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      <title-group>
        <article-title>Hypothesis Management Framework: a exible design pattern for belief networks in decision support systems</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Sicco Pier van Gosliga</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Imelda van de Voorde TNO Defence</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Security</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Safety The Hague</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>The Netherlands</string-name>
        </contrib>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>This article discusses a design pattern for building belief networks for application domains in which causal models are hard to construct. In this approach we pursue a modular belief network structure that is easily extended by the users themselves, while remaining reliable for decision support. The Hypothesis Management Framework proposed here is a pragmatic attempt to enable analysts and domain experts to construct and maintain a belief network that can be used to support decision making, without requiring advanced knowledge engineering skills.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
      <p>
        Since their introduction by Kim and Pearl [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ] belief
networks have become a popular framework for
decision support and automated reasoning. Also at TNO,
the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scienti c
Research, Bayesian reasoning is used in an increasing
number of projects and application domains. One of
these application domains is decision support for
criminal investigations. The typical application in this eld
is to perform a quick scan on available evidence to
select the most likely hypothesis, and to prioritize
unavailable evidence to aid further investigations. The
need for sound probabilistic reasoning is quite large
in this area, and belief networks are becoming an
accepted tool for modeling reasoning.
      </p>
      <p>
        Well-known examples of belief networks such as the
Alarm [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ] and Hail nder [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] networks are quite
complex and their development requires the co-operation
between both Bayesian specialists and domain
experts. Also, currently available software packages
(e.g. HUGIN, Netica and GeNie)1 for modeling and
analysing belief networks require expertise and skill in
belief networks. Whereas in the eld of criminal
investigations, the typical user of such decision support
software is usually not a Bayesian specialist but either
an analyst or an expert on the area being analyzed,
a so-called domain expert. To get belief networks
accepted as a standard tool in criminal investigations,
we should improve the usability to such a degree that
a domain expert is able to produce useful models
without the assistance of a Bayesian specialist. Obviously,
analysts should nd it bene cial for performing their
analyses as well.
      </p>
      <p>Besides o ering criminal investigators a method to use
belief networks, also some e ort should be focused on
preventing bias arising in analyses. Where much
attention goes into getting unbiased and accurate prior
probabilities, in this paper we are more concerned with
any bias within the topology; the choice of variables
included in the model. When an analyst looks for
support for a certain hypothesis, it is easy to get into a
so-called tunnel view in which contradicting evidence
and alternate hypotheses are neglected. When a
plausible alternative perspective is missing in the model,
a potential bias is present yet invisible. It seems
impossible to always exclude such a bias, but applying
certain strategies in the design of a belief network may
lead to more balanced and less biased models. Among
others, the following strategies might be considered.
Firstly, di erent domain experts can add an
alternative point of view to the same model. Secondly, each
domain expert can work independently on a di erent
hypothesis or counter-hypothesis. And nally, domain
experts can design reusable templates that are not
tailored for a speci c case, but for generic classes of cases.
Whatever combination of strategies may work best to
avoid a bias, the case for a exible and modular way
1The software packages HUGIN Expert, Netica and
GeNie are respectively found at: http://www.hugin.
com, http://www.norsys.com/netica.html and http://
genie.sis.pitt.edu/
to design belief networks to aid better decision making
should be apparent.</p>
      <p>
        To maximize its applicability in real world applications
the following two requirements should be met:
Various systematic techniques are available to guide
the modeling of a belief network in a systematic
manner. Many of these generate a belief network by
translation of another type of model, e.g. ontologies [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">19</xref>
        ],
rule-based systems [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ], causal maps [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ], or by
merging quantitative and qualitative statements in a
canonical form [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ]. However, all these techniques rely on a
sound understanding of the application domain to
establish the qualitative aspect of a belief network: the
topology of the graph. When a domain is modeled
that is dynamic in nature and of which causality is
not fully known, the technique used to construct a
belief network must above all be modular and easily
extendible as new insights constantly change the
perspective of what variables matter to the hypotheses of
interest.
      </p>
      <p>This led to the development of the hypothesis
management framework (HMF) at TNO. This design pattern
enables a domain expert to independently create and
maintain a belief network, and an analyst to
evaluate evidence in a criminal investigation. The HMF
is a modular belief network structure that is easily
expandable by the users themselves, while remaining
reliable for decision support. The HMF adds a layer
of abstraction to the belief network, so the belief
network can be kept hidden from the user. Multiple users
can independently modify or extend the model based
on his or her domain knowledge. The HMF ensures
that all parts of the model remain a coherent whole,
suitable for consistent reasoning.
