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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>The Journal of Politics (2024).
doi:10.1086/730737.
[32] Y. Krak</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1007/978-3-031-21101-0_24</article-id>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Detection of Web Propaganda Patterns by Transformer Neural Networks: Improving Efficiency via Dataset Balancing</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Khmelnytskyi National University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>11, Instytuts'ka str., Khmelnytskyi, 29016</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2025</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>3496</volume>
      <fpage>0000</fpage>
      <lpage>0001</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>In the paper, a proposed approach for improving efficiency of web propaganda patterns detection by transformer neural networks is presented. Approach consists of sequential use of three developed methods: method for dataset balancing, method for fine-tuning individual binary neural network models and method for detecting web propaganda patterns. Compared to existing analogues, the use of proposed approach allowed achieving an efficiency increase of 0.1 by F1 metric when detecting propaganda patterns in web texts using transformer neural networks due to dataset balancing optimization. Analyzing the impact of parameter that determines proportion of texts without web propaganda patterns allows assessing how the models ability to distinguish propaganda patterns from neutral texts and texts with other propaganda patterns. This allows finding the optimal ratio of dataset classes to increase the overall effectiveness for detecting web propaganda patterns. Conducted research has established that the highest results were achieved when forming the training dataset with a percentage of texts without patterns of 30% using the RoBERTa neural network, and was achieved 0.725 by F1 metric. Proposed approach ensures the determination of the optimal ratio between text sets with propaganda patterns and neutral text set, which improving the generalization ability of models and reduce their bias.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;web propaganda patterns</kwd>
        <kwd>dataset balancing</kwd>
        <kwd>BERT</kwd>
        <kwd>RoBERTa</kwd>
        <kwd>NLP</kwd>
        <kwd>transformer neural network 1</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        In the modern information environment, propaganda content plays a significant role in shaping
public opinion, political views, and social behavior [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. Social networks have become a key space for
disseminating information, but at the same time they are also a tool for manipulative influence [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ].
Algorithmic content distribution, personalized news feeds, and automated recommendation systems
contribute to the rapid spread of manipulative messages, which makes it difficult to detect web
propaganda patterns using traditional methods [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3 ref4">3, 4</xref>
        ]. Since manipulative content can have subtle
linguistic markers and adapt to the context [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ], its identification requires the use of context-oriented
language models, in particular transformers [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]. Significant progress in the field of automatic text
analysis has made it possible to use neural networks to detect manipulations, but the accuracy of
such models largely depends on the training sample. The balance of the sample affects the model's
ability to recognize manipulative patterns and distinguish them from neutral or unintentional
influence [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        The research is closely related to the UN Sustainable Development Goals, as it contributes to the
formation of quality education (SDG No. 4) through the development of media literacy and critical
thinking [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]. This allows society to more effectively recognize manipulative content and make
informed decisions, which is consistent with the principles of ensuring access to reliable
information. In addition, methods for detecting web propaganda patterns in text messages play an
important role in maintaining peace, justice and strengthening democratic institutions
(SDG No. 16) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref9">9, 10</xref>
        ]. They help combat disinformation, increase the level of transparency of
governance and contribute to reducing the impact of manipulation in society, which is a key factor
in the sustainable development of the information space [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>The aim of paper is to improve the efficiency of detecting propaganda patterns in web texts
using transformative neural networks by optimizing the dataset balancing. Research is aimed at
reducing the impact of class imbalance, increasing the accuracy of classification and improving the
generalization ability of model.</p>
      <p>The main paper contribution is created methodology that includes method for fine-tuning
individual binary neural network models to detect propaganda patterns, method for balancing the
dataset, and method for detecting web propaganda patterns. The paper also provides an analysis of
the impact of the balance of the training sample on the effectiveness of models for detecting
manipulative patterns in social media. An experimental study of the performance of the BERT and
RoBERTa transformative language models depending on the distribution of training examples
between classes was conducted. The results obtained contribute to a deeper understanding of the
role of the training sample in improving algorithms for detecting manipulative texts and can be
used to increase the reliability of automated systems for analyzing the information space.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Related Works</title>
      <p>The issue of automated detection of web propaganda patterns in social media has widely attracted
the attention of researchers.</p>
      <p>
        The research [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ] considers a multimodal and multilingual dataset of propaganda patterns PPN
(Propagandist Pseudo-News), which contains news texts collected from web resources that expert
organizations have classified as containing manipulation patterns. The study analyzes various NLP
approaches that allow identifying the characteristic features that annotators have highlighted and
comparing them with the results of automated classification. For this purpose, the following
methods are used: VAGO to determine the level of subjectivity and vagueness of statements, TF-IDF
as a basic analysis tool, as well as four classification algorithms – two RoBERTa models, CATS,
which focuses on syntactic features, and XGBoost, which combines semantic and syntactic features.
