<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Archiving and Interchange DTD v1.0 20120330//EN" "JATS-archivearticle1.dtd">
<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>Work-in-Progress in Hardware and Software for Location Computation June</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>In-Lab Receiver Testing Based on Live Captured RFI Events for DFMC GBAS Development</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Nadezda Sokolova</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Aiden Morrison</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Adrian Winter</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>SINTEF Digital, SCT Dept.</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Strindveien 4, Trondheim, Norway, 7034</addr-line>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2025</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>1</volume>
      <fpage>0</fpage>
      <lpage>12</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>As the Ground Based Augmentation Systems (GBAS) have to often operate in close proximity to high trafic roads, parking garages, and other transportation infrastructure, the chances of being afected by unintentional Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) from low-cost jamming devices and malfunctioning equipment are high. Multiple recent studies have indicated that interference levels in such environments are frequently exceeding the tolerable limits for safety-critical system/infrastructure operations. It is therefore important for GBAS to have efective RFI detection and mitigation mechanisms. This article presents sample results and analysis of GNSS receiver responses to diferent RFI signal types generated based on real life observations made as part of multi-dimensional parameter spaces extracted from a multi-site, multi-year monitoring campaign carried out in Europe and Scandinavia. The obtained results are discussed in light of RFI monitor design in support of the dual frequency multi constellation (DFMC) GBAS ground system providing initial recommendations for the potential monitoring scheme with respect to which observables should be used and how they interrelate over the various RFI signal types.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;GNSS</kwd>
        <kwd>RFI</kwd>
        <kwd>GBAS</kwd>
        <kwd>Interference monitoring</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        While GNSS signals used in aviation are located in a protected Aeronautical Radio-Navigation Signal
(ARNS) frequency band, jamming afecting this band is occurring frequently as it has been shown by
multiple projects including the EU H2020 STRIKE3 [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ], ESA NAVISP-EL3 Advanced RFI Detection
Analysis and Alerting System (ARFIDAAS) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ], as well as multiple other studies (see e.g. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3 ref4">3, 4</xref>
        ]).
Results show that the amount of observed interference frequently exceeds the tolerable limits for
safety-critical infrastructure systems. It is also expected that the occurrence rate, complexity, as well
as the range will increase due to growing financial and geopolitical incentives [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ]. Low-cost GNSS
receiver manufacturers already support dual- and multi-frequency solutions. With GNSS being deeply
embedded in today’s digital infrastructure and numerous applications, more jamming events targeting
multiple GNSS frequencies at the same time are being observed, as well as more attacks of increased
complexity [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6 ref7">6, 7</xref>
        ]. GBAS is a local area GNSS-based precision approach guidance system for the final
approach phase. The system is intended to be used for safety-critical operations (e.g., zero-visibility
operations including Autoland), and is therefore designed to support very stringent integrity, continuity
and availability requirements. GBAS ground reference receivers have to operate in close proximity to
high-trafic roads and airport parking so the chances of being afected by RFI are high [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8 ref9">8, 9</xref>
        ]. At the
current moment, the GBAS Approach Service Types (GAST) utilizing the GPS L1 and L5, as well as the
Galileo E1 and E5a frequencies is still under development [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]. As resilience against unintentional RFI
(here we are excluding the case of state actor generated high power, wide range attacks) is an important
aspect of system design, reaction strategies necessary to ensure continuity and availability of service
relying on multiple frequencies (i.e., switching between modes based on diferent core frequencies), as
well as RFI monitoring and detection algorithms need to be developed. Development of such algorithms
requires knowledge of the current RFI threat space and an understanding of receiver responses to
various interference signal types and characteristics. Mapping the RFI threat space is a challenging
task as it relies on long-term monitoring, characterization, and threat evolution analysis. Within the
ESA funded NAVISP-EL3 program ARFIDAAS project, more than a decade of aggregated GNSS site
monitoring was analyzed with raw data for over 50 thousand RFI events captured [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]. This extensive
database of the captured RFI events allows one to extract the important parameters, parameter ranges,
and characteristics of diferent interference signals observed in real life and use those to generate
representative signal types and patterns for in-lab testing. This article presents sample results and
analysis of two GNSS receiver responses (NovAtel OEM7 and Septentrio mosaic-T) to diferent RFI
signal types generated considering multi-dimensional parameter spaces extracted from the ARFIDAAS
event database. The focus is on the GPS L1 and L5, as well as the Galileo E1 and E5a signals that
are the core ones used in the next generation dual frequency, multi-constellation (DFMC) GBAS. The
obtained results are discussed in light of RFI monitor design in support of the DFMC GBAS ground
system development providing initial recommendations for the potential monitoring scheme with
respect to which observables should be used and how they interrelate over the various RFI signal types.