2</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>THE PURPOSE OF HMF</title>
      <p>
        While devising the HMF design pattern we had one
particular goal in mind: to enable the design of
modular and extendible Bayesian models for users that are
no Bayesian specialist. Once a rst version of a model
has been developed, it should be easily extended and
maintained later-on. It is likely that the set of
variables as well as the subjective priors for conditional
probability tables require regular revisions as the eld
of investigation changes over time. Therefore it should
be possible to reconsider the set of variables, without
having to elicit all of the priors on each change of the
model. The need for multiple revisions of a
developing model was addressed by the AI group at the
University of Kentucky in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ]. A design pattern should
preferably be such that it enables the use of templates,
generalized submodels within the belief network, that
can be maintained independently by a group of domain
experts. Such templates should be applicable within
multiple belief networks.
1 Reliability (or consistency) The belief network
should capture the knowledge of domain experts.
Given the same set of evidence, the domain
experts should agree on the same most likely
hypotheses and the results of the model should
intuitively make sense.
2 Usability The number of priors to be elicited
should be kept to a practical minimum. We
prefer to have a limited set of well founded priors,
rather than a larger set of priors of which the
domain expert is less con dent. Conditional
probability tables with a small set of priors are
easier to maintain and validate, especially when the
number of conditioning parent variables is
limited. Furthermore, it should be unambiguous to
domain experts (as well as the analysts) what the
variables and their priors stand for.
      </p>
      <p>These requirements are indeed very common, and
generally accepted as basic requirements in the context of
system development. We think, however, that they are
hard to comply with without the use of a generalized
framework.
3</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>AN OVERVIEW OF HMF</title>
      <p>The HMF places each variable of interest within a
prede ned structure, as visualized in Figure 4(c).
Furthermore it prescribes which variables may be
instantiated with evidence, and for some variables the content
of conditional probability tables. All variables must
be categorized by the user in hypotheses, indicators or
information sources. Each type has its own place and
role within the topology of the belief network:
1 Hypotheses are statements of which we would like
to get a posterior probability distribution. In
general, hypotheses are unobserved. The user can
specify unconditional priors for each hypothesis,
or use a uniform nondiscriminative distribution
instead. As an option, one can add alternative
hypotheses to represent known facts that explain
observed indicators in an other way than existing
hypotheses.
2 Indicators are statements related to hypotheses.</p>
      <p>Knowledge of an indicator helps to reveal the
states of related hypotheses. Indicators describe
events that are dependent on the occurrence of
one or more hypotheses. Causal relations between
hypotheses and indicators are not always obvious,
or present at all. Indicators are assumed to be
`caused' by hypotheses, not the other way around.
For each relation between an indicator and a
hypothesis, a domain expert should specify
conditional probabilities for that speci c relation.
3 Information Sources are used to express the
reliability of sources related to an indicator, when
the user does not want to enter 'hard evidence'.
For instance, an information source may be a
report, a sensor or a person. An indicator can be
associated to multiple information sources.</p>
      <p>
        Although common, it is not necessary for an arc in a
belief network to imply causality. The HMF makes use
of this freedom by taking a more abstract perspective
on the relations between variables of interest. The
structure is based on the relatively simple notion of
hypotheses and indicators. Indicators may all support
or contradict any of the hypotheses, but the indicators
themselves are assumed independent of one another.
Hypotheses are independent (root nodes) and typically
have many children. Quite similar, so-called 'naive
Bayes' structures [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ], have been e ective in other areas
where causality is unknown or too dynamic in nature
(e.g. e-mail spam ltering [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ]).
      </p>
      <p>
        If more structure is desired, this modeling style may
be applied in a recursive fashion in which a
hypothesis may have sub-hypotheses, who are modeled in an
similar way. This is not demonstrated in this article.
It is good practice to use a causal model whenever
possible [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ], and it should be stressed that HMF does
not aim to substitute such models. The HMF design
pattern is speci cally designed for domains in which
causal dependencies are debated or not fully known.
