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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>A review: strategies and challenges for preventing AI cyber attacks</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Musab A. M. Ali</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Nessibeli Askarbekova</string-name>
          <email>n.askarbekova@iitu.edu.kz</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Damelya Yeskendirova</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Zhadyra</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>College of Computing and Information Sciences, University of Technology and Applied Sciences</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Sultanate of</addr-line>
          <country country="OM">Oman</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>International Information Technology University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>34/1 Manas St., Almaty, 050000</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="KZ">Kazakhstan</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>The increasing integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into critical sectors such as autonomous vehicles, healthcare, finance, and cybersecurity makes these systems prime targets for cyberattacks. AI systems, especially those based on machine learning (ML) and deep learning (DL), exhibit vulnerabilities due to their reliance on large datasets, complex algorithms, and "black-box" decision-making processes. This paper explores the weaknesses of AI systems, focusing on adversarial attacks, data poisoning, model inversion, and evasion attacks. Specific examples include how adversarial inputs can mislead self-driving cars or cause diagnostic errors in healthcare systems. Defense mechanisms like adversarial training, defensive distillation, feature squeezing, model assembling, and gradient masking are discussed as methods to protect AI systems. However, these defenses face limitations, such as high computational costs and susceptibility to advanced attacks. The study concludes by emphasizing the need for ongoing research into strengthening AI defenses, securing private data, and balancing performance with robust cybersecurity. Ensuring AI security is crucial as cyber threats continue to evolve in complexity and scope.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>artificial intelligence</kwd>
        <kwd>machine learning</kwd>
        <kwd>deep learning</kwd>
        <kwd>model techniques</kwd>
        <kwd>cyber attacks</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies are built in complex systems that play critical roles and
interact with infrastructure or human lives. AI operates in a variety of sectors, like self-driving cars,
healthcare, finance, and cyber security which is why using AI systems makes them a target for cyber
attackers. Their advanced automation and data processing capabilities were also their weakness in
some ways as these systems are targeted by crooks. In this study, the details and features of these
threats are studied by example prorate malware, why such strong defending measures need
to be built in AI systems, and a summary about how we can protect our AI system from
attacks.</p>
      <p>
        AI solutions are susceptible to threats because they depend on large datasets and complicated
algorithms, thus it can be difficult for many of them that build upon machine learning (ML) and deep
learning (DL) models. These concerns become more relevant when one considers the "black-box"
nature of many AI models, where it is not possible to interpret decision-making processes—this
complicates their security landscape even further. If not properly addressed, this lack of transparency
can facilitate the attack by an adversary that clandestinely manipulates AI outputs undetected and
potentially has disastrous consequences in safety-critical applications [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. These include various
successful studies showing that AI systems are all too vulnerable to cyberattacks. A common threat
model in AI is the malicious adversary who can feed a trained AI bad data to have it return a false or
harmful prediction, known as an adversarial attack [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ]. In autonomous driving systems, such
perturbations are translated to catastrophic failures where the system misidentifies traffic signs
resulting in accidents [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. In healthcare, adversarial examples can result in diagnostic AI systems
mistaking medical images and thus recommending wrong treatments [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>One of the first steps to develop effective defense systems is to be able to understand what are the
types of cyber attacks an AI system can suffer from. Adversarial attacks which include poisoning of
data, inversion of models, and evasion attacks are thus possible.</p>
      <p>
        1. Adversarial attacks: Adverse attack approaches creating small, often imperceptible
perturbations to input data cause the AI models to create a wrong decision. An AI system for
a self-driving car recognizes an image of a stop sign (right) as a picture of associated traffic
lights and the same device considers a similar graphic with some added noise to correspond to
another illustration presenting yield. In this attack, the training data of an AI model is
manipulated so that it can learn false patterns causing biased or incorrect output from trained
models running in actual deployment [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ].
2. Model inversion: Model inversion attempts to recreate the input data from a model's output
and as a result reveals sensitive information. Model inversion attacks constitute privacy leaks
in facial recognition [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ].