Since GBAS ground reference receivers do not implement time-frequency adaprive processing, or other
algorithmic RFI mitigation measures, these are disabled on the evaluated receivers during the tests
presented here.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Source of Data</title>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>2.1. ARFIDAAS Event Database</title>
        <p>
          To support the in-lab testing carried out in this work, data captured by the ARFIDAAS GNSS RFI
monitoring network was used as the basis. The network comprised 14 sites in Europe and Scandinavia,
where each site is equipped with a low-cost monitoring unit supporting all navigation bands transmitted
by GPS (L1, L2 and L5), Galileo (E1, E5a, E5b and E6), GLONASS (G1, G2 and G3) and Beidou (B1, B2
and B3). For more details about the monitoring unit design as well as event statistics and analysis see
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4 ref6 ref7">4, 6, 7</xref>
          ]. Each of the detected RFI events was passed through an automatic event classification algorithm
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
          ] for identifying jamming signal type and its characteristics (center frequency, bandwidth and time
modulation frequency, etc.). Classification results, site details, as well as the captured raw signal samples
for all the detected events at each monitoring site where then stored in the cloud. The accumulated
database includes more than 50 thousand RFI events captured across the ARFIDAAS monitoring network.
As illustrated in Figure 1, for event classification within the ARFIDAAS system, fourteen RFI types
across four main categories (narrowband, time-modulated, wideband, and environment baseline) were
defined.
        </p>
        <p>
          As presented in [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
          ] where the developed automatic classification algorithm is described, the
narrowband category includes RFI signals that evidence one or more narrowband signals. The time modulated
category collects events which have signals where the power is concentrated in a specific region of the
spectrum over each observation interval within the limits of the Fourier transform window width(s)
used such as chirp signals where the power is swept over a range of frequencies but at each epoch it is
concentrated at a specific frequency. Wideband events are in contrast those for which the RFI signal
impacts one or more regions of the spectrum, but for which the signal cannot be isolated in frequency
versus time, such as white noise sources. The fourth category called ‘environment baseline’ is a special
case where the event has not measurably distorted the observed spectrum despite the in-band power
meters and Automatic Gain Control (AGC) feedback detection criteria being met. As this increase in
measured in band power without spectral profile distortion is what would be expected during a low
power spoofing event, this category serves as an indication of potential spoofing/meaconing events. It
is noted that at the current moment, the analysis results of this group of events are yet available, and
will not be used as part of the work presented in this article leaving the focus purely on jamming.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>2.2. Parameter Set Extraction</title>
        <p>
          The event classification results accumulated across sites and over time allows one to study the observed
jamming signal characteristics, define key parameter sets for each of the main signal categories, as
well as define parameter ranges based on real life observations. Tables 1-3 show parameter ranges for
the three of the most frequently observed categories [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
          ], namely the time modulated, wideband and
narrowband jamming signal types. In total, there are eleven RFI signal categories covered of the thirteen
listed in Figure 1. excluding the environment baseline category. While the ARFIDAAS system classifier
was developed to identify each of these types, some were not observed in the wild by the monitoring
network leading to Tables 1-3 having the indicated subset of signal types present. Another important
detail to note here is that the extracted parameter sets and ranges include all observations made by the
ARFIDAAS network also considering the non-standard events that were classified as a particular type
while not matching the standard characteristics. Figure 2 shows examples of such events. In both cases,
the automatic classification algorithm placed the event in a particular category, however each of the
events was on closer inspection not a clear match to the expected signal structure.