As pointed out by Biedermann and Taroni [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ], in
forensic science the availability of hard numerical data is
not a necessary requirement for quantifying belief
networks and Bayesian inference could therefore be used
nonetheless. By using HMF, a Bayesian model can
be constructed even when the qualitative aspects of a
belief network are hard to obtain.
There are various options to elicit priors for such large
CPTs. One could apply linear interpolation over a
subset of elicited priors [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">20</xref>
        ], but this requires more
elicited priors and is less exible than the solution
found for HMF. Rather than connecting indicators
directly to hypotheses, the HMF uses intermediate
variables. In this article all variables are booleans. This
is not a strict requirement, but a general
recommendation when it simpli es the elicitation of prior
probabilities. Elicited priors will be stored in the
intermediate variable between the indicator and the
hypothesis. This reduces the number of prior probabilities
to elicit, and conditions to consider for each prior. In
fact, the HMF splits up each indicator in multiple
variables (Figure 1): one or more intermediate variables
(ih1; ih2) and a variable that combines them (i0). For
three hypotheses i would require 16 priors, instead of
12 priors for the three intermediate variables together.
When evidence is available for an indicator, we
instantiate all associated intermediate variables.
Alternatively, one can use information sources. An
information source for an indicator (s in Figure 1) may
exist as multiple variables with identical priors in the
HMF belief network (sh1; sh2). The priors of an
information source variable represent the reliability of
the source in regard the associated indicator.
Information source variables are children of intermediate
variables, and have only one parent and no children.
Either all information sources of an indicator are
instantiated for evidence, or all associated information
source variables. Instantiating intermediate variables
of an indicator d-separates information sources from
hypotheses, rendering all information sources for that
indicator obsolete.
      </p>
      <p>
        When there is no evidence for an indicator, the
combining indicator variable (i0) will resemble the
posterior probability of the original indicator (i) by taking
the average probability of all intermediate variables.
This information is useful to predict the likelihood of
unobserved indicators or for selecting the most in
uential unobserved indicator. Equation 1 is used to
construct the conditional probability table of the
combining indicator variable. Note, that the HMF does not
use a logical function (e.g. OR/MAX, AND/MIN or
XOR). Logical functions that assume independence of
causal in uence, in a discrete or noisy variant, have
been long in use [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ] as a solution for variables with
many parents. An extensive overview of such methods
are described by Diez and Drudzel in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]. Although
many alternatives may be considered, our preference
goes to an averaging method to avoid scalability
problems. The scalability problem will be further discussed
in Section 5, while the results of using the averaging
method in Equation 1 are discussed in Section 6.
P (Xjparents(X)) = 1:0
maxV alueOf (parents(X))
valueOf (parents(X))
(1)
This article focuses on how HMF can aid the
construction of belief networks. It does not elaborate on how
a software tool might facilitate this process.
Nonetheless, we would like to discuss brie y how we envision
such a tool and how the HMF might be presented to
the user. We di erentiate two types of roles for users:
domain experts and analysts. A user may have both
roles in practice. By using the HMF, the GUI can
effectively hide the underlying belief network from the
user. Both types of users need a di erent user
interface.
      </p>
      <p>
        An analyst processes information sources and selects
evidence for indicators to support or contradict
hypotheses. For analysts the GUI (Figure 2) shows
indicators in a foldable tree-like structure. The indicators
are organized in categories and sub-categories. For
each indicator the analyst can choose a state (e.g. true
or false) based on observed evidence. If the analyst is
uncertain about an observation, the analyst is given
the ability the express the reliability of each
information source for that speci c indicator. This requires
a prior probability for both positive observations and
false positives, given that the indicator is a boolean.
Domain experts evaluate the conditional probabilities
of an indicator given an hypothesis, and choose prior
probabilities for hypotheses. The GUI should enable a
domain expert to construct and maintain a list of
indicators and hypotheses. A domain expert is
responsible for relating indicators to hypotheses in a sensible
manner, and assign conditional probabilities to each
relation. Figure 3 shows how this may be presented to
the domain expert. There is a column for each
hypothesis. Assuming only booleans are used, the respective
column requires only two elicited priors: one prior for
the likelihood of observing the indicator given the
hypothesis is true, and another for when the hypothesis
is false. Qualitative descriptions or frequencies can be
more e ective than probabilities [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]. Such notations
can be used instead of probabilities, as long these
descriptions are consistently translated into conditional
probability tables.