      </p>
      <p>
        In [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ] two architectures for classifying propaganda patterns were analyzed: one involved the
use of data augmentation (EDA) methods, and the other worked without them. The models using
EDA showed a 3% improvement in F1-measure, reaching 57.57% on the test set. A significant
increase in accuracy was observed for manipulation patterns such as "Appeal_to_fear-prejudice",
"Exaggeration, Minimisation" and "Repetition", while for individual techniques, in particular
"Doubt" and "Flag-Waving", a slight decrease in results was noted. "Causal_Oversimplification" and
"Thought-terminating_Cliches" showed the most noticeable improvement. Determination of
optimal parameters for classification was carried out by analyzing the number of epochs, the length
of text fragments and the learning rate. This allowed the authors to achieve an F1-measure of 44% in
the sentiment detection task and 57% in the classification of manipulation patterns.
      </p>
      <p>
        The authors of [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ] used the RoBERTa language model to detect propaganda patterns in news
articles. The model was evaluated on the SemEval-2020 Task 11 reference dataset, which confirmed
its effectiveness in recognizing complex manipulation patterns in text. Compared to baseline model,
RoBERTa achieved an F1-measure of 60.2%, demonstrating its higher accuracy.
      </p>
      <p>
        In [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ] the multilingual set of propaganda patterns was created by translating the PTC and
WANLP corpora, supplemented with SemEval23 data. Three models were proposed:
MultiPropBaseline (an ensemble of GPT-2, mBART and XLM-RoBERTa), MultiProp-ML (meta-learning for
languages with minimal data) and MultiProp-Chunk (processing long texts exceeding the token
limit). As a result of the experiments, the F1 score for the Polish language was 62.5%.
      </p>
      <p>
        The study [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ] indicates the ambiguity in the ability of LLMs to recognize propaganda patterns
in news texts. Experiments conducted on the annotated SemEval2020 Task 11 corpora demonstrated
maximum Recall values of 64.53% and Precision of 81.82%. At the same time, none of the models
was able to exceed the baseline F1 score, which was approximately 50%. The highest achieved F1
score was only 20%, which is significantly inferior to the baseline and indicates the limitations of
generative models in ensuring reproducibility.
      </p>
      <p>
        In [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ] emphasize that most previous studies focused on linguistic features to detect
manipulation patterns in texts. Therefore, authors propose the method based on meta-learning that
allows for automatic identification of semantic manipulation patterns at sentence level in news
materials. For this, multi-task learning is used, aimed at detecting semantic contradictions. Proposed
approach combines CRF, BiLSTM and pre-trained language models, which provides an F1-measure
of 61% for multilingual data and 68.8% for monolingual.
      </p>
      <p>
        The authors of [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
        ] evaluate the possibility of using large language models (LLMs), in particular
OpenAI GPT-3.5-turbo, to detect propaganda in news articles. The analysis is based on 18
propaganda techniques identified by Martino et al., and covers materials from Russia Today and the
SemEval-2020 Task 11 corpus. Using a specially designed prompt, the model determines the
presence of propaganda techniques and classifies articles. Qualitative analysis of results allows us to
assess effectiveness of LLMs in this task and optimal prompt parameters.
      </p>
      <p>
        The application of machine learning models to identify manipulation patterns in text content is
considered in the study [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">19</xref>
        ]. Among the analyzed approaches, the Stacking Classifier, which uses
feature processing methods, in particular Word2Vec and TF-IDF, demonstrates high adaptability
and accuracy. Comparative analysis shows that this model outperforms others, such as Naive Bayes,
SVM, KNN, Logistic Regression and Random Forest. The implementation of feature engineering
significantly improves the results, which is confirmed by the increase in Accuracy, Precision and
F1measure.
