=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-3888/keynote1
|storemode=property
|title=Image Schemas, Cognitive Metaphor, and Film: Bridging Discourses
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3888/Keynote_1.pdf
|volume=Vol-3888
|authors=John Bateman
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/isd2/Bateman24
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==Image Schemas, Cognitive Metaphor, and Film: Bridging Discourses==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3888/Keynote_1.pdf
Keynote
Image Schemas, Cognitive Metaphor, and Film: Bridging
Discourses
John A. Bateman
Bremen University, Bremen, Germany
Abstract
There has been active exploration of the role of cognitive metaphor theory and image schemas in the audiovisual
analysis of film for a considerable time. Starting from primarily literary concerns, however, many of these remain
interpretative in orientation. This means that likely metaphors, blends, and image schemas are proposed for pieces
of film and adopted as scaffolds for largely discursive analysis. In the meantime, there has been considerable
progress in refining the notion of image schemas and suggestions have been made both for logical formalisations
of image schemes and for explicit connections to computational work and reasoning. Until now, these two areas
of research involving image schemas have had little contact. In this position paper, I offer a brief review of the
current state of the art in discussing film in terms of image schemas and metaphor and consider methods by
which this could be brought together more closely with formal and computational accounts with benefits for
both sides. As potential lines of development for the future, it is suggested that: (a) filmic representations may
offer a highly appropriate method for depicting image schemas, and (b) we still need to consider formalisations
of image schemas that directly engage with issues of first-person embodiment and simulation.
Keywords
film analysis, blending, image schema visualisation, multimodality, embodiment
1. Introduction
This contribution is a position paper on some possible directions for making advances towards accurate
and usable characterisations of image schemas. It is a slightly extended and media-adapted version of
the presentation given at the Eighth Image Schema Day. The essential point pursued here is that we
can draw useful lessons from parallels in the treatment of image schemas over the past 20 years and
rather similar discussions that have arisen in attempts to characterise film, particularly narrative film.
Both see an increasing orientation, and often re-orientation, to questions of embodiment. Engaging
with this facet of the phenomena at hand will be suggested to be an essential precondition for progress.
Considering some of the developments being pursued for treating film may then also offer some ideas
for broadening accounts of image schemas.
2. Some basic theoretical building blocks
To begin the discussion of the relationships between the definition of image schemas and their occurrence
in film and film analyses, it is useful to set out three areas of discussion related closely to metaphor: first,
metaphor considered as a literary device; second, cognitive metaphor theory; and third, metaphorical
mappings involving blending.
First, metaphor as a literary device has naturally been used in interpretations and analyses of literature
for a very long time, but the question of whether this rhetorical trope is possible visually has led to
some more critical discussion. Some authors just do not like what are seen as essentially linguistic
achievements being applied to other expressive forms. Film-makers have of course never been limited
in this way and there are many examples of quite explicit metaphors in film from film’s earliest days;
The Eighth Image Schema Day (ISD8), Bozen-Bolzano, November 2024
$ bateman@uni-bremen.de (J. A. Bateman)
0000-0002-7209-9295 (J. A. Bateman)
© 2024 Copyright for this paper by its author. Use permitted under Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
CEUR
ceur-ws.org
Workshop ISSN 1613-0073
Proceedings
notable examples are the well-known association drawn between the violent suppression of striking
workers by police and the slaughtering of a cow in Sergei Eisenstein’s Strike (1924) or the construction
of commuters heading to work as a flock of sheep in Charlie Chaplin’s Modern Times (1936). Whereas
these early examples were typically constructed filmically by directly intercutting visuals showing
source and target domains, this method is nowadays seen as rather too direct, and so metaphors are
constructed more subtly, building the invited associations into the storyworld in more or less motivated
fashions. Several films by Alfred Hitchcock make extensive use of such constructions, including, for
example, the metaphors of a psychological trauma appearing throughout Spellbound (1945) as discussed
by Gibbs, Jr. [1] or the much commented closing scene from North by Northwest (1959). Several further
examples are discussed in Whittock [2] and somewhat formalised in Bateman [3].
