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    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Frameworks for testing and monitoring in IoT systems</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Dmytro Prosvirin</string-name>
          <email>dmytro.prosvirin@antonov-airlines.aero</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Volodymyr Kharchenko</string-name>
          <email>kharch@nau.edu.ua</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Oleg Ivashchuk</string-name>
          <email>iva.oleg2000@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>ADP 24: International Workshop on Algorithms of Data Processing</institution>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Antonov Company</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Akademika Tupoleva str., 1, Kyiv, 03062</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff2">
          <label>2</label>
          <institution>National Aviation University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Liubomyra Huzara Ave., 1, Kyiv, 03058</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>This paper addresses the challenges of testing in IoT systems and proposes an approach to tackle these challenges. Key insights into the framework design include the necessity of considering the entire lifecycle of IoT components - from design, through integration, to operational deployment. When components are interconnected, threats and risks can spread across the system, because defects in one component can impact the functionality of others. Managing testing for IoT devices is challenging due to their wide distribution, lack of transparency, and limited processing resources. Identifying critical system components, assessing their vulnerabilities, and planning mitigation strategies are essential aspects of threat analysis. While information derived from operational tracking assists in directing enhancements, deploying these updates to many battery-efficient devices located across wide locations poses a significant challenge.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>IoT</kwd>
        <kwd>TELEMETRY</kwd>
        <kwd>testing</kwd>
        <kwd>monitoring 1</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>IoT devices typically function as black boxes for their deployers and users, which limits
access to their internal components and structures for testing;
the unique requirements of IoT device firmware make updates challenging, especially given
the numerous devices distributed across various locations;
weaknesses in a single component can impact the entire system lead to threats and risks
propagating to other components within a given system.</p>
      <p>To address these difficulties, there is a need for tools, techniques, and holistic methodologies for
cybersecurity testing and vulnerability detection at both the component level and within the
integrated systems. This will facilitate cyclical review of IoT components and systems throughout
lifecycle, enhancing assurance for component developers, system integrators, and operators who act
on behalf of the system s end users [4].</p>
      <p>TELEMETRY will deliver reliable tools for the steady evaluation of heterogeneous, interconnected
components and systems that form Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystems -encompassing devices,
software, services, and communication infrastructures. Addressing every phase of their lifecycle, the
TELEMETRY methodology offers a comprehensive toolkit for:</p>
      <p>Component Development: Rigorous testing of individual components;
System Integration: Testing and monitoring during component integration;</p>
      <p>System Operation: Ongoing monitoring throughout operation.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•</p>
      <p>The project will push the boundaries of cybersecurity testing and runtime monitoring through
the deployment of cutting-edge machine learning algorithms for real-time anomaly detection and
dynamic threat analysis to evaluate potential threats. Key innovations include:</p>
      <p>Privacy-preserving data sharing across independent entities, such as supply chains;
IoT device emulation environments for in-depth analysis and testing;
Reputation management mechanisms to maintain trust across ecosystems;</p>
      <p>Lightweight, secure update mechanisms to ensure trusted software maintenance.</p>
      <p>TELEMETRY promotes a steady improvement cycle throughout design and runtime, fostering
resilience in IoT systems. It will also explore three diverse use cases in aerospace, smart
manufacturing, and telecommunications to drive the design and validation of tools and
methodologies [5].</p>
      <p>By focusing on these domains, TELEMETRY aims to enhance the accuracy of threat detection,
reduce response times, and lower the cost of testing IoT systems [6]. Committed to open-source
principles, the project will actively engage with communities to ensure wide dissemination and
exploitation of its outcomes.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Aircraft data monitoring</title>
      <p>Our study mostly focuses on flight data/cargo monitoring by Antonov Company. The main purpose
of this is the automated processing of flight data transmitted from the aircraft in online mode (24
hours per day/7 days per week/365 days per year) in order to improve flight safety, and operational
communication between the aircraft crew and ground personnel to increase the efficiency and
profitability of commercial transportation of Antonov Airlines. For this an in-flight communication
link of short burst data (SBD) from the plane and circuit switched data (CSD) toward the plane is
established along with the existing use of global positioning system (GPS).</p>
      <p>Flight data/cargo monitoring is a tool for effective management and analysis of processed flight
information (parametric, voice and video information) registered by the onboard flight data recorder,
both during normal operation of the fleet and during investigations of flight accidents and incidents.
