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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Controlling the Quality of Synthetic Medical Images Created via GANs</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Farhaan Areeb</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Divyansh Vashist</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Lekshmi Kalinathan</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>School of Computer Science and Engineering, Vellore Institute of Technology</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Chennai Campus</addr-line>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>The detection of training data usage in generative models is critical for preserving privacy in synthetic medical imaging. This study evaluates a set of baseline and attention-enhanced convolutional architectures to identify whether real medical images were used to train a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN). Using a Siamese network framework, we evaluated four standard backbones such as ResNet50, EficientNetB2, DenseNet161, and Vision Transformer (ViT), along with enhanced variants that incorporate cross-attention modules. Our approach leverages an adaptive similarity metric that combines absolute diference and dot product signals to improve sensitivity to subtle "fingerprints" left by GANs. Experiments on a lung CT dataset demonstrate that cross-attention significantly improves detection performance, with ResNet50 + Cross-Attention achieving the best balance between accuracy and generalizability. These results highlight the potential of attention-guided deep networks in the forensic analysis of synthetic medical imagery and contribute to the broader efort to ensure the ethical deployment of AI in healthcare.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;Synthetic Medical Imaging</kwd>
        <kwd>Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)</kwd>
        <kwd>Siamese Network</kwd>
        <kwd>Cross-Attention</kwd>
        <kwd>Training Data Detection</kwd>
        <kwd>Forensic Deep Learning</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>Our team, SCOPE VIT Visioneers, participated in the ImageCLEFmedical 2025 Challenge, focusing on
Subtask 1: "Detect Training Data Usage." This task aims to determine whether a specific real medical
image was used to train a GAN that generated synthetic images. The challenge addresses growing
concerns around data privacy and the traceability of training data in medical AI. Our work explores
methods to detect such traces by analyzing the relationship between real and generated images.</p>
      <p>Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) have emerged as a powerful class of deep learning models
capable of synthesizing highly realistic images. Their architecture, consisting of a generator that
creates images and a discriminator that evaluates them, has enabled significant progress in generating
synthetic content across various domains. In healthcare, GANs are particularly valuable for generating
synthetic medical images to augment datasets, reduce annotation costs, and support privacy-preserving
data sharing. These capabilities make GANs an attractive tool for training diagnostic models without
exposing sensitive patient data. However, as synthetic images become increasingly photorealistic,
concerns have grown about their misuse and the potential leakage of real training data into generated
outputs.Detecting whether real medical images were used during the training of a GAN is a complex
but crucial task. Modern GANs can embed subtle artifacts or statistical patterns, often referred to as
’fingerprints’, that link synthetic outputs to their training data. These fingerprints may not be visible to
the human eye, but can be identified through machine learning techniques that analyze image textures,
frequency patterns, or deep feature representations. This challenge becomes even more critical in the
medical domain, where synthetic images must maintain clinical validity while ensuring that patient
identities and attributes are not inadvertently exposed. Thus, robust forensic tools are necessary to
audit synthetic datasets and guarantee the ethical use of AI-generated medical content.</p>
      <p>To address this problem, we propose a framework based on a Siamese Neural Network (SNN) to
detect training data fingerprints in synthetic medical images. It consists of twin subnetworks with
shared weights that independently process a pair of images (one real and one synthetic) and extract
high-dimensional feature representations. These subnetworks utilize convolutional backbones, such
as ResNet50 or DenseNet161, without their final classification layers. To enhance sensitivity to subtle
generative artifacts, the model incorporates a cross-attention mechanism that dynamically aligns
features of real and synthetic images by computing context-aware interactions. The attended feature
representations are passed to an adaptive similarity module that combines absolute diferences and
dot products to capture both dissimilarity and correlation. These signals are then processed through a
multilayer perceptron to produce a similarity score indicating the likelihood that a real image was used
during GAN training. This modular and interpretable design ensures the robustness and adaptability of
the framework, even in medical imaging scenarios with limited data.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Background Study</title>
      <p>
        The rapid evolution of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) has led to substantial research on
synthetic image generation and forensic detection. Marra et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] first highlighted the presence of
unique GAN ’fingerprints’, similar to PRNU patterns in camera images. This foundational idea was
expanded by Yu et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ], who demonstrated fine-grained attribution of synthetic images to specific GAN
models, revealing the forensic potential of deep-generative models. Liu et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ] further contributed
by analyzing frequency domain noise for real-versus-synthetic image detection, while Yang et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]
developed GFD-Net to disentangle content-independent GAN fingerprints across diverse datasets.
