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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Methods for Representing Bias in Bayesian Networks</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Eric Carlson</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Sean Guarino</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Jonathan Pfautz Charles River Analytics</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Mount Auburn Street Cambridge</string-name>
        </contrib>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2003</year>
      </pub-date>
      <fpage>163</fpage>
      <lpage>168</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>Bias is intrinsic to observation and reasoning in both humans and automated systems. Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) are well suited for representing these biases and for applying bias models to improve reasoning practices, but there are a number of different ways that bias can be represented and integrated into reasoning processes using BBNs. In this paper, we describe a number of methods to model biases using BBNs and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each method.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
      <p>
        Bias is intrinsic to observation and reasoning. Though the
concept carries connotations of human judgment, bias
also applies to automated systems, introduced by the
limitations of their capabilities. Reasoning about
information that includes bias (i.e., processed information,
whether from human of machine) requires reasoning
about the information, itself, and about the biases that
influenced it. Humans do this naturally. In rich
human-tohuman interactions, each person derives an understanding
of the biases involved from shared context and estimates
of the other’s attitudes and beliefs. In other circumstances,
such as shallow person-to-person interactions (e.g.,
reading a restaurant review from an unknown person) or
interactions involving automated processes (e.g., getting
directions from a GPS; incorporating human reports into
an automated decision aide; integrating contributions
from multiple sensor systems in a data fusion system),
biases and their influences need to be made explicit. As
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">Hastie &amp; Dawes (2001)</xref>
        argue, incorporating an explicit
model of biases and their influences into reasoning
processes can lead to more robust and accurate reasoning
in both humans and automated systems.
      </p>
      <p>
        Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) are well suited for
modeling biases in automated processing systems and
decision aides. Many factors contribute to bias,
interacting in a complex manner with each other and with
the overall bias. BBNs represent the type of probabilistic
influences and causal relationships required to capture
this interaction (Pearl &amp; Russell, 2000; Pearl, 2001).
Furthermore, the graphical nature of BBNs further
supports the expression of these relationships by
providing an intuitive method to capture contributing
factors and influences. In addition to providing an
applicable modeling approach for capturing biases, BBNs
are already applied in many fields where consideration of
biases has the potential to make significant contributions
to performance and realism, such as military intelligence
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">(Koelle et al., 2006; Pfautz et al., 2005a; Pfautz et al.,
2005b)</xref>
        , medical diagnostics
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">(Kononenko, 1993;
Parmigiani, 2002; Nikovski, 2000)</xref>
        , and human behavior
modeling
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref4 ref9">(Guarino et al., 2006; Hudlicka &amp; Pfautz, 2002;
Neal Reilly et al., 2007; Pfautz &amp; Lovell, 2008)</xref>
        .
To advance the incorporation of bias models in these
fields and others, in this paper we discuss the role of
biases in the decision making process (which includes, for
our purposes here, observation, reasoning, and decision
selection), several ways bias can be modeled using BBNs,
and the benefits and drawbacks of each of these methods.
2.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>BACKGROUND</title>
      <p>
        The study of biases to date largely focuses on cognitive
biases. Several attempts have been made to categorize
different types of bias and to identify how they affect the
decision-making process. One method for classification is
to look at the source of the bias, for instance, dividing
uncertainty into forms that come from computational
models as opposed to human interpretation (Schunn,
Kirschenbaum, &amp; Trafton, 2003). Another method is to
examine the use of bias and uncertainty in the
decisionmaking process, resulting in categories, which has
resulted in categories such as executional uncertainty,
goal uncertainty, and environmental uncertainty (Yovits
&amp; Abilock, 1974). Another set of classifications
developed by
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">Lipshitz and Strauss (1996)</xref>
        divides forms
of uncertainty into inadequate understanding, lack of
information, and conflicted alternatives. Similar
taxonomies were developed by Schunn et al. (2003) and
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">Klein (1998)</xref>
        . These taxonomies can prove to be useful in
attempts to develop descriptive models of human
reasoning. For example,
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">Lipshitz &amp; Straus (1996)</xref>
        discuss
five strategies for reasoning under uncertainty: 1) reduce
uncertainty by collecting more information; 2) use
assumptions to fill in gaps of knowledge; 3) weigh pros
and cons; 4) forestall; and 5) suppress uncertain
information. While these classifications of uncertainty
and an understanding of biases they introduce to
decisionmaking have been useful in the development of models of
human behavior, they may not generalize to other types of
biases.
