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  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>I. Krak);</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Valeriia Klimenko</string-name>
          <email>ler.klimenko.8@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Olena Sobko</string-name>
          <email>olenasobko.ua@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Olexander Barmak</string-name>
          <email>alexander.barmak@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Glushkov Institute of Cybernetics of NAS of Ukraine</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Kyiv</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Khmelnytskyi National University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Khmelnytskyi</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff2">
          <label>2</label>
          <institution>Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv</institution>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <volume>000</volume>
      <fpage>0</fpage>
      <lpage>0001</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>A solution of the problem of political manipulations techniques detection in Internet posts that uses a thresholds auto-selection optimization was proposed in the paper. Approach consists of using two tracks: the track of neural network models fine-tuning by One-vs-Rest strategy with thresholds auto-selection in multiclass decision space, and the track of detecting political manipulations techniques in Internet posts. The main contribution of paper is development method for neural network models fine-tuning by One-vsRest strategy with thresholds auto-selection optimization. The method differs from existing ones by using individual auto-selection thresholds optimization for detecting techniques and using the One-vs-Rest strategy for fine-tuning neural network models. This allows more accurately take into account semantic markers characteristic of each technique and increase the detecting manipulations accuracy. Conducted researches have established that use of One-vs-Rest strategy for fine-tuning the RoBERTa neural network model provided increase of detection accuracy by F1 macro-metric compared to existing analogues from 0.625 to 0.73; use of One-vs-Rest strategy in combination with thresholds auto-selection optimization provided additional increase in detection accuracy by F1 macro-metric to 0.76. In general, the proposed approach provides an increase in detection accuracy by macro-metric F1 by 0.135.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;political manipulations techniques</kwd>
        <kwd>One-vs-Rest</kwd>
        <kwd>NLP</kwd>
        <kwd>BERT</kwd>
        <kwd>RoBERTa</kwd>
        <kwd>thresholds auto-selection 1</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        In modern society, information manipulation has become a widespread practice, covering various
areas – from politics to advertising, media and social networks. Due to this, in conditions of
information overload, manipulation is increasingly becoming a tool for influencing public opinion
and people's behavior [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref2">1, 2</xref>
        ]. At the same time, the development of artificial intelligence
technologies has significantly accelerated the process of spreading manipulation, since now
content can be generated not only by people, but also by automated systems that are able to create
texts that are almost indistinguishable from materials written by people [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3 ref4">3, 4</xref>
        ]. This creates new
challenges, since manipulative content is becoming more difficult to detect and analyze. Therefore,
along with the development of these technologies, there is a need to develop new artificial
intelligence models capable of detecting such manipulative techniques in texts [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5 ref6">5, 6</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Currently, there are methods and approaches that allow automatic detection of manipulative
techniques, but this issue has not yet been fully explored. One of the main aspects is the definition
of a threshold for each manipulative technique at which it can be stated that this technique is
present in the text [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]. This threshold is important for the correct classification of manipulations,
since different techniques have different semantic markers [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]. For example, manipulation through
emotional load will have different signs than a technique aimed at inducing feelings of guilt or fear.
The definition of these thresholds is key to the accurate detection and classification of
manipulations, since for each technique their presence requires different assessment criteria and
different levels of confidence in specific markers in the context of the text [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref9">9, 10</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>The paper aim is to increase the accuracy of political manipulative techniques classification of
in Internet posts by optimizing threshold solutions.</p>
      <p>The main paper contributions is the development of method for neural network models
finetuning by One-vs-Rest strategy, which includes the thresholds auto-selection optimization in
multiclass decision space. Method differs from existing ones by the use of individual threshold
values for each type of manipulation technique, which allows for more accurate account of various
semantic markers characteristic of each of the techniques. In addition, the use of the One-vs-Rest
training strategy is proposed, which allows for the classification of manipulative techniques set
into separate classes, taking into account the specific characteristics of each of them. This allows
for higher accuracy of detecting manipulations in Internet posts, in particular in the conditions of
multi-class tasks, where each class may have a different level of manifestation depending on
context and specifics of manipulation technique.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Related works</title>
      <p>The problem of detecting and classifying political manipulative techniques in text messages has
been widely studied by scientists in recent years.</p>
      <p>
        So, in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ] noted that previous studies have mainly focused on linguistic features for detecting
propaganda in texts, but the role of semantic features in the spread of propaganda remains
understudied. In this direction, the authors propose a meta-learning-based method for
automatically detecting semantic propaganda at the sentence level in news, using multi-task
learning to detect semantic contradictions. The method combines conditional random fields (CRF),
bidirectional LSTM networks (BiLSTM) and pre-trained language models, which allows achieving
an F1 score of 0.61 on multilingual data and 0.688 on monolingual data. The authors note that the
proposed model outperforms existing approaches, confirming the effectiveness of multi-task
learning for detecting disinformation tactics in news.