      </p>
      <p>
        The study [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">20</xref>
        ] considers the application of machine learning methods to detect types of
propaganda in the text content of social networks. The authors used data obtained through the
social network API to evaluate the effectiveness of various models. The results of the study showed
that neural networks, in particular the LSTM architecture, have high accuracy in this task, reaching
77.15%. It is noted that the further implementation of more modern models, such as BERT, can
contribute to even better results in future studies.
      </p>
      <p>Paper [21] proposes an ensemble model for identifying manipulation patterns in texts obtained
from memes. The authors consider the use of modern pre-trained language models, as well as
optimization methods, in particular data augmentation and combining multiple models. The model
evaluation was carried out on the SemEval-2021 Task 6 dataset, and the results showed that
proposed approach allows achieving an F1-micro measure of 60.4% on the test set.</p>
      <p>Authors of [22] used a two-stage process to determine the optimal threshold for classifying
manipulation patterns to assess the effectiveness of the model. First, experiments were conducted
with macrothresholds in the range from 0.1 to 0.9, the threshold with the highest F1 score was
selected, after which microthresholds were added for further optimization. The XLM-RoBERTa
models were trained using the Adam optimizer, and early termination was used to prevent
overtraining. The Accuracy, Precision, Recall, and F1-measure metrics were used to assess
performance at each stage.</p>
      <p>From above reviews of scientific publications, it is clear that the issue of balancing datasets in
existing methodologies was considered only from the perspective of creating synthetic samples, and
the issue of the influence of the number of texts without manifestations of propaganda patterns was
not considered at all. Therefore, our study is relevant and aims to eliminate this drawback by
analyzing the influence of the number of texts without propaganda patterns on the effectiveness of
transformer models.</p>
      <p>The paper aims to determine the optimal ratio between texts with propaganda patterns and
neutral texts, which will improve the generalizability of the models and reduce their bias.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Methodology</title>
      <p>To solve the problem of detecting web propaganda patterns, it is first necessary to fine-tune the
neural networks to detect each of the web propaganda patterns. Accordingly, this can be formalized
as the problem of training a set of individual binary neural network models NN, where each model
nni corresponds to a certain propaganda pattern pi from the set of propaganda patterns P:</p>
      <p>P={ p1 , p2 , … , pk }, (1)
where pi – i-th propaganda pattern, k – number of unique propaganda patterns, i=1..k. Within
the scope of the study, k=10, and the set P acquires the following elements:
 p1=”Loaded Language”;
 p2=”Glittering Generalities”;
 p3 =”Euphoria”;
 p4=”Appeal to Fear”;
 p5=”FUD”;
 p6=”Bandwagon”;
 p7=”Thought-Terminating Cliche”;
 p8=”Whataboutism”;
 p9=”Cherry Picking”;
 p10=”Straw Man”.</p>
      <p>This set of propaganda patterns is linked to the existing data source presented within the
framework of UNLP 2025 [23], dedicated to the competition for detecting manipulative propaganda
patterns in the Ukrainian-language media space [24].</p>
      <p>Accordingly, {NN} will take the form:</p>
      <p>NN ={nn1 , nn2 , … , nnk }, (2)
where nni – i-th neural network for i-th propaganda pattern.</p>
      <p>Approach for detection of web propaganda patterns by transformer neural networks consists of
sequential use of three developed methods: method for dataset balancing, method for fine-tuning
individual binary neural network models and method for detecting web propaganda patterns
(Figure 1).</p>
      <p>Proposed approach ensures the determination of the optimal ratio between text sets with
propaganda patterns and neutral text set, which improving the generalization ability of models and
reduce their bias. This improves the efficiency of detecting propaganda patterns in web texts using
transformer neural networks through optimizing the dataset balancing.</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>3.1. Method for Dataset Balancing</title>
        <p>Method for dataset balancing is designed to transform the general set of data in the input dataset
into 2 datasets (training dataset and validation dataset), which will allow to increase the accuracy of
detecting propaganda patterns in web texts. Scheme of training dataset prepare is shown in Figure
2.</p>
        <p>Percent of texts without manipulation patterns m – the studied parameter for analyzing the
influence of the balance of the training sample on the effectiveness of models for detecting
manipulative propaganda patterns in social media. This parameter has an impact on the formation
of the training dataset.</p>
        <p>In addition to the training dataset, a validation dataset is constructed, which consists equally of
all types of web propaganda patterns and texts without propaganda. This allows determining
whether the model does not confuse patterns with each other and whether it is able to detect them
independently of each other, which is critically important for the multi-label classification problem.