      </p>
      <p>
        To accommodate the rapidly evolving landscape of generative models, Marra et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ] proposed an
incremental learning strategy that maintains detection performance in old and new GANs. Meanwhile,
eforts to secure synthetic medical images led to innovative detection pipelines. Asakawa et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]
employed multistage transfer learning across domains, and Ghazi et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ] used texture analysis to
reveal whether GAN-generated medical images leak training data characteristics. Subburam et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]
incorporated CNN and image hashing techniques to detect synthetic medical content.
      </p>
      <p>
        Few-shot and hybrid learning methods have shown promise in detection with limited real data.
Bharathi et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ] used relational networks and clustering to distinguish real biomedical images
from GAN-generated images, while Andrei et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ] provided a comprehensive review of detection
methodologies from ImageCLEFmedical GANs 2023 task. Chai et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ] analyzed properties that
consistently make fake images detectable, and Jeong et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ] introduced FingerprintNet - a model
that leverages frequency-based signatures to detect images from previously unseen GANs.
      </p>
      <p>
        Beyond detection, research has critically evaluated the representational fidelity and utility of GANs
in medical contexts. DuMont Schütte et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ] examined synthetic data as a privacy-preserving
alternative to patient data, providing benchmarks for quality assessment. Kelkar et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ] questioned
the ability of GANs to capture canonical medical image statistics, while Skandarani et al. [15] conducted
empirical evaluations across imaging modalities, revealing challenges in generating clinically viable
synthetic images. Collectively, these studies highlight the importance of balancing innovation in image
generation with robust forensic safeguards.
      </p>
      <p>Recent developments in benchmarking synthetic image detection have been strongly guided by the
ImageCLEFmedical challenges. The 2025 edition of the ImageCLEFmedical GANs task [16] has extended
its focus toward evaluating how well detection methods generalize to unseen generative models and
whether training data can be reverse-identified from generated outputs. The broader ImageCLEF 2025
overview paper [17] outlines the scope of the medical challenges, emphasizing reproducibility,
crossdomain learning, and the ethical implications of synthetic medical imaging. These benchmarks have
provided a structured environment for comparative evaluations and for tracking progress in forensic
detection methods under real-world constraints.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Methodology</title>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>3.1. Dataset Description And Pre-Processing</title>
        <p>The dataset comprises axial CT scan slices (256×256 pixels) of patients with lung tuberculosis, split into
real and synthetic categories. Real images are grouped into two classes: 100 ’real used’ images involved
in the GAN training and 100 ’real not used’ images excluded from it. The synthetic portion includes
5,000 training images and 2,000 testing images(as represented in Figure 1), generated using a consistent
GAN architecture that mimics the visual features of real CT scans while preserving patient anonymity.
This class imbalance of real images being vastly outnumbered by synthetic ones necessitated strategic
sampling to ensure fair model training.</p>
        <p>An 80-20 data split was applied to both real and synthetic samples. Real images contributed 80
samples per class to training and 20 to testing; Synthetic images were split into 4,000 training images
and 1,000 test images. To avoid distortion of subtle generative ’fingerprints’, no data-augmentation
techniques (e.g., flipping, rotation, noise) were applied. All images were resized to 224 ×224 pixels
and normalized using ImageNet statistics (mean = [0.485, 0.456, 0.406], std = [0.229, 0.224, 0.225]) for
compatibility with pretrained deep learning models. During training, a weighted random sampling
strategy was used, assigning sampling weights inversely proportional to class frequencies to ensure
balanced exposure to both ’used’ and ’not used’ images. The preprocessing pipeline, which includes
resizing, normalization, and class-aware sampling, is visually summarized in Figure 2.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>3.2. Proposed Methodology</title>
        <p>The proposed framework employs a Siamese Neural Network (SNN) to detect training data fingerprints
in synthetic medical images. It consists of twin subnetworks with shared weights that independently
process a pair of images; one real and one synthetic, and extract high-dimensional feature representations.