Second, with the advent of cognitive metaphor theory by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson [4], it
became far more accepted that metaphor be treated as a cognitively anchored operation of structuring
mappings across domains, rather than simply a ‘style of speech’, or rhetorical trope. This has been
taken up by a broad range of scholars; early discussions can be found in Kennedy [5], while many
analyses of pictorial metaphor in advertisements are offered by Forceville [6]. Multimodal metaphors,
where source and target domains are expressed in different modalities, have now received considerable
attention in many media, including film (Forceville and Urios-Aparisi [7]).
Third, blending theory, as set out by Mark Turner and Gilles Fauconnier [8], provides further
refinements on the specific formal properties of the kinds of structured mappings that one also sees in
metaphors [9]. Blending has been taken up by many scholars, including many concerned with literary
interpretation [e.g., 10, 11, 12, 13]. In film, blends are found in many places, ranging over particular
aspects of narrative, such as perspective-taking, flashbacks (Gordejuela [14]) or similar, genres (Allen
[15]), pastiche (Veale [16]), and media (Bateman [3]). Although blending, particularly when construed
formally along the lines of morphisms between theories as proposed by Goguen [17] and articulated
in detail by Kutz et al. [18], offers substantial insights into the nature of creativity and emergence of
new concepts, such formalisations are generally independent of time. However, when actually used,
the deployment of blends and metaphors is always a dynamic process of interpretation that unfolds by
accruing clues and indications of precisely what is to be blended. This aspect of their working will be
of considerable concern below.
With these three constructs on the table, we can turn to our main concern: image schemas, as
introduced by Mark Johnson [19] and Lakoff and Johnson [20], along with substantial refinements and
further discussion from Oakley [21], Grady [22], Gibbs, Jr. [23, 24], and many more. Image schemas
are most commonly introduced as dynamic embodied patterns acquired in early child development in
interaction with the world. They are seen as the bridge between embodiment/perception and higher-
level, more abstract, conceptualisations. Various catalogues or lists of image schemas appear in the
literature, with examples such as containment, contact, source-path-goal, blockage, removal-
of-constraint, centre-periphery, near-far, and many more. However, despite their appeal, image
schemas have proved difficult to formalise. This is precisely because of their dual role in relating
conceptualisations to embodiment since these realms constitute two very different kinds of phenomena
ontologically.
To help towards formalisation, image schemas are often broken down into finer categories. Examples
here include the view from a psychological developmental perspective proposed by Mandler and Pagán
Cánovas [25] involving spatial primitives, image schemas, and schematic integration. There is also
the common proposal building on Grady [22] concerning primary metaphors, i.e., organisations of
experience that must be in place before more abstract conceptual representations can be built up by
blending. These primary metaphors do not rely on sharing features, as is assumed to be the case with
standard metaphorical mappings, but rather experiential correlations between ‘fundamental dimensions
of experience’. Primary metaphors are then thought to be directly embodied. Again, as usually the
case in all areas of metaphor, although originally primarily related to verbal examples, since Ortiz [26]
primary metaphors have also been extended multimodally – first to include the visual, and then to
broader ranges of sensory modalities as well; this development will also be central below. Finally, quite
a different kind of decomposition is pursued by Hedblom et al. [27], who develop a logical treatment
where image schemas are organised into a collection of hierarchically related formal theories of varying
complexity. More complex image schemas are then formed by the logical combination of the formal
theories describing their simpler components.
Regardless of their precise treatment, however, image schemas are generally assumed to operate at
a fundamental level in our dealings with the world and communication about that world. They are
suggested as fundamental stepping stones from bodily experience to abstract thought. But, despite
commonly being used in analyses of various kinds, it remains less than clear just what such analyses
need to be saying in order to be effective and revealing about the phenomena being addressed. This
problem is illustrated well by the concern raised with respect to purely verbal analysis by Kimmel; as
he remarks:
“Although embodiment has been rightly identified as a highly interesting issue for analysis,
the undifferentiated way that cognitive literary studies have equated image schemas with
embodiment makes it hard to pinpoint particularly embodied text passages or deduce
anything relevant about a text at large (given the near-ubiquity of image schemas in
language).” (Kimmel [11, p. 161])
There are now accordingly moves to add more empirical support for such statements, primarily in the
form of experiments where depictions that are supposed to invoke particular image schemas are placed
in combination with embodied tasks of various kinds, to see if there is indeed any interaction.