        </p>
        <p>Event shown in Figure 2 (a) for example was classified as multilevel chirp, and while there are some
features in it resembling one, it is dificult to say why such a signal structure would be used to jam GNSS
as it might not be as eficient as a less complex signal modulation. For this reason, and based on the fact
that the center of the RFI is located several MHz above the band center of GLONASS G2, it is believed
that this signal is unintentionally generated. The example shown in Figure 2 (b) is a special case as it
contains three distinct perturbing signals at power levels low enough that the main lobes of the GPS
and Galileo L1/E1 signals are still visible. While the weak CW signal is of no note, the simultaneous
occurrence of two distinct time modulated signals is. In addition to the traditional linear chirp signal,
an exponentially swept signal is present.</p>
        <p>This exponentially swept form was not observed during the first two years of the ARFIDAAS network
operation and therefore was not defined as a separate signal type, however, by the end of the fourth year
of operation this signal type was present with some regularity at multiple sites. While such a scenario
containing multiple diferent RFI types plus a novel modulation which the classifier was not designed
to isolate represents a significant challenge to classification, the classifier successfully categorized this
event as a form of time-modulated interference. The identified parameter ranges as shown in Tables
1-3 have been used to define the limits of the simulation space. In this paper, we focus on a selected
subset of results from the category of time-modulated (single linear, single exponential, and linear in
combination with exponential chirp simultaneously as shown in Figure 2 (right)). The motivation for
focusing on the dual signal case comes from a concern that this newly observed RFI combination may
have been selected by malicious actors due to particularly disruptive impacts to GNSS signal tracking.
In order to establish a baseline for comparison, it was decided to also test the traditional linear chirp
impacts over their observed parameter space as linear chirp is by far the most frequently observed
time-modulated RFI type in the wild. A particular note is that these evaluations focus on threshold
impact power levels to stimulate disrupted tracking behavior in the receivers while allowing them
to maintain signal lock so as to still provide observables/measurements for analysis. Since the GNSS
receiver devices under test (DUT) must be run in real-time and require both initial acquisition time as
well as a reset interval to ensure independence between test cycles, the number of simulation cycles and
therefore the granularity of the 3D simulation space had to be constrained. With each simulation cycle
desired to produce 60 seconds of RFI impacted output data, a single simulation cycle requires 5 minutes.</p>
        <p>Given a simulation grid of 13 bandwidth steps, 17 repeat rate steps, and 8 diferent power levels the
aggregate simulation cycle reaches 2.5 days for a single scenario such as linear chirp, exponential chirp
or the combined dual chirp. The amount of time is tripled in the case when the performance is evaluated
on two frequency bands individually and combined (i.e. L1, L5, and L1 + L5).</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Simulation Setup</title>
      <p>To generate the jamming signal types observed live, the equipment setup illustrated in Figure 3 was used.
A HW GNSS Spirent GSS800 simulator was supplemented by two Ettus Research universal software
radio peripheral (USRP) B200 units for jamming signal generation. The USRP radios used have an
adjustable transmit power gain between 0 and 89 dB, where a gain setting of 15 dB corresponds to an
increase in total received power in band of 1 dB at each of the connected receivers. The supported signal
bandwidth can go up to 50/55 MHz. When two jamming signals are simulated in the same frequency
band, this setup allows for digital adjustment of the power level between signal components sent by
the same radio. While this test bench equipment setup allows for the evaluation of four receivers
simultaneously, the results in this paper focus on observations made from two geodetic grade receivers
(NovAtel OEM7 and Septentrio mosaic-T). To confirm the capability to produce complex combined
signal events prior to running a large number of simulations, the equipment setup was thoroughly
tested to ensure that the interference signals were generated correctly. For this purpose, the ARFIDAAS
front-end was used to capture and analyze the combined signal outputs.</p>
      <p>While this test bench equipment setup allows for the evaluation of four receivers simultaneously, the
results in this paper focus on observations made from two geodetic grade receivers (NovAtel OEM7 and
Septentrio mosaic-T). To confirm the capability to produce complex combined signal events prior to
running a large number of simulations, the equipment setup was thoroughly tested to ensure that the
interference signals were generated correctly. For this purpose, the ARFIDAAS front-end was used to
capture and analyze the combined signal outputs.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. RFI Monitoring in GBAS</title>
      <p>GBAS development must be carried out in accordance with rigorous standards therefore system evolution
process is complex and time demanding with dual frequency architecture still in development phase.