Also it is a fulfilment of the 4D flight monitoring function [7].</p>
      <p>The flight data/cargo monitoring system is designed for:
•
fulfil the requirements of the governing normative documents regarding continuous
monitoring of the aircraft position and its technical condition by the operator;
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
creation of a unified information space, which will allow the Antonov specialists involved to
interactively receive the necessary information (parametric, voice and video) about each
flight of the Antonov aircraft, including technical characteristics of the condition of the
aircraft and its systems, at any moment, while ensuring protected personalized access of
different categories of users to the information;
independent automated collection and accumulation of technical information from aircraft
on Antonov hardware with its subsequent processing and distribution to certain groups of
users within Airlines departments;
increasing the level of informing Antonov specialists by providing the Antonov with
operational information on the aircraft movement and requested technical characteristics of
the aircraft and its systems in flight;
providing information support to the aircraft crew during the flight or at the airfield in
preparation for the flight by transmitting operational data for the forthcoming flight,
aeronautical and other information from the Antonov to the aircraft;
operational assistance to aircraft crews and on-board engineering staff in the form of
recommendations for actions in the event of special situations during flight and/or technical
operation of aircraft outside the Antonov base to eliminate defects after completed flights;
collection and provision of accumulated information from the aircraft to the Antonov
management in the current situation that requires prompt response for decision-making;
flight safety management, taking into account the introduction of algorithms for automated
processing of flight data related to the condition of aircraft equipment, monitoring of
compliance with the rules of aircraft operation by the crew in flight and by the engineering
staff on the ground, as well as assessing the level of training of Antonov flight personnel;
ensuring automation of risk management in planning and performing commercial flights of
Airlines aircraft, taking into account the objective situation along the route and technical
condition of the aircraft, qualification and readiness of the crew and technical personnel on
board;
ensuring automated maintenance of the "Electronic Form" of the aircraft in order to control
consumption of the actual life of the airframe and engines, as well as to analyse their technical
condition, quality of production and repair.</p>
      <p>Providing secure and efficient access to information resources is an important component of the
aircraft production process and its subsequent operation. Testing and optimization of access control
systems to information resources will make the work of an airline company more efficient.</p>
      <p>The challenge with an aircraft operators intricate information access control system is that
various access points allow users to obtain permissions from various regulations. This results in an
increase in valid permissions, which collectively poses an elevated risk. A universal and intuitive
tool for testing access control systems will allow the network administrator to improve the quality
of decisions made and reduce response time to incidents.</p>
      <p>Testing the cybersecurity of IoT systems will allow to identify vulnerabilities in access control to
system components and regulate the creation of temporary or permanent users with different access
levels and sets of rights. It will also allow to control their typical or atypical behaviour, provide
testing of response to incidents at HW and SW level. Examples may include:
•
•
•
•
•
•</p>
      <p>Closing user rights;
Ensuring the safety of logs;
Sending clusters to quarantine;
Notifying responsible employees;
Setting timings;
issuing recommendations in case of violation of the conditions or rules for resolving an
incident;</p>
      <p>Logging actions when resolving an incident.</p>
      <p>TELEMETRY will provide threat analysis and use anomaly and misuse detection, in components
and systems to recognize hazardous conditions at component and system level. Also, TELEMETRY
will identify vulnerabilities in access control to system components and will monitor the creation of
temporary or permanent users with different access levels and sets of rights. TELEMETRY will also
control typical or atypical behaviour, provide testing of response to incidents at the HW and SW
level (closing user rights, ensuring the safety of logs, sending clusters to quarantine, notifying
responsible employees, setting timings, issuing recommendations in case of violation of the
conditions or rules for resolving an incident, logging actions when resolving an incident, etc.).</p>
      <p>As an example of implementation of TELEMETRY results cargo monitoring systems was
considered There will be different steps of implementation during the project run-time [8]. The
phases of the implementations are:
1.
2.
3.