3. Evasion attacks: Evasion takes place when training or deploying an AI system that feeds in
inputs designed to thwart detection or purposely misclassify. In cyber security-associated
contexts, evasion attacks are prominent for AI models used to see malware or fraudulent
events [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        The practical defenses against AI cyber attacks:
1. Algorithms for adversarial robustness: Adversarial training improves AI accuracy with a
failure aspect of production models which are trained on the misclassified usage taught them
to recognize attacks and fight back. It involves high computational costs and leads to
overfitting certain attacks [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]-[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ].
2. Defensive distillation: A related technique called defensie distillation involves training a
distilled model on the soft outputs and allows to reduction sensitivity of the final model to
input perturbations. Its effectiveness may be evaded by advanced attacks [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ].
3. Image feature compression: Image simply means compressing the characteristics in name,
that is transforming small-size input data into a larger one to eliminate adversarial attacks.
      </p>
      <p>
        Before data is fed into the model, it filters objections to filter potential threats [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ].
4. Ensemble: Ensembling different models' output to make it harder for the adversarial attacker.
      </p>
      <p>
        They might somehow be resource-intrusive and may introduce latency [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ].
5. Obfuscating gradients: Obfuscated gradients hide the actual gradient from attackers, causing
them to struggle more in producing adversarial examples. It is not a silver bullet, considering
that the attacker would find ways to break it [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ].
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Literature review</title>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>2.1. Overview of AI vulnerabilities</title>
        <p>
          As we rely on AI for critical infrastructure and day-to-day applications, the increased attack surface
leaves these systems vulnerable to all kinds of cyber threats. Due to the complexity and
datadependent nature, AI model techniques, especially ML and DLs, are inherently at risk. These
weaknesses are exacerbated by the “black-box” character of several AI approaches, in which
decision-making models—operating on an estimated grader—are inaccessible to direct examination
and the forecast or detection AI system is vulnerable [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
          ]. Asystems are notoriously brittle against
adversarial attacks where tiny, sometimes imperceptible changes to input data can cause the AI
model's output to go astray [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref11 ref12">10-15</xref>
          ]. [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
          ] showed that a small amount of perturbation in input data
could lead to an ANN making wrong image classifications, and this had possibly catastrophic
implications when considering the use of machine learning models by applications such as
autonomous driving or for medical diagnosis. These adversarial attacks rely on the model's
sensitivity to imperceptible input changes that have a pronounced effect on the models' outputs. Data
poisoning attacks, manipulating the learning patterns through tampering with training data of an AI
system. Such attacks, which distort the meaning of some AI model base by creating bias or errors
during inferencing [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
          ] are called adversarial. The damage data poisoning can cause is substantial,
especially in industries that rely on AI for do-or-die decisions (e.g., finance, healthcare, and security).
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>2.2. Types of cyber attacks on AI systems</title>
        <p>An overview of different types of cyber attacks that AI systems faces to safeguard them. Various
common attack vectors such as adversarial attacks, model inversion, data poisoning, and evasion
attacks are described in the study:</p>
        <p>Adversarial attacks: These are the most commonly discussed forms of cyber threats towards
AI systems. These techniques are called attacks since they introduce tiny perturbations in the
input data and result in incorrect or unexpected outputs from an AI model. [17] in this
brought to light the importance of adversarial examples and in doing so showed that
state-ofthe-art models can be tricked. This is not restricted to digital environments; these situations
can occur in the real world as well. They can be effective in the physical world, where very
minor perturbations of objects or images cause misclassification by AI [16].</p>
        <p>
          Data poisoning: These attacks, which include the training phase of an AI model by injecting
the malicious data into a training set, an attacker causes learning of wrong patterns in the
model leading to delivery biased/incorrect answers. [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
          ] also underscored the difficulty of
making AI systems that are less capable of being detected as they develop more sophisticated,
integrated systems with vital infrastructures.