Accordingly, the result of the method of dataset balancing will be 2 datasets: training dataset and
validation dataset. Schematically, their composition is shown in Figure 3.</p>
        <p>Document</p>
        <p>count</p>
        <p>It is worth noting that the base dataset is annotated at the fragment level, and the training
dataset and validation dataset contain not the full text, but fragments (sentences that are marked as
propaganda patterns).</p>
        <p>The dataset contains annotated data at the fragment level that determine the presence of
manipulative influence patterns from the set P. A typical text of the dataset from the category
"propaganda patterns" can have either one or several labels. A typical text of the dataset from the
category "without propaganda patterns" does not contain any web propaganda patterns from the set
P. According to the marked data, the number of documents corresponding to the patterns p1 – p10
has the distribution shown in Table 1.</p>
        <p>This approach to dataset generation allows us to assess the impact of sample balancing on the
quality of propaganda pattern detection, as well as to avoid the dominance of the most common
classes in the training set [25]. Using separate binary models for each pattern allows us to model
them independently, which is important in problems with class intersection, when one text may
contain several types of manipulation. This allows us to investigate how each pattern is separated
within the data corpus and how it is affected by the imbalance of the training sample.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>3.2. Method for Fine-Tuning Individual Binary Neural Network Model for</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-3">
        <title>Propaganda Patterns Detection</title>
        <p>As can be seen from Table 1, the data have an uneven distribution, so using a single multi-class
neural network model will not allow to obtain high results. A multi-class model tends to dominate
widely represented classes, which leads to a decrease in accuracy for poorly represented classes. As
a result, the model may simply ignore small categories, which will lead to a significant imbalance in
predictions. In addition, multi-class classification assumes that the text belongs to only one class
[26], which contradicts the nature of the task, where 1 text can have several labels corresponding to
certain web propaganda patterns. Accordingly, using separate binary models for each pi pattern
allows to train each model separately without the influence of the imbalance of other classes to take
into account texts with several patterns, since each model from NN set works independently and
does not limit the choice to only one class.</p>
        <p>To investigate the impact of the balance of the training sample on the detection of web
propaganda patterns using a set of individual binary neural network models NN, it is necessary to
first present a method for obtaining a typical individual binary neural network model nni for
detecting propaganda pattern pi, the scheme of which is shown in Figure 4.</p>
        <p>The input data of the method are prepared datasets for training and validation and
pre-trained model nn. On Step 1, Fine-Tuning of typical nni on training DataSet, formed by method
of datasets balancing, is performed. Fine-Tuning within the framework of the study will be carried
out for individual binary neural network model BERT [27] and RoBERTa [28] with «HuggingFace»
library [29].</p>
        <p>Accordingly, on Step 2, evaluation of individual binary neural network model nni is performed,
for evaluations both training dataset and validation dataset, which were formed by method of
datasets balancing, will be used. Evaluation of models will be carried out by metrics Accuracy,
Precision, Recall and F1. On Step 3, save of validated nni is performed. Accordingly, output data is
fine-tuned model nni with metrics.</p>
        <p>As pre-trained model nn, the use of BERT-like architectures is proposed, since these models can
be applied to the analysis of Ukrainian texts even in the absence of large volumes of marked-up data
[30, 31]. This feature is associated with pre-training on large text corpora, which allows these
models to form universal language representations that can be refined on specific datasets to detect
propaganda patterns. Fine-tuning allows you to adapt the model to the specifics of manipulative
discourse, in particular in the Ukrainian language environment, which contains both unique
stylistic and syntactic features.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-4">
        <title>3.3. Method for Web Propaganda Patterns Detection</title>
        <p>After forming datasets and training a set of individual binary neural network models NN, detection
of web propaganda patterns occurs. Scheme of method of web propaganda patterns detection by
transformer neural networks is shown in Figure 5.</p>
        <p>Input data of the method detection of web propaganda patterns by transformer neural networks
are fine-tuned models NN, web content for analysis and threshold t.</p>
        <p>On Step 1, preprocessing of web content for analysis occurs, which includes of splitting into
sentences, after which tokenization is performed [32, 33]. The result of web content splitting for
analysis will be the representation (3):</p>
        <p>S={s1 , s2 , … , sn }, (3)
where sj – j-th sentence in web content for analysis, n – count of sentence.</p>
