=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-3885/paper24
|storemode=property
|title=The Dark Side of Radio Technology
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3885/paper24.pdf
|volume=Vol-3885
|authors=Giorgi Tomadze,Ilia Lomidze,Mikheil Kurashvili,Giorgi Akhalaia,Vladimer Svanadze
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/ivus/TomadzeLKAS24
}}
==The Dark Side of Radio Technology==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3885/paper24.pdf
The dark side of Radio Technology*
Giorgi Tomadze1,∗,†, Ilia Lomidze1,†, Mikheil Kurashvili2,†, Giorgi Akhalaia3,† and
Vladimer Svanadze4,†
1 Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University
2 21th Public School
3 Caucasus University, Caucasus School of Technology
4 Business and Technology University
Abstract
Due to the fact that most modern technologies of the 21st century are based on radio signals, their
safety is of utmost importance. The article presents common types of radio hacking, describes, and
demonstrates some of them, and explains in detail how to spoof a GPS signal, as well as
the associated dangers and ways to protect against them. Along with this, the purpose of ADS-B (a
system installed on an aircraft that periodically broadcasts its location, altitude and other important
details) and the importance of the safety of this system are discussed. The paper provides a
comprehensive overview of GPS and ADS-B spoofing techniques, highlighting potential threats to
navigation and airspace security. provides case studies and case studies of the changing landscape
of navigation and aviation cyber threats.
Keywords
ADS-B, Spoofing, GNSS, HackRF, Radio hacking
1. Introduction
In our present-day relocation of technology, the loud and unambiguous presence of radio
waves have been vacant in paths of modern existence. A good example is the wireless
communication devices that we heavily utilize everyday be it a call, a simple text or even a
video chat. The radio waves may be invisible but they are the conduits that connect the world
that is now complex with industries like aviation.[1] However, with this widespread reliance
comes a new frontier of challenges: an effect of radio hacking.
The early 21st century was the almost immediate surge of the carrying online attacks by
radio wave technologies, which are so significant and dangerous not only for private users,
but also for critical infrastructure. This article takes a look at both sides of radio hacking
which have serious consequences in our daily life, discuss current context, approaches and
offer possible solutions.
Radio hacking, at its basis, comprises unauthorized uses, manipulations, and tempering of
radio signals with a variety of techniques that target any weak link in the radio
communication system. The advent of the digital age is coupled with the development of the
cyber threat, as technology adapts so do the hostile elements that aim to use these newly
made systems for bad intentions.[2]
Before delving into a discussion on the genesis of radio waves, it is important to traverse
their beginning with German physicist Heinrich Hertz in the late 1800s. Hertz's unique
experiments established the infrastructure for how our knowledge about electromagnetic
waves came into being that gave rise to all the modern applications we so vividly witness
around us.
* IVUS2024: Information Society and University Studies 2024, May 17, Kaunas, Lithuania
1,∗
Corresponding author
†
These author contributed equally.
CEUR
ceur-ws.org gio.tomadze@gmail.com (G. tomadze); ilikolomidze@gmail.com(I. Lomidze); misho.kurashvili789@gmail.com (M. Kurashvili),
Workshop
Proceedings
ISSN 1613-0073
gakhalaia@cu.edu.ge (G. Akhalaia); vsvanadze@indein.net (V. Svanadze).
0000-0002-4194-2681 (G. Akhalaia)
©️ 2024 Copyright for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
The spin-off effect of radio waves, which enabled communication and connectivity, also
ushered in new threat vectors that are gravely damaging in aviation safety systems. Because
of its place of utmost importance, cybersecurity in the Aviation industry is a subject under the
spotlights, the integrity of radio systems being pivotal for the safety of the passengers and
crew. Using practical examinations, showcases, and involving interpretation, this
article is committed to shining a light on all possible dynamics of radio jamming, thus
helping readers to act safely and apprehensively in this digital duration. Through
strengthening our awareness of the difficulties for adequately protecting the systems, we
will continuously strive to shape a world where such cyber-attacks on radio systems would
be a thing of the past.[2]
2. Literature Overview
The information we dig into entails a broad scope of technology and security concerns
that border on aircraft technology, the incorporation of GPS systems with Global Navigation
Satellite System Technology (GNSS) and the imminence of GPS spoofing.