These subnetworks utilize convolutional backbones, such as ResNet50 or DenseNet161, without their
ifnal classification layers. The extracted feature vectors (2048-D) encode spatial and semantic patterns
critical for distinguishing real-used samples from real-not-used ones.</p>
        <p>To enhance sensitivity to subtle generative artifacts, the model incorporates a cross-attention
mechanism that dynamically aligns features of real and synthetic images. This is achieved through attention
blocks that compute context-aware interactions between the paired feature maps, highlighting regions
where potential fingerprints are most likely to persist. The attended feature representations are then
passed to an adaptive similarity module that captures both dissimilarity (via absolute diference) and
similarity (via dot product) between the inputs. These signals are concatenated and processed through
a multilayer perceptron (MLP) to yield a similarity score between 0 and 1, indicating the likelihood that
a real image was used during GAN training. The architecture’s modular design ensures interpretability
and facilitates robust generalization across diverse image types, even in low-data settings. A visual
overview of the architecture is presented in Figure 3.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Results</title>
      <p>To evaluate fingerprint detection in synthetic medical imagery, we implemented four baseline Siamese
network architectures: ResNet50, Eficient NetB2, DenseNet-161, and Vision Transformer (ViT). Among
these, ResNet50 demonstrated strong performance, achieving high recall and accuracy, likely due to its
deep residual connections that efectively capture spatial hierarchies in grayscale CT images. However,
its relatively low precision indicated a tendency to generate false positives. EficientNetB2, despite its
success in color-based medical image analysis, underperformed on grayscale input, likely a result of its
compound scaling not aligning well with domain-specific features. DenseNet161 achieved very high
precision but sufered from poor recall, signaling overfitting, and limited generalization. ViT ofered
promising precision and F1 scores, demonstrating its capacity to suppress false positives; however, its
reliance on larger data volumes and its sensitivity to class imbalance negatively afected its overall
precision.</p>
      <p>To address the limitations of the baseline models, we introduced cross-attention blocks into selected
CNN backbones. This mechanism facilitated feature alignment between real and synthetic image pairs,
enhancing the network’s ability to detect subtle training data traces. In particular, ResNet50 with
cross-attention achieved the most balanced and robust performance among all evaluated models, with
an F1 score of 0.5902 and a precision of 0.9000. It improved both precision and generalization, making it
the most efective architecture for fingerprint detection in this study. DenseNet161 with cross-attention
demonstrated greater recall, but sufered from reduced precision, reafirming its tendency to overfit
despite improved attention alignment.The corresponding results have been summarized in Figure 4.</p>
      <p>The improvements introduced by cross-attention were further supported by ablation insights. The
cross-attention module proved critical in dynamically focusing the model’s attention on discriminative
regions likely to carry generative fingerprints. In parallel, the adaptive similarity metric, which is
based on the combination of absolute diference and dot product, enabled the model to assess both
semantic alignment and divergence between paired features. Together, these components consistently
outperformed their baseline counterparts, highlighting the value of contextual attention and informed
similarity scoring for forensic analysis of synthetic medical images.</p>
      <p>In addition to the model evaluations presented above, our final submission to the ImageCLEFmedical
2025 challenge, registered under submission ID #1160, achieved the following performance metrics:
Kappa score of -0.032, accuracy of 48.4%, precision of 48.3%, recall of 45.6%, and an F1-score of 46.9%.
These results reflect the real-world performance of our framework in detecting training data usage in
synthetic medical images and underscore the practical challenges in achieving high generalizability
across diverse generative models.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>5. Conclusion And Future Work</title>
      <p>This study presented a robust Siamese network-based framework to detect the usage of training
data in synthetic medical images generated by GANs. By evaluating multiple convolutional and
transformer-based backbones and enhancing select architectures with cross-attention mechanisms
and an adaptive similarity metric, the model demonstrated strong performance in identifying subtle
generative fingerprints. Among the configurations tested, the Siamese network with a ResNet50
backbone augmented by cross-attention achieved the best balance of accuracy and generalization,
underscoring the efectiveness of learning pairwise relationships between real and synthetic images in
a shared embedding space.</p>
      <p>To support reproducibility and further exploration, the implementation notebooks used in this study
have been made publicly available at Github [18]</p>
      <p>The results highlight the potential of attention-guided Siamese architectures for forensic analysis in
synthetic medical imaging, ofering a scalable and interpretable approach to ensuring data integrity and
privacy. Future research could explore the extension of this framework to 3D medical volumes such as
MRI and full-body CT by adapting the Siamese structure to volumetric data. Further robustness can be
achieved through adversarial training against evolving generative techniques. In addition, integrating
explainability modules, such as attention heat maps, could enhance transparency in clinical settings.
Finally, deploying this system in a federated learning setup and optimizing for real-time performance on
edge devices would broaden its applicability across diverse healthcare environments while preserving
data privacy.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>The authors would like to express their sincere gratitude to Vellore Institute of Technology (VIT),
Chennai, for their continuous support and encouragement in carrying out this research work.
Although the computational experiments reported in this paper were executed on local resources (Lenovo
Thinkstation P348 with Intel Core i7-11700 @ 2.5 GHz, 64 GB RAM, 2 TB storage, and a 12 GB NVIDIA
GPU), the institutional support provided by VIT was instrumental in the successful completion of this
study.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Declaration on Generative AI</title>
      <p>During the preparation of this work, the author(s) used GAN-based methods to generate synthetic
medical images as part of the research methodology, as described in the paper. The author(s) did not use
any Generative AI tools for writing, editing, or creating figures beyond this methodological purpose. All
textual content was written and verified by the authors, who take full responsibility for the publication’s
content.
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