        <p>Step 2 performs web content labeling by each of nni . Each sentence sj is evaluated separately by
each of nni, and if the output value of the neural network model nni for sentence j exceeds the given
threshold t –propaganda pattern pi is considered to be manifested in sentence j. Accordingly, each
sentence will be given a subset PPj of the elements of the set P:</p>
        <p>S score=</p>
        <p>PP j⊆ P , PP j={ pi|scorei , j&gt;t }, (4)
where scorei,j – the output value nni of the model for j-th sentence in {S}.</p>
        <p>At Step 3, the formation of output view takes place, which is performed according to rules:
 if there are already manifestations of other propaganda patterns for sentence sj, then such
propaganda patterns are considered manifested in the text, however, the maximum value
max_scorej will be displayed with highlighting:
max¿= max scorei , j , (5)</p>
        <p>pi⊆ PPj
 if there are multiple sentences with the pi propaganda pattern, the overall score of the
manifestation in web content for analysis is calculated as the arithmetic mean:</p>
        <p>1 (6)
¿ SSi∨¿ ∑ scorei , j , SSi={s j∨ pi∈ PP j }¿</p>
        <p>sj⊆ SSi
where SSi, – a set of sentences in which  is found.</p>
        <p>Output data of the proposed method are probabilities of each of propaganda patterns in web
content and highlighted sentences in which identified patterns are most evident [34].</p>
        <p>The proposed in sections 3.1 – 3.2 methods are investigated experimentally in section 4.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Experiment</title>
      <p>In accordance with purpose of research, problem of improving efficiency via dataset balancing
arises, which can be mathematically represented as a problem of maximizing the F1 metric:
m¿=arg max f ( m ) , (7)</p>
      <p>m
where f(m) – the value of the F1 metric of the nni model obtained after fine-tuning on the dataset
with the selected percentage value m.</p>
      <p>The solution of the optimization problem will be carried out experimentally, changing the % of
non-propaganda texts in the Training DataSet from 10% to 70% in steps of 20%.</p>
      <p>For the experimental part, specialized software was created, consisting of 2 modules: a training
module (without a graphical user interface) and a neural network validation module (the application
is shown in Figure 6). The Python language, PyTorch libraries [35], transformers [36], datasets [37]
were used to develop the training module. The PySide6 libraries [38], transformers, PyTorch were
used to develop the validation module.</p>
      <p>Propaganda
patterns
m %
p1
p2
p3
p4
p5
p6
p7
p8
p9
p10</p>
      <p>Target</p>
      <p>Accordingly, the created test software obtained the results shown in Section 5.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Results</title>
      <p>After filling the Training DataSet using the method described in section 3.1, data sets were obtained,
the quantitative distributions of which are given in Table 2.</p>
      <p>The Precision (P), Recall (R), F1 metrics for fine-tuned individual binary neural network models at
different percentage values of the parameter m on the test sample (20% of the Training DataSet,
which did not participate in training) are given in Table 3. The Precision (P), Recall (R), F1 metrics
for fine-tuned individual binary neural network models at different percentage values of the
parameter m on the training sample (80% of the Training DataSet, which participated in training)
are given in Table 4.</p>
      <p>Target
B
E
R
T</p>
      <p>Propagand
a patterns
p1
p2
p3
p4
p5
p6
p7
p8
p9
p10
p1
p2
p3
p4
p5
p6
p7
p8
p9
p10</p>
      <p>The Precision (P), Recall (R), and F1 metrics for fine-tuned individual binary neural network
models at different percentage values of parameter m on validation dataset are given in Table 5.</p>
      <p>Comparisons by the Accuracy metric (average value) for fine-tuned individual binary neural
network models of the BERT and RoBERTa architectures at different percentage values of the
parameter m on the Validation DataSet are shown in Figure 7.</p>
      <p>Comparisons by F1 metric (average value) for fine-tuned individual binary neural network
models of the BERT and RoBERTa architectures at different percentage values of the parameter m
on the Validation DataSet are shown in Figure 8.</p>
      <p>It is also worth providing a table comparing the obtained results with the data of existing studies
(Table 6).</p>
      <p>Therefore, the problem of improving efficiency via dataset balancing, given in the form (7), has a
solution m* = 30. An analysis of the obtained results is given in Section 6.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>6. Discusion</title>
      <p>In the presented results of testing models (Table 3) for detecting manipulative propaganda patterns
on the test sample (20% of the training sample) with different percentages of texts without
manipulations m (10%, 30%, 50%, 70%), one can observe a clear trend towards improving the
performance of models with an increase in the value of the parameter m, i.e. with an increase in the
percentage of texts without propaganda patterns in the training sample. For fine-tuned models
based on BERT, it is seen that Precision, Recall and F1-measure for each category of propaganda
patterns gradually increase from m=10% to m=70%. For example, for the “Loaded Language”
category, the F1-measure increases from 0.498 at m = 10% to about 0.798 at m = 70%, which indicates