The article How ADS-B Revolutionizes Air Traffic Surveillance and In-Cockpit
Information Access examines its wholesome effect on air surveillance traffic and cockpit
information access. ADS-B out and ADS-B in are the methods which are mainly used for more
accurate tracking and real-time sharing of data with air traffic controllers and pilots
respectively. With this breakthrough, the entire airspace management is bound to radically
change and aviation authorities such as the FAA will undertake strict measures; possibly
obligate ADS-B equipment in operating U.S. controlled airspace. Yet, doubts and skepticism
about the cost-efficiency of such introduction remain among the air travel community that
should be further controlled as the novel technology implementation on a wide scale seemed
to be an ambitious goal. [2]
Whilst GNSS-based systems’ precision location feature facilitates both long-term
surveillance and real-time tracking of critical structures, such as buildings and bridges, the
scope of improving cities’ safety and security is undoubtedly augmented. Although the real-
time kinematic (RTK) and precise point positioning (PPP) techniques have added new
dimensions to the field for optimization of positioning accuracy, challenges still emerge due to
atmospheric variability and observation noise. In spite of this, the provision of GNSS-based
solutions with rapid data collection and analysis efficiency which leads to unique monitoring
systems gives proof that their potential is in increasing the level of structural integrity and
safety. [5]
During the same time the conversation about GPS spoofing gives a greater understanding
of a mere danger of the unfriendly interference in navigation signals. Through the tampering
of GPS signals such as simulators, Emulators, or Sentinels, which deceive receivers into
believing
false signals, spoofing has detrimental repercussions in many sectors depending on the GPS
technology. While protective measures consisting of technical countermeasures, policies, and
frameworks exist, rather solving GPS spoofing is an intricate task hence. Patenting laws and
strong measures of protection systems and integrity of data are the core pillars in the
constantly evolving digital landscape.[7]
The three articles here may have different focuses but they all reach a conclusion that
technology is moving forward, and the issue of security is one of these challenges. The field to
be applied from aviation surveillance, hardware monitoring, to even internet security is the
requirement of these systems for the connectivity between the modern architects and the
securing procedures they have. It is through appreciating and resolving the deep rooted
Disclosure: The past is often used to interpret the present, but it is important to keep in mind
that each era had its own unique circumstances and challenges.
3. Radio hacking in aviation
The modern aviation system relies heavily on radio technologies, which are essential for the
efficient operation of this complex system. Most of these systems use the very high frequency
range of radio signals, or VHF [1].
This system includes the following:
1. Voice and written communication between the air traffic controller and the pilots.
2. Use of ADS-B and its integral part – GNSS.
Using them, it becomes possible for the aircraft to broadcast its position, altitude, and
other important data. This information is critical for air traffic controllers, as the above has
serious vulnerabilities that could lead to dire consequences for an attacker. Cyber-attacks are
carried out by a range of perpetrators. They include individuals, organized criminals, and
state- sponsored entities.
An attacker can impersonate the signals transmitted by the aircraft and pretend to be a flying
object or change the data transmitted by the authentic aircraft. This action could cause critical
damage to aviation infrastructure and air flow.
In addition, other radio technologies are used in the aviation field, although they are
beyond our research topic.
Picture 1, based on an ADS-B source, shows an aircraft that was destroyed by bombing on
February 27, 2022, during the Russo-Ukrainian war. The photo was taken a few days later. It
was an ideological cyber-attack [3].
Picture 1
4. Experimental Work
We used HackRF's hardware for the demonstration. HackRF is a versatile software-defined
radio (SDR) platform known for its flexibility and open-source design. It allows users to
explore and experiment with different radio frequencies and provides reception and
transmission over a wide range of radio frequencies (1mHz to 6gHz) [4].
Picture 2 Picture 3
To generate fake ADS-B signals with a HackRF device, we start by encoding false aircraft data
in protocol DO-260B. ADS-B messages follow the Mode S Extended Squitter protocol, using a
56- bit data frame to share details like position, altitude, and identification. Next, we modulate
the encoded data into binary bits for the ADS-B message. The HackRF device then transmits
these bits at a carrier frequency within the ADS-B band, at 1090 MHz. We then send these
fake ADS-B signals sporadically to mimic a non-existent aircraft. Picture 2 and picture 3
demonstrate our experimental work.