        </p>
        <p>
          Model inversion: It reverse engineer the model's outputs to reconstruct input data and reveal
behind privacy. Such an attack can be impactful in settings where AI models are used to deal
with private information (e.g., biometrics and medical data). Model inversion attacks can also
expose private data [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ] as well which highlights the requirement for more privacy-preserving
methods to be incorporated in AI model deployment homes.
        </p>
        <p>
          Evasion attacks: This type of attack targets AI systems during the inference phase, with
attackers sending crafted inputs that are in turn intended to be either not detected or
misclassified. Such attacks are pertinent in cybersecurity use cases, where AI models are used
to identify malware or fraudulent activities [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
          ]. [18] presented an exhaustive survey of
evasion attacks and existing countermeasures arguably exemplifying the cat-and-mouse
game which replicates in the AI domain anytime between offense driven by attack generation
strategy refinement that gets countered directly or else through side-channel detection
response improve on part of the defender.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-3">
        <title>2.3. Defensive strategies against AI cyber attacks</title>
        <p>
          Adversarial training: Adversarial training uses adversarial examples during the training process to
strengthen AI models and make them more robust against manipulations. This incurs deeper
computational costs and may cause overfitting to certain adversarial strategies [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ]:
        </p>
        <p>
          Defensive distillation: it decreases the influence of attacks by building a distilled model that is
trained on predictions rather than hard labels from a pre-trained and full-precision version. It
can be bypassed by more advanced attacks that need investigation [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
          ], [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>
          Feature squeezing: Feature squeezing protects the model from adversarial examples by
reducing input data complexity. Abstract of an activated neuron in a feature map made
through a convolutional layer is available are hard to succeed filtering data before it reaches
the Classification Model creates intentional but non-functional approximations of features or
samples reduces entropy filters out possible adversaries [16]. The use of multiple models
together.
3. Model ensemble techniques: This does help to make the system more secure — it makes it
harder for adversarial examples to deceive all three systems. This approach can be very slow
and cause delays [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
          ].
4. Gradient masking: Gradient masking masks the gradients used by attackers to generate
adversarial examples, increasing attack difficulty albeit not rendering attacks impossible and
hence raising a call for research on this subject [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>Summary and Research Gaps shows in Table 1.</p>
        <sec id="sec-2-3-1">
          <title>Adversarial training involves training AI models on adversarial examples to improve robustness, but it can lead to increased computational costs and potential overfitting. [5], [19]</title>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-3-2">
          <title>Defensive distillation reduces a model's sensitivity to small input perturbations by training a distilled model on soft outputs, though it can be bypassed by advanced attacks. [1], [9]</title>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-3-3">
          <title>Feature squeezing simplifies input data, reducing the effectiveness of adversarial attacks by filtering out malicious alterations before they reach the model [9]</title>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-3-4">
          <title>Model ensemble techniques involve using multiple models and aggregating their outputs to enhance robustness, though this approach can be resource-intensive [4]</title>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-3-5">
          <title>Gradient masking obscures the gradients used by attackers to generate adversarial examples, making it harder to craft successful attacks, though it is not foolproof [9]</title>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-3-6">
          <title>Research Gaps</title>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-3-7">
          <title>Balancing security and</title>
          <p>performance remains a
challenge, with potential
issues of overfitting</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-3-8">
          <title>Further research is</title>
          <p>needed to counteract
sophisticated adversarial
techniques that bypass
distillation
Exploring the trade-offs
between accuracy and
robustness, and the
impact on real-world
applications
Resource-intensiveness
and latency issues in
model ensemble
techniques need to be
addressed
Research is required to
develop more reliable
methods that cannot be
easily circumvented by
attackers</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Research methodology</title>
      <p>The research method using the systematic literature review (SLR) explains existing studies related to
AI security that prevent cyber attacks on AI systems. The SLR methodology was selected due to its
systematic method for identifying, reviewing, and combining existing research studies so that
provide a thorough understanding of the currently known state of knowledge as well as areas