As one such method, interesting results have been found concerning how told stories can have
directly embodied responses for participants performing selected tasks. Kimmel [28], for example,
shows interactions between stories that are hypothesised to involve force image schemas and the
performance of various grasping actions. Similarly, Gibbs reports work where participants are presented
with two contrasting stories, one concerning a smooth relationship and one that runs less smoothly,
followed by physical actions or the imagination of physical actions. As Gibbs explains:
“My basic hypothesis was that people understand these two stories not by merely activating
a relationships are journeys conceptual metaphor, in which the source domain is
structured by the source-path-goal image schema. Instead people imaginatively simulate
themselves in the journey and actually experience some embodied sense of the source-
path-goal image schema as part of their understanding of the stories.” (Gibbs, Jr. [23, p.
128])
Even though the stories in such experiments are typically constructed to ensure that there is no explicit
indication of the particular image schemas assumed to be at work, the subsequent tests nevertheless
regularly show effects that are difficult to characterise without the image schema being present. This
kind of embodied simulation therefore appears to find quite substantial support empirically and so
clearly needs to be taken further. How precisely this is to be done raises substantial challenges, however.
3. Image schemas, metaphors, and films
There are already many detailed considerations of image schemas in film [29, 30]; Quendler [31] and
Forceville [32] offer overviews, while Fahlenbrach [33] and Coëgnarts and Kravanja [34] contain many
examples. A particularly useful overview table showing the distribution of image schemas across
studies can be found in Coëgnarts and Kravanja [35, p. 119]. One of the reasons for this increasing
engagement with film has been the growing realisation that treatments of film simply demand accounts
of embodiment in order to explain the effectiveness of the medium. Support for this also received
a substantial boost from the investigations of the role of simulation in film reception developed by
Vittorio Gallese and Michele Guerra [36], now extended considerably in a series of publications [37, 38].
Nevertheless, many discussions of image schemas in film still limit themselves to broadly descriptive
accounts in which particular segments in films are labelled exhibiting one or the other image schema
(Dancygier and Vandelanotte [39]). For example, some portion of film might be labelled as showing a
source-path-goal organisation when some protagonist is on a journey, or as exhibiting verticality
when the protagonist falls, etc. It is not immediately clear how the particularly embodied aspect of
image schemas contributes to analyses of this kind, although Forceville [40] and Forceville and Jeulink
[29] suggest that it is due to the engagement of image schemas that particular emotional and affective
responses to film might be best explained.
A rather more explicit account of the role of embodiment is proposed by Müller and Kappelhoff [41],
who argue that applying image-schema ‘labels’ as a post-hoc treatment of what has already happened
in engagement with a film is insufficient. Instead, one needs to address that engagement in its own
right and, for this, they propose the central construct of the cinematic expressive movement. This is a
generalisation of already existing embodied accounts of gesture and, in particular, the use of gesture to
dynamically construct extended metaphors in interaction (Cienki and Müller [42]).
One example of this approach offered by Müller and Kappelhoff is an extended sequence near the
beginning of William Wyler’s film Jezebel (1938), where the main character, played by Bette Davies,
arrives at a party. The scene opens with the character arriving before the house where the party is
taking place on a galloping and rearing horse, which she jumps off of, leaving a servant boy to take care
of the horse and exchanging a few lively words with him before running into the house, past several
waiting servants, into the main room of the party where she is shown moving through largely static
groups of party guests. Both the sound and the camera are highly dynamic; the sound emphasises
ongoing action, while the camera follows both her movement and its own movement around groups
and servants providing drinks for the party-goers. As Müller and Kappelhoff then observe:
“For the viewers, this figuration of cinematic expressive movements becomes an obstacle
course of affective mood alternations, which they literally realize as a sequence of perceptual
sensations taken as bodily experience and from which metaphorical meaning emerges
successively.” (Müller and Kappelhoff [41, p. 169])
As Müller and Kappelhoff note in several further detailed examples, this mode of engaging with
audiovisual materials is by no means limited to narrative film and can play an equally strong role in
non-fictional genres such as news reporting. The critical point, echoing and extending the position
of Gallese and Guerra above, is that engagement with film and similar audiovisual media is already a
thoroughly embodied experience.