To receive and prove the transmitted signal was encoded and transmitted correctly, we use
receiver only software defined radio. We decode the signal using open-source software dump-
1090, [10] after the data is decoded live, we confirm that the transmitted and received data
match.
The attack was performed in a controllable environment and transmitted signals did not
exceed controlled premises. (picture N4).
Picture 4
5. Global navigation satellite system (GNSS)
In the modern world it is extremely difficult to find a person without GPS. GPS is an American
satellite system that belongs to GNSS, in fact we also use its other systems such as Galileo,
Glonass, BeiDou etc. Many people use this navigation tool in their daily life, but only a few of
them know how dangerous the cyberattack on it can be. The principle of its operation, at first
glance, is quite simple. It works by using a network of satellites orbiting the Earth to pinpoint
a position on the planet's surface by calculating the distance between a receiver and multiple
satellites to determine a specific location in three-dimensional space based on the timing of
the signal and the known positions of those satellites.
Today, a GNSS receiver is available to everyone. All types of GNSS satellites broadcast
on different channels, namely: L1, L2, L3, L4, L5. Information from GNSS satellites is
transmitted at a speed of 50 bits/sec. It transmits data about the satellite's orbit and satellite
time, which in the case of civil aviation cannot be deciphered [5].
GNSS vulnerabilities coupled with radio frequency interference are a concern in the
aviation industry. GPS signal loss is becoming increasingly common in civil aviation,
especially in politically tense regions. There could be many reasons for this, but it is likely that
they are provoked since signal suppression is no longer a problem today. While jamming is
very dangerous and can happen from time to time, a spoofing attack is even more dangerous
and predictable.
6. GNSS Spoofing
GNSS spoofing is a technique in which false signals are transmitted to the receiver,
causing it to calculate an incorrect location. It can be spoofed by generating signals that mimic
authentic GNSS signals, i.e. sending false information to the receiver. GNSS spoofing increases
threat risks because It can be used to fool navigation systems, frustrate critical infrastructure,
or disrupt the path of autonomous vehicles and aircraft [6,7]
In a noteworthy incident in 2010, Hanover Airport became an unintended target of a
GNSS spoofing attack. Despite the seeming incredibility of such an event, a thorough
investigation revealed that the false signals disrupting the aircraft's positioning system
stemmed from an ongoing test conducted in a nearby hangar. This incident underscores the
vulnerability of GNSS technology to manipulation and highlights the ease with which signals
can be spoofed. The ramifications were far-reaching, as the falsified positioning data
automatically altered the corresponding ADS-B information, emphasizing the potential
implications of such attacks on aviation safety and security [2].
In 2018, Russia accused the US of faking the authenticity of the drone and using it to
attack a Russian air base in Syria. Also, in the past few years, there have been many location
spoofing incidents near the Russian border, and drones are believed to have been "placed" at
nearby airports [8].
This incident sparked significant geopolitical tension between Russia and the United
States. Russia leveled accusations against the US, alleging that the authenticity of a drone used
in an attack on a Russian air base in Syria had been falsified. This accusation underscored the
deep- seated mistrust and rivalry between the two nations, particularly in the context of the
complex and volatile Syrian conflict.
Moreover, the claim that drones have been involved in location spoofing incidents near the
Russian border raises concerns about the security of airspace and critical infrastructure. These
alleged incidents suggest a deliberate attempt to manipulate location data for strategic or
nefarious purposes. The suspicion that drones may have been clandestinely placed at nearby
airports adds another layer of complexity to the situation, highlighting the potential
vulnerabilities in aviation security and the challenges faced in safeguarding against emerging
threats. Such accusations and incidents not only exacerbate tensions between nations but also
raise broader questions about the integrity of military operations, the reliability of
surveillance and monitoring systems, and the need for enhanced cybersecurity measures in an
increasingly interconnected world. [13] As technology continues to advance, the potential for
misuse and manipulation of drones and other unmanned systems underscores the
importance of international cooperation and robust security protocols to mitigate risks and
maintain stability. Simple and relatively complex attacks are possible on GNSS. In a
simple attack, the attacker suppresses the authentic signal and broadcasts his own fake
signal, causing the receiving device to tune in to his signal. Detecting and avoiding such a
simple attack is not very difficult, since the fake and real signals will not be synchronized, and
this can be easily detected by software. [11] In the case of more complex attacks, the attacker
tries to covertly convert the receiver from an authentic signal to a fake one, for this he must
first mask the authentic signal with a fake signal so that all indicators are initially like the
authentic one, and then change it in his favor [9].
