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  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>International Journal of Intelligent
Systems and Applications 9 (2017) 46-58. doi:10.5815/ijisa.2017.12.05.
[16] X. Yuan</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.5815/ijisa.2017.12.05</article-id>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Secure trafic engineering routing framework under normalized link-blocking constraints in softwarized networks</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Oleksandr Lemeshko</string-name>
          <email>oleksandr.lemeshko@nure.ua</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Oleksandra Yeremenko</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Anatoliy Persikov</string-name>
          <email>anatolii.persikov@nure.ua</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Kharkiv National University of Radio Electronics</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Nauky Ave, 14, Kharkiv, 61166</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2021</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>831</volume>
      <issue>02</issue>
      <fpage>46</fpage>
      <lpage>58</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>The paper presents a Secure Trafic Engineering Routing Framework for softwarized networks, emphasizing normalized link-blocking constraints to enhance network security. The proposed framework builds on a flow-based secure routing model with load balancing, incorporating key Trafic Engineering principles while accounting for network security metrics. Secure routing with load balancing is formulated as a linear programming optimization problem, which ensures predictable computational complexity and low processing demands on routing devices, including routers and controllers. A novel aspect of this framework is its adaptation of the exponential linkblocking model using normalized conditions, which prevents secure links from unnecessary blocking and optimizes link resource use. Experimental results demonstrate the model's responsiveness to network topology, lfow characteristics, link bandwidth, utilization level, and link compromise probabilities, redistributing trafic to more secure paths and reducing utilization of vulnerable links. Comparative analyses show that the NormSecTE model, an advanced secure TE variant, balances Quality of Service and security metrics. While NormSecTE marginally increases end-to-end delay, it significantly lowers packet compromise probability relative to the SecTE model, achieving an efective trade-of between security and QoS in softwarized network environments.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;Secure routing</kwd>
        <kwd>Link compromise</kwd>
        <kwd>Normalized link blocking</kwd>
        <kwd>Trafic Engineering</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        The growing complexity of modern networks necessitates innovative approaches to managing both
Quality of Service (QoS) and security [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref2 ref3">1, 2, 3</xref>
        ]. Software-defined networks (SDNs) enable flexible
trafic management, integrating QoS and security requirements [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ]. However, this flexibility presents
challenges for routing protocols, which must adaptively meet diverse QoS and security demands to
determine optimal trafic routes. Efective adaptability to network changes is essential in complex
environments, enabling fast failure recovery and maintaining high QoS and security levels within an
integrated trafic management framework [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3 ref4">3, 4</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        The use of mathematical tools is essential for developing optimized routing solutions that address load
balancing and security challenges, forming the basis for new strategies suited to modern, programmable
networks. Traditional IP routing protocols, such as RIP and OSPF, rely on graph models and shortest path
algorithms, which, while efective with limited computing power, do not consider flow characteristics
or security [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5 ref6 ref7">5, 6, 7</xref>
        ]. Advances in softwarized network architecture now allow for more sophisticated
routing models that handle multi-flow trafic and optimize both QoS and security, prompting recent
research to focus on QoS methods incorporating security indicators [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref11 ref12 ref8 ref9">8, 9, 10, 11, 12</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        A promising direction in secure routing is the application of Trafic Engineering (TE) principles to
balance network resource usage, avoiding overload on individual network segments and preventing
QoS degradation [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13 ref14">13, 14, 15</xref>
        ]. Several solutions in this area adapt load balancing to include security
considerations [16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. The secure TE routing model proposed for the developed framework
in this paper advances solutions [21, 22, 23, 24, 25] by focusing on load balancing and trafic blocking
under potential network link compromises.
      </p>
      <p>This paper addresses a critical scientific and applied problem in developing a secure Trafic
Engineering routing framework under normalized link-blocking constraints in softwarized networks. The
proposed framework aims to optimize network performance by incorporating enhanced load balancing
conditions and a normalized model for blocking compromised communication links, thereby increasing
the overall levels of both QoS and security.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Secure trafic engineering routing framework under normalized link-blocking constraints</title>
      <p>
        Building on the research results of various secure Trafic Engineering routing models in communication
networks [21, 22, 23, 24, 25] and an analysis of current technological solutions [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13 ref14 ref2">2, 13, 14</xref>
        ], this paper
proposes recommendations for the structural and functional design of advanced SDN solutions. Fig. 1
illustrates a modular representation of the secure Trafic Engineering routing framework architecture,
designed with normalized link-blocking constraints to enhance QoS and network security in softwarized
networks. This framework is based on the practical implementation of the NormSecTE model [26].