4. Commonalities between image schema definitions and treatments
of film
At this point it is interesting to pay closer attention to a striking parallel between the development of
discussions of image schemas and that of film analysis. On the one hand, we are frequently reminded
when considering image schemas that:
“when we describe the image-schematic structure alone, we never capture fully the qualities
that are the flesh and blood of our experience.” (Johnson [43, p. 28])
On the other hand, we have the development of ‘neo-phenomenology’ in film [44, 45], which also
emphasises that without consideration of the embodied nature of perception, analysis of film is in
considerable danger of simply missing the point. Vivien Sobchack makes this particularly clear:
“Nearly every time I read a movie review in a newspaper or popular magazine, I am struck
once again by the gap that exists between our actual experience of the cinema and the
theory that we academic film scholars write to explain it—or, perhaps more aptly, to explain
it away.” (Sobchack [44, p. 53])
Authors such as Sobchack, Müller and Kappelhoff, and others all emphasise that film needs to be seen as
a ‘specific mode of experience’, where filmic features such as cinematic movement expressions function
as affective temporal gestalts (Müller and Kappelhoff [41, p. 21]). Extended metaphors are then seen as
emergent in performance, rather than being fixed blocks of meaning that are simply applied to data to
label interpretations.
This dynamic generation of meaning through embodied perception in film is precisely the position
argued to hold for image schemas as well by, for example, Gibbs:
“image schemas may be described as emergent properties that arise from different ‘cycles of
operation’ constituting a person’s life and represent a kind of ‘structural coupling’ between
brain, body, and world. Image schemas reflect a form of stability within cognitive systems.”
(Gibbs, Jr. [23, p. 131])
“my argument has been that image schemas are created on-the-fly as part of people’s
ongoing simulations . . . Image schemas are not divorced from their bodily origins . . . This
perspective helps restore image schemas to their rightful status as ‘experiential gestalts’...”
(Gibbs, Jr. [23, p. 132])
Thus, we have, on the one hand, image schemas as ‘experiential gestalts’ and, on the other hand, film as
driving ‘temporal gestalts’ of orchestrated affective responses. As Forceville [40] suggests in his analyses
of the force image schema in several animation films, the essential embodiment of image schemas is
consequently crucial to their use in analysis. The idea is that embodied viewing itself involves intrinsic
responses that are directly associated with, or even caused by, what is perceived. Such responses can
then ground more complex, and abstract, conceptual metaphors that nevertheless always maintain
contact with their embodied foundation.
A very appealing aspect of Gibbs’ approach for both film analysis and for considerations of image
schemas in general is then to consider image schemas not only in terms of ‘simulations’ but also as
simulators. As he explains: “a simulator provides something close to what it actually feels like in a
full-bodied manner” (Gibbs, Jr. [23, pp. 118–119]). Drawing an analogy with flight simulators, then:
“As a simulator, image schemas provide a kinesethetic feel that is not simply the output of
some abstract computational machine, but the results of full-bodied experiences that have
textures and a felt-sense of three-dimensional depth.” (Gibbs, Jr. [23, p. 119])
Construing image schemas in this way has several important consequences both for defining image
schemas further and for their use in analysis, particularly of films. Moreover, as we shall briefly now
discuss, it also raises the possibility of more direct ‘depictions’ of image schemas making use of the
expressive resources of film.
5. Embodiment in representation and the role of multimodality
Many authors have proposed visual representations for image schemas over the years as a contribution to
their formalisation and in order to support interpretations of their intended import (e.g., Langacker [46];
Talmy [47], Hedblom and Kutz [48]). The most recent such proposal is the image schema language set out
in Hedblom et al. [49], which seeks to overcome the tendency of earlier visual representations to become
quite complex by being more thoroughly ‘diagrammatic’ in the sense of supporting compositionality. All
such proposals are, however, static, which stands in opposition to the understanding of image schemas
as dynamic processes set out above. Indeed, the dynamic view of image schemas clearly suggests that
there may be no such thing as ‘static’ image schemas at all, thereby raising even more challenges
for static representations. As Gibbs argues: “People continually simulate ‘static’ schemas in a more
dynamic manner than is mostly assumed in cognitive linguistics” [23, p. 120]. This is also supported
developmentally: “The acts of going in and out of containers are what matter to infants, more than the
containers themselves; these are not static conceptions” (Mandler and Pagán Cánovas [25, p. 515]); an
argument also made by Dewell [50].