4
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>HMF WALKTHROUGH BY AN</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>EXAMPLE</title>
      <p>
        To explain how the HMF may be used and why we
have chosen this speci c topology, we will now
discuss three di erent models based on a civil case
concerning a car accident. The rst is a logical causal
model by Prakken and Renooij [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
        ]. The second
is a Bayesian belief network by Huygen [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ], directly
based on Prakken's logical model. Third and nally, a
Bayesian belief network that follows the HMF is
constructed for the same case. 2
The legal case concerns a nightly car accident involving
a driver and a passenger, after a party which both
persons attended. The police that arrived at the scene
after the accident observed that the car crashed just
beyond an S-curve and the handbrake was in a pulled
position. The police did observe tire marks (skid marks
and jaw marks), but did not observe any obstacles.
The driver claims that the passenger was drunk and
pulled the handbrake. The passenger claims that the
driver speeded through the S-curve. The judge had
to decide whether it is plausible that the passenger
caused the accident, rather than the driver.
The logical model about this case by Prakken and
Renooij is aimed at reconstructing the reasoning
behind the court decision on this case. Figure 4(a) shows
the causal structure for the case. Nodes within the
structure visualize causal concepts (propositions), and
arcs represent causal rules between them. Each arc is
annotated to show whether the proposition at the head
supports (+) or contradicts (-) the proposition at the
tail of the arc. By using abductive-logical reasoning
on the structure given evidence for some concepts, one
can determine whether other concepts are plausible.
Although such a model, a causal map, like the one in
Figure 4a may resemble a belief network, it lacks the
quantitative information required for Bayesian
inference. Nadkarni and Shenoy [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ] discussed how a causal
2the belief networks discussed in this article are
available for download at: http://www.science.uva.nl/~spg
(a) A logical causal model by Prakken and Renooij.
(b) The belief network by Huygen.
(c) A variant that uses the HMF design pattern.
map, can be used as a foundation for constructing
belief networks when supplemented with casual values
that express the strength of a causal connection.
There is evidence for the following facts: :obstacles,
tire marks present, observed nature of tire marks after
S-curve, handbrake in pulled position, driver's
testimony and drunk passenger. The hypotheses speeding
in S-curve and loss of control over vehicle explain two
facts but contradicts three others. Whereas the
hypothesis passenger pulled handbrake of moving
vehicle explains three rules and contradicts nothing. This
makes the drivers point of view more convincing.
Huygen used the causal model of Prakken to construct
a belief network for the same case (Figure 4b). The
topology was slightly changed: the node for obstacles
has been removed and the propositions for speeding
and slowing down in S-curve have been replaced by
a single boolean that represents both. Furthermore,
each node is accompanied with a conditional
probability table or prior probability distribution (not visible
in Figure 4(b)). This e ectively replaces the
annotations along arcs in the causal map. Huygen decided
not to use evidence for variables on tire marks,
because in the sentence of the court it was not explicitly
stated that the nature of the tire marks were proof for
not speeding, but gave insu cient support for the
suggestion that the driver had speeded. Huygens suggests
to change the priors, when one would like to use this
evidence.
      </p>
      <p>Given evidence for: pulled position, driver's testimony,
passenger drunk and crash, it is highly likely that the
passenger pulled the handbrake ( 100%). Since the
evidence against the passenger explains away the car
crash, it is unlikely that the crash was caused by lost
control of the vehicle after speeding through the
Scurve (0:1%). The bayesian belief network comes to
the same conclusion as the causal map of Prakken and
Renooij.</p>
      <p>When we model the same case using the HMF, we get
a radically di erent topology (Figure 4(c)) that does
not resemble the causal map of Prakken and the belief
network of Huygen. Both claims are modeled as
hypotheses in the HMF model: accident caused by
speeding and passenger pulled handbrake of moving vehicle.
