<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Archiving and Interchange DTD v1.0 20120330//EN" "JATS-archivearticle1.dtd">
<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>O. Huralnyk);</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Method and Means of Critical Information Processing in Corporate Networks⋆</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Oleksandr Huralnyk</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Andrzej Kwiecien</string-name>
          <email>andrzej.kwiecien@polsl.pl</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Vadym Paiuk</string-name>
          <email>vadympaiuk@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Olexandr Klein</string-name>
          <email>olexandrkleyn@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Oleksii</string-name>
          <email>oleksii.lyhun@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Intelitsis'25: The 6th International Workshop on Intelligent Information Technologies &amp; Systems of Information Security</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Aprile 04, 2025, Khmelnytskyi</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Khmelnytsky National University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Khmelnytsky, Instytutska Str., 11, 29016</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff2">
          <label>2</label>
          <institution>Silesian University of Technology</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Akademicka str., 2А, Gliwice</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="PL">Poland</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>1896</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>000</volume>
      <fpage>0</fpage>
      <lpage>0003</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>The article studies modern methods and means of processing critical information in corporate networks. Since the growth of data volumes increases the risk of data breaches, the main causes of such incidents are analyzed, in particular, unintentional personnel errors (misdelivery, misconfiguration) and abuse of privileges by insiders. Data Loss Prevention (DLP) technologies are considered as a key mechanism for data protection, including detection, monitoring, prevention and audit of information flows. A comparative analysis of different models of DLP systems (centralized, distributed, hybrid) and their application in the corporate environment has been carried out. Particular attention is paid to commercial solutions from leading manufacturers, their capabilities, advantages and disadvantages. The article focuses on the current challenges of DLP systems, such as the high frequency of false positives, limited capabilities for analyzing encrypted traffic, difficulties in detecting insider threats, and scalability issues. A review of recent research demonstrates promising approaches combining anomaly analysis, machine learning, attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE), and Zero Trust principles. The article discusses the peculiarities of using botnets to steal critical information in corporate networks. A solution for protecting information in case of botnet activity is proposed, based on the integration of data leakage prevention systems (DLP) - a module specially configured to neutralize botnet threats. The results of the study indicate the need for an integrated approach to information security, which includes a combination of technological, organizational and legal measures. This will significantly reduce the risks of data leakage and ensure reliable protection of critical information in the face of modern cyber threats.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>critical information</kwd>
        <kwd>data leakage</kwd>
        <kwd>Data Loss Prevention (DLP)</kwd>
        <kwd>data protection</kwd>
        <kwd>botnets 1</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>Modern business operations depend on information technology, which leads to a significant increase
in the amount of data processed and stored within corporate networks. On the one hand, this opens
up significant opportunities for analytics, improving business processes, and making decisions based
on processed data. On the other hand, the growth in the volume of information significantly
increases the likelihood of data leaks that can have a serious negative impact on companies.</p>
      <p>Losses of critical information can occur for various reasons: from unintentional staff errors to
intentional malicious actions. This can mean the loss of confidential information, disclosure of
intellectual property or financial information, which ultimately causes financial losses, undermines
the trust of customers and partners, and may also entail legal liability.</p>
      <p>In the era of globalization and active digitalization of business, ensuring information security is
becoming one of the priorities. Corporations must implement comprehensive security strategies that
encompass not only technological aspects but also organizational and legal aspects. Knowing how
to effectively prevent them and implementing combined security systems helps reduce risks and
protect the most valuable data.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Errors and problems in information processing</title>
      <p>
        According to the analysis of the report [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ], the main problems during information processing are
Privilege Misuse and Miscellaneous Errors in the context of the two most common types of such
errors - Misdelivery and Misconfiguration.
      </p>
      <p>
        According to [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ], about 25% of successful data leakage incidents in the corporate sector are the
result of botnet activity. The risk especially increases if the botnet is used for the targeted theft of
critical data - financial, intellectual property, personal.
      </p>
      <p>In modern corporate networks, botnets have acquired the status of one of the most dangerous
tools of cyberattacks. A botnet is a collection of compromised devices (computers, servers, IoT
devices) united under the control of an attacker (the so-called botmaster). Due to the distributed
nature of the attack, botnets effectively hide the origin of malicious actions by using the legitimate
resources of the victims.</p>
      <p>Privilege abuse is almost always associated with insiders using legitimate access to a system for
purposes other than its intended purpose—for example, for financial gain, to damage the company’s
reputation, or for the “convenience” of employees bypassing security measures to get the job done
faster. Most often, personal information (customer, employee, partner data) is stolen, which can be
easily monetized. In the healthcare industry, access to medical records can be abused because the
volume and sensitivity of patient data creates additional opportunities for attackers.</p>
      <p>
        In recent years, the most prominent Miscellaneous Errors have been Misdelivery (sending or
transferring data to the wrong person) and Misconfiguration (incorrect access or system
configuration settings that cause a leak). Misdelivery is often associated with email (wrong recipient)
or sending physical documents to the wrong address. Misconfiguration most often occurs due to
incorrect configuration of web servers, cloud storage, etc., when access is open to a wider range of
people or is generally available on the Internet without proper authentication. In most cases, personal
information is disclosed. The average amount of data that becomes publicly available due to such
errors is often significant, and the fact of the leak is often reported by the affected customers
themselves or third-party security researchers [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>The most common channels of data leakage include:
•
•
•
•
•
•</p>
      <p>Network (browser, cloud services).</p>
      <p>Email.</p>
      <p>Printed documents.</p>
      <p>Stolen or lost equipment.</p>
      <p>Removable media (USB, phones, hard drives).</p>
      <p>Instant messaging programs (Telegram, Viber).</p>
      <p>
        Key recommendations for preventing data leaks include logging and monitoring the actions of
privileged users, regular auditing, and revoking access rights, especially if an employee resigns or
changes position. Training staff to explain why specific security rules exist to reduce the risk of
deliberate violations. Automated verification mechanisms to detect potential errors. Secure default
settings, especially in cloud environments, to reduce the likelihood of accidental public availability
of confidential data. Checking the correctness of email addresses, introducing warnings or
confirmations when sending emails with attachments or a large number of recipients. Regular
communication with staff about data transfer policies (especially critical information), including
working with physical documents. These measures should be part of a more holistic information
security strategy, which should include the implementation of technical solutions using modern Data
Loss Prevention (DLP) systems [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ].