3.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>ROLE OF BIAS</title>
      <p>For the purpose of incorporating consideration of bias into
reasoning process, we are concerned with bias in two
separate roles. First, because bias impacts the creation of
the products of observations and reasoning processes, it
must be accounted for in the interpretation of those
products. Limitations, methods, and, in the case of
humans, preferences and cognitive biases introduce a
systematic modification into an observed product. This
modification must be identified and defined to properly
reason based on these products. Elaborating on the earlier
example, consider a negative review of a French
restaurant written by someone who dislikes French food.
Whether he is cognizant of this influence or not, the
product of his observation—the review—incorporates his
pre-existing preference. To reason based on this review,
anyone reading it needs to recognize and correct for the
preferences of the reviewer. Automated systems may not
have personal preferences, but their technical limitations
can introduce similar biases. Consider a sensor that
detects the presence of humans based on heat signatures.
Because readings are based on the contrast between the
person and the ambient temperature, this sensor has a
higher occurrence of false negatives when the temperature
is above body temperature. So, a reading showing no
people present on a 100°F day may be disingenuous
because it is the product of both the reading and the
hidden bias introduced by its technical limitations. As
with the previous example of human bias, the consumer
of this automated report—human or automated system—
must reason about both the contributing bias and the
information, itself, to accurately use the product.
Second, bias impacts the reasoning process applied to
make decisions based on information products. The
consumer introduces its own systematic modification of
the information based both on its own biases and on the
perceived biases incorporated in the product. For
example, the analysis system using reports from the heat
sensor may incorporate the fact that it does not function if
the temperature is over 100°F , and disregard the sensor’s
information products on a particularly hot days. Similarly,
the analysis may favor one sensor type over another for
gathering specific information, regardless of specific
conditions (e.g., an analysis system may trust a radar over
an eye witness due to a bias against non-technical
sources). In this role, bias is not considered solely in the
context of information production (though this may be
considered); these biases consider how the information is
being used and the reasoning processes involved.
These two roles are cyclic, as the results of a reasoning
process can be viewed as its own information product. If
there are known biases in that product, an estimate of
those biases may become an element in a new consumer’s
reasoning processes, alongside other reasoning biases of
the consumer. When the information product being
interpreted pertains to an observable truth (e.g., a sensor
detecting some object), understanding the influence of
bias allows the consumer to determine the accuracy of the
product and to integrate that accuracy information into its
own reasoning processes. When the product pertains to a
subjective belief or assessment (e.g., an opinion about a
restaurant), understanding the contributing biases allows
the consumer to determine how to integrate those biases
with its own biases.</p>
      <p>These two roles comprise use cases for bias models, each
with their own concerns motivating different design
decisions. In the interpretation role, a model of bias can
serve as a mechanism to correct for biases. Here, the
details of the sources of those biases may not necessarily
be important. Rather, it is important to correct for errors
caused by biases. In the reasoning role, a model can be
used to self-regulate against the introduction of additional
biases, as well as to increase the accuracy of the
consumer’s estimation of biases contributing to a product,
which allows information to be incorporated into the
consumers own reasoning at the highest fidelity possible.
Here, the details of the sources of those biases may be
extremely important, as different meta-information and
information may have a direct influence in the reasoning
process.
4.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>THE STRUCTURE OF BIAS</title>
      <p>
        As a concept, bias is closely related to meta-information.
Meta-information is information about information. That
is, information that serves to qualify and give context to
other information. For example, if a sensor reading is
information, the fact “the reading is two weeks old” is
meta-information—information about the report. For a
more extensive discussion of meta-information, see
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">(Guarino et al., 2006)</xref>
        . Whereas meta-information is a
statement of fact (“the report is old”), bias is the effect
meta-information has on observations and reasoning
processes (“because the report is old, its contents are
probably inaccurate”). Thus, information types can be
divided into three levels:
1) the information, itself (e.g., the contents of the report)
2)
      </p>
      <p>meta-information (e.g., information about the report)
3) biases (e.g., the impact information about the
report—the meta-information—has on the
information in the report)
Biases are derived from meta-information by combining
that meta-information with elements of the information.