      </p>
      <p>
        The study [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ] proposes a multilingual system for detecting propaganda that uses ensembles of
models with different architectures and prediction aggregation methods (Use-FFN and Skip-FFN).
Results in seven languages (English, Arabic, German, Italian, French, Polish, Russian) showed that
the MultiProp-Chunk Hybrid model outperformed the others in Arabic and Russian, with F1-micro
results of 0.598 and 0.595, respectively. The MultiProp-Baseline En-B model demonstrated stable
results in Polish and Italian (F1-macro up to 0.625 for Polish), and the MultiProp-ML Hybrid
achieved strong results in cross-lingual adaptation, with results for French and German of 0.587
and 0.583, respectively. These results highlight the effectiveness of the system in multilingual
propaganda analysis, where the use of meta-learning and specialized models for each language
allows for significant improvements compared to traditional methods.
      </p>
      <p>Political manipulations in news often aim to manipulate public opinion through psychological
and rhetorical strategies.</p>
      <p>
        In [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ] an advanced pre-trained language model RoBERTa is used to detect propaganda
manipulations in news articles. The model is evaluated using the SemEval-2020 Task 11 dataset,
which was used for this task. The results show that the RoBERTa model, thanks to use of word
vectors, detects complex propaganda techniques and achieves an F1-score of 60.2%.
      </p>
      <p>
        The study [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ] presents an ensemble model that solves the problem of detecting propaganda
techniques in texts extracted from memes. The paper also considers modern pre-trained language
models and optimization techniques, such as data augmentation and model ensemble. The model
was evaluated using the SemEval-2021 Task 6 dataset, and the results showed that the proposed
system achieved an F1-micro score of 0.604 on the test set.
      </p>
      <p>
        In the study [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ] two architectures for classifying propaganda techniques were considered: one
with and without data augmentation (EDA). The models with EDA showed a 3% improvement in
F1-score and achieved 57.57% on the test set. Most propaganda techniques, such as
"Appeal_to_fear-prejudice", "Exaggeration, Minimisation" and "Repetition", showed an increase in
performance, although some techniques, such as "Doubt" and "Flag-Waving", showed a slight
decrease. The largest improvement was observed for the techniques "Causal_Oversimplification"
and "Thought-terminating_Cliches". The optimal parameters for the classification tasks were
established based on the analysis of epochs, sentence length and learning rate, which allowed
achieving an F1-score of 0.44 for the sentiment detection task and 0.57 for the propaganda
technique classification task.
      </p>
      <p>
        In the context of machine learning models studied in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ] for detecting propaganda content, the
Stacking Classifier using feature processing methods such as Word2Vec and TF-IDF demonstrates
high versatility and flexibility. This approach integrates multiple representations of complex
features and predictive models, making it effective for solving complex text classification tasks. The
performance analysis of different models shows that the Stacking Classifier outperforms other
models, including Naive Bayes, SVM, KNN, Logistic Regression, and Random Forest. The inclusion
of feature engineering significantly improves the performance of the model, as evidenced by the
increase in Accuracy, Precision, and F1 scores compared to other methods. The Stacking Classifier
with TF-IDF and Word2Vec achieved Accuracy of 87%, Precision of 81%, and F1 score of 84%. These
indicators exceed the results of other tested models; however, the testing was carried out on a
sample with a large class imbalance. The model demonstrates the ability to adapt to various text
categorization tasks, making it an effective tool for detecting propaganda content, particularly in
poster headlines.