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Data Loss prevention (DLP) technologies</title>
      <p>DLP systems are becoming increasingly important in the field of protecting critical information from
illegal extraction, misuse, unauthorized access or accidental deletion, which can occur at endpoints,
in networks and in data stores. Their implementation contributes to increasing the level of
information security, compliance with the principle of least privilege, monitoring data flows,
compliance with legal requirements on confidentiality and protection of intellectual property.</p>
      <p>
        A DLP system is a set of tools and processes aimed at detecting, monitoring and protecting
confidential data from unauthorized access, leakage or theft. Such solutions control the movement
of data in the corporate environment (at rest, during use and in transit) and prevent it from reaching
unauthorized persons [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Advanced DLP solutions use encryption, a notification system and preventive measures to reduce
the risks associated with data leaks. In today's market, such systems are actively developing in
response to the rapid growth of information volume, which requires protection against cyber
espionage and cyberattacks in both the government and corporate sectors [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>The principal components of Data Loss Prevention (DLP) systems include discovery, monitoring,
prevention, reporting, and auditing [10]. Discovery entails periodic or continuous scanning of
corporate devices and storage systems to identify the presence of confidential data, irrespective of
its location. Monitoring ensures persistent oversight of data transmission and usage within
information flows, such as network channels, workstations, and application services. Prevention
mechanisms enable the blocking, encryption, or redirection of data transfers in alignment with
established security policies. Reporting and auditing functions are responsible for generating
comprehensive reports on security incidents, user activities, and policy compliance, while also
maintaining an event log to support subsequent analysis.</p>
      <p>Such multi-level coverage Figure 1 makes it possible to detect potential leaks in time and respond
to threats, in particular through automated scenarios or notifications to responsible persons.</p>
      <p>
        A typical algorithm for a DLP system’s operation [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ] encompasses several interrelated phases
designed to ensure comprehensive data protection. The initial stage, data collection and interception,
involves deploying an endpoint agent or network sensor to capture information flows. Subsequently,
the system conducts content analysis by searching for specific keywords, phrases, or regular
expressions that may indicate the presence of sensitive information. The analyzed data is then
compared against established security policies, prompting preventive measures—such as issuing
warnings or blocking transmissions—when a match is detected. Throughout this process, all events,
user identifiers, timestamps, and transmission channel details are recorded in a logging module to
facilitate both immediate oversight and post-incident investigation. Lastly, the system’s reaction
phase may halt the sending of information, enforce document encryption, or dispatch notifications
to an administrator.
      </p>
      <p>
        In modern DLP solutions, data is generally categorized into three broad types [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ]. The first, Data
in Use, pertains to the regulation of data usage on workstations, which includes monitoring actions
such as copying, printing, or creating screenshots. Data in Motion focuses on overseeing and
managing data transfers within network traffic, including web, email, and FTP channels. Finally,
Data at Rest entails scanning storage repositories—such as file servers and databases—to detect and
classify confidential files. This tripartite classification enables organizations to implement targeted
safeguards for each stage of the data lifecycle.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Classification of DLP systems</title>
      <p>
        During the development of DLP systems, researchers commonly differentiate between centralized
and distributed models. In the centralized approach, event collection and analysis occur under the
control of a single console, with all endpoint agents and sensors (installed on client PCs, servers, or
network devices) transmitting data to a central module. Such a configuration facilitates
straightforward management and rapid coordination of security policies, but requires sufficient
computational capacity to accommodate large traffic volumes. In contrast, the distributed model
conducts event analysis locally, within the specific part of the system where a security threat
materializes. Although this design alleviates the burden on central nodes, it can introduce
complexities in maintaining consistent policies and a unified response methodology [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Hybrid solutions are frequently employed in practice, merging the advantages of centralized
administration and distributed analysis according to the infrastructure’s scale and security
requirements. A comparative overview of the key features of centralized, distributed, and hybrid data
loss prevention (DLP) systems is presented in Table 1.</p>
      <p>
        Beyond these architectural models, DLP technologies can be grouped by their deployment
strategies. Endpoint DLP relies on agents installed on local machines (such as desktops or laptops)
to provide fine-grained oversight of user actions, including copying data to external media, printing
documents, or capturing screenshots [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]. Network DLP operates through sensors or proxies that
intercept and analyze traffic in real time, thereby offering robust control over data in motion while
still exhibiting limitations in monitoring localized activity [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]. Discovery DLP targets data at rest by
scanning file repositories, mail servers, and databases to identify and label sensitive information,
enabling a more precise application of security policies [26]. Cloud DLP, relevant to SaaS
environments such as Office 365 and Google Workspace, focuses on controlling uploads and
downloads to and from the cloud, and is often integrated with a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB)
to extend protection capabilities [25].
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>Large corporations with numerous remote offices, data centers, and global presence.</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>Central server + local nodes/agents in remote networks or branches.</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-3">
        <title>Centralized policies with the ability to finetune at the local level.</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-4">
        <title>Flexible scaling: the main server scales “up” and distributed nodes “down”.</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-5">
        <title>Balanced performance: some processing is performed centrally, the rest on the nodes.</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-6">
        <title>Higher than</title>
        <p>centralized, but
depends on the
availability of the
central node and</p>
        <p>remote ones.</p>
        <p>Medium: centralized
management, but local
configuration may be
required for remote
nodes.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-7">
        <title>Balanced costs: more</title>
        <p>flexibility, but still
requires coordination
between the central
node and local ones.