      </p>
      <p>The generalized modular architecture depicted in Figure 1 operates across three functional levels,
each responsible for distinct tasks:
• the data plane (network infrastructure);
• the control plane (represented by the controller);
• the application plane (implemented as the NormSecTE Application).</p>
      <p>Within the controller architecture, data from modules monitoring network topology, communication
link bandwidth, and security metrics, as well as trafic characteristics, are transmitted to the NormSecTE
Application. This information enables the application to formulate routing solutions according to the
secure Trafic Engineering routing model [26].</p>
      <p>The data collected from monitoring modules is essential for establishing conditions to ensure flow
conservation and prevent link overload. The processed results are subsequently transmitted to a module
responsible for minimizing the upper bound of network link utilization. Through optimized secure
routing processes with load balancing, routing solutions are calculated and subsequently translated
into flow tables by the controller, which then distributes them to the network‘s forwarding elements
(Figure 1).</p>
      <p>Next, this paper presents the rationale for selecting the exponential normalized link-blocking model
for use within a secure Trafic Engineering routing framework. The model’s performance is assessed
through simulation and compared with existing models.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Secure TE routing model under exponential normalized link-blocking constraints</title>
      <p>This section explains the basics of the secure TE routing model under exponential normalized
linkblocking constraints and Table 1 contains a model notation summary.</p>
      <p>The multipath routing constraints have a form [21]:
(5)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(6)
 , =
∑︀∈</p>
      <p>, .
{︃0, if , = max;</p>
      <p>1, if , = min,</p>
      <p>The function , (, ) models link blocking during secure TE routing, indicating the portion of link
capacity used or blocked due to increased compromise probability.</p>
      <p>We proposed the modifications of the conditions [ 26] when compromise scenarios and link probability
bounds are known:</p>
      <p>The flow conservation conditions ensuring the route connectivity [21, 26]:</p>
      <p>0 ≤  , ≤ 1.
⎧∑︀:,∈ , −
⎪
⎪
⎨∑︀:,∈ , −
⎪⎪⎩∑︀:,∈ , −
∑︀:,∈ , = 0,  ∈ ,  ̸= , ;
∑︀:,∈ , = 1,  ∈ ,  = ;
∑︀:,∈ , = −1,  ∈ ,   = .</p>
      <p>The next formula estimates link utilization [26]:
The enhanced load balancing conditions are the following [21, 26]:
22
Routing variables (portion of a flow’s intensity on a specific link , ∈ )</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>Compromise probability of the most secure link</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>Maximum allowable compromise probability beyond which the link is blocked</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-3">
        <title>End-to-end probability of packet compromise for the th flow</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-4">
        <title>Average end-to-end delay of packets in the th flow</title>
        <p>0 ≤  min ≤  , ≤  max ≤ 1.</p>
        <p>In a secure TE routing model, we aim to minimize this boundary value  [26, 27]:
In a further study of secure TE routing using the model (1)-(8), we will focus on the exponential
min .
,
︂(
, (, ) = exp −
, −  min )︂
max −  min
.</p>
        <p>(7)
(8)
(9)
link-blocking model:
max = 1.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Numerical research</title>
      <p>Figure 2 illustrates the dependencies of , (, ) (9) for  ≥ 1
and the values of min = 0.3 and
This study analyzed and compared four TE routing models:
• the Sec model, which identifies the most secure route for packet transmission;
• the TE model, which does not consider network security parameters [27];
• the SecTE model, which incorporates network security parameters across the full range of link
compromise probabilities (min = 0 and max = 1) [21, 22];
• the NormSecTE model, an enhanced version of the SecTE model that incorporates normalized
network security parameters (Figure 2), represented by the model (1)–(9) (min = 0.3 and
max = 1).</p>
      <p>Further research enabled a comparison of the efectiveness of the proposed secure TE routing model
with existing models based on three key indicators: the upper bound of network link utilization  max
[21]; the end-to-end packet compromise probability for the th flow

the average end-to-end packet delay of the th flow  2 [21, 23].</p>
      <p>To illustrate the approach to secure TE routing, we consider the network structure shown in Figure 3.