Design of an appropriate RFI monitoring scheme for a dual frequency system is therefore still a topic for
investigation. While there is no dedicated RFI monitor, interference detection in GBAS ground reference
receivers is typically carried out by monitoring the variation of the Carrier-to-Noise density ratio (C/N0)
or various metrics derived from it in the form of the required low signal power monitor. While other
signal/measurement quality monitors might be triggered by RFI, their purpose is to ensure integrity
of service in the presence of other specific threats, so while the faulty measurements/ranging sources
will be excluded ensuring required performance, this information is typically not used for flagging
the presence of RFI. This misattribution could lead to incorrect assumptions about the environment
at given sites and otherwise lead to overlooking mitigation options such as berms and fences which
would potentially resolve the RFI. Although the use of the Automatic Gain Control (AGC) outputs and
histograms of analogue-to-digital converter (ADC) bins for RFI monitoring have been demonstrated
to be very efective and sensitive, their availability is not guaranteed. While any receiver that utilizes
multi-bit sample quantization would be expected to contain an AGC if not a histogram engine, these
measurements are not always output by the receiver/visible to the user. With specific consideration of
GBAS, currently there is no certified dual frequency GBAS ground receiver available, while the available
certified single frequency GBAS receivers do not output either of these metrics. In this work we have
therefore focused on the known available/supported measurements. It is also noted that while additional
RFI suppression measures are desirable (e.g. use of the Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas), their
use in GBAS may introduce calibration errors that will degrade system integrity and availability even if
these measures will reduce the system’s vulnerability against RFI.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Results and Analysis</title>
      <p>As mentioned above, the results presented in this article focus on a sub-set of interference signal
types, namely single linear, single exponential, and linear in combination with exponential chirp
simultaneously. In the case of a single signal, the identified parameter set space is covered for the
considered signal type. The dual signal case covered in this article is represented by the combination of
a variable exponential chirp signal, meaning that for this signal type in each test a diferent sub-set of
parameters is used, while the modulation parameter set for the linear chirp signal is kept the same at
200 kHz repeat rate and 20 MHz bandwidth. The power level of both signals is varied with constant
relative ofset. Since the primary interest of this study is the relative impact of the various jamming
signal modulations over their parameter space, the results are presented to emphasize trends and not the
absolute performance. High level and expected results include the observations that diferent receivers
respond diferently to the generated RFI types and regions of the parameter space. Due to reasonably
expected diferences in the C/N0 estimators and the tracking loop designs and parameters implemented
in the receivers, their responses to various parameter combinations were notably diferent. In GBAS,
this factor is taken into account by characterizing the performance of a specific certified receiver model
when designing fault monitoring algorithms. One observation of note is that the impact of certain RFI
modulation and parameter combinations result in diferentially observable efects between the C/N0
degradation and the carrier phase uncertainty amplification. This is illustrated in Figures 4 and 5in the
case of a single linear chirp signal where the NovAtel OEM7 receiver reports a near random but low
loss of signal power for all RFI parameters for both GPS L1 C/A and Galileo E1 signals, but high noise in
the carrier phase measurements in response to lower sweep bandwidths and lower repeat rates for GPS
L1 C/A, while Galileo E1 is sensitive to bandwidth, but insensitive to the repeat rate. This scenario has
the interference signal power level injected which raises the received total power in band by 1 dB. This
is a very low power RFI signal, so the observation is of note in that even a very weak RFI signal causes
both observable degradation as well as noticeable diferential observable behavior. The same behavior
trend has been observed when higher linear chirp signal power was considered though with a more
frequent and longer lasting loss of observables starting with frequent cycle slipping and progressing to
complete loss of lock.</p>
      <p>The same general observation holds when considering the exponential chirp signal as it impacts
the GPS L5 tracking by the same receiver. Figure 6 shows the C/N0 degradation and the carrier phase
