 2 specifies some philosophical views of diachronic identity and lays out the basic structure of BFO. Section 3 explores the interconnection between artifacts and realizable entities; in particular, between material artifacts and realizable entities in BFO. More concretely, we introduce the notions of canonical artifact and usefact to disambiguate the meaning of the polysemous term “artifact”, which is employed in distinct ways across different domains. The basic idea is that a canonical artifact is something that is intentionally produced for some purpose, while a usefact is something that is intended to be used for some non-original purpose. We also define the terms “material canonical artifact” and “material usefact” in terms of realizable entities in BFO. Section 4 discusses related work. Section 5 concludes the paper.
We illustrate some philosophical views of diachronic identity with the example of a pot made out of an amount of clay which is intentionally shaped and dried at time t1: •
The continuity view: At time t1, this amount of clay (clay1) continues to exist and comes to instantiate the kind Pot.2 2 For the sake of terminological clarity, we will occasionally write names for particular or token-level entities in bold (e.g. “clay1”) and names for kinds or type-level entities in italics (e.g. “Pot”), respectively. We will also occasionally use a subscript for entity names in BFO (e.g. “BFO:function”). We also note that, in using the term “artifact” in the expression “the artifact kind Pot” above, we mean a canonical artifact as defined below, while remaining neutral as to whether the term “pot” and other specific artifact terms such as “screwdriver” and “paperweight” always refer to a canonical artifact or not.
•
The non-continuity view: At time t1, a new material entity pot2 (which instantiates the kind Pot) comes into being.
a. The discontinuity view: At time t1, clay1 ceases to exist and a new material entity pot2 comes into being. b. The constitution view: At time t1, clay1 continues to exist and a new material entity pot2 (constituted by, but distinct from, clay1) comes into being. Cf.
[
These philosophical views of diachronic identity are important for the ontology of artifacts because production and use are usually understood under the non-continuity view and the continuity view, respectively. We will assume the continuity view in this paper to provide a systematic analysis of the relationship between production and use under the same philosophical view of diachronic identity. Note that, under the continuity view, the production of a material artifact does not imply the coming into being of a new material entity, but rather the coming into being of a new realizable entity as detailed below. However, our realizablecentered approach to artifacts can be, mutatis mutandis, reformulated to fit well with the noncontinuity view as well (see e.g. Section 3.4).
We will use Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) [
BFO includes the top-level distinction between continuants and occurrents. On the
continuant side, independent continuants include material entities such as organisms and heaps
of stones. A specifically dependent continuant is a continuant that depends (existentially) on at
least one independent continuant. A realizable entity is a specifically dependent continuant that
can be realized in associated processes of specific correlated types in which the bearer
participates. Among realizable entities in BFO, we will focus on dispositions and roles in this
paper (see our companion paper [
A disposition in BFO is a realizable entity that exists because of certain features of the physical makeup of the independent continuant that is its bearer. It is an “internally grounded realizable entity”: if a disposition ceases to exist, then the physical makeup of the bearer is changed.3 Examples include the fragility of a glass and the flammability of a match.
A role in BFO is a realizable entity that (1) exists because the bearer is in some special
physical, social, or institutional set of circumstances in which the bearer does not have to be
(optionality), and (2) is not such that, if this realizable entity ceases to exist, then the physical
3 For more thoughts on dispositions, see Röhl & Jansen’s [
On the occurrent side, a process is an occurrent that exists in time by occurring, i.e. by having temporal parts, and which depends on at least one independent continuant as participant. Examples of processes include cell division and a walk taken by a person.
BFO:Continuant
BFO:Independent continuant
BFO:Material entity BFO:Specifically dependent continuant
BFO:Realizable entity
Material canonical artifact (see Section 3.4) Material usefact (see Section 3.5) BFO:Disposition
BFO:Function BFO:Role Intentional realizable entity (see Section 3.2) Novel realizable entity (see Section 3.4)
Novel intentional realizable entity (see Section 3.4) Novel intentional realizable entity (see Section 3.4) BFO:Occurrent
BFO:Process those introduced by us.