Centralized distribution
with the ability to make
individual changes on
local nodes (balance of
speed and consistency).</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-8">
        <title>Organizations with</title>
        <p>mixed infrastructure:
some systems are
concentrated in one
place, and some are
distributed.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-9">
        <title>High scalability, localized processing, no single point of failure.</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-10">
        <title>Main</title>
        <p>Disadvantages
"Single point of
failure", there may be
problems with
bandwidth and
performance in
largescale networks.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-11">
        <title>Complex policy management and synchronization, higher administration costs</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-12">
        <title>Combining the</title>
        <p>advantages of both
approaches: centralized
management +
distributed detection
and processing.</p>
        <p>Requires careful
architecture: it is
necessary to configure
the interaction between
the central server and
distributed nodes.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Overview of modern DLP solutions</title>
      <p>Systems for comprehensive detection and prevention of data leaks for corporate networks can be
divided into commercial and research (non-commercial). In this article, we will consider commercial
systems, which, unlike research ones, offer more complete and multifunctional options for protecting
critical information, and can also provide comprehensive solutions with scalability and integration
capabilities.</p>
      <p>Below is an overview of the architecture of DLP systems, the main components, the interaction
between them and the place of the system in the overall data protection infrastructure are considered.</p>
      <p>Broadcom – Symantec Data Loss Prevention [10] is a comprehensive solution composed of several
interdependent components. The Enforce Server, also known as the Management Console, serves as
the central node where administrators configure policies, dictionaries, and overarching system
settings. Detection Servers, each specialized in a particular function, directly analyze network traffic
or files; for example, Network Prevent (for Web or Email) integrates with network and mail gateways
to monitor and block unauthorized transmissions, Endpoint Prevent operates as an agent on
workstations to regulate USB and clipboard usage, and Data Insight or Network Discover
periodically scans file repositories and databases to locate confidential data. A dedicated Database
stores incident logs, policy definitions, and scanning results, supporting both immediate threat
detection and historical analysis.</p>
      <p>In operational terms, the Enforce Server generates security policies and synchronizes them with
the Detection Servers, which conduct either real-time or scheduled data analysis. Policy triggers are
returned to the Enforce Server, recorded as incidents, and included in relevant reports. One of the
system’s notable features is its clear delineation between the Management (Enforce) tier and the
Detection layer, enabling seamless clustering and scalability by adding new Detection Servers as
needed. Its broad integration capabilities extend to mail gateways, proxy servers, and cloud services,
thereby ensuring multi-layered protection that spans endpoint controls (Data in Use), network traffic
(Data in Motion), and storage environments (Data at Rest). The solution offers modules such as
Network Prevent (for web or mail), Endpoint Prevent, and Discovery (for scanning local and network
resources), supplemented by a considerable library of predefined templates aimed at detecting
personal data and financial information, including PCI DSS, SOX, and HIPAA compliance. Deep
infrastructure integration and high-accuracy detection of sensitive data position this platform as a
powerful tool; however, its deployment can be complex and requires meticulous configuration to
minimize false positives.</p>
      <p>Forcepoint’s Data Loss Prevention Portfolio Suite [11] represents a comprehensive solution
encompassing multiple components that collectively provide robust protection against data
exfiltration. The Forcepoint Security Manager (FSM) acts as a centralized administrative console,
enabling the configuration of DLP policies, analytics, and reports. Endpoint Agents operate on both
stationary and mobile workstations, overseeing activities such as file manipulation, clipboard usage,
and interactions with USB devices. Network Agents or Protectors analyze network protocols—among
them HTTP, HTTPS, and FTP—and can integrate with existing proxies and gateways, while the
Forcepoint CASB module extends DLP functionality to cloud applications. The system’s analytics
and reporting capabilities include user and entity behavior analysis (UEBA), facilitating more
sophisticated monitoring of user actions.</p>
      <p>From an operational perspective, FSM transmits defined policies to both Endpoint Agents and
Network Agents, ensuring that data in use (encompassing local copying, printing, and other endpoint
activities) and data at rest (through Discovery modules) remain under consistent scrutiny. Network
Agents further monitor data in motion across network channels, and Forcepoint CASB broadens the
protective scope to various cloud services. Among its notable attributes is the system’s capacity for
elastic scaling according to the number of endpoints and control points present in the network. The
solution supports Network DLP, Endpoint DLP, Email DLP, and CASB, overseeing data transfer via
email, web, FTP, and removable media. A unified protection policy spanning both DLP and web
security, combined with the capability for granular policy tuning and network segmentation,
underscores its versatility. At the same time, large-scale deployments may necessitate significant
investments and demand meticulous coordination across endpoint and network agents to ensure
optimal performance.</p>
      <p>Fortra Digital Guardian [12] is a solution offered by Fortra that integrates several interdependent
components to provide comprehensive protection against data exfiltration. The primary
Management Console acts as a central hub for policy administration, auditing, and reporting, while
the Endpoint Agent—installed on Windows, Mac, or Linux workstations—serves as the main
mechanism for monitoring files, processes, and data operations in real time. Additionally, Discovery
&amp; Classification modules automatically identify and categorize sensitive data, and an optional
Network Sensor can be employed to analyze HTTP and SMTP traffic, though the system’s emphasis
remains on endpoint-level controls.</p>
      <p>During operation, the Endpoint Agent continuously observes activities such as copying,
forwarding, and printing. If an event conflicts with configured security policies, it can either block
the action, encrypt the file, or issue a notification to the Management Console. Upon receiving event
logs, the console generates detailed reports and enables the administrator to refine policies in
accordance with emerging requirements. The platform distinguishes itself through its robust insight
into user behavior at workstations, offering thorough safeguards against insider threats by tracking
file, clipboard, printer, and removable-media actions in conjunction with real-time data classification.