a significant improvement in the model’s ability to distinguish target and non-target examples with
an increase in the proportion of text samples without manipulations.</p>
      <p>Comparing the performance of models for different propaganda patterns shows that some
categories, such as “Glittering Generalities” and “Bandwagon”, “Cherry Picking”, have consistently
high F1-measures as m increases, indicating that the characteristic features of these patterns are
easier to separate with balanced training. In contrast, other categories, such as “Straw Man” and
“Thought-Terminating Cliche”, show relatively lower performance, which may be due to greater
variability or subtlety of the linguistic features characterizing these patterns.</p>
      <p>Similar analysis for RoBERTa-based models shows similar trends, with the overall performance
being slightly higher compared to BERT models. This is explained by the more robust pre-training
and optimized architecture of RoBERTa, which allows the model to generalize information better.
The improvement in the evaluation indicators with an increase in the proportion of unmanipulated
text samples highlights the importance of balancing the dataset to overcome the problem of class
imbalance, which, in turn, contributes to more reliable and stable detection of propaganda patterns
by individual binary neural networks. For the BERT neural network, on average, for the F1 metric,
the delta between m = 10% and m = 30% is +0.048, between m = 30% and m = 50%, the delta is 0.063,
and between m = 50% and m = 70%, the delta is 0.091. At the same time, for the RoBERTa neural
network, delta of +0.0632 is observed between m = 10% and m = 30%, a delta of 0.056 is observed
between m = 30% and m = 50%, and delta of 0.082 is observed between m = 50% and m = 70%.</p>
      <p>The analysis of the data from Table 4 indicates the ability of neural network models to
remember, and here, naturally, as in Table 3, there is a tendency for metrics to increase with
increasing parameter m. For the BERT neural network, on average, for the F1 metric, there is a delta
between m = 10% and m = 30% of +0.049, between m = 30% and m = 50%, there is delta of 0.02, and
between m = 50% and m = 70%, there is delta of 0.031. At the same time, for the RoBERTa neural
network, a delta of +0.028 is observed between m = 10% and m = 30%, delta of 0.022 is observed
between m = 30% and m = 50%, and delta of 0.024 is observed between m = 50% and m = 70%.
Accordingly, RoBERTa demonstrates a gradual increase in metrics, which indicates stable
generalization due to the optimized architecture. BERT demonstrates somewhat jumpy increases,
which may be due to the lower flexibility of its architecture in adapting to changes in the
proportion of text samples without propaganda patterns.</p>
      <p>For the RoBERTa neural network, when detecting manipulation patterns “Glittering
Generalities”, “Appeal to Fear”, “FUD”, “Bandwagon”, “Whataboutism”, an F1 value of more than
0.95 is observed. For the BERT neural network, a value above 0.95 is observed only for “FUD”. In
general, the use of different values of the parameter m affects the ability of neural networks to
remember the features of the training set. However, the metrics calculated on the training data
allow us to assess how well the model remembered this data, but do not give a complete picture of
its ability to generalize new information.</p>
      <p>The most relevant estimates of the experiment are given in Table 5, since here the model was
validated on data that did not participate in training, and which contain equally represented
propaganda patterns and texts without such patterns.</p>
      <p>According to Table 5 and Figures 7 and 8, at the parameter m=30% the metrics demonstrate the
highest result, where the average value of the Accuracy metric is 0.733 for the RoBERTa neural
network, and 0.704 for the BERT architecture. The F1 metric for RoBERTa is 0.725, and for the BERT
architecture – 0.693. This suggests that the initial addition of data allows to increase the metrics, but
then the effect is smoothed out or even worsened due to overloading with less useful information,
such as texts without propaganda patterns. Accordingly, while neural networks show a tendency to
better distinguish propaganda patterns at higher values of m during training, testing on a balanced
validation set refutes the hypothesis that the higher the resolution of the training data, the better
the generalization ability of the neural network model. It is possible that as the proportion of m
increases, the models are overtrained due to the lack of unique values inherent in each of the web
propaganda patterns. The conclusion that the m*=30 found is also confirmed by the minimum mean
deviation between the test data for m=30 (Table 3 and Table 5) for both the BERT architecture
neural network (0.05) and RoBERTa (0.06).</p>
      <p>
        The comparison with analogues is carried out in Table 6, and for the purity of the comparison of
the developed approach and existing analogues, the F1 value was taken specifically on the validation
data. Accordingly, the highest F1 indicator for the RoBERTa architecture at m=30% is 0.725, which is
0.1 higher than the analogue described in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ]. Therefore, the task of improving the efficiency of
detecting propaganda patterns in web texts using transformative neural networks through
optimizing the balancing of the dataset has been fully implemented and experimentally proven.