We will explore the relationship between artifacts and realizable entities by analyzing the realizable entities that are involved in the following scenarios: • • •
At time t1, a particular amount of clay (clay1) is intentionally shaped and dried to be able to contain liquid.
At time t1’ (later than time t1), clay1 is intended to be used to contain liquid.5
At time t1’' (later than time t2), clay1 is intended to be used to hold a door.
4 For more thoughts on roles, see Röhl & Jansen’s [
•
At time t2, a particular pebble (pebble2) is intended to be used to keep papers in place.
(cf. [
We begin by examining clay1 at time t1 from the viewpoint of realizable entities. According
to a traditional view of artifacts, an artifact is something that is intentionally produced for some
purpose (e.g. [
To develop a realizable-based view of canonical artifacts such as clay1 at time t1, we will focus
on the disposition d1 to contain liquid that clay1 comes to bear at time t1 — such that d1 exists
in virtue of the container-like structure of clay1 at and after time t1. As the notion of a canonical
artifact is related to agent intentions as well as the idea of purpose- or goal-directedness, we
will deploy Toyoshima et al.’s [
According to Toyoshima et al.’s [
These considerations of the intentional and goal-directed dimensions of clay1 at time t1 will
contribute to our analysis of the canonical artifactual character of d1. First of all, d1 is formed
as a result of the process (process1) of intentionally shaping and drying clay1 to be able to
contain liquid.7 Moreover, process1 is (part of) a realization of intention1 and it has as part the
process of clay1 becoming capable to contain liquid, which is an instance of the goal Clay1
becoming capable of containing liquid. We can say that d1 has an intentional and goal-directed
6 Note that, in the case of complex canonical artifacts such as cars, associated intentional acts required for the
production of a canonical artifact can involve the aggregation of a multiplicity of diverse parts according to a
“make plan” and a “use plan” in the sense of the work [
Based on this discussion, we define the term “intentional realizable entity” as follows: intentional realizable entity =def. A realizable entity that comes into being for a specific goal through an intentional act.
By this definition, d1 is an intentional realizable entity: it comes into being through process1 (which an intentional act) and it is directed towards the goal of clay1 being capable of containing liquid, which can be realized in a process of clay1 containing liquid.
We provide one important clarification of the term “intentional realizable entity”: its definition includes the term “goal” and “intentional act”, but contrary to Hobbs & Gordon’s intention-based theory of goals, we do not assume that the goal-directed dimension of an intentional realizable entity is always directly connected with the realizable entity’s intentional dimension. To see this, suppose that this pile of earth bears the disposition danthill to house ants. While danthill may be directed towards the goal of the pile of earth being capable of housing ants, it is questionable whether this goal-directedness can be attributed to the intention of individual ants, or even a collective intention shared by the members of an ant colony, to produce something for purpose of housing ants. Since we are interested in various sorts of artifacts, including those that are not included within the category of technical artifacts, we argue that the relationship between the intentional and goal-directed dimensions of intentional realizable entities merits careful consideration, even if it may be straightforwardly analyzable when it comes to technical artifacts (e.g. clay1 at time t1).
We said that, at time t1, clay1 is a canonical artifact and it comes to bear d1, which is an intentional realizable entity in our terms. One may be inclined to think that the notion of a canonical artifact can be fully characterized in terms of an intentional realizable entity, i.e. that a material canonical artifact is definable as “a material entity that bears an intentional realizable entity”. However, we argue that, while bearing an intentional realizable entity is necessary for a material entity to be a canonical artifact, it is not sufficient, because there are some material entities which are not canonical artifacts in our sense of the term but which nonetheless bear intentional realizable entities.