These hypotheses correspond to similarly named
predicates in Figure 4a and probability variables in Figure
4b. Uniform probability distributions were used as
priors for these hypotheses. We use indicators to support
our beliefs in the hypotheses, these are: driver's
testimony directly after incident, handbrake in pulled
position after incident, passenger had drunk alcohol,
observed yawmarks of sliding vehicle and observed
skidmarks beyond the curve.</p>
      <p>By choosing di erent priors, the evidence for tire
marks is now usable. Some intermediate variables that
relate facts with the two hypotheses are no longer in
use. These are locking of wheels and loss of control
over vehicle. The information source of passenger had
drunk alcohol is undisclosed. Suppose the source was
a guest at the party, than the reliability of this
testimony is represented by an information source variable
(Figure 4(c)).</p>
      <p>Given the available evidence, we get a high likelihood
for the passenger pulling the handbrake of the
moving vehicle ( 100%). The propability for speeding is
much lower ( 27%), and therefore far less convincing.
All three approaches can adequately model the case
and derive equally sensible conclusions.
Abductivelogical reasoning over a causal map explains the
logical correctness and contradictions of propositions. The
advantage of a Bayesian approach is that by
quantifying in uence, it is able to give insight in what
hypothesis is most credible as well as the relevance of
evidence. The models of Prakken, Renooij and
Huygen are based on a causal map. Although HMF follows
a di erent approach to the construction of belief
networks, and therefore uses a rather di erent topology,
it does derive the same conclusions.
5</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>ISSUES REGARDING</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>EXTENDIBILITY</title>
      <p>Extendibility as well as modularity are important
requirements. The models by Prakken and Huygen are
'static' models in the sense that they were designed to
model one single case with a xed set of evidence and
hypotheses. This is feasible when consensus has been
developed on all aspects of the case. However,
supporting decision making at an earlier stage requires a
high level of exibility. The HMF was developed to
facilitate decision making when the set of evidence (or
indicators) and hypotheses is still evolving and a
constant topic of discussion. Models designed with the
HMF are exible, meaning that a model is
decomposable into independent modules. So that each module
can be maintained or extended by a di erent domain
expert. This section will discuss issues that concern
the extendibility of models developed with the HMF.
These issues will be illustrated by extending the
existing models from the previous section.</p>
      <p>We have pursued extendibility by modular
independence of the elicited priors. When an indicator is
added to the model, the only priors to elicit are those
for the intermediate nodes of that speci c indicator.
Priors that were elicited before do not have to be
reconsidered. The same holds for adding
hypotheses. We will illustrate this by considering an
additional hypothesis for the car accident case. Suppose
the driver pulled the handbrake of the moving
vehicle. If the driver was under in uence of alcohol, that
would have also in uenced the driving behavior and
therefore the likelihood of speeding as well as the
possibility of pulling the handbrake of the moving vehicle.
In all three models we would have to add and update
existing prior knowledge.</p>
      <p>To add the alternative hypothesis to the logical model
of Prakken and Renooij a proposition is needed for the
new hypothesis, and another to represent the
possibility that the driver was under the in uence of alcohol.
These additional causal relations are highlighted in red
in Figure 4(a). Together, these additions extend the
existing set of 12 rules with 6 more.
When we add similar variables and relations to the
belief network of Huygen, we need to specify new
conditional probability tables for locking of wheels,
handbrake in pulled position and driver's testimony.
Furthermore, we would have to replace the prior
probability distributions of speeding through S-curve with a
new conditional probability table. These changes
comprise the elicitation of 34 new priors that substitute 14
previously elicited priors.</p>
      <p>To add to the HMF model the hypothesis driver pulled
the handbrake of the moving vehicle, requires a new
column in the model in Figure 4. The possibility of the
driver being under the in uence of alcohol is modeled
as an indicator, which adds a new row to the model.
Table I shows how many elicited priors are required
for extending the models. The extensions of the HMF
model comprise only 22 elicited priors, all 36 existing
priors remain unchanged. This makes HMF
considerably cheaper to extend than the belief network of
Huygen. The original causal model of Prakken is even
simpler to extend. That model, however, lacks
quantitative support for probabilistic inference.</p>
      <p>As the car accident case shows, the HMF is tolerant to
extensions. Figure 5 shows the general e ect of adding
hypotheses and indicators to a model by outlining the
maximum number of elicited priors. While the
total number of parameters grows exponentially when
more hypotheses are added, the amount of elicited
priors grows in a linear fashion. The gure assumes
the worst case in which each indicator is associated to
all hypotheses. Although the model assumes boolean
variables and two priors for each intermediate variable
would su ce, it is assumed that all priors for
intermediate variables are elicited as well as a prior
probability distribution for each hypothesis. Note that we
have excluded all other parameters that require
elicitation such as variable names and state de nitions. As
a reference Figure 5 includes the number of priors of
Hail nder (3741), Alarm (752), the original belief
network of Huygen (44) and the HMF model from Section
4 (36). The extensions proposed in this Section were
excluded from the HMF model.</p>
      <p>As mentioned in Section 3 indicators are modeled
by intermediate variables and one combining variable.