      </p>
      <p>However, the proposed approach has limitations. In this study, an approach at the sentence level
was used. This may have an impact on the quality of detecting propaganda patterns, which may
work at the level of paragraphs or even entire texts, rather than individual sentences. Also, a single
sentence may be neutral in itself, but in the context of propaganda text its meaning changes. These
issues will be addressed in further research. There are also limitations at the level of the data source.
The manual labeling used in the dataset may contain subjective judgments, which affects the
training of the model.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Conclusions</title>
      <p>In the paper, a proposed approach for improving efficiency of web propaganda patterns detection by
transformer neural networks is presented. Approach consists of sequential use of three developed
methods: method for dataset balancing, method for fine-tuning individual binary neural network
models and method for detecting web propaganda patterns. Compared to existing analogues, the
use of proposed approach allowed achieving an efficiency increase of 0.1 by F 1 metric when
detecting propaganda patterns in web texts using transformer neural networks due to dataset
balancing optimization.</p>
      <p>In addition to the training dataset, consisting of texts with target propaganda pattern in the
target category, as well as texts without any propaganda patterns and texts with other propaganda
patterns, without target, a validation dataset was built, which consists equally of all types of web
propaganda patterns and texts without propaganda. This allows us to determine whether the model
does not confuse patterns with each other and is able to detect them independently of each other,
which is critically important for the patterns detection task.</p>
      <p>An analysis of the impact of the balance of the training sample on the effectiveness of
propaganda pattern detection models in social media was performed, which showed that of the
considered options for forming the training dataset with different percentages of texts without
manipulations (10%, 30%, 50% and 70%), the highest results were achieved at 30% using the RoBERTa
neural network, and are 0.725 according to the F1 metric. The results obtained contribute to a deeper
understanding of the role of training sample balancing in improving propaganda pattern detection
algorithms and can be used to increase the reliability of automated information space analysis
systems.</p>
      <p>Building a validation dataset that contains an equal number of texts with all types of propaganda
patterns, as well as neutral texts, provides a fair assessment of the performance of the models. This
prevents bias towards the most represented classes and allows for more accurate performance
metrics for each individual pattern. In addition, this approach allows for the identification of
potential relationships between different types of manipulation, since texts can contain multiple
patterns at the same time.</p>
      <p>Analyzing the impact of parameter that determines proportion of texts without web propaganda
patterns allows assessing how the models ability to distinguish propaganda patterns from neutral
texts and texts with other propaganda patterns. This allows finding the optimal ratio of dataset
classes to increase the overall effectiveness for detecting web propaganda patterns.</p>
      <p>The proposed approach has the limitation of analyzing at the sentence level, which may not take
into account the broader context of propaganda patterns at the paragraph or whole text level. In
addition, the use of manual data labeling may contain subjective judgments, which affects the
training of the model.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>Acknowledgements</title>
      <p>This study was conducted using dataset made available by UNLP 2025 Shared Task initiative
(GitHub repository) [24]. Authors are grateful to organizers and contributors for compiling and
sharing this resource, which supports ongoing research in propaganda detection techniques.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>Declaration on Generative AI</title>
      <p>During the preparation of this work, the authors used Grammarly in order to: Grammar and
spelling check. After using this tool, the authors reviewed and edited the content as needed and take
full responsibility for the publication’s content.</p>
    </sec>
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