To elaborate on this point, let us consider pebble2 at time t2, when pebble2 is intended to be
used to keep papers in place. One way to interpret this example in terms of realizable entities
is to consider the role r2 borne by pebble2 to keep papers in place that comes into being at time
t2. According to Spear et al.’s [
We can further clarify r2 by introducing the intention (intention2) to use pebble2 to keep papers in place that comes into being at time t2. (Recall that, as was explained earlier in Section 3.2, we take intentions to be a type of dispositions.) Then r2 is externally grounded, as it can cease to exist when intention2 ceases to exist, without necessarily involving the change of the physical make-up of pebble2. In addition, r2 is also optional, as it exists because pebble2 is in the special circumstances in which pebble2 does not have to be, to wit, in the circumstances in which intention2 exists.
Now, by our definition, r2 is an intentional realizable entity: it is directed towards the goal
of pebble2’s keeping papers in place; and it comes into being through the act of intending to
use pebble2 to keep papers in place, because “mental selection” can be construed as a kind of
intentional act (see e.g. [
To characterize this distinction between canonical artifacts and other “use-based” types of
entities, we introduce the term “usefact” to refer to something that is intended to be used for
some purpose other than the original purpose for which it was intentionally produced (if any).
In effect, usefacts are related to “naturefacts” in anthropology [
The notion of a usefact is nevertheless more general than those of a naturefact and an ecofact in two respects. Firstly, being a usefact is based on some use intention, but not necessarily on an associated actual use. Secondly, not only natural objects (e.g. pebble2) but also canonical artifacts can be usefacts. To illustrate this point, consider clay1 at time t1’ (when it is intended to be used to contain liquid) and clay1 at time t1’’ (when it is intended to be used to hold a door); note that, at both times, clay1 is a canonical artifact, as it became so at time t1. We say that clay1 is a usefact at time t1’’, but not at time t1’, because the purpose for which it is intended to be used at time t1’’ is different from the original purpose for which it was intentionally produced (i.e. for the purpose of containing liquid), while the purpose for which it is intended to be used at time t1’ is the same as the original purpose for which it was intentionally produced.
In our view, the notion of the “novelty” of a realizable entity can serve to capture the distinction we just outlined between canonical artifacts and usefacts. To see this, we contrast the disposition d2 of pebble2 to keep papers in place with the role r2 of pebble2 to keep papers in place (introduced in Section 3.3). (Recall that dispositions are internally grounded realizable entities, while roles are externally grounded and optional ones.)
On the one hand, d2 is internally grounded, as d2 ceasing to exist necessarily involves the change of the physical make-up (solid structure) of pebble2. Moreover, d2 can exist even in the absence of any associated use intention such as intention2 (e.g. before time t1’) and d2 is not an intentional realizable entity, as it does not come into being though an intentional act. On the other hand, r2 is externally grounded, as r2 ceasing to exist does not necessarily involve the change of the physical make-up of pebble2 — in particular, when intention2 ceases to exist. And, as we saw in Section 3.3, r2 is an intentional realizable entity.
Notwithstanding these ontological differences, d2 and r2 are intimately connected with each other in the sense that, whenever r2 is realized in a particular process, then d2 is realized in the same process. In short, r2 is not a “novel” realizable entity for its bearer pebble2 in the sense that any realization of r2 is a realization of d2, which exists before r2 comes into being. At time t2, pebble2 comes to bear r2, which is an intentional realizable entity; however, pebble2 does not become a canonical artifact, but rather a usefact, at time t2 owing to the “non-novelty” of r2 for its bearer pebble2.8
Let us now turn to the disposition d1 to contain liquid that clay1 comes to bear at time t1, as compared to the role r2 to keep papers in place that pebble2 comes to bear at time t2. Whereas d1 and r2 are both intentional realizable entities, clay1 at time t1 (unlike pebble2 at time t2) bears no realizable entity existing before d1 comes into being and such that, if d1 is realized in a particular process, then it is realized in the same process. Unlike r2, d1 is an intentional realizable entity whose realization is of a “new” kind for its bearer clay1. At time t1, clay1 is a canonical artifact in virtue of its bearing d1, because d1 is an intentional realizable entity that is “novel” for its bearer clay1.