7. GNSS Spoofing Prevention Methodology
The greater the involvement of technology in modern life, the greater the probability of
insecurity increases, naturally, technological regression cannot help us in this, although there
must be certain aspects that must be strictly protected.
We have already explained the dangers of these attacks. And now we can talk about the
methods of solving them.
First, to prevent GNSS spoofing, we all think of encrypted data exchange, but with today's
technology, this is practically impossible.
Because of the distance, they have to broadcast at a low frequency, which does not allow
the implementation of mass encryption. Unlike the military unit.
The military sector is capable of encrypted communication only because they use the
same encryption algorithm that the receiver uses to decode the signal. All receivers use the
same key. Current GNSS systems only allow communication to be encrypted with a
symmetric algorithm. It is unsuitable for civilian use, as storage, distribution and
management of different encryption keys is practically impossible.
In fact, one of the appropriate ways of protection may be a verification mechanism.
Additional sensors will be used such as inertial navigation systems (INS) or alternative
positioning technologies, which play a critical role in the protection of navigation systems. By
combining data from multiple sensors, including GPS, these systems can maintain accurate
positioning information even in difficult environments or when the GPS signal is interrupted.
Additional sensors provide a backup mechanism that is responsible for the continuity of
navigation and protects against potential threats such as GPS spoofing or blocking.
We can consider multi-frequency receivers as another protection mechanism.
Multi-frequency authentication in GNSS allows us to use different frequency signals such
as L1, L2 and L5. This approach enhances accuracy by reducing the effects of environmental
factors such as the ionosphere, blurring the signal, and resisting interference and spoofing
attempts. Multi-frequency authentication contributes to the reliability and security of GNSS,
making it valuable for applications that require accurate and reliable positioning information.
We may also have active monitoring of signal quality as a version, which ensures detection
of signal changes, anomalies, and unauthorized interference.
8. ADS-B Spoofing Prevention Methodology
By using message authentication, we can make sure that the data is not forged.
Authentication of the message can mean an electronic (cryptographic) signature, with which
the recipient will confirm the integrity of the message. Or the easiest way, let's go back to the
compass methodology.
Amplitude sensing techniques leverage the diverse signal strengths received by various
antenna elements. By tapping into the distinct directivity features offered by each antenna's
gain pattern, we can assign a distinct signal signature to every direction from which a signal
arrives. One notable method in this category is the Watson-Watt (Adcock) antenna approach.
In the realm of signal authentication, the precision of angular measurements required hinges
upon the spatial configuration among the transmitting source, the receiving end, and any
simulated or phantom aircraft falsely indicated by a spoofed signal. Achieving a desired
confidence level in position estimation demands a keen eye on the quality of angular data,
ensuring accurate localization despite potential deceptive signals.[12]
9. Conclusion
In this elaborate presentation we analyzed the dark side of radio technology leaving no
stone unturned on the danger involved in GNSS and ADS-B spoofers. Our foray into this
domain underlined the immediate need of heightened readiness and reinforced policies to
strengthen the safety, dependability of these indispensable systems.
It seems that most criticism of ADS-B stems from its weak electronic security which was
demonstrated in our own testing. It was a wake up call to air traffic controllers, unveiling its
vulnerabilities and ease by spoofing. Not only we pointed out the risks but also discussed
possible defense measures providing a comprehensive tactical guide for protection against
malicious behavior. Against the backdrop of a geopolitical environment characterized by
lingering symptoms dating from times gone with cyberspace escalates into an inner shell that
commands dangerous amounts, any close examination remains relevant as a shroud against
attempts to exert pressure or undermine our systems and institutions.
Through collaboration and vigorous mechanisms put in place for cyber security, we can all
work together to navigate through the complex world of radio technology ensuring it remains
a force good then an instrument which people use as instruments. By ensuring vigilance,
inventiveness and unified political will for cyber security we can reduce the chances lurking in
spoofing practices to achieve a secure technology future.
References
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_threats_on_GPS_and_ADS-B_systems
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