For example, a two week old sensor reading showing the
location of people in an open setting would not convey
their current location with high confidence, while a two
week old sensor reading showing the location of buildings
would represent their current position with a high degree
of certainty. So, in this example, the bias (“the
information in the reading is wildly inaccurate”) is
derived from a factor of the information (“people move
frequently”) combined with meta-information (“the report
is ten days old”). This same logic holds for subjective
assessments. In the restaurant review example,
•
•
•</p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>Meta-information: The reviewer hates French food</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>Information: The restaurant is French</title>
        <p>Bias: The reviewer was predisposed to hate the
restaurant, regardless of its quality
These definitions of information types and the derivation
of bias are the basis for the structure of our bias models.
5.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>BIAS MODELS</title>
      <p>In this section, we present a number of ways to model
bias, and we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of
each model in light of the roles of bias (see section 3) and
additional concerns about model use and creation. Bias
models vary along two dimensions: the level of detail
expressed about the bias and the level of integration with
the reasoning model to which it is meant to contribute.</p>
      <sec id="sec-5-1">
        <title>5.1 IMPLICIT BIAS MODEL</title>
        <p>The implicit bias model does not contain a representation
of the bias in its structure. Instead bias is expressed in the
relationship between nodes of the existing elements of the
model. Insomuch as it exists anywhere, the bias exists in
each node’s Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs). The
effect this bias exerts on the product of the model—the
observation, decision, behavior, etc.—is a change in the
beliefs of the nodes. The bias, itself, is not explicitly
represented separate from the state information of the
model. For example, see Figure 5-1, an implicit bias
model of our previous heat sensor example.
The sole factor represented as contributing to whether
people are present is the number of people detected by the
sensor. The bias in this model is expressed as uncertainty
in the outcome. For positive readings, the likelihood of
people being present is high. Because there are conditions
that can increase the likelihood of false negatives, though,
a negative reading leads to a lower certainty of people not
being present (see Figure 5-2).</p>
        <p>(a)
(b)
Figure 5-2: (a) left, shows the high belief that people are
present based on a positive reading of the heat-based
sensor; (b), right, shows a less certain belief that people
are not present based on a negative reading of the same
sensor. The bias is reflected in the increased uncertainty
due to the possibilities of false negatives.</p>
        <p>The implicit bias model reflects the simplest case. Though
it does reflect the reality of the situation, this model is
insufficient in most other ways. Because elements that
contribute to the bias (i.e., meta-information) are not
explicitly represented, the bias is reflected in a permanent
change in confidence rather than reflecting specific
conditions (e.g., because the ambient temperature is not
explicitly represented, the confidence cannot change
based on the specific value of that variable). Instead, this
model merely represents that bias is possible in the
reasoning process. This model may be sufficient for
representing bias while interpreting data because the
value of the relevant meta-information may not be
available to the consumer. However, because it does not
explicitly describe the contributing factors and applies the
bias as a consistent change in certainty rather than on a
case-by-case basis, it is ineffective at providing a nuanced
bias model for reasoning.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-2">
        <title>5.2 INTEGRATED BIAS MODEL</title>
        <p>In an integrated model, the factors that contribute to bias
(i.e., meta-information) are explicitly represented as
nodes in the network and are fully integrated into the
model of the observation, reasoning process, behavior,
etc. The bias—the effect of this meta-information—is still
contained in the CPTs. Like the implicit model, there is a
bias in the computational process, but that bias is not
explicitly represented as a node in the BBN. Figure 5-3
expands Figure 5-1 into an integrated model by adding
Ambient Temperature as an input node.</p>
        <p>Figure 5-3: An integrated bias model of the heat sensor
example. Meta-informational factors are represented. Bias
is represented in the CPTs.</p>
        <p>This inclusion of factors that moderate biases allows the
bias model to account for the exact value of relevant
meta-information, allowing the bias to change
dynamically (see Figure 5-4). Furthermore, because each
factor is expressed independently, their combined effect
on the reasoning process can be nuanced.
Figure 5-4: Integrated bias model of the heat sensor
example. In (a), a high ambient temperature increases
uncertainty. In (b), a low ambient temperature decreases
uncertainty. The bias reacts in real-time to conditions,
increasing accuracy of the model.</p>
        <p>In an integrated bias model, factors contributing to bias
are explicitly expressed, so these models are more
accurate, and, therefore, better than implicit models in an
interpretation role. However, as in the implicit model, the
effect of these factors is still captured fully in the CPTs.