To spell out the idea of the “novelty” of intentional realizable entities involved in canonical artifacts, we introduce the terms “novel realizable entity” and “novel intentional realizable entity” as follows: novel realizable entity =def. A realizable entity r such that the bearer has no realizable entity r’ such that (i) r’ exists before r comes into being and (ii) if r is realized in a process, then r’ is realized in the same process.9 novel intentional realizable entity =def. An intentional realizable entity that is a novel realizable entity.
According to the definitions of these two terms, d1 is a novel intentional realizable entity but r2 is not, although they are both intentional realizable entities. We can now provide a general realizable-based characterization of canonical artifacts by defining the term “material canonical artifact” as follows: material canonical artifact =def. A material entity that bears a novel intentional realizable entity.
By this definition, clay1 at (and after) time t1 is a material canonical artifact in virtue of its
bearing d1; but pebble2 at time t1’ is not, despite its bearing r2 (which is an intentional but
“non-novel” realizable entity, where the term “non-novel realizable entity” is defined as “a
realizable entity that is not a novel realizable entity”).
8 Note that the same argument, mutatis mutandis, applies to clay1 at time t1’’. To see this, consider the disposition
d1’ to hold a door open that clay1 bears after time t1, insofar as the physical makeup (e.g. solid structure) of clay1
remains unchanged; and the role r1’ to hold a door open that clay1 comes to bear at time t1’’, when an associated
use intention comes into being.
9 In future work we will further elucidate our notion of (non-)novelty of realizable entities by considering the
identity of processes in BFO (e.g. [
We provide two clarificatory remarks on our way of analyzing the relation between
canonical artifacts and realizable entities. Firstly, our analysis of canonical artifacts in terms of
novel intentional realizable entities under the continuity view of diachronic identity can be,
mutatis mutandis, reformulated to fit the non-continuity as well. According to the definition
of novel realizable entities, when a realizable entity comes into being simultaneously with its
bearer, it is “trivially novel”, since the bearer did not exist before then, nor did any realizable
entity of the bearer. For an example illustrating this argument, see our discussion of functions
in BFO in our companion paper [
Secondly, we characterize material canonical artifacts in terms of novel intentional
realizable entities, although we have been treating the disposition d1 of clay1 at time t1 as a
driving example of a novel intentional realizable entity. This is because our notion of a canonical
artifact is not restricted to the category of technical artifacts, where production typically
involves physical modifications, such as shaping and drying clay1 (cf. [
We now turn to a closer examination of the notion of a usefact. In particular, we define the term “material usefact”, which denotes a more restricted subclass of usefacts. One naïve attempt is to define this term as “a material entity that bears a non-novel intentional realizable entity”. Certainly, this simple definition of material usefacts would have the desirable consequence that pebble2 at time t1’ is a material usefact in virtue of its bearing r2, which is a non-novel intentional realizable entity.
The naïve definition of material usefacts may be nonetheless too broad. To illustrate this, consider the role r1 to contain liquid that clay1 comes to bear at time t1’.10 Like r2, r1 is a nonnovel intentional realizable entity. In particular, r1 is a non-novel realizable entity: if r1 is realized in a process, then d1 is realized in the same process. According to the naïve definition of “material usefact”, clay1 at time t1’ is a material usefact in virtue of its bearing r1. This would contradict our notion of a usefact as something that is intended to be used for some purpose other than the orginal purpose for which it was intentionally produced.
Therefore, usefacts should be considered as material entities that bear a specific kind of nonnovel intentional realizable entities. To this end, we introduce the relation of “being non-novel because of” between two realizable entities as follows: 10 We can justify the coming into being of r1 (borne by clay1) at time t1’, in the same way as we justified the coming into being of r2 (borne by pebble2) at time t2 in Section 3.3. One might want to deny the existence of r1 on the grounds that it is “redundant” because of the disposition d1 to contain liquid which clay1 has borne since time t1. But this argument against the existence of r2 would lead to denying the existence of r1, as r1 would be “redundant” because of the disposition d2 of pebble2 to keep papers in place. Although the individuation of realizable entities is a topic that requires further discussion (see Section 4 for a brief discussion), it can be plausibly prescribed that the principle for individuating them must be consistent. We postulate consistently the existence of both r1 and r2 in this paper.