Nevertheless, it is of course by no means the case that only dynamic representations can represent
dynamic situations and so the issue of representation needs to be addressed more carefully. Many static
media have developed techniques for expressing movement while remaining within the limits of their
materiality. The techniques employed in representations of image schemas have until now been rather
limited, however. For example, some representations employ arrows to show directions of movement,
others employ sequential panels as found in comics, and still others employ further resources common
to comics such as blurring and motion lines (cf., e.g., McCloud [51]; Cohn [52]; Bateman [53]).
For the purposes of capturing image schemas, however, all representations, whether those are filmic,
static pictures, diagrams, verbal expressions, comics, tangible interfaces, or even logics, can be evaluated
by asking how well they function as embodied ‘simulators’ for the phenomena they are attempting to
capture. Similar considerations can in fact be applied to all representations. This is an essential result
of current work on multimodality and multimodal semiotics of the kind set out in Bateman et al. [54]
and provides a clear method for asking (and evaluating) what effective representations or depictions of
image schemas could be.
One can also, for example, even consider alternative verbal representations. Cameron [55] argues
against the classic A is B representation of metaphors in favour of a form emphasizing the dynamics
of metaphor construction, where the relation between source (vehicle) and target is characterized as
𝑉 ∼ 𝑇 → 𝑀ing accompanied by “short descriptive summaries of metaphorizing trajectories; the
metaphorizing narrative to describe multiple interwoven trajectories.” (Cameron [55, p. 33]). An
example would be:
“𝑀ing : a dry desert of unending blankness ∼ how the sleepless nights feel”
(Cameron [55, p. 27])
We can immediately see how this formulation may indeed be more effective in offering a ‘simulator’
for the intended experience, simply because it draws on an enriched verbalisation capable of evoking
embodied experience. This is not directly present in a sleepless night is unending desert version,
although with suitable additional filling-in of intentions this difference could be reduced.
This is actually the situation holding for diagrammatic representations in general. The bare iconic
depictions in such representations place constraints on interpretation – in the form of ‘operations’
that are compatible with the iconics – but these need to be filled in indexically to ground them in
experience, i.e., in simulation. The appropriate kind of ‘filling in’ is then usually cued conventionally
by particular expressive techniques – for example, and as noted above, those developed for comics.
Any static representations of image schemas should therefore take particular care to specify how this
enrichment of the bare iconics is intended to proceed.
An exception to the need to fill in additional details may, however, be offered by media which already
match the embodied experience of image schemas sufficiently; this appears to be satisfied by suitably
designed films. Now, such depictions do not need to strive for maximal realism – it appears that certain
depictions of movement, force, resistance can be evoked by animation as well (Forceville [40]). It would
be interesting, therefore, to explore the boundaries of this: considering, for example, whether some
kinds of anthropomorphic characters are required or whether abstract (deformable) shapes might be
sufficient as well.
Although following this line of development might help achieve better, i.e., more directly interpretable,
representations of image schemas, we are still left facing the key problem of how to get at, and even
model, image schemas’ essential experiential aspect. For this, simulation appears inescapable. Earlier
proposals for relating accounts to simulation, such as those found in embodied construction grammar, are
summarised in Bateman [56] and explored further in, for example, Bateman et al. [57] and Pomarlan and
Bateman [58]. Here the essential idea was to employ hybrid reasoning, where symbolic representations
are placed in correspondence with abstractions linked directly to simulation conditions. Simulations
then run and their final states are fed back to symbolic representations via image-schematic constructs.