Rules may also be dynamically adapted on the basis of user risk profiles or active processes, ensuring
a high degree of responsiveness. Although its endpoint focus delivers substantial efficacy in securing
“Data in Use,” organizations seeking a more holistic scope for network or storage protection may
need to integrate supplementary tools. As with many endpoint-centric DLP architectures, careful
configuration of agents is crucial to minimizing false positives and maintaining optimal performance.</p>
      <p>GTB Data Protection Suite [13] from GTB Technologies comprises several interconnected
components that collectively provide a robust data protection framework. A hardware or virtual GTB
Inspector monitors network traffic (HTTP, SMTP, and FTP) in either inline or tap mode, identifying
potential leaks as they occur. The Endpoint Protector, deployed on individual workstations, controls
local data operations and can enforce encryption, while the Management Console aligns network
and endpoint policies, oversees event logs, and produces comprehensive reports. An Exact Data
Matching (EDM) Engine enhances detection accuracy by comparing transmitted information against
known patterns—such as a database of payment card numbers—and recognizing even partial
matches.</p>
      <p>This integrated approach ensures coverage of data in motion and data in use, with the
Management Console unifying policies across the Inspector and Endpoint Protector and thereby
facilitating immediate detection and response. A patented content-aware analysis method allows the
system to recognize confidential data even when fragmented, minimizing false positives. The suite
includes Endpoint Protector, Network Protector, Email Protector, and Cloud DLP modules, and
supports various detection methods—ranging from regular expressions and lexical analysis to
machine learning algorithms and EDM—ensuring flexibility and precision. While it holds a smaller
market share and offers fewer predefined integrations and dictionaries compared to industry leaders,
GTB Data Protection Suite distinguishes itself through its advanced detection technologies and
capacity for refined data classification.</p>
      <p>ManageEngine’s Log360 (DataSecurity Plus) [14] offers a unified platform for log collection and
analysis, user activity tracking, and DLP functionality. The core Log360 component aggregates and
evaluates logs from servers and network devices, while the DataSecurity Plus module monitors file
servers, configures DLP policies, identifies confidential data, and tracks user actions. Both elements
connect through a central Management Console, where logs and DLP-related incidents converge for
reporting and oversight.</p>
      <p>This integrated solution provides SIEM capabilities, enables comprehensive audits of the
Windows environment, and consolidates incident analysis and data leak prevention within a single
user interface. Its Active Directory Audit, File Server Audit, and DLP features form part of a cohesive
ecosystem particularly well suited to small and medium-sized organizations. Although the DLP
module may lack the nuanced detection accuracy of leading competitors, the system’s ease of
deployment and centralized management interface render it a convenient option for entities seeking
combined log management, security incident analysis, and data loss prevention.</p>
      <p>Proofpoint’s Sigma Information Protection Platform [15] comprises several interconnected
modules designed to safeguard sensitive information across multiple vectors. Proofpoint Email
Security, which can be deployed either as a gateway or cloud-based service, inspects both incoming
and outgoing email traffic, applying DLP checks to prevent data leaks and detect phishing attempts.
Its Cloud App Security Broker (CASB) component extends protection into cloud environments such
as Office 365 and Google Workspace, classifying files and regulating public access. An optional
Endpoint DLP Agent offers an additional layer of defense for local data operations, monitoring
activities related to USB usage and the clipboard. All of these elements converge in the Information
Protection Console, which presents a unified interface for managing policies, overseeing content
lists, and reviewing log data and incidents.</p>
      <p>A core emphasis of the Sigma platform lies in its cloud-centric capabilities, covering email
channels, cloud services, and phishing prevention. By employing user and entity behavior analytics
(UEBA), the system identifies anomalous actions that deviate from a typical user’s activity profile.
Its modules include Email DLP, the Cloud App Security Broker, and Endpoint DLP, featuring robust
algorithms for content analysis and phishing detection. Although the solution’s breadth in
networkbased scenarios may be comparatively narrower, it delivers comprehensive coverage of email and
cloud workflows. Organizations choosing to deploy endpoint modules may require additional
licenses, reflecting the product’s flexible yet modular approach to enterprise data protection.</p>
      <p>A comparison of the main advantages and disadvantages of each of the considered DLP solutions
is given in Table 2.</p>
      <sec id="sec-5-1">
        <title>Clearly separated architecture:</title>
        <p>Enforce Server + Detection Servers
(Endpoint, Network, Email) for
scalability. Rich Discovery variety
(Network Discover, Data Insight),
allows you to cover "Data at Rest".
Powerful policy configuration via
Enforce Console.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-2">
        <title>Disadvantages</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-3">
        <title>High deployment complexity (need</title>
        <p>to coordinate between multiple
Detection Servers). Tight integration
may require a large number of
resources (servers, databases).
Possible performance issues with a
large number of Detection Servers.
Forcepoint –
DLP Portfolio</p>
        <p>Suite</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-4">
        <title>Fortra – Digital</title>
        <p>Guardian</p>
        <p>GTB
Technologies –
GTB Data</p>
        <p>Protection</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-5">
        <title>ManageEngine – Log360 / DataSecurity Plus</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-6">
        <title>Proofpoint – Sigma Information Protection</title>
        <p>Modular structure (Email, Web,
Endpoint, CASB), allowing you to
adapt to different environments.