This model simulates the routing of a single packet flow, where packets are transmitted from the first
2 across all utilized paths; and
router to the fifth. Consequently, the flow number is omitted in the analysis below. Table 2 lists the
bandwidths of the communication links and their respective compromise probabilities. Based on the
network structure (Figure 3) and link characteristics, Table 3 displays the available routes between the
source 1 and destination 5 routers, along with their compromise probabilities.</p>
      <p>Thus, based on the data in Table 2, the dependencies shown in Figure 2 apply to the example under
study. Table 4 presents the calculation results for the TE routing models under analysis at a rate of
 = 250 packets per second and  = 7, simulating the routing of a single packet flow. For the Sec
model, all packets were transmitted via the first route, as it was the most secure option among the
available paths.</p>
      <p>Based on the network structure (Figure 3 and Table 2), the flow rate of specific network links
determines the packet flow rate on each route: link 2,5 afects the first route (  1), link 1,3 afects the
second route ( 2), link 2,3 afects the third route ( 3), and link 2,4 afects the fourth route ( 4).</p>
      <p>Table 5 presents the calculated performance metrics for each routing model, highlighting
loadbalancing eficiency and aspects related to network security and quality of service. A comparative
analysis is provided for  = 7, aligning with the results shown in Table 5 for packet flow rates of
 = 250 pps and  = 200 pps.</p>
      <p>The comparative analysis (Table 5) shows that the Sec model prioritizes the most secure paths, limited
by available bandwidth. The TE routing model focuses on improving QoS metrics (Figure 4), such as
average end-to-end delay. In contrast, the SecTE (Figure 5) and NormSecTE (Figure 6) models balance
both QoS and security (Table 5). Under the exponential link blocking model (9), link blocking intensifies
as  increases (Figure 2), leading the SecTE and NormSecTE models to prioritize security. Conversely,
as  decreases, QoS considerations gain importance in load balancing. The NormSecTE model achieved
a higher level of network security than the SecTE or TE models, although with a slight trade-of in QoS.</p>
      <p>The Sec model achieved the highest network security level (
2 = 0.58), while the TE model
increased packet compromise probability by 34%. The SecTE and NormSecTE models ofered intermediate
security, increasing packet compromise probability by 15.83% and 13.4%, respectively. Although the TE
model minimized average end-to-end delay (6.1 ms and 5.8 ms), the Sec model significantly increased it
by 1.96 to 3.5 times. The SecTE and NormSecTE models resulted in moderate delay increases of 13.21%
to 20.41% and 21.75% to 39.57%, respectively.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Discussion</title>
      <p>The findings of this study highlight the critical role of integrating security considerations into Trafic
Engineering routing models to enhance network resilience and performance. The proposed model</p>
      <sec id="sec-5-1">
        <title>Model</title>
        <p>addresses trafic load balancing and secure routing challenges by extending the TE framework to
incorporate network security parameters. This novel approach models secure routing under normalized
link-blocking constraints, formulating an optimization problem as linear programming to ensure
computational predictability and low demands on network devices. A key enhancement lies in modifying
the exponential link-blocking model (9) to avoid ineficient resource use by preventing unnecessary
blocking of secure links. Testing confirmed the model’s eficacy in adapting routing based on network
conditions, such as topology, link utilization, bandwidth, and compromise probability. The model
efectively redistributes trafic away from high-compromise links, achieving a balanced load on secure
links.</p>
        <p>Comparative analysis of TE routing models revealed that, while the classical TE model optimizes
link utilization and packet delay, it lacks any security provisions, resulting in a higher compromise
probability. In contrast, the SecTE and NormSecTE models, particularly the latter, ofer a balanced
solution by integrating both security and quality of service requirements. Specifically, the NormSecTE
model enhances network security by redistributing trafic to less vulnerable links, with a minor trade-of
in packet delay. These findings underscore the importance of adopting security-aware routing strategies
that protect network integrity without significantly impacting performance.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>6. Conclusions</title>
      <p>This research presents the NormSecTE model as a significant advancement in secure Trafic Engineering,
integrating both QoS and security metrics within a single framework to enhance routing in softwarized
networks. The model’s linear programming formulation supports eficient computational processing,
ensuring low resource demands while efectively prioritizing security in routing decisions. Comparative
results highlight the limitations of conventional TE models, which, although optimized for performance
metrics like delay and utilization, neglect critical security considerations. In contrast, the NormSecTE
model reduces the probability of packet compromise through load balancing and trafic redistribution
toward more secure links.</p>
      <p>The study validates the NormSecTE model’s efectiveness in balancing network performance and
security and emphasizes the need for further research to expand its capabilities. Future work should
incorporate a broader range of link-blocking models and explore diverse network topologies and
compromise scenarios. These developments will strengthen the model’s ability to address complex
routing demands in softwarized networks, supporting a robust and secure infrastructure that balances
QoS with enhanced security.</p>
      <p>NormSecTE model ofers valuable insights for the broader cybersecurity ecosystem. In case when
security metrics are included in routing decisions, compromise prevention becomes an integral part of
the logic behind routing, rather than an additional task requiring a separate solution. This approach
can serve as the basis for designing cyber-resilient infrastructures with proactive cybersecurity logic.
In this way, the NormSecTE model supports the development of secure-by-design networks, which are
crucial to the growth and development of a robust cybersecurity ecosystem.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>This paper was published due to work on the Erasmus+ Project Jean Monnet module “Integrating
the future-proof EU cybersecurity ecosystem in Ukraine” Project No.: 101177024 –
ERASMUS-JMO2024-HEI-TCH-RSCH. Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however
those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European
Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). Neither the European Union nor EACEA can be
held responsible for them.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>Declaration on Generative AI</title>
      <p>The authors have not employed any Generative AI tools.</p>
    </sec>
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