      </p>
      <p>In the study [17], a two-step process was used to evaluate the model’s performance in
determining the optimal threshold for classifying propaganda techniques. First, experiments were
conducted with macrothresholds ranging from 0.1 to 0.9, the threshold with the highest F1 score
was selected, and then microthresholds were added for further optimization. The XLM-RoBERTa
models were trained using the Adam optimizer, and early termination was used to prevent
overtraining. The performance metrics accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score were used at each
stage. The results of the study showed that the model effectively classified propaganda content, but
the accuracy for the “propaganda” and “non-propaganda” classes had a significant difference,
indicating an imbalance in the data. The following results were obtained by evaluating the model
at different thresholds for classification. The standard threshold of 0.5 allowed to achieve an
accuracy of 0.85 and an F1 measure of 0.83 for the main techniques. For some categories, such as
“Enemy Creation,” increasing the threshold to 0.7 increased the accuracy to 0.92, although it
decreased the sensitivity on less represented classes. This confirms the importance of tuning the
threshold to optimize the results depending on the specific classification goals, in order to achieve
a balance between accuracy and sensitivity.</p>
      <p>The related works review found that existing methods for classifying political manipulative
techniques in Internet posts have several significant limitations. One of the key shortcomings is the
use of universal threshold values for all classes, which does not take into account the specifics of
each manipulative technique. This leads to decrease in accuracy, since different techniques have
different levels of semantic expressiveness and frequency in text content.</p>
      <p>In addition, most approaches use traditional multi-class classification strategies that do not
provide adequate separation between classes with high level of feature overlap. This makes it
difficult to correctly identify combined or weakly expressed manipulative techniques. Insufficient
attention to the individual characteristics of manipulations techniques complicates the results
interpretation and reduces the models practical effectiveness. Study hypothesizes that One-vs-Rest
training strategy application in combination with thresholds auto-selection optimization for each
manipulative technique will improve classification accuracy.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Methods and materials</title>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>3.1. Approach to detecting manipulations techniques using thresholds autoselection</title>
        <p>Approach to detecting political manipulations techniques in internet posts with thresholds
optimization consists of using two tracks: the track of neural network models fine-tuning by
Onevs-Rest strategy with thresholds auto-selection in multiclass decision space [18] and the track of
detecting political manipulations techniques [19]. Generalized diagram of man interaction with
tracks of political manipulations techniques detection is shown in Figure 1.</p>
        <p>The result of running Track 1 is set of finely tuned models  , each of which is trained using the
One-vs-Rest strategy for corresponding manipulative technique. Set of models is defined as:
(1)
(2)
 = { ,  , … ,  | |}
where each model  corresponds to separate manipulative technique  .</p>
        <p>The manipulative techniques set T has a dimension equal to the number of political
manipulations techniques identified in research:</p>
        <p>| | = 10
In turn, political manipulation techniques set considered in research:</p>
        <p>T={Loaded Language, Glittering Generalities, Euphoria, Appeal to Fear,
FUD (Fear, Uncertainty, Doubt), Bandwagon/Appeal to People, Thought-Terminating Cliche, (3)</p>
        <p>Whataboutism, Cherry Picking, Straw Man}</p>
        <p>The limitation of set  is explained by the composition of the available dataset [20], which
contains annotated examples only for the specified manipulative techniques. Thus, each technique
  corresponds to a separate model   , which allows for independent training and classification
using the One-vs-Rest strategy.</p>
        <p>The result of Track 2 execution are the identified manipulative techniques in Internet posts. The
political manipulations technique is considered used if the neural network value is above the
threshold. The threshold is determined adaptively for each manipulative technique on Track 1
using the Youden criterion [19].</p>
        <p>The implementation of Track 1 as a method for neural network models fine-tuning will be
considered in detail in Section 3.2. At the same time, the implementation of Track 2 consists in
using the results of Track 1 using the previously developed method for political propaganda
detection [20].</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>3.2. Method for neural network models fine-tuning by One-vs-Rest strategy</title>
        <p>Method for neural network models fine-tuning by One-vs-Rest strategy with thresholds
autoselection optimization in multiclass decision space is intended for further use for political
manipulations techniques detection. Scheme of method for neural network models fine-tuning by
One-vs-Rest strategy is shown in Figure 2. Step 1 of the method for neural network models
finetuning is devoted to datasets preprocessing for training by One-vs-Rest strategy, which extracts
fragments from the input dataset that are annotated by the authors as expressing manipulative
techniques, processes them accordingly, and places them in the appropriate catalogs. Step 2
consists of fine-tuning neural network binary classification models, which involves training
separate binary classification by transformer neural network models for each manipulation
technique. Step 3 consists in optimization of classification threshold for each manipulative
technique, which allows improving the performance of the corresponding model. Step 4 evaluating
of models efficiency by metrics and the trained neural network models will be evaluated using the
following set of metrics: Accuracy, Precision, Recall, F1 measure.</p>
        <p>The input data is the dataset [21], created as part of the Fourth Ukrainian Workshop on NLP
(UNLP 2025), in which the authors participated. The workshop was dedicated to solving the
problem of detecting political manipulation techniques in social networks. The dataset contains
marked data at the fragment level. The distribution of documents in the dataset without
preprocessing is shown in Figure 3.</p>
        <p>The total number of unique documents in the dataset is 3822, of which 2589 are marked as
having manifestations of the use of manipulative techniques, and 1233 as not having
manifestations of manipulative influences. Each document that has manifestations of the use of
manipulative techniques can have more than 1 label. The records in the dataset are presented as
Ukrainian, however, after the analysis it was found that records are also found in other languages.