requiring further investigation. We analyzed the selected literature review studies — which ensures
that key themes are identified, and categorized based on AI security. The study describes attacks and
classifies cyber threats against AI systems as adversarial attacks, data poisoning, model inversion,
and evasion. Research gaps to highlight current research gaps, e.g., what is known and not well
understood about such attacks (hence requiring more investigation), what are the challenges in
deploying existing countermeasures, or when it comes to developing new paradigms.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Results</title>
      <p>We were interested in looking at some of the main studies on AI security as either affecting
vulnerabilities or defensive strategies against cyber attacks.</p>
      <p>
        Adversarial Attacks (The Ultimate Adversary of AI systems): A tiny change in input data can
parse the wrong output. These attacks work well in both digital and physical settings,
showing the importance of strong defensive capabilities [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Data poisoning attacks: Data poisoning exploits the behavior of AI models when they are
constructed to take blocks of additional information which pollutes and corrupts that data
structure at training, leading directly or indirectly to biased responses from them. These
types of attacks are very dangerous for critical applications including medical and finance
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Model Inversion: This kind of attack allows the reconstruction or restoration of input data
based on the output information available from a model. It creates privacy issues, especially
when this type can be carried out in an environment that is very sensitive to various
applications Some stronger privacy-preserving techniques may be necessary to address these
possible attacks [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Adversarial training: While adversarial training is beneficial in strengthening models, it
comes with its own set of problems like higher computation and risk of overfitting to a
particular kind of attack [19].</p>
      <p>
        Defensive distillation: Using the defensive distillation method makes the model less sensitive
to input perturbations bypassed by advanced attacks, but it leaves room for improvement and
research [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ].
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Discussion</title>
      <p>A literature review of existing works provides important insights and challenges towards AI-based
cybersecurity:



</p>
      <p>
        Adversarial attack: Adversarial training, has a lot of potential destructiveness but is
associated with cost and high risk for overfitting (hence it may not be the panacea itself).
Consistent with this principle, a resilient network can be used in hybrid approaches of
machine learning defense where it combines feature squeezing and model ensembles to
collectively improve system-wide robustness [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ], [19].
      </p>
      <p>
        Data poisoning and model inversion: These attacks demonstrate the necessity of improved
defenses, countermeasures, and privacy-preserving mechanisms to mitigate fundamental
vulnerabilities in AI systems [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Defensive techniques: Although defensive distillation and gradient masking are effective
countermeasures, their susceptibilities to stronger attacks indicate that continuous research
is necessary to harden both methods. The practical utility of techniques model ensembles [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ]
and homomorphic encryption comes with resource requirements as well as performance
trade-offs [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Secure deployment and monitoring: Practices of continuous monitoring, and secure
deployments are very important for being agile because cyber threats do not stand. These
approaches worked well for long-term security, but they are based on static guarantees that
will fail against new types of attacks unless the applied techniques get updated too [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Research gaps: Some of the major areas for research include enhancing protection from
advanced adversarial attacks, improving homomorphic encryption towards real-time usage,
and striking a balance between security, performance, and computational costs.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>6. Conclusion</title>
      <p>Looking beyond targeted adversarial data perturbations, the above studies highlight secure
deployment as a critical layer of defense and monitoring for adversaries. This is not enough, so an
innovation model needs to be. For example, future research needs to address vulnerable areas such as
the need for better defenses against more sophisticated adversarial attacks and new
privacypreserving learning techniques that maintain security guarantees while supporting applications
capable of homomorphic encryption in real-time.</p>
      <p>In addition, the need to apply classic cyber hygiene with AI-specific security controls and an
evolving threat landscape is what helps in keeping it secure, reliable as well as effective. With cyber
threats being at their peak of evolution in a digital world, developing tougher and more scalable
solutions seems to be the path to future AI security.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Declaration on Generative AI</title>
      <p>The authors have not employed any Generative AI tools.
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