Single console Forcepoint Security
Manager, where policies are
synchronized with agents and
network modules. Well integrated
with Forcepoint UEBA.</p>
        <p>Strong emphasis on endpoint
architecture: all critical events are
processed locally by the agent. Deep
control of user actions (Data in Use)
in real time. Flexible policies applied
at the endpoint, fast response.</p>
        <p>EDM technology shows high
accuracy in content analysis. Single
management of Endpoint + Network
with the possibility of "tap/mirror"
mode. Less "heavy" architecture than
some competitors, with an emphasis
on accurate content analysis
Combining SIEM functionality with
a DLP module. Single console for
incident analytics and file
management, Active Directory
Audit. Easy implementation,
especially for medium-sized</p>
        <p>Windows networks.</p>
        <p>Powerful Email DLP, anti-phishing,
powerful integration with email
gateways. CASB module for data
control in cloud services. UEBA
component for user behavioral
analysis</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-7">
        <title>Increased complexity when using</title>
        <p>multiple modules simultaneously
(Network DLP, Endpoint DLP,
CASB). Often requires multiple
servers or virtual machines for full
functionality. Resource intensive
with high network traffic</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-8">
        <title>Smaller network component, if full</title>
        <p>fledged Network DLP is required, an
additional solution is required.
Dependence on endpoint agents,
which can complicate support for
different platforms. With a large
number of endpoints, the load on the
management server increases.
Fewer ready-made integrations and
templates than market leaders.
Requires fine-tuning of EDM,
without which it may not work
correctly. Lack of support for certain
environments.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-9">
        <title>DLP capabilities may be inferior in</title>
        <p>depth and flexibility to specialized
DLP solutions. May lack individual
implemented cloud or network</p>
        <p>components for complex
environments. Dependence on</p>
        <p>Windows ecosystem.</p>
        <p>Network scenarios (HTTP) are less
covered, other solutions must be
used (Network Firewall, Proxy).</p>
        <p>Endpoint DLP has less functionality
than competitors. High cost of the
complete set (Email + CASB +</p>
        <p>Endpoint).</p>
        <p>All commercial solutions considered have a common goal - to detect, monitor and protect
confidential data from leakage (insider or external). However, they differ in specialization and scope
of application. The difference also lies in the depth of integration (endpoint or Network),
specialization (Email, insider threats) and deployment method (on-premises, hybrid, SaaS). Each
system has a central policy manager and one or more types of agents. In some solutions (Symantec,
Forcepoint) the architecture is very large-scale, distributed, while in others (Safetica) it is more
compact, with an emphasis on rapid deployment and simplicity.</p>
        <p>Each solution has its own "pluses" (area of main expertise) and "minuses" (gaps in integration,
complexity of architecture or lack of broad functionality). The choice depends on the scale of the
company, the level of risk, budget and existing IT landscape (on-premises or cloud). A significant
criterion when choosing a DLP system is the ability to scale and customize policies for specific
industries (e.g., finance, healthcare, government). It is also important to pay attention to
compatibility with existing corporate network protection and management systems (Firewall, IAM,
SIEM, etc.).</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>6. Disadvantages of existing DLP systems</title>
      <p>Modern DLP systems either detect deviations from typical behavior (based on anomalies) or apply
signatures of known attacks. Although signature-based methods allow you to accurately identify
familiar threats and effectively block them, they are unable to respond to unforeseen attacks or
attackers who use unusual intrusion vectors (for example, those known only to insiders). In contrast,
anomaly-based methods can detect as yet unknown attacks, but due to frequent false positives, their
contribution to detecting suspicious activity is limited. [17]. The system considers plain text to be
critical data (for example, a format match with a credit card number). As a result, users receive
excessive blocking, and work efficiency decreases.</p>
      <p>One of the shortcomings of DLP systems is the problem of working with encrypted traffic. DLP
does not see the content of encrypted data. Proxy decryption is required, but this increases the
computational load. Integration with endpoint agents that analyze data before encryption is also
possible [18].</p>
      <p>Working with insiders with legitimate access is problematic. DLP can miss a leak if a user has
official access to a file, but sends it through a prohibited channel [22]. It is necessary to monitor
anomalous actions, even if they are formally permitted, and monitor upload volumes, time of day,
and unusual addresses.</p>
      <p>With large volumes of traffic, performance and scalability problems may arise, and analysis may
create delays.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>7. Review of new research</title>
      <p>Research [17] presents a hybrid DLP system that combines anomaly-based and signature-based
approaches to facilitate prevention and detection. Using an anomaly-based mechanism, the
framework automatically creates a model of typical user behavior that allows it to detect unusual
transactions made by insiders. Operator responses to alarms are then used to automatically create
and update attack signatures.</p>
      <p>In [16], a methodology combining behavior-based DLP, machine learning-based DLP, and
network-based DLP is proposed to improve data integrity in cyberspace. This approach provides a
comprehensive and integrated solution that detects and prevents data loss across the entire network.