Before training the neural networks, typical text preprocessing operations [22] are performed on
the elements of the dataset.</p>
        <p>Also, the input data is a pre-trained model of the transformer architecture. The study compared
the BERT [23] and RoBERTa [24] models, the choice of which is due to the support of the
Ukrainian language. The choice of BERT and RoBERTa allows comparing a universal and
specialized transformer model for the analysis of the Ukrainian language, which makes the study
more representative.
in section 3.2.1), fine-tuning neural network binary classification models (described in section
3.2.2), determining the adaptive threshold for each manipulative technique (described in section
3.2.3) and evaluating of models efficiency by metrics (described in section 3.2.4).</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-3">
        <title>3.2.1. Datasets preprocessing for training by One-vs-Rest strategy</title>
        <p>Step 1 of method for neural network models fine-tuning by One-vs-Rest strategy is datasets
preprocessing for training. From the input dataset D containing text fragments xi and their labels
Li⊆T, fragments annotated by authors as expressing manipulative techniques are extracted. Each
fragment xi that has label t is added to the corresponding catalog Ct::

= { | ∈  }
(4)</p>
        <p>Accordingly, each fragment is placed in a separate file, which is placed in a directory with the
same name as the name of the manipulative technique. If there are several techniques within the
document, fragments are duplicated in directories with the same name for the techniques
expressed. Figure 4 shows the process of distributing fragments into directories. After the specified
distribution, the following distribution was obtained, shown in Figure 5.</p>
        <p>Files in the resulting directories are filtered by size; if the file is less than 100 bytes, it will not
participate in fine-tuning binary BERT models of similar architectures. If the dataset contains texts
in languages other than Ukrainian, they are automatically translated.</p>
        <p>
</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-4">
        <title>3.2.2. Fine-tuning neural network binary classification models</title>
        <p>Fine-tuning neural network binary classification models is Step 1 of method for neural network
models fine-tuning by One-vs-Rest strategy. This step involves training separate binary BERT
classification models for each manipulation technique. Since the sample has some imbalance, the
child datasets were formed according to certain rules:</p>
        <p>All samples are selected from the target catalog (positive samples) expressing text messages
of a certain manipulative influence:</p>
        <p>All samples from the equipment catalog ti are included in the positive class. Accordingly, the
sample will have dimension |</p>
        <p>| =  .</p>
        <p>The non-target catalog is added α*100% of texts (from the dimension of the target class) that
do not contain manipulative influences, and β*100% of texts from other catalogs that
contain manifestations of other, different from the target, manipulative techniques:
where 
are random texts without manipulations (sample size  *  ),  ¬
are random
texts with other techniques than the target one. The hyperparameters α and β determine the
sample balance and satisfy the equation:</p>
        <sec id="sec-3-4-1">
          <title>Thus, the general dataset for fine-tuning the</title>
          <p>model will look like this:</p>
          <p>The influence of the values of the parameters α and β for the content of the non-target sample
requires a separate study, which will be performed in further work, within the framework of the
study the parameters will be: α=0.5 and β=0.5. The use of non-target manipulative techniques in
the non-target class will help the model distinguish precisely the target manipulative technique,
and not just the presence of manipulation in general [20, 25].</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-5">
        <title>3.2.3. Determining the adaptive threshold for each manipulative technique</title>
        <p>Step 3 of method for neural network models fine-tuning by One-vs-Rest strategy is optimization of
classification threshold for each</p>
        <p>manipulative technique ti, which allows improving the
performance of the corresponding model ft. For each model fti, the probability p of belonging of text
x to class ti is calculated:</p>
        <p>Classification is carried out according to the threshold rule:
 ( ) =  ( =  | )

=
1,  ( ) &gt; 
0,
(11)
where</p>
        <p>is the optimal threshold for the manipulative technique ti. In this study, the Youden
criterion [19] will be used, which is used to select a threshold value that provides the optimal
balance between «True Positive Rate» and «False Positive Rate»:
 ( ) =   ( ) − 
( )</p>
        <p>The Youden criterion [19] is calculated as the difference between the sensitivity and the level of
false positives, allowing to find the threshold at which the model demonstrates the maximum