The more hypotheses are associated to an indicator,
the more probabilities of intermediate variables will
have to be combined. On each extension the
combining variable gets an extra parent, and as a consequence
its conditional probability table (CPT) doubles in size.
In the HMF an averaging function has been chosen as
the preferred option for these CPTs. By default, the
CPT of a combining variable e ectively takes the
average posterior distribution of all intermediate variables
(Equation 1).</p>
      <p>
        Arguably, one might nd a logical OR-function [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]
more intuitive. However, we have chosen not to use an
OR or AND function for these CPTs since a
methodical bias may arise in the model if it is extended. A
practical drawback of using OR-tables in this situation
arises when more than (approximately) ve alternative
hypotheses are connected to an indicator. By adding
more parents to a deterministic OR-table the
probability for the child variable quickly converges to unity,
or alternatively a pre-de ned upper bound. This is
shown in Figure 6(a). It is likely that this will lead
to unintentional overestimation of the occurrence of
unobserved indicators. This can be illustrated by
extending the belief network of Huygen, where the
variable locking of wheels is modeled as an OR-table with
an upper bound of 0:80. Suppose the case would be
extended to include one or two additional drunk
backseat passengers who may have pulled the handbrake
of the moving vehicle. The extra backseat passengers
are modeled in the same way as the passenger in front,
using the original priors P (lockingjpulled) = 80% and
P (lockingj:pulled) = 0% (where pulled is true when
any of the persons in the vehicle pulled the handbrake).
Given that the driver is sober and all passengers are
drunk, the probability of locking the wheels increases
rapidly (one drunk passenger: 2.4%, two drunk
passengers: 4.7%, three drunk passengers: 7.0%). Even
when we have not instantiated any other variables
(e.g. crash or driver's testimony ). After these
extensions, one might like to reconsider the original priors of
P (pulljdrunk) to prevent overestimating the
probability of locked wheels. This potential problem is avoided
when the method in Equation 1 is used.
      </p>
      <p>
        Another potential problem that is associated with
ORtables is the asymmetric in uence of an indicator:
positive observations have less impact than a negative
observation. This is shown in Figure 6(b)). Where
observed indicators will only have marginal impact
on hypotheses when observed true, the impact on
intermediate variables of an indicator observed as false
is deterministic and therefore usually stronger. It is
likely that the user will be unaware of these e ects.
This makes the model relatively vulnerable to errors
in the priors. Therefore, we advice to use Equation 1
as the default method. Other methods for
constructing CPTs of combining variables may hinder extending
(a) The likelihood of an indicator.
(b) The impact of evidence for an indicator.
To evaluate the outcomes of HMF belief networks we
have translated the Asia belief network, as introduced
by Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ], into the HMF
format.
      </p>
      <p>We will use abbreviations that correspond to the rst
character of each variable. The original model is shown
in Figure 7 (left), the HMF version of Asia is shown on
the right. In the HMF model of Asia we distinguish
hypotheses: fb; l; tg, indicators: fs; v; x; dg and
intermediate nodes: fsb; sl; vt; xb; xl; xt; db; dl; dtg. The
variable T bOrCa is missing from the HMF model, which
in the original belief network combines the
probabilities of tuberculosis and lung cancer with a logical OR
function has become obsolete.</p>
      <p>In the HMF model of Asia, the prior information for
the indicators is speci ed separately for each
associated hypothesis. This assumes that the in uence of
e.g. lung cancer on dyspnea is una ected by
bronchitis. The following probabilities will have to be
elicited from a domain expert, when using HMF on
Asia. Unconditional priors for each hypothesis: P (b),
P (l), P (t) and conditional priors for all
intermediate nodes: P (sbjb), P (sljl), P (vtjt), P (xbjb), P (xljl),
P (xtjt), P (dbjb), P (dljl), P (dtjt).</p>
      <p>
        The Asia model uses only boolean variables and
therefore only one probability for each hypothesis has to be
elicited and two for each association of an indicator
with a hypothesis. For Asia this gives a total of 21
probabilities. In this case the priors for the
hypotheses and intermediate nodes were derived from the joint
probability table of the original Asia belief network.