This would then match with Gibbs’ conclusion that: “Image-schematic reasoning does not simply mean
doing something with one’s mind, but constructing a simulation of experience using one’s body” [23,
p. 115]. As we saw above, this is also the conclusion reached in studies of film, where it is the direct
experience and engagement of viewers with the unfolding filmic experience that appears prior, not
a labelling in terms of metaphors or image schemas. The link down to actual first-person simulation
seems crucial. But how can one get to such an internal view?
In cognitive robot architectures such as those developed within the interdisciplinary research centre
on ‘Everyday Activity Science and Engineering’ (EASE), an explicit logging of internal states is a central
component of the model (Beetz et al. [59]). These ‘narrative enabled episodic memories’ (NEEMs)
are intended primarily for learning ways of performing tasks on the basis both of observing human
behaviour and of simulated trial-and-error, and for performing meta-cognition on how to solve problems
that arise regularly in everyday activities. One might, therefore, also see this as a potential source of
‘internal’ data of the form intrinsic to the simulation view of image schemas. That is, internal states of
actuators, forces applied, resistances met, and so on may offer usable data for revealing image-schematic
generalisations, albeit not human image schemas. Attempting to learn patterns from such datasets
might nevertheless be indicative of how such processing might proceed in humans and it would be an
interesting range of experiments to see just what image-schema-like generations might be acquired.
There is certainly still very much to explore here.
Finally, one might then complete the loop back to representations and visualisations of situations
characterised in terms of such ‘image schemas’. Within the EASE framework, there are already close
hook-ups between robot descriptions, robot perception, and visualisations of agents and situations in
the form of ‘digital twins’. This means that, ideally, all internally represented states and actions can
be re-played in 3D virtual reality. This might then offer a useful interface both for exploring acquired
image schemas further and for investigating distinct visualisation options directly. Crucial will be the
appropriate maintenance of the dynamics of the phenomena explored throughout as only then do we
remain within the domain of phenomena relevant for image schemas.
6. Closing remarks
This position paper has proposed that it might be beneficial to explore several connections between
the areas of simulation, visualisation, and robotics for moving closer to an embodied understanding
of image schemas. Similarities between shortcomings observed for formalising image schemas and
for analysing film were used to suggest gaps that need filling. Although there is a long history of
discussions concerning the ‘metaphorical’ nature of thought and experience which may be true in
an abstract kind of way, the ready import of metaphorical notions into embodied engagement with
the world has not so far been successful. Operating with image schemes largely in terms of abstract
labels may not then be enough. The treatment of both image schemas and metaphorical readings of
experience as essentially emerging from dynamic embodiment appears unavoidable.
This suggests a couple of areas where further research might be profitably explored for revealing
more about the workings of image schemas:
• First, it would perhaps be worthwhile designing (and evaluating) distinct medial variants of image
schema depictions. Different media have different affordances and so might support different
points of access to image schemas and for making the gaps in existing proposals clear. Here it
would even be interesting to explore possibilities beyond the visual, with other sensory modalities
perhaps making additional contributions to how image schemas are to be conceived. Developing
these would certainly constitute a range of attractive student projects, for example.
• And second, performing learning on robotically acquired internal states while robots are per-
forming various tasks might be investigated for the potential emergence of image-schemal-like
generalisations. The data used in such studies should naturally range across all modes available
to the robot so as to provide holistic views of the robots’ placement in their environments, and
be linked to goals and notions of success and difficulty. This is evidently considerably more
challenging and so might provide a range of interesting projects for various stakeholders in the
area.
Both directions, individually or combined, mark out paths by which image schemas might be brought
successively under tighter theoretical control.
Acknowledgments
The research on which this position statement is based was partially supported by the German Research
Foundation (DFG), as part of the Collaborative Research Center (Sonderforschungsbereich) 1320 “EASE
- Everyday Activity Science and Engineering”, University of Bremen (http://www.ease-crc.org/). That
research was conducted primarily within subproject P01: ‘Embodied Semantics for the Language of Ac-
tion and Change’ (2017–2025). Early preparatory work was also supported by the DAAD/MIUR-funded
mobility scheme ‘SCORE: From Image Schemas to Cognitive Robotics: computational simulations’ (ID:
57397370) between the University of Bremen and the Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (2018–2020).
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