ability to distinguish texts containing a specific manipulative technique from those that do not
contain it. Optimization of this indicator helps to avoid an excessive number of false positives and
improves the quality of recognition. The adaptive threshold for each technique allows to flexibly
adjust the classification according to the specifics of the manipulative effect, since different
techniques can have different levels of expressiveness in texts, using a single threshold value for all
cases can lead to a decrease in the efficiency of classification. Determining the optimal threshold
separately for each class allows to achieve better differentiation and improve the overall
performance of the model.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-6">
        <title>3.2.4. Evaluation of neural network models efficiency by metrics</title>
        <p>Step 4 of method for neural network models fine-tuning by One-vs-Rest strategy is evaluation of
neural network models efficiency by metrics. In the research, the trained neural network models
will be evaluated using the following set of metrics: Accuracy, Precision, Recall, F1 measure [26].
This set of metrics is sufficient for evaluating neural network models within the framework of the
classification of political manipulative techniques, given the specifics of the task, in particular, the
multi-class nature of the classification and the imbalance in the distribution of classes.</p>
        <p>Since each neural network model is responsible for a specific political manipulative technique,
such an assessment will allow us to accurately determine where each model works well and where
it needs improvement, allowing us to adapt threshold values and improve the overall results of the
classification of political manipulative techniques [20].</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Experiments</title>
      <p>To research the proposed hypothesis about the feasibility of applying the One-vs-Rest learning
strategy in combination with an adaptive threshold to each manipulative technique to increase
accuracy, a series of experiments will be conducted with BERT-like architectures that support work
with the Ukrainian language. The scheme of experiment is shown in Figure 6.</p>
      <p>The first part of the experiment is training neural network models of the BERT and RoBERTa
architectures. To train neural network models using the One-vs-Rest strategy with and without
adaptive thresholding, a console application was created in Python, which uses the PyTorch [27],
transformers [28], datasets [29] libraries. The result of the application is the saved trained models
and their evaluations by metrics and optimal threshold.</p>
      <p>Also, as part of the second part of the study, a desktop application was created that uses the
PySide [30], PyTorch, transformers libraries and allows you to evaluate the quality of detecting
manipulative techniques. The appearance of the developed application is shown in Figure 7.</p>
      <p>The next section will present graphs comparing the performance of the trained versions of
neural networks and the main results obtained.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Results and discussion</title>
      <p>After training the classifiers on the datasets formed according to transformations (4)-(8) for
implementing the One-vs-Rest strategy, the results were obtained on the training (80% of the total
dataset) and test samples (20% of the total dataset), shown in Table 1.</p>
      <p>The analyzed data presented in Table 1 allow to conclude that in general, RoBERTa trained
using the One-vs-Rest strategy demonstrates higher performance on the test set for most
techniques, especially in the Precision and F1-score metrics. This indicates that this model is more
resistant to generalization and better recognizes patterns of manipulative rhetoric.</p>
      <p>BERT shows high performance on the training data, but there is a significant decrease in the
metrics on the test set for some categories, for example, “Bandwagon/Appeal to People”, which
may indicate a certain tendency to overtraining. At the same time, RoBERTa demonstrates more
balanced results between Train and Test, especially for techniques such as “Cherry Picking”,
“Glittering Generalities” and “Whataboutism”, which confirms its ability to generalize knowledge
more effectively.</p>
      <p>Some manipulative techniques remain difficult for both models, for example, “Loaded
Language”, for which RoBERTa has a significant performance decrease on the test data, which may
indicate the difficulty of semantic identification of this technique due to its contextual variability.</p>
      <p>Thus, RoBERTa is generally a better model for detecting manipulative techniques,
demonstrating more stable results between training and test sets.</p>
      <p>The evaluation of neural networks using the One-vs-Rest strategy with adaptive thresholding
by transformations (9) – (11) is given in Table 2.</p>