We computed the posteriors of the hypotheses for all
possible scenario's of evidence for the indicators. In
each of these scenarios each indicator was either
observed or not. Note that we instantiate the
intermediate nodes for evidence, rather than the combining
variables. As mentioned in Section 3 an indicator is
represented by both intermediate variables and a
combining variable. The conditional probability table of
the combining variable is implemented by Equation
1, whereas the elicited priors are stored in the
intermediate variables. Instantiating only the combining
variable would undervalue those elicited priors.
The results are shown in Table II. For each
indicator and hypothesis, the table shows the average and
maximum absolute di erence in posteriors, as well as
the Jensen-Shannon divergence [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ]. The bottom row
shows the percentage of scenario's in which the
outcomes (i.e. the most likely state) for the variables
were equal. Especially this last criterion is important
for decision making, as the 'real' priors and posteriors
will always be open to debate when a causal model
is hard to obtain. The table shows that while
posterior distributions may vary between both versions, on
average the di erence is relatively small (&lt; 4
percentage points). For almost all scenario's the outcomes
are identical. The few exceptions are caused by the
synergistic e ect between an abnormal X-Ray and the
presence of dyspnea. This synergistic a ect is absent
in the HMF version, and in those situations we get
the relatively large di erences in the posterior
distributions of bronchitis and long cancer.
7
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>CONCLUSIONS</title>
      <p>The current HMF design pattern is extendible and
modular. In our opinion the HMF succeeds in its
purpose. We have con dence that HMF comes as a relief
to those application domains that so far have been
relatively underequipped with practical decision
support tools, due to the lack of 'hard and solid' domain
knowledge that can be used as a basis for probabilistic
models.</p>
      <p>The arrangement of the HMF supports a working
method which deals with tunnel-view in a well
considered manner. The HMF will not explicitly reduce
or prevent bias occurring within the topology of a
model. However, it o ers the possibility to use certain
strategies during the design of a model which lead to
more balanced and thus less biased models. Using such
strategies will enlarge the awareness about tunnel-view
(and bias) and as such may partly prevent it.
Although the requirements of reliability and
usability are not validated by domain experts and analysts,
several issues concerning these requirements have been
discussed in this paper. The Asia example shows that
posteriors via a HMF model can be quite similar to
those derived via a belief network based on causality.
The issues that we have encountered so far in applying
belief networks for criminal investigations have been
addressed in this paper. However, it is a continuous
e ort to further improve the HMF.
8</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>FUTURE RESEARCH</title>
      <p>One of the complementary wishes of the authors
involves a bias measurement combined with automated
commentary that highlights useful missing evidence.
By calculating how discriminative the indicators and
the evidence is to each hypothesis and
counterhypothesis, we can evaluate whether tunnel vision may be
present. It can also be used to investigate the added
value of collecting evidence for unobserved indicators.
One way of getting this information is by simulating
evidence and evaluate the posteriors of all hypotheses.
Since the maximum potential impact of an indicator
may only occur at a certain combination of evidence
for other indicators, the simulation should consider all
possible combinations of evidence for all unobserved
indicators. This may be a costly operation.
Alternatively one may derive the maximum impact directly
from the conditional probability tables of the variables,
and use message passing to investigate the maximum
potential impact of each indicator.</p>
      <p>The naive structure of a HMF belief network may in
some occasions not capture the targeted e ects. In
those cases we would like to extend the HMF model
with constraining variables that model the synergistic
e ect between indicators (or in between hypotheses).
We have not been able to test such mechanisms in
realistic cases so far. Therefore these need further
investigation to test the feasibility of adding constraints, and
whether the implications of such mechanisms violate
the extendibility and modularity.</p>
      <p>The HMF has been applied on several study cases
based on real data by the authors. In the foreseeable
future it is expected that domain experts will work
with this framework. Their experience will be very
useful for validating the usability and reliability of this
method, and for nding ways to further improve it.</p>
    </sec>
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