For this reason, expansion of the model is difficult, as
additions could require significant modifications to those
CPTs. Therefore, in a reasoning role it is difficult to adapt
parts of an integrated bias model for reuse in a larger
reasoning model.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-3">
        <title>5.3 CONSOLIDATED UNKNOWN BIAS MODEL</title>
        <p>In a consolidated unknown bias model, bias is expressed
as a single node in the network, with connections to each
of the nodes in the network. This single node is a “black
box” meant to represent the amount of bias in the model
with no concern for the cause of the bias (note: this node
could be a placeholder for bias calculated using the
standalone bias model discussed in sections 5.5 and 5.6).
For an example of a consolidated unknown bias model,
see Figure 5-5.</p>
        <p>This model does contain a mechanism to express bias in
every part of the model, but it makes a large assumption
about the distribution of that bias. The effect bias has on
each element is expressed in the CPTs, which means that
the specific effects of the bias strength is individual to
each node, but the strength is shared. This model does
represent the effect of bias on a gross level, so it can be
used somewhat in an interpretation role, albeit with lower
fidelity since all biases are expressed in a single
dimension. The effect of the bias is hidden in the CPTs,
and the factors that contribute to the bias are completely
unstated, so in a reasoning role biases cannot be utilized
by addition elements of a reasoning model.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-4">
        <title>5.4 DISTRIBUTED UNKNOWN BIAS MODEL</title>
        <p>The distributed unknown bias model represents bias as a
number of “black boxes”, each having an effect on one or
more elements of the reasoning model. Again, as black
boxes, the factors contributing to each bias are not
explicit. Bias nodes provide an overall representation of
the biases in the reasoning components to which they are
attached. For an example, see Figure 5-6.</p>
        <p>Figure 5-6: A distributed unknown bias model, where bias
is represented as a number of unknowns, each connected
to elements of the reasoning model.</p>
        <p>Distributed unknown bias models are superior to
consolidated unknown bias models because they express a
more nuanced situation reflecting the susceptibility of
various elements of the model to different biases. The bias
nodes play a similar role to meta-information nodes in an
integrated bias model, but, as black-box bias modules,
they consolidate all factors contributing to a particular
bias into a single node. In an interpretation role, these
models are more useful than implicit bias models because
at least some gauge of the strength of bias active in each
element is present. However, unlike the integrated bias
model, the meta-information factors that affect their
strength are unknown. This reduces the already limited
ability of bias factors in distributed unknown bias models
to be integrated into an external reasoning model. Unlike
the models representing meta-information factors
explicitly, the ability to add factors is not a concern
because they are aggregated together in a single node, so
no CPTs need to be changed. However, without
expressing the composition of the bias, the bias strengths
and relationships are highly subjective.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-5">
        <title>5.5 STANDALONE BIAS MODEL</title>
        <p>A standalone bias model expresses bias in an independent
model separate from the reasoning model. This is distinct
from the integrated model where factors are represented
but are integrated with the reasoning model itself. The
measure of bias resulting from this model can then be
applied to the reasoning model, filling the black-box need
of the consolidated or distributed bias model, or used
alone. Bias is expressed explicitly as a single node. Each
element in a reasoning model where bias is a factor would
require an independent bias model. The mechanism by
which each factor contributes to bias is hidden in the
CPTs. For an example of a standalone bias model, in the
heat-based human detector the meta-information factor
“Ambient Temperature” could be expressed (alongside
any other relevant factors) as explicit nodes. The effect
that each factor has (i.e., that high temperature increases
the uncertainty of negative readings) is still expressed
only in the CPTs. This example is depicted in Figure 5-7.
Figure 5-7: A standalone bias model of detection bias for
a heat-based person detector. The product of this
standalone model could then be applied in a reasoning
model.</p>
        <p>Like the integrated model, because standalone bias
models represent the contribution of each of a set of
factors to a bias explicitly, these models can dynamically
capture bias, providing greater accuracy. Expressing
factors in a separate model allows them to easily be
applied as a factor in a large or frequently changing
model. For this reason, standalone bias models excel in
circumstances where a bias model might be applied
independently at multiple points in a reasoning process.
For example, consider a data fusion application that
receives sporadic inputs from a host of sensors. Rather
than use a single monolithic model that integrates
information from all sensors, standalone bias models
could be used to dynamically assemble a model that
represents only those sensors that are currently active.