      <p>Analysis of the results of the classification of manipulative techniques based on the BERT and
RoBERTa models demonstrates the effectiveness of the One-vs-Rest strategy with an adaptive
threshold. Compared to the baseline indicators (Table 1), the use of this strategy leads to an overall
improvement in classification accuracy.</p>
      <p>RoBERTa generally demonstrates better results than BERT in most techniques, especially in
terms of stability between training and testing metrics. The most noticeable gap in favor of
RoBERTa is observed in the manipulative techniques “Whataboutism” and “FUD”, where the
F1score and Precision significantly exceed the similar indicators of BERT. This indicates that the
model differentiates these manipulations better and has a lower tendency to overtraining.</p>
      <p>For BERT, significant improvements are observed in the techniques “Straw Man”, “Glittering
Generalities” and “FUD”, where the F1-score increased compared to the previous approach,
indicating the effectiveness of the adaptive threshold in balancing precision and completeness.</p>
      <p>Adaptive thresholding had a positive impact on the metrics of the test set. For example, in BERT
for the manipulative technique “Bandwagon/Appeal to People” Precision increased from 0.677 to
0.727, indicating a decrease in false positives of the model. Similarly, in RoBERTa Precision for the
technique “Straw Man” improved to 0.825, which is an important indicator for recognizing
manipulative techniques.</p>
      <p>At the same time, adaptive thresholding does not always provide significant improvements for
complex techniques such as “Loaded Language”, where in RoBERTa there is still a gap between the
training and test metrics (F1-score dropped from 0.717 to 0.65). This indicates the need for
additional optimization of the model for processing context-sensitive expressions.</p>
      <p>Comparison of BERT and RoBERTa neural networks on the test set of applying the One-vs-Rest
strategy with adaptive thresholding and without the Precision metric is shown in Figure 8.</p>
      <p>Comparison of BERT and RoBERTa neural networks on the test set using the One-vs-Rest
strategy with and without an adaptive threshold using the Recall metric is shown in Figure 9.</p>
      <p>Comparison of BERT and RoBERTa neural networks on the test set using the One-vs-Rest
strategy with and without an adaptive threshold by the F1 metric is shown in Figure 10.</p>
      <p>Compared to known analogues, this approach allows to obtain higher estimates. Comparison of
the approaches with the proposed one is given in Table 3.</p>
      <p>According to the data from Table 3, the One-vs-Rest training strategy allows improving the
known analogues by at least 0.095 for the implementation of BERT without adaptive threshold. The
best increase in the F1-macro metric is observed for the One-vs-Rest strategy with adaptive
threshold, and is 0.135.</p>
      <p>The One-vs-Rest strategy with adaptive thresholding improves the generalization ability of the
models, which is especially noticeable in the example of RoBERTa, which demonstrates higher
resistance to overtraining compared to BERT. The results indicate an improvement in the balance
between accuracy and completeness of classification, especially for the techniques "Whataboutism",
"Glittering Generalities" and "FUD", where Precision and F1-score remain consistently high on both
training and test samples.</p>
      <p>Despite the overall improvement in metrics, for complex categories such as “Loaded Language”,
there is a significant gap between training and testing indicators, which may indicate insufficient
generalization of the model. This may be a consequence of limited data or high variability of lexical
constructions in these cases. In addition, the increase in F1-score for most techniques indicates that
the methodology allows for a more effective balance between detecting positive cases and reducing
false positives.</p>
      <p>Considering the results obtained, the use of adaptive thresholding in the One-vs-Rest strategy in
classification is a promising direction for improving the generalization ability of transformative
models in the tasks of identifying propaganda techniques. To further improve the accuracy of
classification, it is necessary to consider expanding the training dataset or using additional
regularization mechanisms to reduce the gap between training and testing metrics in complex
categories.</p>
      <p>
        The proposed method has a number of limitations. Research is based on dataset [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ], which
contains annotated examples for only 10 manipulative techniques. Accordingly, the methodology
does not take into account other possible manipulative strategies. Another limitation is possibility
of working only in Ukrainian, other languages were not studied. Method works with text files from
100 to 7514 bytes long with tokenizer size of 512 tokens.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Conclusions</title>