The proposed methodology includes identifying sensitive data, deploying endpoint DLP, network
DLP, and machine learning DLP solutions, integrating DLP solutions, implementing monitoring and
reporting, and continuous system improvement.</p>
      <p>[18] considers the use of a ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption algorithm to protect data
both during transmission and at rest. The system triggers preventive actions, such as encryption
updates or access restrictions, in case of suspected data breaches to mitigate the consequences. By
combining anomaly detection techniques with Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
(CPABE), a robust framework is created to improve data security and privacy across a range of domains,
providing a proactive line of defense against potential data breaches.</p>
      <p>In their paper [19], they propose to strengthen organizational security by using a zero-trust
security approach that should completely replace traditional solutions. In addition to restricting
access to resources through the principle of least privilege, the zero-trust paradigm emphasizes the
importance of authenticating and verifying each person and device. Devices are only granted access
after they have received their credentials and access rights. User authentication, application security,
and device security are some of the factors considered. A zero-trust framework is a practical way to
address the challenges of modern network systems and secure legacy systems. The paper analyzes
the zero-trust security problem in a number of modern networks, including the financial industry,
IoT (Internet of Things), enterprise, and 5G networks.</p>
      <p>The paper [20] examines an approach to mitigate cybersecurity risks associated with text data
leakage. Unlike traditional DLP products, this solution focuses not only on creating and updating
policies, but also on minimizing false positives. A web extension is presented that captures and
securely transmits all data entered in the browser to the organization’s server. Using a server-based
Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT) trained on specific organization
datasets, the system classifies text to improve the detection of critical information.</p>
      <p>In this [22] research paper, a new level of data leak detection based on insider behavior and trust
in the insider is proposed. The proposed system is based on a multi-agent paradigm that is used for
threat detection because it can solve the problem of behavior logs in terms of self-sufficiency and
productivity. A new dimension of analysis is added based on the behavior of an internal employee
and his various interactions in the information system.</p>
      <p>In [23], an approach to botnet detection for distributed systems is presented. It is based on a
developed three-level model that includes botnet components: a control center, control centers, and
botnet core elements (bots). The new framework provides the ability to detect known and unknown
botnets and consists of host and network levels.</p>
      <p>In [24], a new method for detecting DDoS botnets is proposed based on the analysis of the
network characteristics of botnets. It uses semi-supervised fuzzy c-means clustering. The analysis is
based on characteristics extracted from network traffic that may indicate the presence of DDoS
botnets on the network.</p>
      <p>In [21], a new information technology for detecting botnets is proposed based on the analysis of
botnet behavior in a corporate network. Botnet detection is performed in two ways: using
networklevel analysis and host-level analysis. One approach allows analyzing the behavior of software on
the host, which can indicate the possible presence of a bot directly in the host and identify malicious
software, and the other involves monitoring and analyzing DNS traffic, which allows concluding
that network hosts are infected with a botnet bot.</p>
      <p>
        In the article [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ], a method for detecting botnets in corporate networks is presented. It is based
on the use of artificial immune system algorithms. The proposed approach allows distinguishing
harmless network traffic from malicious traffic using a clonal selection algorithm taking into account
the features of the presence of a botnet in the network.
      </p>
      <p>
        In [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ], information technologies were developed that are used to collect, process, and store large
amounts of data from the web. The technology studies the statistical characteristics of different
segments of the web space and their cluster structure. To find the optimal number of clusters and
cluster centers, two methods are used: the well-known k-core decomposition algorithm and a new
method developed by the authors. The new algorithm is based on the distribution of eigenvalues of
the stochastic matrix, which describes the process of Markov transitions in the system. The
clustering process is carried out using the Power iteration clustering algorithm.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>8. Mechanism of stealing critical information through botnets</title>
      <p>Botnets typically revolve around a command and control (C&amp;C) center, one or more intermediate
nodes, and a set of compromised devices known as bots [23]. The C&amp;C center can function through
a centralized server or a peer-to-peer network, enabling attackers to distribute commands to every
infected machine under their control. Intermediate nodes—often acting as proxies or relays—serve
to obfuscate the true origin of malicious activities, making it more challenging to identify the
attacker’s location. Each bot, once infected, executes the directives it receives, which may involve
scanning the network, collecting files, or exfiltrating sensitive data.</p>
      <p>
        In a common attack sequence, the botnet operator gains unauthorized access by exploiting
software or operating system vulnerabilities, frequently aided by social engineering methods such
as phishing. Once established on the target system, the malicious code runs in a concealed mode and
waits for further commands from its control server. It often secures elevated privileges (root or
administrator) and circumvents antivirus solutions, allowing it to search local files, databases, or
other repositories for confidential information, such as financial records or intellectual property.
When sufficiently valuable data is identified, the malware prepares it for clandestine extraction—
sometimes by embedding it into sessions that appear legitimate, for example via HTTP or HTTPS, or
by employing hidden tunnels (DNS or P2P) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]. Attackers may additionally encrypt the outbound
traffic to make network-level detection more difficult. Since these transfers often blend with typical
user activity, conventional security tools may fail to recognize them as malicious, thereby allowing
the botnet operator to systematically remove sensitive documents without drawing attention.
      </p>
      <p>Traditional security measures demonstrate limited effectiveness against targeted botnet activity.
Firewalls, although vital for perimeter defense, rarely provide the depth of content inspection needed
to identify data leaks hidden within benign traffic. Antivirus applications rely on known signatures
and may prove incapable of detecting new or obfuscated threats. Intrusion detection and prevention
systems (IDS/IPS) can flag anomalies but often generate excessive false positives and do not always
uncover exfiltration disguised as ordinary communication. Consequently, these solutions can be
circumvented by attacks that specifically aim to mimic legitimate network behavior.</p>
      <p>To counteract this sophisticated threat, a more comprehensive strategy integrates a specialized
botnet detection mechanism with a data loss prevention (DLP) system. This combined approach
targets both network-level indicators of compromise—such as irregular traffic patterns or unusual
encryption usage—and the handling of sensitive data at endpoints. By correlating information from
botnet monitoring with DLP logs, security teams can identify subtle warning signs of exfiltration
that might otherwise remain undetected. Ultimately, unifying these technologies enhances the
capacity to intercept unauthorized data transfers, narrows the window in which attackers can
operate, and strengthens an organization’s overall resilience against critical information theft.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>9. System architecture diagram with integrated information protection component</title>
      <p>In the proposed architecture of the critical information processing system Figure 2, there are four
key nodes: a computer or server on which users work, which can be infected by a botnet (Endpoint
Host), a small software module that monitors data manipulation (DLP Agent), a central policy and
incident management server (DLP Console), and a network traffic monitoring module designed to
detect botnet activity (Botnet Detection).</p>
      <p>In the process of operation, the system operates as follows: when a user performs certain actions
on a workstation or server (in particular, working with documents, copying files, using external
media), the DLP Agent tries to recognize whether the files are confidential and whether the actions
do not contradict the established policies. If violations are detected, the agent sends a signal (incident)
to the DLP Console, where logs can be stored and warnings for administrators can be generated. At
the same time, this same Endpoint Host generates network traffic that passes through Botnet
Detection. If the internal algorithm or signature analysis detects suspicious behavior typical of
botnets (various commands or connections to dubious addresses), the detection module sends a
signal (incident) to the DLP Console, signaling possible damage. Then, by comparing data from both
sources (agent and botnet detection module), the DLP Console can establish a correlation: if a
botlike program tries to send files silently, this becomes a reason to block the transfer, tighten policies,
or inform security. This way, confidential files cannot be transferred without knowledge or approval,
and suspicious activities are immediately reported to the notification system, allowing for a rapid
response to incidents.