Because the majority of the sensors are silent at any given
time, this improves the efficiency of bias application in
such conditions. However, this autonomy has a tradeoff in
that bias is consolidated into a single metric resulting in
the influence of specific pieces of meta-information
having limited nuance in their effect on the reasoning
process. Furthermore, an element or even a network
fragment might be repeated in multiple standalone models
leading to wasteful repetitive computation. Nevertheless,
due to the explicit representation of meta-informational
factors and simple portability, this type of model applies
well in both interpretation and reasoning roles.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-6">
        <title>5.6 FULLY ENUMERATED STANDALONE BIAS</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-7">
        <title>MODEL</title>
        <p>Fully enumerated standalone bias models explicitly
represent both the meta-information that causes the bias
and the element that defines how that meta-information
contributes to bias (as discussed in Section 4). Rather than
a single model for each bias type as with the standalone
bias model, fully enumerated standalone bias model have
a single model for each element of the information that,
when paired with meta-information, could introduce a
bias. These models express all factors contributing to bias
and the bias itself as elements in the network, rather than
being contained in the CPTs. For an example of fully
enumerated standalone bias models, see Figure 5-8.
(a)
(b)</p>
        <p>Similar to the way standalone bias model can be applied
dynamically based on the biases present, fully enumerated
standalone bias models can be applied based on the
definition of the system creating the product. So, a system
using these needs a model for each possible property of
the data sources. It can then apply them based on the
definition of each source. For example, in a fusion system
designed to dynamically calculate bias for any
configuration of sensors, a bias model could be
automatically assembled for each sensor based on the
operating characteristics of that sensor. The heat sensor,
defined as requiring low temperature, would incorporate
biases related to that requirement. Because these networks
determine the bias introduced by each factor separately,
their integration into a reasoning process can be more
nuanced than representations that consolidate bias into a
single measure. This, along with the transparency of
contributing factors, makes them ideal in a reasoning role.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>CONCLUSIONS</title>
      <p>There are numerous ways to represent bias as a BBN,
each of which has its own strengths and weaknesses.
Models of bias provide a mechanism to correct for bias to
increase accuracy and to integrate biased information into
human and automated reasoning processes. The most
advantageous form of model for a particular situation
depends on its intended use.</p>
      <p>By systematically examining the composition of bias, we
have identified factors in its composition. The various
model types we discussed make use of this definition by
incorporating various factors at a range of fidelities,
making specific elements more or less accessible.
Additionally, we have defined two separate roles bias can
play in reasoning processes. These roles form the basis for
use cases, which we have used to evaluate each of the
types of models. Of the models discussed, the more
nuanced the application of bias to elements that
contributed to the production of information, the greater
the benefit in accurately interpreting the product of
reasoning processes without introducing additional biases.
To reason based on those products, those models that
include the greatest level of detail and autonomy for
factors that contribute to bias can be more easily and
accurately integrated into reasoning processes.
7.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>DISCUSSION</title>
      <p>This set of bias representations encapsulates a significant
range of capabilities and tradeoffs. Among the most
prominent difference between these representations is the
degree of specificity about the sources of bias. In certain
applications, like accounting for bias from a technical
sensor, these bias factors can be easily identified and
described. In others, like accounting for bias in human
reasoning, these sources are obscured and can only be
hypothesized through intense effort, and are largely
unverifiable. In light of these impediments, going forward
we need to determine what guidelines could be
established to govern the applicability of different styles.
How can uncertainty about the causes of bias be
mitigated? Is there a way to create representations that
don’t incorporate unspecified sources of bias, but that are
applicable in situations where those sources are vaguely
defined? Or, are there ways to use black box bias
measures without fully sacrificing the attribution that
identifying specific sources provides? Is this attribution of
bias to particular sources necessarily important (e.g., for
accountability, trust)? What conditions of use make
attribution important (e.g., frequent updates, logic
exposed to the user)? The complexity of specificity
results, too, in a gain in precision in the end bias measure.
Can factors contributing to bias be calculated precisely
enough to warrant this precision in the end product?</p>
      <sec id="sec-7-1">
        <title>Acknowledgements</title>
        <p>The authors would like to express their deepest gratitude
to the subject matter experts who contributed to our
understanding of biases. Additionally, we would like to
thank Dr. Greg Zacharias for funding our work on
Bayesian Belief Networks.</p>
        <p>Nikovski, D. (2000). Constructing Bayesian Networks for
Medical Diagnosis From Incomplete and Partially Correct
Statistics. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data
Engineering, 12(4), 509-516.</p>
        <p>Parmigiani, G. (2002). Modeling in Medical Decision
Making: A Bayesian Approach. John Wiley and Sons.
Pearl, J. (2001). Causality: Models, Reasoning, and
Inference. Cambridge Univ Press.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
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