=def. There exists some independent continuant b such that (i) b bears r and (ii) b bears r’ and (iii) r’ exists before r comes into being and (iv) if r is realized in a process, then r’ is realized in the same process.
The definition of this relation enables us to classify non-novel intentional realizable entities (such as r1 and r2) into the following two types: • •
Non-novel because of some novel intentional realizable entity: e.g. r1 is non-novel because of d1 (borne by clay1 at time t1’).
Non-novel because of some realizable entity that is not a novel intentional realizable entity: e.g. r2 is non-novel because of d2 (borne by pebble2 at time t2).
Based on the idea that material usefacts can be characterized as bearing the second type of non-novel intentional realizable entities, we define the term “material usefact” as follows: material usefact =def. A material entity that bears an intentional realizable entity which is non-novel because of some realizable entity that is not a novel intentional realizable entity.
By this definition, pebble2 at time t2 is a material usefact in virtue of its bearing r2, but clay1 at time t1’ is not despite its bearing r1.11
Although there is a large body of literature on artifacts in many domains, the notion of a
canonical artifact can be related to a long-standing standard account of artifacts, as it can be
traced back to Hilpinen’s [
In formal ontology, there are some existing BFO-compliant definitions of the terms “artifact” and “material artifact”. 12 These definitions tend to characterize artifacts in terms of 11 In connection with Footnote 8, this definition yields the desired consequence that clay1 at time t1’’ is a material usefact, as the role r1’ to hold a door open (borne by clay1 at time t1’’) is non-novel because of the disposition d1’ to hold a door open (borne by clay1 after time t1) and d1’ is not a novel intentional realizable entity because it is not an intentional realizable entity. 12 Examples of BFO-compliant definitions of the term “artifact” include: “A material entity created or modified or selected by some agent to realize a certain function or role” [23, p. 1]; “Something that is deliberately designed (or, in certain borderline cases, selected) by human beings to address a particular purpose” [1, p. 3]; and “A material entity that has been intentionally selected by some agent to serve in attaining some end and is recognized in some community as having been created for some purpose” [24, p. 26].
Examples of BFO-compliant definitions of the term “material artifact” include: “An object deliberately created to have a certain function” [25, p. 7]; and “A material entity that was designed by some agent to realize a certain function” [26].
BFO:functions and the BFO notion of function may fail to mesh well with the continuity view
of diachronic identity. By contrast, we articulated the notion of a canonical artifact in terms of
novel intentional realizable entities, a notion that is not restricted to what we may call “design
BFO:functions”, in a way that is compatible with the continuity view. A detailed analysis of
functions in BFO is presented in our companion paper [
As for related work outside the BFO context, Borgo et al. [27, p. 232] highlight that there is a “fundamental choice in ontology structuring” as to technical artifacts: “via a constitution relation” (which amounts to the constitution view in our terms) or “via an intentional property”. We took the latter approach by elaborating the notion of an intentional realizable entity, i.e. a type of intentional property, from the perspective of the continuity view.
To bring out the unique features and flexibility of our analysis of artifacts, we briefly discuss
three existing definitions of technical artifacts, as highlighted by Borgo et al. [27] as “ontological”
[
In our framework, B&V’s ontological notion of a technical artifact may be characterized as a material entity that bears some kind of (novel or non-novel) intentional realizable entity, which allows the entity in question to be classified either as a canonical artifact or as a usefact. To motivate such a broad understanding of technical artifacts, suppose that, at time t2’, pebble2 is intentionally shaped in the form of a cube. On the one hand, pebble2 at time t2’ may be interpreted as a material canonical artifact, in case the disposition d2 of pebble2 to keep papers in place ceases to exist owing to intentional shaping and a novel intentional disposition (say, to keep papers in place tightly) comes into being, at time t2’. On the other hand, it may be interpreted as a material usefact, in case d2 “survives” intentional shaping and continues to exist even after time t2’. Generally speaking, the individuation of realizable entities (and thus the existence of d2) is open to multiple distinct interpretations and this vexed issue can sometimes lead to indeterminacy between cases in which an entity is classified as a canonical artifact and cases in which an entity is classified as a usefact.