measurement uncertainty observed in a scenario with a higher level of in band power (7 dB). Here
the C/N0 degradation is sensitive to only the bandwidth of the exponential chirp, while carrier phase
uncertainty is particularly sensitive to only a small region of the bandwidth and the repeat rate parameter
space. While it is believed that the enhanced sensitivity of the L5 signal tracking to certain repeat
rates of the exponential chirp RFI is related to the symbol rate of the signal, the same cannot be said
for the L1 and E1 signal responses to the same RFI type. As shown in Figure 7 illustrating the results
captured by the Septentrio mosaic-T receiver from the combined simultaneous linear and exponential
chirp signals, the C/N0 loss and the carrier phase noise responses of the L1 and E1 signals match in
their trends over the parameter space and the peak disruptions correspond to the parameter set where
the quasi-constant frequency portion of the exponential sweep overlays a modulation main lobe. These
sensitivities manifest regardless of the presence of the simultaneous linear chirp signal, meaning they are
the function of the exponential chirp and not the combination of the two signal types. The same general
observation holds when considering the exponential chirp signal as it impacts the GPS L5 tracking by
the same receiver. Figure 6 shows the C/N0 degradation and the carrier phase measurement uncertainty
observed in a scenario with a higher level of in band power (7 dB). Here the C/N0 degradation is sensitive
to only the bandwidth of the exponential chirp, while carrier phase uncertainty is particularly sensitive
to only a small region of the bandwidth and the repeat rate parameter space. While it is believed that
the enhanced sensitivity of the L5 signal tracking to certain repeat rates of the exponential chirp RFI is
related to the symbol rate of the signal, the same cannot be said for the L1 and E1 signal responses to
the same RFI type. As shown in Figure 8 illustrating the results captured by the Septentrio mosaic-T
receiver from the combined simultaneous linear and exponential chirp signals, the C/N0 loss and the
carrier phase noise responses of the L1 and E1 signals match in their trends over the parameter space
and the peak disruptions correspond to the parameter set where the quasi-constant frequency portion
of the exponential sweep overlays a modulation main lobe. These sensitivities manifest regardless of
the presence of the simultaneous linear chirp signal, meaning they are the function of the exponential
chirp and not the combination of the two signal types.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>6. Conclusions</title>
      <p>
        Based on the analyzed results presented in this article, initial recommendations for the DFMC GBAS
monitoring scheme based on observables available within GBAS implementations include the need to
monitor for the impacts of RFI separately on each individual signal modulation even in cases where those
modulations are spectrally overlapped as indications are that subtle interactions of signal parameters
and tracking strategies can lead to substantial diferences in impact. Further, it is believed that the use of
existing monitors to isolate the RFI impact would imply further work due to the lack of uniformity in the
impact over the parameter space on the observables generated. This variable impact leads to triggering
of diferent monitors for diferent RFI modulations and varied parameters within a modulation. For
this reason, monitoring of RFI directly via automatic gain control feedback or other novel monitoring
is desirable though acknowledged to require new outputs be made available. While the authors still
believe that the exponential chirp signal is tuned to defeat certain types of RFI mitigations as previously
discussed in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ], in the context of this study where all receiver level RFI mitigations are disabled we can
observe that the combination of linear and exponential chirps has no additive efects on the receivers
beyond the impacts of the individual RFI signals. Comparing the impacts of the two signal types
individually, the exponential chirp signal achieves higher phase stability impacts at lower relative power
levels for the L1 and E1 signals.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>7. Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>The authors would like to thank the European Space Agency (NAVISP program) for funding the
development of the ARFIDAAS system used for live data capture, as well as the Norwegian Council of
Research (project number 344275) and HEU/EUSPA EDGAR project (project number 101130407) for
funding the in-lab simulation environment development and data analysis.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>Declaration on Generative AI</title>
      <p>The author(s) have not employed any Generative AI tools.</p>
    </sec>
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