      <p>A solution of the problem of political manipulations techniques detection in Internet posts that
uses a thresholds auto-selection optimization was proposed in the paper. Approach consists of
using two tracks: the track of neural network models fine-tuning by One-vs-Rest strategy with
thresholds auto-selection in multiclass decision space, and the track of detecting political
manipulations techniques in Internet posts. The One-vs-Rest strategy assumes that each technique
is analyzed separately, which allows achieving greater detecting accuracy, avoiding mixing of
various manipulative influences. Pre-trained BERT and RoBERTa transformer neural network
models supporting the Ukrainian language were used for fine-tuning. This made it possible to
compare universal and specialized architectures for text analysis and determine their effectiveness
in detecting manipulations. Optimization of the classification threshold for each model is carried
out based on the Youden criterion, which helps to balance between the «True Positive Rate» and
«False Positive Rate» indicators. This approach allowed fine-tuning the model to the specifics of
each manipulative technique, increasing the overall classification efficiency. Additionally, the use
of non-target manipulative techniques in the opposite class to the target one contributes to more
accurate distinction between different techniques of political manipulations.</p>
      <p>The main contribution of paper is development method for neural network models fine-tuning
by One-vs-Rest strategy with thresholds auto-selection optimization. The method differs from
existing ones by using individual auto-selection thresholds optimization for detecting techniques
and using the One-vs-Rest strategy for fine-tuning neural network models. This allows more
accurately take into account semantic markers characteristic of each technique and increase the
detecting manipulations accuracy, particularly in multi-class tasks, where each class may have a
different level of manifestation depending on the context and the specifics of the political
manipulation technique.</p>
      <p>To investigate the developed approach, experiments series were conducted on training and
evaluating BERT and RoBERTa neural network models using the One-vs-Rest strategy for
classifying manipulative techniques in text Internet posts. Software for training models and
desktop application were developed to evaluate the models performance. Conducted researches
have established that use of One-vs-Rest strategy for fine-tuning the RoBERTa neural network
model provided increase of detection accuracy by F1 macro-metric compared to existing analogues
from 0.625 to 0.73; use of One-vs-Rest strategy in combination with thresholds auto-selection
optimization provided additional increase in detection accuracy by F1 macro-metric to 0.76. In
general, the proposed approach provides an increase in detection accuracy by macro-metric F1 by
0.135.</p>
      <p>The experiment results showed, that RoBERTa neural network model demonstrates higher
overall performance compared to BERT, especially after applying thresholds auto-selection
optimization. The largest increase was observed for the manipulative techniques “Whataboutism”,
“FUD” and “Glittering Generalities”, where the Precision and Recall metrics remained consistently
high on both the training and test samples. The complexity of the classification of some techniques,
in particular “Loaded Language”, indicates the need for further research in the direction of
expanding the dataset or introducing additional regulation mechanisms.</p>
      <p>The methodology has certain limitations. In particular, its practical application depends on the
dataset, for example, the dataset used for research contained 10 manipulative techniques. Also, the
experiments were conducted exclusively for the Ukrainian language, which does not allow
assessing its effectiveness for other languages.</p>
      <p>Thus, the results obtained confirm the effectiveness of One-vs-Rest strategy with with
thresholds auto-selection optimization in multiclass decision space for improving the accuracy of
manipulative techniques classification.</p>
      <p>Further research can be aimed at improving the methodology by expanding the dataset, testing
on multilingual corpora, and developing more flexible models that can adapt to complex
manipulative techniques.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Acknowledgements</title>
      <p>This research was made possible thanks to the dataset provided by the UNLP 2025 Shared Task
initiative (GitHub repository) [20]. We sincerely appreciate the efforts of the organizers and
contributors who curated and shared this valuable resource, enabling further advancements in the
study of propaganda detection techniques.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>Declaration on Generative AI</title>
      <sec id="sec-8-1">
        <title>The authors have not employed any Generative AI tools.</title>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
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</article>