4.</p>
      <p>Wired approach (cargo monitoring) without satellite;
Wired approach (cargo monitoring) with satellite;
Wireless approach (cargo monitoring) with satellite;</p>
      <p>Wireless approach (flight data monitoring) with satellite.</p>
      <p>Threats associated with the current implementation includes anomalies in operation, process
interruption, rogue device, and realtime alarm system. Architecture diagram of cargo monitoring
system is represented in Figure 1.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. TELEMETRY solution</title>
      <p>TELEMETRY tools can help improve the security of an air cargo monitoring system based on
onboard indicators, information traffic analysis tools and anomaly detection.</p>
      <p>Machine learning tools developed by TELEMETRY partners will help detect atypical behaviour
of onboard information sensors (temperature, pressure, humidity), and suspicious network activity
and track requests to connect to abnormal network access points.</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>Detection of anomalies in network traffic and assignment of risk profiles to each device.</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>The cargo is exposed to too high/too low</title>
        <p>temperatures for a prohibitively long time. It
could be prevented during the flight.</p>
        <p>In turn, testing the cybersecurity of on-board and ground-based IT systems will help identify
vulnerabilities in restricting access to system components, and will also allow monitoring their
typical or atypical behaviour, ensuring response to incidents associated with vulnerabilities at the
HW, SW level (closing user rights, ensuring security logging, sending clusters to quarantine,
notifying responsible employees, setting timings, issuing recommendations in case of violation of
the conditions or rules for resolving an incident, logging actions when resolving an incident,
etc.). Overview of Threats in the Aviation Use Case is given in Figure 2.</p>
        <p>Implementation on the aircraft of cargo monitoring system is presented in Figure 3.</p>
        <p>The components marked on the Figure 3 are:
1. Computer ip-5 (is represented in Figure 4);
2. Digital pressure, humidity, temperature sensor (is represented in Figure 5);
3. Digital pressure, humidity, temperature sensor (is represented in Figure 5);
4. Digital three-axis overload sensor;
5. Power cable for ip-5 with polar 27v plug;
6. Connection cable ip-5 to sensor;
7. Connection cable ip-5 to sensor;
8. Connection cable ip-5 to sensor;
9. Connection cable ip-5 to pc with a plug for the rear assistant cabin;
10. Personal computer with power supply (is represented in Figure 6);
11. Ties for fastening sensors and cables (to be purchased separately);
12. Power supply 220v.</p>
        <p>Cargo monitoring system was sucsefully tested on the flight from Germany to USA as part of the
Project with AIRBUS (Airbus-built EarthCARE climate satellite).</p>
        <p>Grafical visualization of the parameters from cargo monitoring system in cargo compartment is
given in Figure 7. The parameters specified on the Figure 7 are: T1 is temperature from the sensor
N1; T2 is temperature from the sensor N2; Pr1 is preasure from the sensor N1; Pr2 is preasure from
the sensor N2; Hum1 is humidity from the sensor N1; Hum2 is humidity from the sensor N2; H1 is
altitude from the sensor N1; H2 is altitude from the sensor N2; U is voltage in the circuit.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Evaluation scenarios</title>
      <p>Developed tool has been tested. The tools can be used standalone, or in combination with other tools
to address a specific storyline.</p>
      <p>The TELEMETRY tools has been installed on a separate laptop residing in the airplane. This laptop
is connected to the sensor network in the airplane. It hosts all required tools for the wired and
wireless approach, as well as for evaluation purposes record the raw data. This allows to evaluate
the tool events with respect to real events.</p>
      <p>TELEMETRY detects anomalies in network traffic and assigns a risk profile to each device. If a
threshold value is exceeded, the operator is informed [9].</p>
      <p>Testing the cybersecurity of IT system allows to identify vulnerabilities in access control to
system components and regulate the creation of temporary or permanent users with different access
levels and sets of rights, and also allow to control their typical or atypical behaviour [10].
TELEMETRY also provides testing of response to incidents at the HW and SW level (closing user
rights, ensuring the safety of logs, sending clusters to quarantine, notifying responsible employees,
setting timings, issuing recommendations in case of violation of the conditions or rules for resolving
an incident, logging actions when resolving an incident, etc.).</p>
      <p>TELEMETRY anomaly detection algorithm identifies operational change and notifies the operator
about anomalies in network traffic and assigns a risk profile to each device. If a threshold value is
exceeded, the operator is informed (Table 2) [11, 12].</p>
      <p>The numerous access points to information provide users with mechanisms to acquire
permissions from different regulations, leading to a buildup of permitted access rights that together
create a some level of vulnerability. A universal tool for testing access control systems allow the
network administrator to improve the quality of decisions made and reduce response time to
incidents (Table 3).</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Conclusions</title>
      <sec id="sec-5-1">
        <title>Tool 2 ML Tool 2. Subject anomaly behaviour</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-2">
        <title>Tool 3 Access control risk 3. Calculate access control risk level and send message for network administrator</title>
        <p>This paper provides an overview of the TELEMETRY framework, designed to offer a flexible suite of
tools and infrastructure for testing and monitoring ICT ecosystems, particularly focusing on IoT
devices and their integration within broader systems.</p>
        <p>Currently, the project is about one-third of the way through its timeline. The framework's
architecture has been defined, use cases have been identified along with their associated difficulties,
and components are in various stages of development or evaluation. Proposed solutions address the
challenges outlined in the Background section and meet the requirements of the project's use cases.
The next steps involve finalizing tool development and testing these approaches, making
adjustments as needed to fit the specifics of the application area.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Acknowledgements</title>
      <p>This research is included in the Horizon Europe TELEMETRY framework (Trustworthy
mEthodologies, open knowLedgE &amp; autoMated tools for sEcurity Testing of IoT software, haRdware
&amp; ecosYstems) project, supported by EC funding under grant number 101119747, and UKRI under
grant number 10087006.
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