10. Experimental studies
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed architecture, where DLP and the botnet detection
module work together, we will conduct experiments in which a botnet attack with a data leak attack
is simulated and the system is tested to what extent it is able to detect and block unauthorized
extraction of critical data. The scenario and parameters by which the system’s performance will be
evaluated are described below.</p>
      <p>In this experiment, test bots (malware emulators) are installed on workstations. They try to send
sensitive files via a previously known channel (HTTP, HTTPS, DNS tunneling). The goal is to check
how the system captures this activity.</p>
      <p>On the host where the DLP Agent operates, a set of files marked as confidential (financial reports)
is placed. The bot emulator tries to send these files to a remote server. It is checked whether the DLP
Agent blocks copying or sending of prohibited files, and whether the botnet detection module detects
a suspicious connection.</p>
      <p>Evaluation parameters for this experiment:</p>
      <p>Detection Rate: the proportion of successfully detected attempts to transmit critical information
among all attacks.</p>
      <p>Response Time: how much time passes from the moment the leak begins to blocking or
notification.</p>
      <p>False Positives: the number of normal operations that the system mistakenly recognized as
malicious.</p>
      <p>The results of the experiments are presented in Table 3.</p>
      <p>According to the test results, the average Detection Rate exceeds 90–95%, which indicates a fairly
high ability of the system to detect attempts at unauthorized data extraction even under conditions
of masking or encryption. The average response time ranges from 10 to 25 seconds depending on the
complexity of the attack, which allows for relatively quick blocking of the transfer of sensitive files.
The false positive rate, which ranges from 2.5–3.5%, is considered acceptable for real corporate
environments: this means that the system does not block or notify about legitimate actions too often.
In general, such indicators indicate the effectiveness of the proposed integrated architecture in
countering botnet attacks aimed at stealing critical information, while leaving the possibility of
further configuring policies to reduce false positive incidents.
11. Conclusions
This article analyzes modern methods and tools for processing critical information in corporate
networks, in particular data leakage prevention systems (DLP). The main causes of information leaks
are investigated, including technical errors of personnel (misdelivery, misconfiguration) and abuse
of privileges by insiders. It is determined that information security threats require a comprehensive
approach, including both technological and organizational measures.</p>
      <p>The main types of DLP systems (centralized, distributed, hybrid) and their features in the
corporate environment are considered. An analysis of popular commercial solutions is conducted,
their advantages and disadvantages are identified. Particular attention is paid to such challenges as
a high number of false positives, difficulties in processing encrypted traffic, the complexity of
detecting threats from insiders, and the issue of scalability of DLP systems.</p>
      <p>A review of current research has demonstrated promising methods for improving DLP solutions,
including the use of machine learning algorithms for more accurate threat detection, attribute-based
data encryption (CP-ABE), and the implementation of the Zero Trust concept to strengthen access
control.</p>
      <p>The results of the experiment showed that the interaction of the DLP module and network
anomaly detection mechanisms allows you to effectively block unauthorized transmission of critical
data and provides a basis for further strengthening the security system.</p>
      <p>Thus, to effectively protect critical information, organizations should apply a multi-layered
approach that combines advanced technologies, clearly configured security policies, constant
monitoring and staff training. The use of modern DLP solutions in combination with other
cybersecurity tools can significantly reduce the risks of data leakage, ensure compliance with
regulatory requirements, and guarantee the company's information resilience in the face of growing
cyber threats.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-10">
      <title>Declaration on Generative AI</title>
      <p>During the preparation of this work, the authors used Grammarly in order to: grammar and spelling
check; DeepL Translate in order to: some phrases translation into English. After using these
tools/services, the authors reviewed and edited the content as needed and take full responsibility for
the publication’s content.
[10] Broadcom – Symantec Data Loss Prevention, 2025. URL:
https://www.broadcom.com/products/cyber-security/information-protection/data-lossprevention.
[11] Forcepoint Data Loss Prevention, 2025. URL:
https://www.forcepoint.com/product/dlp-dataloss-prevention.
[12] Fortra – Fortra’s Digital Guardian, 2025. URL:
https://www.fortra.com/product-lines/digitalguardian.
[13] GTB Technologies – GTB Data Protection Suite, 2025. URL:
https://gttb.com/networkenterprise-dlp/.
[14] ManageEngine – Log360 (Data Security Plus), 2025. URL:
https://www.manageengine.com/logmanagement/.
[15] Proofpoint – Sigma Information Protection Platform, 2025. URL:
https://www.proofpoint.com/us/products/defend-data.
[16] I. Yadav and H. Gupta, Designing Data Loss Prevention system for the enhancement of data
integrity in cyberspace, Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Advances in
Computing, Communication Control and Networking (ICAC3N), Greater Noida India, 2023, pp.
1361-1365. doi:10.1109/ICAC3N60023.2023.10541823.
[17] A. Srivastava, P. Srivastava, A. Pillai and V. S. Sharma, A hybrid framework for Data Loss
Prevention and detection, Proceedings of the International Conference on Signal Processing and
Advance Research in Computing (SPARC), Lucknow India, 2024, pp. 1-6.
doi:10.1109/SPARC61891.2024.10828891.