We think however that the distinction between canonical artifacts and usefacts is theoretically tenable. For instance, this distinction is fundamentally based on the distinction between production and use, and the production/use distinction is of great theoretical significance, as is witnessed by the fact that production and use are usually associated with the non-continuity view and the continuity view, respectively (see Section 2.1).
For Kitamura & Mizoguchi [28], a technical artifact is a material entity that comes into being through an “intentionally performed production process”: a process in which some agent physically changes the material entity with the goal of producing something that can manifest an intended behavior. Because it is related to production and physical change, the engineering notion of a technical artifact proposed by these authors can be construed in our framework in terms of material entities that bear novel intentional dispositions.
For Houkes & Vermaas [
H&V’s account of technical artifacts revolves around the notion of “plan”, whose extensive discussion goes beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, because of its appeal to physical description and production, H&V’s technological notion of a technical artifact could be also be subsumed in our framework under the notion of a material entity that bears a novel intentional disposition.
Finally, artifacts have also been discussed from a formal perspective. Examples of such works include a formal theory of artifacts and their manipulations (e.g. design and use) [29] and formal frameworks for comparing theories of artifacts [30,31]. In relation with these works, it will be a valuable direction for future research to formalize our realizable-based analysis of artifacts in alignment with the logical specifications of BFO.
This paper investigated the interconnection between artifacts and realizable entities, as found in the upper ontology Basic Formal Ontology (BFO). For this purpose, we elaborated the notions of “canonical artifact” (something intentionally produced for some purpose) and “usefact” (something intended to be used for some non-original purpose), respectively, in terms of novel intentional realizable entities and a special kind of non-novel intentional realizable entities. The relationship between canonical artifacts and usefacts thus provides a fertile ground for a systematic, realizable-centered study of multifarious artifacts.
This work is a first step towards our realizable-centered ontology of artifacts, together with
our companion paper on artifactual functions [
This work is part of the SNSF-funded project “An Ontology of Production, Products, and ByProducts” (2023-2027) under the direction of KK and OM. We thank Yuki Yamagata for some valuable comments on an early draft of the paper. We also appreciate feedback from Laure Vieu and from audience (including Nicola Guarino) on the occasion of FT’s conference presentation at Enschede, Netherlands. FT is financially supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS). [23] W. Ceusters, B. Smith, Aboutness: towards foundations for the Information Artifact Ontology, in: Proceedings of ICBO2015, CEUR Workshop Proceedings, vol. 1515, 2015, pp. 1-5. [24] W. D. Duncan, Ontological distinctions between hardware and software, Applied
Ontology, 12(1) (2017), 5-32. [25] M. Drobnjakovic, B(S). Kulvatunyou, F. Ameri, C. Will, B Smith, A. Jones, The Industrial Ontologies Foundry (IOF) core ontology, in: Proceedings of FOMI2022, CEUR Workshop Proceedings, vol. 3240, 2022, pp. 1-13. [26] The Common Core Ontologies Repository. Last updated on July 1, 2024. Available from: https://github.com/CommonCoreOntology/CommonCoreOntologies [27] S. Borgo, M. Franssen, P. Garbacz, Y. Kitamura, R. Mizoguchi, P. E. Vermaas. Technical artifacts: an integrated perspective, Applied Ontology, 9(3-4) (2014) 217-235. [28] Y. Kitamura, R. Mizoguchi, Characterizing functions based on ontological models from an engineering point of view, in: Proceedings of FOIS2010, Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2010, pp. 301-314. [29] N. Troquard, A formal theory for conceptualizing artefacts and tool manipulations, in:
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