[18] V. Sasikala, P. Lakshmi, P. Nagaraja, V. Lakshmi, CH. Bhanu, Data Leakage Detection and
prevention using ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption algorithm, Proceedings of the
11th International Conference on Reliability, Infocom Technologies and Optimization (Trends
and Future Directions) (ICRITO), Noida India, 2024, pp. 1-5.
doi:10.1109/ICRITO61523.2024.10522194.
[19] S. Nagaraj, Shankaramma, Framework analysis and zero trust security issues in contemporary
network systems, Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Computational System
and Information Technology for Sustainable Solutions (CSITSS), Bengaluru India, 2024, pp. 1-6.
doi:10.1109/CSITSS64042.2024.10816783.
[20] V. K. Kaliappan, P. U. Dharunkumar, S. Uppili, A. Adhi Vigneshwarar, S. Bharani, Sentinel guard:
an integration of intelligent text Data Loss Prevention mechanism for organizational security
(I-ITDLP), Proceedings of the International Conference on Science Technology Engineering and
Management (ICSTEM), Coimbatore India, 2024, pp. 1-6.
doi:10.1109/ICSTEM61137.2024.10560825.
[21] S. Lysenko, O. Savenko, K. Bobrovnikova, A. Kryshchuk, B. Savenko, Information technology
for botnets detection based on their behaviour in the corporate area network, in: Gaj, P.,
Kwiecień, A., Sawicki, M. (eds), Computer Networks. CN 2017. Communications in Computer
and Information Science, Springer, Cham, vol 718, 166–181. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-59767-6_14.
[22] M. E. Moudni, E. Ziyati, Data leakage prevention approach based on insider trust calculation,
Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Wireless Networks and Mobile
Communications (WINCOM), Istanbul Turkey, 2023, pp. 1-6.
doi:10.1109/WINCOM59760.2023.10322935.
[23] O. Savenko, A. Sachenko, S. Lysenko, G. Markowsky, N. Vasylkiv, Botnet detection approach
based on the distributed systems, International Journal of Computing, 19(2), 190-198. URL:
https://doi.org/10.47839/ijc.19.2.1761.
[24] S. Lysenko, O. Savenko, K. Bobrovnikova, DDoS botnet detection technique based on the use of
the semi-supervised fuzzy c-means clustering, CEUR-WS (2018), vol.2104, 688-695. URL:
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2104/paper_251.pdf.
[25] Microsoft Purview, 2025. URL: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/.
[26] Varonis Data Loss Prevention, 2025. URL: https://www.varonis.com/platform/dlp.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
    <ref-list>
      <ref id="ref1">
        <mixed-citation>
          [1]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>B. S.</given-names>
            <surname>Shishodia and M. J. Nene</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Data leakage prevention system for internal security</article-title>
          ,
          <source>Proceedings of the International Conference on Futuristic Technologies (INCOFT)</source>
          ,
          <source>Belgaum India</source>
          ,
          <year>2022</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>1</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>6</lpage>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .1109/INCOFT55651.
          <year>2022</year>
          .
          <volume>10094509</volume>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref2">
        <mixed-citation>
          <article-title>[2] What is Data Loss Prevention (DLP</article-title>
          ),
          <year>2025</year>
          . URL: https://www.gartner.com/en/informationtechnology/glossary/data
          <article-title>-loss-protection-dlp.</article-title>
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref3">
        <mixed-citation>
          <source>[3] Verizon data breach investigations report</source>
          ,
          <year>2022</year>
          . URL: https://www.verizon.com/business/engb/resources/reports/dbir/2022/summary-of-findings/.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref4">
        <mixed-citation>
          [4]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Symantec</surname>
            <given-names>DLP White</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Paper</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <year>2022</year>
          . URL: https://docs.broadcom.com/doc/white-paper
          <article-title>-dataprotection-where-it-matters.</article-title>
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref5">
        <mixed-citation>
          <article-title>[5] What are the 3 types of Data Loss Prevention</article-title>
          ,
          <year>2025</year>
          . URL: https://www.xcitium.com/what-arethe-3
          <article-title>-types-of-data-loss-prevention/.</article-title>
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref6">
        <mixed-citation>
          <article-title>[6] Protect sensitive data on all your endpoints</article-title>
          ,
          <year>2025</year>
          . URL: https://www.digitalguardian.com/resources/datasheet/endpoint-dlp.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref7">
        <mixed-citation>
          [7]
          <string-name>
            <surname>Network</surname>
            <given-names>DLP</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <year>2025</year>
          . URL: https://www.forcepoint.com/cyber-edu/network-dlp.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref8">
        <mixed-citation>
          [8]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
            <surname>Lysenko</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>K.</given-names>
            <surname>Bobrovnikova</surname>
          </string-name>
          and
          <string-name>
            <given-names>O.</given-names>
            <surname>Savenko</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>A botnet detection approach based on the clonal selection algorithm</article-title>
          ,
          <source>Proceedings of the IEEE 9th International Conference on Dependable Systems, Services and Technologies (DESSERT)</source>
          ,
          <source>Kyiv Ukraine</source>
          ,
          <year>2018</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>424</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>428</lpage>
          . doi:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .1109/DESSERT.
          <year>2018</year>
          .
          <volume>8409171</volume>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref9">
        <mixed-citation>
          [9]
          <string-name>
            <given-names>O.</given-names>
            <surname>Kyrychenko</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Information technology for statistical cluster analysis of information in complex networks</article-title>
          ,
          <source>Computer Systems and Information Technologies</source>
          <volume>4</volume>
          (
          <year>2022</year>
          )
          <fpage>47</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>51</lpage>
          . URL: https://doi.org/10.31891/csit-2022
          <source>-4-7.</source>
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
    </ref-list>
  </back>
</article>